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

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Obituary

Kenneth Jones

Ken Jones played a major role in reinterpreting modern Indian history. Since his graduate work at Berkeley, where he received his doctorate in 1966, Ken was a pioneer in discovering a wide range of documents hitherto either unknown, or unused, and then applied the information carefully extracted from that material to re-examine many of our assumptions about modern Indian religion and cultural traditions. His book on the Arya Samaj, *Arya Dharm* (University of California, 1976) remains the most important work published on the Arya Samaj and the broader milieu that contributed to a new Hindu consciousness. Literally dozens of subsequent books, articles and dissertations have built upon Ken's insights and methodology. He followed the Arya book with two extensive research trips to India where he explored the nature of Hindu orthodoxy and mobilisation in the twentieth century. That research in turn led him to organise a provocative Association of Asian Studies panel on polemical literature and religious controversy, which he fashioned into an edited volume published by the State University of New York (SUNY) in 1992. Growing international recognition of Ken's work paved the way to his monumental work on socio-religious movements in modern India, part of the prestigious New Cambridge of India series. Stretching between the monographs and the New Cambridge syncretic contribution were numerous articles in journals and edited volumes.

Ken's academic passion focused primarily on the Punjab region. Struggling with the mishmash of languages found in nineteenth century Punjab documents, he painfully mastered tracts, newspapers and contemporary accounts one at a time, taking copious notes, filing away cross-references, and then integrating the material. Without Ken the early years of the Research Committee on the Punjab, which he helped establish, would not have been so fruitful in terms of scholarly interchange, exciting conferences and panels, and a sense of camaraderie that helped frame similar regional study groups in North America, Europe and South Asia. He served as a constant mentor for colleagues and younger scholars,

ensuring that high standards of research and writing would be maintained as Punjab studies continued to spread.

Excellence in service and teaching also characterised Ken Jones as a professional historian for three decades. He strengthened the South Asia Microform Committee, affiliated with the AAS, and through his leadership, ensured that the unique vernacular collections of the India Office were preserved and distributed widely through film. He worked closely with scholars and librarians to get the greatest academic bang from limited resources. It is truly fitting that his own vernacular collection, one of the best in the hands of an individual scholar, will now be transferred to the University of Chicago and made available to the international community through SAMP. Ken also worked hard within the American Institute of Indian Studies, and other related research organisations. At Kansas State University, where he joined the faculty in 1965 and became a University Distinguished Professor in 1989, Ken spent much time building the South Asia program and the History Department, while generating new courses on South Asia and specialised topics. Ken Jones took the communication of ideas very seriously, and part of his legacy is excellence in teaching, building institutions and scholarly publication.

Ken died on September 22, 1996 after a short but very intense struggle with cancer. He is survived by his wife, Marguerite Jones, son Garth S. Jones, and other family members in California. The memorial service on 29 September was classic, with many friends, family and colleagues sharing remembrances and celebrating Ken's life and the meaning of that life. In addition to the transfer of his research collection to Chicago, Ken's legacy will be with us for a long time in the form of his essays and books. A collection of his articles also will be published by Manohar Publishers, New Delhi in 1998. A memorial fund has been established at Kansas State University to support a visiting lectureship in South Asia and Punjab Studies.

N. Gerald Barrier

Morphological and Physiological Changes in Response to Migration: Some Results of the Study of Punjabi Sikhs' Migration to the UK

L.P. Singh and B. Kaur

Indian Institute of Health Management Research, Jaipur

This article examines the effect of migration and the consequently altered socio-economic conditions on the physique, biological growth and blood pressure of Sikhs migrating to the UK, compared to their peers in Punjab. The differences in physique of Sikhs in the Punjab reflect the level of their economic prosperity. In the case of Sikhs who migrated as adults, both males and females are heavier compared to their peers in Punjab. Migrant males have larger amount of subcutaneous fat. The amount of change in the physical characteristics is inversely proportional to the value of these variables in the case of native Punjabi Sikhs. The change in dimensions tends to occur quickly in the case of the migrants from the affluent groups; but over a longer period of time in the case of those from the poorer groups. Contrary to the findings of other studies there are no significant differences in the levels of blood pressure between the migrants and their sedentary peers living in Punjab.

Since early times people are known to have been leaving their places of birth because of economic, political or social reasons and settle in new places. The changed locations may be only a few miles, or thousands of miles away. Most of these migrations are undertaken voluntarily, in order to improve one's economic condition. But some of these migrations, however, are forced, as for example, the migration of the Black Africans to the USA; they could also be semi-voluntary, as in the case of the migration of the Jews from various parts of the world to Israel. In the new places, the migrants adapt themselves socially and politically according

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to the needs of the new social setting. The new environment is very likely to change the migrants through modifications in their physical growth and developmental processes also.

Since the beginning of this century various attempts have been made to study the changes in the physique of human beings as a result of migration. A majority of such studies have focused on people migrating from various parts of the world to the United States. The studies of human plasticity during the first-half of the century were pioneering.[1] In the second-half, many studies concerning the Samoans' migration to the US, the Tokelauns' to New Zealand and the Jews from various parts of the world to Israel have been undertaken.[2] In all these cases, there is a well-marked change in the environment. On the other hand, some studies[3] dealing with the internal migration of Oxfordshire residents, concerning residents of Orkney Island settled in Aberdeen,[4] and study of the Oraons[5] in eastern India, represent cases where there is no major change in the environment.

In this article, an attempt has been made to examine the impact of migration and changed environmental and socio-economic changes in the case of Sikhs migrating from the Indian state of Punjab to the United Kingdom (UK). The subjects are drawn from three well-defined sub-groups of Sikhs, referred to as 'castes', consisting of endogamous populations representing three levels of economic affluence in their home state, i.e., Punjab. Sikhs are an egalitarian society, with no formal recognition of the caste system.[6] The prevalence of caste in the Sikh Society is a legacy of Hinduism. Casteism among Sikhs, however, is not as rigid as in the Hindus, and is mainly restricted to extremely intimate social phenomena like marriage, and is not a hierarchial ranking as is the case among Hindus.

This article is based on a cross-section sample of 984 Sikhs (698 sedentary Punjabi and 286 migrant [and UK-born] Punjabis), both males and females. The study was conducted between April and December 1992 from Phagwara and its surrounding villages. Phagwara is a sub-divisional headquarters in Kapurthala district of Punjab. This town is located in the heart of the Doaba region of Punjab, which happens to be the original home of most of the Sikh immigrants abroad. All the subjects studied were born in and had stayed all their lives in the Phagwara *tehsil*. The three castes examined for the present investigation are Jats, Ramgarhias and Ravidasis, representing respectively the upper, middle and lower economic strata. In their natal setting, the Jats are the agriculturalists, the Ramgarhias, traditionally, are skilled artisans and carpenters

owning small to medium industrial establishments, and the Ravidasis, coming from the poorest strata of Sikh society, comprise one of the Scheduled Caste groups, and are mostly unskilled labourers.

The migrants' sample was collected from Southall in Ealing Borough (Greater London) and from Handsworth (Birmingham) in the Midlands. Both have a heavy concentration of migrant Punjabi Sikhs. Though the sample of migrant Sikhs also, like their homeland peers, belong to the same three caste groups, there were no apparent differences in the economic status of the migrant Sikhs residing in the UK. This was ascertained by classifying the occupation of the sample according to CODOT.[7] Members belonging to the three castes in the UK were found to be equally engaged in manual and non-manual jobs irrespective of their caste affiliations. All the adults in the migrant sample, had been born in the Doaba region and had left for the UK after reaching adulthood.

Though migration of Sikhs from Punjab to the UK started in the early 1950s, it reached its peak during the late 1950s and early 1960s. After 1962, however, certain restrictions were imposed and immigration regulations were tightened. Nevertheless, people kept coming to the UK, albeit in smaller numbers. Though most of the migrants in the two locales have been in the UK for over twenty years now, the sample for the present study was deliberately chosen in such a way that varying lengths of residence got proper representation. In the UK, for inclusion in the study, the minimum period of stay was one year. An attempt was also made to study the UK-born male children of various ages and compare them with their peers of the same caste in Punjab.

Though many anthropometric characters were studied in the present investigation, they can be classified into two main categories. Skeletal variables, like upper arm length and lower leg length, hand length and hand breadth, and humerus and femur epicondylar diameters follow more or less the same pattern as in the case of stature. Most of the mass characters, like skinfolds, arm and calf girth mainly mimic the changes in weight, which in any case is the overall measure of body mass. Therefore, the discussion of adult physique will be limited mainly to stature and weight and their related variables. Another important physiological variable having significant bearing on cardio-vascular morbidity, i.e., blood pressure, will also be discussed. All these measurements, along with the techniques employed for measuring them are discussed in detail elsewhere.[8]

In general, there are no significant differences in stature and related measurements between the migrants and their sedentary peers in the

case of male Sikh adults (Table 1). This is not surprising as all the migrants as well as their sedentary peers had completed their growth in the same environs and as the migrants had come to the UK after attaining adult stature. There was practically no further growth in stature in adults after their arrival in the new environment. This finding is in accordance with other studies dealing with the migration of adults. It shows that in the case of stature, there are no statistically significant differences between the migrants and their sedentary peers.[9]

In marked contrast to the males, there is evidence that migrant adult females are taller than their non-migrant counterparts though they too should have completed their stature growth prior to migration (Table 1). The phenomenon has been explained in terms of selectivity. Most of the females in the present study had come to the UK as brides; the reason for their selection as brides, for the Sikh men settled in the UK, could well lie in the selection process, favouring girls from comparatively better economic backgrounds. They could obviously be expected to have had a better nutritional environment during their growth, thereby being taller than their peers, whose families were not so well-off. Similar findings have also been reported in the case of Japanese females migrating to Hawaii, who were also taller than their sedentary counterparts. It is interesting to draw a parallel between the Sikh female migrants, most of whom came to this country as brides, and the Japanese female migrants, a large majority of whom also came to the USA as 'picture brides'. The migration in the case of the Japanese females may also have been governed by a similar criterion for the selection of the brides.

Body weight is a more interesting character than stature when studying effects of migration on adults, since it keeps on changing with age (throughout life) in most adults. In the present investigation, all the migrant Sikh adults were heavier than their caste peers living in Punjab. The migrants, from most parts of the world, have also been shown to be heavier than their sedentary counterparts in many studies.[10] This increase in body weight is presumably the result of the significant improvement in the nutritional intake among the migrants, and, to some extent may be due to a generally better environment.

Arm circumference, biceps and triceps skinfolds are very important indicators of fat deposition and muscle development. The change in environment and improvement in nourishment are quite accurately reflected in changes in these features. As in the case of weight, the migrants have larger amounts of subcutaneous fat compared with their peers.[11] In this study, similar changes in the arm and calf girth have

Table 1

Comparison Between the Sedentary and the Migrant Sikh Adults for Body Weight, Body Mass Index (BMI), Stature and Blood Pressure.

Measurements	*India Mean±SE*	*UK Mean±SE*	*India Mean±SE*	*UK Mean±SE*	*India Mean±SE*	*UK Mean±SE*
Male Adults						
n	55	30	38	55	46	58
Age (years)	37.92±1.94	47.03±2.78	36.84±2.08	53.29±1.62	45.05±2.27	42.25±1.47
Body weight (kg)	71.22±1.38	79.96±3.26	66.55±1.06	77.07±1.34	56.83±1.44	72.88±1.38
Stature (cm)	170.43±0.71	171.53±0.91	167.85±0.86	167.58±0.86	165.49±0.97	166.39±0.66
BMI (Kg/m^2)	24.48±0.41	27.09±0.99	23.65±0.39	27.40±0.39	20.69±0.45	26.37±0.51
Blood Pressure (mmHg):						
Systolic	124.41±2.06	136.57±5.39	129.26±1.72	134.53±2.01	126.15±1.97	131.58±2.28
Diastolic	84.36±1.26	84.37±3.25	83.10±1.04	84.60±1.16	82.39±1.3	85.52±1.23
Female Adults						
n	40	13	30	12	46	34
Age (years)	40.87±1.75	45.00±3.60	43.10±2.11	51.91±3.58	42.73±2.22	46.50±1.81
Body weight (kg)	60.65±2.07	67.29±1.39	55.33±1.49	71.78±4.25	51.63±1.60	70.10±1.87
Stature (cm)	153.76±0.73	157.56±1.44	150.88±0.50	155.11±0.99	151.80±0.77	154.12±0.74
BMI (Kg/m^2)	25.53±0.74	27.16±0.68	24.28±0.59	29.85±1.76	22.36±0.65	29.50±0.76
Blood Pressure (mmHg):						
Systolic	136.35±2.56	136.00±2.85	137.66±3.38	140.00±4.60	127.78±3.37	134.02±3.74
Diastolic	86.10±1.56	89.38±1.58	89.76±2.30	82.75±2.37	79.34±2.36	81.29±1.76

Source: L.P. Singh, D. Phil thesis, University of Oxford, Oxford (1995).

been noticed, the migrants have higher values as compared to their sedentary peers.[12]

Most migration studies deal with the 'fat issue' quite extensively but little has been said about the changes in the muscle mass in the case of migrants, among whom there is an invariable shift in the patterns of physical work. The changes in physical activity are often clearly depicted in the form of changes in muscle mass.[13] It was observed that the migrants from the poorest strata in the Punjab state develop larger arm and calf muscles, besides more subcutaneous fat in these regions of the body. However, there is no significant change in muscle development in the migrants belonging to more affluent castes. This issue awaits further investigation.

Most of the changes in the physique of migrant Sikhs seem to occur fairly quickly after their arrival in the new environment. This is the case, at least, in the migrants from the relatively affluent castes, e.g., the Jats and the Ramgarhias. The length of time these migrants spend in the UK does not appear to have any noticeable effect. In the case of migrants who are from the poorest caste, however, the mass and volume measurements continue to increase in the UK with the passage of time. The increase in arm girth, arm skinfolds and weight continues for a longer period as compared to the other groups. Little attention has been paid so far to body changes in response to migration vis-à-vis the length of time that the migrants have spent in the new environment. Such a study, in future, could yield interesting results.

Most studies dealing with migration have shown that the migrants have higher values of blood pressure as compared to their sedentary counterparts.[14] In the present study, however, it was found that the blood pressure of the migrants, though slightly higher, was not significantly different from that of their sedentary peers (Table 1). The reason for this could be the relatively higher blood pressure in the case of Punjabi Sikhs. The values of blood pressure in the non-migrant Sikhs are comparable to those prevailing in west European societies.[15] In their study of blood pressure of Punjabi women, reported significantly lower values of blood pressure as compared to those observed in the present investigation. Another study[16] reported significantly lower values of blood pressure as compared to those of the present investigation. The reasons for this 'secular shift' in the values of blood pressure between 1976 and 1992–93 (the period of the two studies) may be due to the recent rise in disturbances and civic unrest in the state of Punjab, causing an exceptional increase in the levels of stress in the daily lives of the

native Punjabis. Stress has been recognised as a significant factor in the aetiology of blood pressure.[17]

The present investigation strongly suggests that the effects of environmental change are much more marked on the timing of growth processes rather than on the adult outcomes. It seems that the earlier stages of growth are more sensitive to differentiation, and the differences most marked in the pre-adolescent phase of growth. Unfortunately migration effects on the physical development could be examined only in the cases of the Jats. They do, however, show that notwithstanding coming from a younger sample, the Punjabi young adults are less different in all measured characters (except blood pressure) than the samples of the 5–6 and 10–11 year olds.[18] Although it has been shown that the Jats are the most prosperous caste in the Punjab and have larger body sizes as compared to the other castes, Jat children growing up in the UK are very significantly larger, both as young children and around adolescence. Similar differences have also been reported in the case of Samoans, where the Samoans born in American Samoa, Hawaii and

Table 2

The Percentage Increase in Anthropometric Measurements and Blood Pressure of the UK-born Jats over their Peers Born in Punjab at Various Ages

Age groups / *Measurements*	*5–6 years*	*10–11 years*	*Young adults*
Height	8.24	2.28	2.19
Weight	21.09	6.52	17.44
BMI	6.80	0.44	15.92
Skinfolds:			
Biceps	34.80	82.84	49.40
Triceps	44.61	110.26	52.27
Calf	53.40	92.18	83.12
Sum	46.03	96.62	67.66
Upper arm circumference	13.85	20.30	17.71
Arm muscle circumference	13.85	18.94	18.79
Calf circumference	16.10	15.99	7.10
Humerus epicondylar	8.63	7.40	2.77
Femur epicondylar	8.14	7.54	2.09
Hand length	5.41	2.83	–0.55
Hand breadth	7.77	1.26	5.04
Upper arm length	9.75	7.38	2.03
Lower leg length	8.14	9.18	—
Blood Pressure (mmHg):			
Systolic	8.91	2.52	5.82
Diastolic	–0.42	0.45	4.40

Source: L.P. Singh, D. Phil thesis, University of Oxford, Oxford (1995).

California have better physical growth over the Western Samoan children. In the case of Tokelaun migrants to New Zealand also, migrant children have better physical growth over their natal peers.[19]

Interestingly, there is also a migration contrast during the growth process, with young children tending to drive maximal benefit of the UK environment in skeletal development, whereas weight and its correlates tend to be maximally higher around adolescence (Table 2). This could, of course, be due to sampling effects, but it is sufficiently consistent to suggest that skeletal growth has responded most to environment in early life but weight growth in early life during maturation. This is in line with other studies, where it has been seen that the earlier stages of growth are more sensitive to the quality of the environment. The study[20] of children and young adults of Guatemalan and European ancestry argued that pre-adolescent growth is more sensitive to environmental influence than growth during adolescence and afterwards. It has also been shown that in cases where migration to better quality environs takes place during the active growth period, the migrants end up taller than their peers, who stay back in the native setting.[21]

Although it was possible to examine the migration effects on growth only in Jats in this study, a comparison of children of different castes ought to be taken into account in all studies of migration from India. Quite clearly, there are marked differences in the development of Jats and Ramgarhias, and especially of Ravidasis, broadly in keeping with their level of economic prosperity in Punjab. A study of the caste variations in growth also draws attention to the importance of differentiation in the timing of growth and maturation in various castes. Unlike the case of the differences between the Jats born in Punjab and those born in the UK, where most of the skeletal differences tend to be most apparent around 5–6 years of age, and the mass and volume differences are most marked around adolescence, the differences between the poorest and the most well-off groups in Punjab (i.e., the Ravidasis and the Jats) are most marked around adolescence in case of skeletal development (like stature and its correlates) and mass and volume measurements i.e., weight and arm and calf girths (Table 3). In the case of blood pressure also, the inter-caste differences are most marked around adolescence. However, in the case of skinfolds, the differences are most marked *after* adolescence (Table 3). It is possible that the apparent contrast between migration effects and caste effects is due to sampling error, but this study does raise the interesting question about the extent to which different kinds of environmental changes have specific affects

on physique development. Inter-caste variations have been reported in various studies from India.[22] But prior to this investigation, no attempt had been made to investigate inter-caste response vis-à-vis migration, changes in the environment and economic conditions.

Table 3

The Percentage Increase in the Anthropometric Characters and Blood Pressure at Various Ages in the Jats over the Ravidasis in the Punjab State

Age groups / *Measurements*	*5–6 years*	*10–11 years*	*12–16 years*	*Young adults*
Height	0.98	7.44	−1.22	1.14
Weight	8.36	17.04	0.04	10.39
BMI	3.88	2.05	2.52	7.84
Skinfolds:				
Biceps	9.80	10.02	15.66	4.95
Triceps	13.27	11.50	29.09	16.36
Calf	6.46	19.39	4.75	4.74
Sum	10.21	14.27	17.58	12.54
Upper arm circumference	1.44	7.41	4.12	6.29
Arm muscle circumference	2.20	6.96	0.10	5.38
Calf circumference	1.14	7.39	5.10	7.20
Humerus epicondylar	0.64	5.78	−2.02	1.89
Femur epicondylar	1.40	4.78	4.45	3.66
Hand length	−2.04	8.77	−4.50	1.44
Hand breadth	7.87	9.81	3.49	2.22
Upper arm length	4.97	5.24	−1.05	0.68
Lower leg length	2.52	5.26	4.27	0.00
Blood Pressure (mmHg):				
Systolic	7.70	10.99	4.00	3.73
Diastolic	13.65	22.68	0.61	8.01

Source: L.P. Singh, D. Phil thesis, University of Oxford, Oxford (1995).

Concern is currently being expressed by the health authorities regarding the increasing incidence of diabetes and obesity and their high correlation with various heart ailments among South Asians in Britain. But little or no attention has, so far, been paid to examining the comparative magnitude of the response to the new environment in migrants vis-à-vis their economic and health status prior to migration. This article attempts to demonstrate how the people of different economic backgrounds

respond to the changes in environmental conditions, and how important it is to consider caste/economic status in the case of migration from India. As mentioned earlier, the caste status of an individual is a rough proxy of the economic status of that individual or group. The consideration of caste in the present context is meant to highlight the importance of the economic background of an individual or group in shaping the response of that individual or group to the migration process.

There have been many studies on blood pressure and other heart diseases among the people of South Asian origin (referred to as Asians) now residing in the UK. Most of them[23] did not differentiate between various groups of South Asians. Similarly, in studies of growth patterns of various population groups, the offspring of the migrants from the Indian subcontinent have been grouped as 'South Asians' on the basis of their first language, e.g., 'Punjabi speaking', 'Urdu speaking', etc.[24] The South Asian migrants come mainly from the Indian and Pakistani states of Punjab, Bangladesh and the Indian state of Gujarat. The migrants from these regions profess different religions (Sikhism, Islam and Hinduism), have different lifestyles and very marked differences in their diet patterns (e.g., Gujaratis are mainly vegetarian; Muslims, largely, do not drink; and the Sikhs do not smoke). Therefore it is not very appropriate to put all the migrants from one large subcontinent in one group. Some studies[25] have tried to concentrate on one particular group among the migrants, e.g., 'Punjabis', which is a better and more informative term than the South Asians. But Punjabis or even Punjabi speakers are themselves quite a diverse group including Sikhs and Hindus as well as Muslims, and people with different economic backgrounds. Therefore, a classification based on the language spoken or the area of origin is not very helpful either. Even within the Punjabi Sikh migrants who come from one particular region in the Punjab state but with varying economic status, the response to the changes in environment and improvement in economic conditions varies, i.e., the more affluent groups change less as compared to the poorer ones. Therefore, it is apparent that migration studies need to be undertaken after taking the detailed economic structure of the migrants prior to migration or that of their peers in the subcontinent, instead of grouping all of them under one broad category.

A question that naturally comes up at this state is: Is it biologically good for the Sikhs to come to Britain? It is clear from this article that the UK Sikhs put on a lot of body fat, and it has been shown[26] that excessive body fat (obesity) is highly correlated to cardiovascular morbidity.

The health of Sikhs vis-à-vis cardiovascular morbidity in Britain seems to be not only poorer than that of the Punjabi Sikhs, but also poorer than that of the local British. This pattern may arise as a result of an interplay between nutritional intake and levels of physical activity. In the Punjab state, nutritional intakes (particularly fat) are less compared to the Sikhs living in the UK, and physical activity tends to be higher as a part of the work regime especially in the rural areas. The Sikhs in the UK have substantially higher nutritional intakes, as indicated in this investigation, but appear to have less physical activity. Judged subjectively, few Sikhs at any stage are involved in active sports. The UK Sikhs' profile of cardiovascular morbidity, being poorer than that of the British natives could be because of lower levels of activity. On the other hand, a number of features of cardiovascular morbidity are as common in the Sikhs in Punjab as in the natives of the Western societies.

As far as the implications of physical development patterns are concerned, the Sikhs born in Britain mature early as compared to their Punjabi peers. The early maturation of UK-born Sikhs can be seen as both beneficial and harmful. It corresponds with the evolutionary requirement that biological organisms should mature as fast as they can. It is certainly pro-natalist, biologically speaking, and it is not surprising in the light of richer quality of nutritional regime and other environmental advantages in the case of UK-born Sikhs. But there are certain disadvantages associated with early maturation. Early maturation ushers in the various stages of maturation process, e.g., adolescence and adulthood, fairly early. This does not permit enough time to growing individuals to cope with the social side of these important growth phases and might lead to discord between the biological and the social aspects of the maturation process.

Conclusions

The degree of difference in physique of the Sikhs in Punjab generally reflects the level of their economic prosperity. The Sikhs belonging to the poorest groups are the shortest and the lightest and have a smaller body-build as adults, compared to those from higher socio-economic groups, who have larger body-build. The Sikhs, who migrated as adults, both male and female, are heavier compared to the natal peers of their respective castes, and males have higher amounts of subcutaneous fat compared to their sedentary peers. The changes in the mass and volume dimensions occur more quickly in the case of migrants from the affluent

groups, but over a longer period of time in the case of migrants fro the poorer groups. In male adults, there are no differences in the skelet dimensions between the natives and the migrants, as both groups hav completed their growth in the same environmental setting. Howeve evidence of selectivity of migrants is clearly seen in the case of female where all the female migrants were taller than their sedentary peer Unlike in other studies, there are no significant differences in the level of blood pressure between the migrants and their sedentary peers. It i suggested that while carrying out investigations regarding the health o South Asian migrants, it is important to consider their varying economi status as well as varied cultural backgrounds prior to migration, or, a an alternative, to study their peers in their native countries instead o grouping them all in one broad category as the South Asians.

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Of Victims and Villains: Representation of Muslims in Khushwant Singh's *Train to Pakistan* and Chaman Nahal's *Azadi*

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The trauma of the Partition of India has left an indelible mark on the psyche of people who witnessed it, and more specifically those who were unfortunate enough to actually experience the horrors which accompanied it. The literature which followed this holocaust has generally admitted that all the three communities (Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs) involved in this collective madness suffered in comparatively similar circumstances and that all of them had to bear the responsibility of their community's actions. In the two novels discussed, the events portrayed are different as there are different individuals and communities who are perceived to be victims (Sikhs and Hindus) and those who are invariably the villains (Muslims). These biased accounts are still perceived as mature and balanced renditions of the events of Partition. This paper examines two such novels.

Introduction

The Partition of India in 1947 was one of the greatest tragedies of the modern era. It was an event that resulted in a momentous loss of life and displacement of large populations of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs who had lived in a united colonial India. The communities who experienced these traumas have to date been unable to come to terms with this catastrophe. The fiction describing this cataclysm still resonates with tormenting feelings of each citizenry. Certain authors have written about these painful and traumatic emotions but only a select group has

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been able to maintain some semblance of impartiality. A number of writers, as we shall see in this paper, have given vent to their own biases and, through their fiction, have persisted in presenting Muslims through certain fabricated stereotypes which continue to augment aggression and hatred towards them by the two other major communities, namely Hindus and Sikhs.[1] The two novels under discussion are *Train to Pakistan* by Khushwant Singh and *Azadi* by Chaman Nahal.[2] Even though these novels have a gap of about twenty years between them, the representation of Muslims seems to continue in the same mode.

In her study of the Partition, Susie Tharu argues that:

> In India, Partition is rarely conceived (as it seems to be in Pakistan) as a political resolution to the Hindu–Muslim tensions that developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—a perspective that would image the violence as regrettable but perhaps unavoidable. . . . Indian accounts are nearly always shot through with a sense of grotesque and uncivilized violence of human nature that has been desecrated.[3]

Her analysis of the Indian perspective of the Partition's violence sidesteps the crucial issue of whom the violence is directed towards, or which community of the Indians are portrayed as carrying our most of these acts of 'uncivilized violence'. In other fictional accounts, as in the two novels under discussion, the archetypal Muslim man is continuously represented as an agent of physical as well as sexual violence towards the Hindu and Sikh communities. According to Tharu, it is not until the 1980s and 1990s that the Muslims have been collectively blamed, and not the British. As she continues, '[T]he antagonists now are Muslims, with their "sub/pre-national" religiosity who take on the role of the enemy and symbolise the evils of a "soft" (Nehruvian/socialist) state.'[4] Another prominent literary and cultural critic, Aijaz Ahmad has called for the analysis of Partition in which people of the subcontinent have to consider the impact and the consequences of the events which took place by looking at their own actions rather than blaming the British. He has no doubt in stating that:

> Our 'nationalism' at this juncture was a nationalism of mourning, a form of valediction, for what we witnessed was not just the British policy of divide and rule, which surely was there, but our own willingness to break up our civilizational unity, to kill our neighbors, to forgo

> that civic ethos, that moral bond with each other, without which human community is impossible . . . . The major fictions of the 1950s and 1960s . . . came out of refusal to forgive what we ourselves had done and were still doing, in one way or another, to our own polity. No quarter was given to the colonialist; but there was none for ourselves either.[5]

Saros Cowasjee, a literary critic who has written about Partition literature, has summed up his views with regard to the Sikh fictional accounts of Partition as:

> We see a persistent pattern running through the novels by Sikhs. First, the principal characters in the novels are all Sikhs, and each novelist shows a romance between a Sikh boy and a Muslim girl . . . . [T]he Sikh writers admit to Sikh atrocities against the Muslims, but argue that it was only in retaliation for what the Muslims did to them. This last contention, however, is not supported by independent observers. Both Leonard Mosley and Michael Edwardes in their respective studies mention Sikhs spoiling for a fight, and Collins and Lapierre in *Freedom at Midnight* (1975) refer to them as the 'most vicious killers of all'.[6]

There seems to be no limit to the Hindu/Sikh authors' capacity to misrepresent and vilify the Muslims as both history and literature are enlisted in this depraved service. I will also point out a number of examples which illustrate unambiguous misogynistic tendencies practised by both authors, especially in relation to Muslim women.

As in a number of narratives detailing the process of nation-building, women are presented as the central figure of those who are most vulnerable and, in the case of the Indian subcontinent, whose 'honour' is quintessentially tied with that of the whole family, and thus needs to be 'protected' at all costs. Veena Das indicates, the role women as assigned to, as a 'nation' takes form, is:

> Tradition is what diminishes women and permits a subtle everyday violence to be perpetrated upon them . . . . In the modern project of building a nation the image is not diminished, but enlarged. Its dramatization means that bodies of women are violently appropriated for the causes such as nationalism gives birth to its double—communalism. If one deified women so that the nation could be imagined

as the beloved, the other makes visible the dark side of this project by making the bodies of women the surfaces on which their text of the nation is written.[7]

Women of the 'other' community have to be 'unspoiled' for it is they who will have children which will ensure the future and purity of not only the family and religion, but of the whole nation as well. Khushwant Singh and Chaman Nahal have emphasised the essential and primary duty of women and the men of Sikh and Hindu communities respectively to carry forward their 'honour'. On the other hand, the Muslim community as a whole, and their women in particular, are represented as either incapable of controlling their sexual impulses or are willing partners to the 'impurity' (according to the logic of these writers and their rationalisations as to what is expected of the women of their faiths). The Sikh and Hindu women, according to both authors, can only be 'defiled' by Muslims, and that can only be achieved through extreme violence.

I

A revisionist perspective, which forms an essential element of any historical novel, is conspicuously absent from both the novels being discussed. The narrative techniques of Singh and Nahal express an 'unself–reflexive' attitude in their version of events (as opposed to Linda Hutcheon's category of 'self-reflexive' element which casts doubts about the 'truths' regarding events as well as characters' motives). These novelists also display an utter lack of effort to detach themselves from all totalising modes of historical thought; in fact, their narratives seem to reconfirm, rather than question the prevalent version of events 'authorised' by the meta-narrative of the state. An added ingredient of barely concealed personal bitterness and hatred for the Muslim community results in a narrow and parochial view of the Muslim characters.

Khushwant Singh's *Train to Pakistan* is probably the best known Indian novel about the subcontinent's Partition in 1947. This novel was an act which gave voice to his sympathy towards the Muslims, which he says is very close to his heart. He expressed his feelings in an interview, where he said that 'I had no animosity against either the Muslims or the Pakistanis; but I felt that I should do something to express that point of view'.[8] A vast number of critics have hailed it as one of the classics of modern Indian writing. It is a story of a sleepy

little village on the Indian border, near a train station, which has a roughly equal number of Muslims and non-Muslims who have lived in comparative harmony for a long time. However, as the Partition approaches, a train comes from Pakistan and it is full of dead bodies of Hindus and Sikhs. Then there is another such train, and a large number of bodies are seen floating in the river. A group of Sikhs set out to do the same to a train heading towards Pakistan, but the protagonist, Juggat Singh, saves the train and is killed in the process.

Singh begins this 'balanced' version of Partition, in his novel, by taking an equally tough stance against what he perceives as the two religious groups involved in the violence.

> Muslims said the Hindus had planned and started the killing. According to the Hindus, the Muslims were to blame. The fact is, both sides killed. Both shot and stabbed and speared and clubbed. Both tortured, both raped.[9]

From the very first sentence, his description is anything but realistic. It should be noted that Singh's co-religionists, the Sikhs, claimed by some eye-witnesses to be the community most responsible for large-scale collective violence, are curiously absent from this reference to the warring communities. By refusing to acknowledge, and thereby give equal responsibility to the Sikhs, he seems to have endowed the predators with the moral ground of the victims.

Mano Majra (*The village*) has organised its daily life around the timely arrival and departure of trains:

> Before daybreak, the mail train rushes through on its way to Lahore, and as it approaches the bridge, the driver invariably blows two long blasts of the whistle. In an instant, all Mano Majra comes awake . . . . By the time the 10.30 morning passenger train from Delhi comes in, life in Mano Majra has settled down to its dull daily routine . . . . As the midday express goes by, Mano Majra stops to rest . . . . When the evening passenger from Lahore comes in, everyone gets to work again . . . . When the goods train steams in, they say to each other, 'There is the goods train.' It is like saying goodnight.[10]

The ominous hints of impending disaster are set in motion by the unexplained and disturbing disruption of the train schedules, and arrival of the first of the 'ghost' trains from Pakistan as it sets the mood of

the supposed horrific intentions of the Muslims. Finally, the train comes during the daytime, and soldiers come to Mano Majra to collect kerosene:

> A soft breeze began to blow towards the village. It brought the smell of burning kerosene, then of wood. And then—a faint acrid smell of searing flesh. The village was stilled in a deathly silence. No one asked anyone else what the odour was. They all knew. They had known it all the time. The answer was implicit in the fact that the train had come from Pakistan. That evening, for the first time in the memory of Mano Majra, Imam Baksh's sonorous cry did not rise to the heavens to proclaim the glory of God.[11]

The train, an emblem of modern transportation, a symbol of mobility on a large scale, and thus a symbol of life, is perverted as it mutates into a hideously gigantic conveyance which carries death and destruction on a massive scale. The train from Pakistan arrives without its headlight, an indication of the loss of light of life of its passengers. 'There are no lights. The engine did not blow its whistle.' It becomes the carrier and a manifestation of genocide committed by the Muslims of Pakistan. This is just a start, according to Khushwant Singh, of the massacres, as the river near the village is filled with mutilated bodies as another trainload of dead arrives in Mano Majra.

Khushwant Singh's *Train to Pakistan* is set in the month of August–September 1947, and yet, according to his version of events, there was still no resentment of the Sikhs towards the Muslims, and it is not until violence is initiated from Pakistan that there is a threat of retaliatory violence from the Indian side. According to Chaman Nahal's version of events, which he situates in June 1947, the 'ghost' (to use Khushwant Singh's term) trains were already arriving from Amritsar into Pakistan at that time. This is in direct contrast to Khushwant Singh's narration of events in which the first train to arrive is in August–September, and it is only after the arrival of another train that Sikhs decide to take any retaliatory action.

Even though religious conflict is the basis of much of the violence, yet most critics seem to have chosen to ignore the religious affiliations of the characters. The Sikhs are presented as a community, and we have a cross-section of people, which include the bandit Juggat Singh, the religious representative, Meet Singh, as well as the policemen. On the other hand, Muslims are presented in the barest minimum details, without any cohesive role in their village or their personal lives. It is

more than surprising that, apart from Imam Baksh, who is not only (literally) blind, but is presented as equally blinded in his personal life as well, there are no other Muslim men in the village. Khushwant Singh, fully knowing the impossibility of an inter-religious marriage, forces a 'love' relationship between a Muslim girl and a Sikh man to break a social and religious taboo. What is surprising is that no such romance is hinted at, even remotely, between a Muslim man and a Sikh/Hindu woman. The Sikhs use a number of occasions for describing the threat from Muslims to their women and the length they would go to protect their 'honour'. The Muslims, though differing in religion, share the same cultural and social characteristics; however, there is no man or woman shown in those novels who protests against this systematic and voyeuristic 'dishonouring' (in the terms applied to the Hindu/Sikh women) by the non-Muslims. These wanton relationships between the men from their own community and the 'other' women demonstrate Singh and Nahal's forced efforts to indicate the apparent 'impurity' of the Muslim community because their women have been involved with non-Muslims. The three Muslim girls, Haseena and Nooran in *Train to Pakistan* and Nur in *Azadi* are all presented as willing to be ostracised from their communities, for the sake of their non-Muslim lovers, and there is not one voice of dissent from any member of their family or their community. Both the authors' representation of Muslim women is very much like any dominant cultures' representation of those individuals or communities relegated to the periphery. This essentialised and parochial representation by Singh and Nahal is not dissimilar from what Edward Said has mentioned as the Orientalist West's creation of the highly sexualised women of the East, and at the same time, putting their own women away from the fantasised threat of ever-virile Muslims.

Imam Baksh is the 'leader' of the Muslim community of Mano Majra; he is totally ineffective in showing any control over the Muslims. What makes his character even more implausible is that he is shown as someone who is responsible for guiding the Muslims, and yet, is presented as a blind man. Acting as a spiritual guide for Muslims is one matter; he is also totally out of touch with the escapades of his only daughter. Not once does Singh show them to be even talking to each other.

It is not until Khushwant Singh presents us with his female Muslim characters that we fully comprehend his antipathy towards Muslim women.[12] The first girl that Singh describes is Nooran, who is the daughter of Imam Baksh and is in the fields, having an 'affair' with Juggat Singh:

> Juggut shut her mouth with this. He bore upon her with his enormous weight. Before she could free her arms he ripped open the cord of her trousers once again. 'Let me go. Let me go . . .' She could not struggle against Juggut Singh's brute force. *She did not particularly want to.* Her world was narrowed to the rhythmic sound of breathing and the warm smell of dusky skins raised to fever heat. His lips slubbered over her eyes and cheeks . . . . She felt the dead weight of the lifeless man; the sand gritting in her hair . . . . The girl began to cry. 'Something is happening in the village. My father will wake up and know I have gone out. He will kill me.' Juggut Singh was not listening to her. He did not know what to do. She was saying so: 'I will never come to see you again. If Allah forgives me this time, I will never do it again.'
> 'Will you shut up or do I have to smack your face?' The girl began to sob. She found it hard to believe this was the same man who had been *making love* to her a moment ago. (italics mine)[13]

Nooran is sidelined after she has acted as a receptacle for what she tells him is his desire in '[A]lways wanting to sow your seed.' As Juggat is the protagonist of the novel, he is the one who elicits the author's as well as the readers' emotions and sympathies. As his relationship with Nooran is dispensed within an unproblematic manner (for we never hear of Nooran until she is pregnant), it is up to the reader to look at the violence which takes place.[14] If one shrinks from this essential undertone of this inter-faith relationship, especially at the period being described, then I believe that the reader also becomes a violator whose gaze perpetuates the violence of a crime that reduces women (in this case, Nooran) to the state of an object. As Wolfgang Iser states, in novels such as this, where the author intends to push forth his version of events, and it involves violence against women:

> The degradation of the experience is heightened by the naked woman's forced participation in her own objectification . . . . The reader's presence as not only an observer but a participant in the novel's violence is obscured by a literary screen that assures the reader of his or her distance from the act of violence even as it affords an entry into that violence.[15]

The narrative tone of the novel fails to acknowledge this act of extreme barbarity because it is being carried out by a Sikh. The readers are denied 'space' to contemplate the consequences for Nooran of this

sexual violation. By so doing, not only do they perceive this rape from the violator's perspective but also assume his 'position', to anticipate, to plan, and to execute—in the arena of imagination—the crime of rape. The novel continues to assert the purely literary nature of violence enacted on a Muslim minor in the reader's mind. It is therefore not surprising that no literary critic has questioned this incident as anything more than what Singh has presented it to be.

Some of the commentary to come out of the subcontinent on *Train to Pakistan* and *Azadi* follows the same attitude as the authors of these novels, for there is lack of any effort to question the author's description of events. Thus, we may read S.C. Harrex's verdict on Singh's writing, and wonder at his monumental inability to reason. In his opinion:

> [Singh is a] writer who has been deeply affected by catastrophe and that he had relied largely upon the direct, forthright and energetic methods of realism to convey his reactions to experience. In *Train to Pakistan*, 'conciseness' is confined to what is dramatically necessary (an inevitable concession to realism since most of the characters are simple peasants). . . . Juggat Singh's vigorous and brutal conquest of Nooran at the beginning of *Train to Pakistan* is the prelude to the growth in him of a vital and responsible love . . . . Climax of the novel that it is through love, not intellectualized ideology, that salvation is possible.[16]

Harrex expresses these simplistic opinions about Khushwant Singh and his novel without any trace of irony. He does not question Juggat's 'vigorous and brutal conquest', which might indicate to anyone but the diehard followers of Singh that this action conveys the feelings not only of the character but of the author as well.

The second 'relationship', once again between a non-Muslim man and a Muslim girl is that which takes place between Hukum Chand, the magistrate, who is in his late forties, and a sixteen-year-old 'courtesan' named Haseena. Even a despicable character like Hukum Chand is given the opportunity to differentiate between the way in which women are treated in Hindu and Muslim societies:

> 'Harey Ram, Harey Ram', rejoined Hukum Chand with a deep sigh. 'I know it all. Our Hindu women are like that; so pure that they would rather commit suicide than let a stranger touch them. We Hindus never raise our hands to strike women, but these Muslims have no respect for

> the weaker sex. But what are we to do about it? How long will it be before it starts here?'[17]

With each tauntingly inadequate representation of violence, each symbolic allusion to the crime, each purely imaginary conjecture of sexual perversion of violence of Hukum Chand, the act itself becomes more visibly absent; the sexual violation becomes a gaping hole in the text that Khushwant Singh opens for his readers to fill. In *The Act of Reading*, Iser describes such narrative gaps as 'structured blanks', 'Communication in literature,' Iser states:

> [I]s a process set in motion and regulated, not by a given code, but by a mutually restrictive and magnifying interaction between the explicit and the implicit, between revelation and concealment . . . . Hence, the structured blanks of the text stimulate the process of identification to be performed by the reader on terms set by the text.[18]

Such blanks function as invitations to the reader to participate not only in the viewing but in the making of the novelistic universe; the gap in the narrative 'turns into a propellant for the reader's imagination, making him supply what has been withheld'.[19]

In the sexual violence and objectification carried out by Hukum Chand and Juggat Singh on the two girls, the erotic objects of their perverted desires are not only transformed into objects of violence but are made to testify to the suitability of the abject position they are assigned. Haseena's character not only exposes the connection between violation and objectification of Muslim women in Khushwant Singh's narrative, but also the ease with which it is presented to the reader in order to persuade him/her to accept both.

II

Chaman Nahal's *Azadi*[20] is a story of a Hindu grain merchant, Lala Kanshi Ram and his family, along with a small community of Hindus and Sikhs in Sialkot in Western Punjab during June–September 1947. It is during this period that Mountbatten announces that India would be given freedom, as well as partitioned, and a new dominion, Pakistan, would be created. As Partition's date approaches, tensions, which had been previously few and far between, take on a frightening turn for the worse. At the end, Kanshi Ram has no option but to migrate to

India, but before that he is put in a refugee camp, where he hears the terrible news that his daughter and her husband have been killed in a train which was attacked by Muslims. Refugees are assembled into a large caravan which is escorted by the Indian army across the geographical boundary into India. But before they cross over, the caravan is attacked by Muslims near Narowal, many people are killed, and a number of women are abducted. Upon their arrival in Delhi, Kanshi Ram is horrified and disheartened by the treatment meted to the refugees by the Indian officials. And it is there that he observes the large-scale looting and massacres of the Muslims (who are fleeing to Pakistan) by Hindus and Sikhs. At the end, he is shown to be involved in attempting to rebuild his work and life once again.

Chaman Nahal equates Muslim characters' demand for a separate homeland with a loss of their morality and thus a rigorous vilification follows. This can be seen in the portrayal of Abdul Ghani (Muslim shopkeeper) and Captain Rahmatullah Khan (the Muslim camp commander). There seems to be only one way for a Muslim character to possess some semblance of decency, and that is tied with his/her clear and unequivocal belief in renouncing any desire for a separate homeland and condemning or expressing ignorance of the Muslim League policies. Mohan Jha considers Nahal's novel to be a 'masterpiece' and an 'epic' on Partition, but is unable to see the need for a variety of characters required in a fictional work which he has judged to be a 'classic'. Instead, he tells us that, '[I]n fact, there are only two characters in the novel, Lala Kanshi Ram and Arun, who deserve, even command, a close and detailed consideration'.[21]

Muslims are set apart from the Hindu protagonists from the very beginning of the novel. The first reference to a 'Muslim' is an indication of what one learns to expect from Nahal; he describes an incident between the English Superintendent and Kanshi Ram where the latter is hesitating in bribing the former, because he '. . . would not take the goods gratis. Ultimately the superintendent left a reasonable amount of money on the counter, which the Muslim city inspector, who always accompanied the superintendent on his rounds of the city, quickly pocketed'.[22] It is curious that the reader is not told anything about the religious affiliations of either Kanshi Ram or, for that matter, of the English superintendent, but the city inspector is only identified with his religion even before he is given any name.

Even Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, is not spared Nahal's hatred as he uses Kanshi Ram as a mouthpiece, and says: 'Who

took Jinnah seriously before September 1944? It was doubtful if he took himself seriously, either. Ever since then he had been sharpening his teeth and becoming more and more menacing.'[23] Thus, Nahal has described Jinnah with a bloodthirsty animal imagery, a metaphor which has strong connotations of expressing the feelings of Hindus and Sikhs, who felt that Jinnah and the Muslims were primarily responsible for tearing apart 'Mother India'. It should be noted that as Jinnah is degraded to a bestial level, Nahal refers to Gandhi with a 'Ji' (a reverential and a formal tone of address which denotes respect). When Jinnah makes a speech about the creation of Pakistan, 'Suraj Prakash switched the radio on again and in the sudden crackle of noises, the room went silent. Jinnah was finishing his speech and what they heard, loud and crisp, were his last words: "Pakistan, Zindabad! Long Live Pakistan!" Suraj at once turned the radio off. But they had heard the cry of Jinnah and there was no mercy in it, only pride.'[24] This twisted caricature had just been preceded by Nehru's description as the 'brilliant leader'.[25] Nahal seems determined that it would not be worth his while to create any Muslim characters, from the Muslim League leadership to the average person in the street, who could have any semblance of decency or a realistic desire to distance themselves from the violence which was to overtake a large section of northern India. All attributes of respectability and human dignity are confined to characters whose only merit is that they were non-Muslims. This belittlement starts from the very beginning and gathers momentum as the novel progresses as Muslims' characteristics metamorphose towards alarmingly grotesque proportions, until at the end, they seem be devoid of any humanity at all.

From the very beginning, even before the decision for the separation has been announced, Hindus and Sikhs have plunged into the dark abyss of paranoia about the alleged brutalities which they 'know' will be carried out by the Muslims. This prevision is of the people in whose midst they had been living as a minority and where they have been economically better off than the majority. These sentiments of foreboding are apparent in the daily conversations of the Hindu and Sikh characters, as can be seen from the dialogue between Kanshi Ram and his wife, Prabha Rani:

> 'If Pakistan is created, we'll have to leave. That is, if the Muslims spare our lives!'
> 'There will be much killing, you think?'
> 'Don't you know the Muslims? There has been much killing going on

for the past many months. Imagine what will happen once they're in power!'[26]

Conversation between Prabha Rani and her Sikh neighbour Isher Kaur, reveals equally ominous signs of the Muslims' expected brutality:

'. . . do you think the Muslims will get their Pakistan?'
Isher Kaur's voice: 'Difficult to say, *Chachiji* (Aunty). I hope they don't—these *badmash* (crooks)!'
'Your *chacha* thinks there will be much killing.'[27]

References such as these are directed towards Muslims in totality, without any attempt by the author or the characters to exclude any of them from this monstrous generality. No effort is made to differentiate between those who will carry out these alleged atrocities in future, or those Muslims who will be suffering a similarly gruesome fate due to the Hindus and Sikhs.

Almost every action of the Muslims is forcibly and inevitably construed as an apparent threat of violence. Public celebrations with fireworks and processions, because they are organised by Muslims, cease to be occasions of joy and happiness at the end of colonial rule and an attainment of a separate homeland, but are somehow seen as acts of intimidation which are inevitably directed towards the non-Muslims. According to Kanshi Ram and his neighbours, these acts of rejoicing are an inevitable prelude to their eventual victimisation. Hindus and Sikhs are not threatened; but they seem to have known all along that the situation would eventually come to confrontation. As a result, they have made preparations for more than a year before, Muslims even thought of 'intimidating' them:

Muslims in the city were celebrating. From all over the city huge fire-crackers shot up into the sky and exploded into billions and trillions of little lights of red and green . . . . The first indication of a procession was rumbling noise in the distance. It was the sound of drums. Everyone on the roofs raised his head in alarm . . . . There were two flights of stairs to the street, and on the way they bumped into Mukanda's mother. She was slowly climbing to the roof. 'Arun, I was coming to ask you—what do you *think* they are doing to my Mukanda?' . . . And quickly they held an on-the-spot council of war . . . . It was only during the last year that they had formed a youth club to face the

> Muslims. The gates had been set up only three or four months back . . . . And most young men of the street at his (Hare Krishna's) advice had joined the training in self-defense a few Hindu organisations were giving in the town. By now the youngsters in the street were trained in the use of the stick and other guerrilla activities and each house had its store of acid-filled bottles, bricks and heavy sticks.[28]

Because the procession has dared to come into the exclusive neighbourhood of Hindus and Sikhs, its most immediate and pressing menace is reflected by the concern of a female character, who is not concerned about the loss of her life or property, but of something which is most threatened by the Muslims: 'Padmini came up to Lala Kanshi Ram and said, "Lalaji they might dishonour us!".'[29] The women's trepidation has attained such a level that they actually take on the burden of their men's paranoid obsession with the Muslims' sexual threat to them.

As the date of Partition moves ever closer, the intensity of the Muslims' alleged killings and pillaging of the non-Muslim community in Sialkot gains momentum. Nahal narrates these events, without even once questioning their authenticity, and the magnitude of guilt seems to amass on the whole Muslim community. His is the omniscient voice which implicates and eventually passes judgement on events as well as the people in his novel. He seems to have made up his mind as to which community would bear the brunt of his anger and hatred; it would be no one except the Muslims. As a result of this premeditated loathing, it is not even surprising that he should gloss over what he considers to be single incidents of violence, for he seems to be waiting for an opportunity to show a massive scale of violence to convince his readers, and more than that, to convince himself that Muslims are inherently evil and villainous. As he writes:

> On the twenty-third of June, the Legislative Assembly of the Punjab formally decided in Lahore to opt for the partition of the province . . . . But for the common Muslims that vote had a sentimental appeal; for them it was a step further in their goal of Pakistan. And in their excitement, the Muslims of Sialkot broke loose the following day and killed a number of Hindus. And then it became almost a daily ritual. There were four or five cases of stabbing each day and at least four or five fires. It was not mass killing or organized killing—not yet.[30]

One can almost imagine him anticipating his readers' expectation

regarding those scenes of horror and brutality which will finally convince them of inhumanity of the Muslims, just as he *knows* that they will do.

Nahal implicates every section of the Muslim population in the callous and unprovoked attacks on Hindus. He refers to different segments of the Muslim administration through a token individual and then generalises the obviously obdurate actions of that individual to cast aspersions on the collective group. The first person to come up in this systematic defamation is the city inspector, Inayat Khan, who is initially accused of being corrupt and is then portrayed as someone who is responsible for inciting Muslims against Hindus. The next reference is of a nameless Muslim policeman who kills the peacemaker Hindu deputy commissioner. Yet, this is not the epitome of Muslims' treachery, for he is now '(A)bsconding. That's the story. He will turn up soon enough, and I think the Pakistani government will bestow a medal on him'.[31] Thus, the clique of villains grows ever bigger, as it encompasses the whole government of western Punjab, which according to Nahal, is engaged in a relentless drive to exterminate all non-Muslims. The next section to illustrate the Muslims' bestiality are the businessmen who stand to gain the monetary riches of the Hindus. Abdul Ghani is the sole representative of that group, as he tries to force Kanshi Ram to go into a partnership with him, both knowing fully well that the latter stands to gain from it. Obviously, Kanshi Ram refuses; thus spurned, Abdul Ghani extracts a terrible revenge. When Arun ventures into the camp where the dead are being cremated, to find the body of his sister and her husband who had been killed in one of the train massacres, a voice from his past confronts him:

> 'Imagine! If it isn't Arun.' Arun identified the voice before he saw the man. It was Abdul Ghani. Abdul Ghani smartly saluted the police officer and said: 'I'm one of the Khaksar volunteers, sir, helping to keep our city clean by cremating the kafir (infidels) dead.' And cynically, showing his teeth which lit up eerily in the light of the fire, he said to Arun: 'Who told you your sister was killed, my boy? But don't worry. I put her and her husband into the fire with my own hands, and they're now on their way to dozakh, to hell—where I hope they rot for ever!' He made no effort to disguise his venom.[32]

If this was a single instance of a person's evil and cruel nature, it would have made an impact, but as a result of Nahal's persistent portrayal

of every conceivably hellish crime that a person could commit and attribute it to Muslims, his characterisation seems increasingly hollow and forced as the novel progresses.

The third group to suffer the vitriolic rage of Nahal's pen is the Pakistan army, which is manifested, once again, through the portrayal of one demented individual, Captain Rahmatullah Khan. He is a godsend, for he, more than anyone else, is the personification of all the sexual threat a Muslim man poses to Hindu and Sikh women. He is a one-time class-fellow of Arun, but is now the commander of the refugee camp. Rahmatullah Khan invites Arun to his office and expresses his fondness for one of the latter's neighbours and tells him that;

> 'Look, I might as well be frank with you. I like this woman....' Riding the crest of his laughter, he added: 'Couldn't you arrange for me to meet her?'—
> *I wish I could perish before her doorstep*
> *But she would kill me not, nor sheath her dagger.*
> As he recited from Ghalib and as he sighed, Arun saw the veins on his neck throbbing hard.[33]

Even though, as a camp commandant, he has the power to do whatever he likes, nothing happens with regard to his lecherous intentions towards Sunanda, Arun's Sikh neighbour. Instead of resting this case to leave aside at least one Muslim from causing bodily harm to the departing Hindus and Sikhs, Nahal reintroduces Rahmatullah Khan back into the narrative. This time, it is during the night raid by a Muslim mob on the caravan which consists of several thousands of refugees as they trek towards their destination in eastern Punjab. Amazingly Rahmatullah is able to find Sunanda among this chaos of thousands of people scattering into the night, and takes her into a deserted house. More amazingly, Arun reaches that same house as he is running away from the point of attack. As he enters the otherwise deserted house, he recognizes the man as Captain Rahmatullah Khan, raping a woman who happens to be Sunanda:

> Quietly, step by step, he walked into the other room and picked up a sharp wooden spike from among the farm implements . . . . He had seen the mass of black hair and he had taken a careful aim. Lying atop her, the man was still holding her in his arms. With the blow his arms slackened and he rolled off to the side. His body twitched but he did

not move after that. Arun hit him repeatedly on the head, as though he had gone mad . . . he was looking at the collapsed heap of the man and he was hitting him repeatedly on his head. He swung the spike high above and brought it down with his full force. Again he swung it high and brought it down. And again. He continued hitting . . . . Arun bending low to look at Captain Rahmatullah Khan's body and kicking it as he left.[34]

Rahmatullah Khan not only bears the brunt of the anger of raping a Sikh woman, but is also punished for all the repressed hatred of not only Arun but of the author as well.

At the closing stages of the novel, Nahal seems to create a 'balance' with what seems very much like an afterthought, as he makes a mere token reference to the miseries that the Muslims must have suffered at the hands of the Hindus and Sikhs. Lala Kanshi Ram acknowledges to his wife that '[W]hatever the Muslims did to us in Pakistan we're doing to them here . . . every single horror . . . . We're only the same, *exactly* the same.'[35] But even here, the statement is made with explicit connotations of the undeniable *fact* (as Kanshi Ram and Chaman Nahal would have it) that it is the Muslims who had initiated the violence and the other communities had reacted against it. It is inconceivable to both the protagonist and the author that the events could have unfolded in any other manner.

III

The reader is compelled to identify with Hindu/Sikh characters for they are the protagonists in both novels, and they are developed as characters with qualities and weaknesses that one can identify with. These characters' only flaw is their un-reflexive and unproblematic view regarding the events and characterisation of Muslims, which is taken to be the absolute truth. It is only through the narrow-minded and essentialised accounts and characterisation by both authors that we are told about the events of Partition. It is narratives such as these two that Benita Parry, an eminent cultural and literary critic argues against. She believes that such a conceptual structure is 'calculated to drain the writings of historical specificity', and which in turn 'naturalizes the principles of the master culture as universal forms of thought and projects its authorized representations as truth'.[36]

This wilful misrepresentation of the existing records is thinly disguised

and passed off under the guise of a 'balanced' fictional account of a fairly complex and a multifaceted event. Both authors have constructed an utterly biased metafiction as official stories of Partition. These novels contain numerous accounts of the Muslims' alleged barbarity and thus their collective castigation, whereas Hindu and Sikh communities are exonerated from any wrongdoing. Biased accounts such as these not only fail to confront the bitter and emotional complexities of the problem, but fail to allow for questioning and self-examination of those within all communities who took part in this collective madness.

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Notes

1. There are a few notable exceptions; two prominent writers whose works perceive Muslims in quite a different mode than these two authors are Krishan Chander and Rajinder Singh Bedi. Both these authors have written about Partition without appropriating the collective Muslim community as the forces responsible for the ferocious violence of Partition. Both these writers wrote in Urdu and their novels have been translated into English. The only writer who elaborates on the violence committed by all communities, including the Sikhs, is Kartar Singh Duggal in his novel, *Twice Born Twice Dead*.
2. The two novels have been chosen from a number of other works dealing with Partition for various reasons. Both deal with the events which took place in Punjab, and yet both have a number of contrasting factors which made them suitable for this paper. *Train to Pakistan* is written by a Sikh, it's focus is on the events in East Punjab, it has a rural setting, it was written after a comparatively short period after the Partition, and Muslims form a minority of the community of Mano Majra. *Azadi*, on the other hand, is written by a Hindu, is based in the urban setting of Siafkot, in western Punjab, written about more than thirty years after the Partition, and Muslims form the majority of the community being described.
3. Susie Tharu, 'Rendering Account of the Nation: Partition Narratives and Other Genres of the Passive Revolution', *The Oxford Literary Review*, 16 (1994), 69–91.
4. Ibid., p. 75.
5. Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures*. (London: Verso, 1992), 119.
6. Saros Cowasjee, 'The Partition in Indo–English Fiction', in R.K. Dhawan (ed.), *Explorations in Modern Indo–English Fictions* (New Delhi: Bahri Publications, 1982), 16–29.
7. Veena Das, 'Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain', *Daedalus*, 125, 1 (Winter 1996), 67–92.

8. Mahfil, 'Mahfil interviews Khushwant Singh', *Mahfil*, 1969.
9. Khushwant Singh, *Train to Pakistan* (New Delhi: Time Books International, 1989), 1.
10. Ibid., p. 4–5.
11. Ibid., p. 84.
12. Despite his vehemence and bitter attitude towards the Muslims in *Train to Pakistan*, he has presented himself, quite ironically, as an author who is overtly inclined and sympathetic to their point of view. What is more surprising is the fact that almost none of the literary critics have questioned the apparent contractions between his opinions and writings.
13. Ibid., p. 14–15.
14. This pattern of a 'relationship' is not an isolated occurrence; other Sikh writers have essentially one factor common to all their novels: the romance between a Sikh man and a Muslim girl/woman. Various examples of such quixotic relationships are present in these novels: H.S. Gill's *Ashes and Petals*, Raj Gill's *Rape*, and Kartar Singh Duggal's *Twice Born Twice Dead*.
15. Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading: The Theory of Aesthetic Response* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 19.
16. S.C. Harrex, *The Fire and The Offering* (Calcutta: A Writers Workshop Publication, 1977), 163–65.
17. Singh, *Train to Pakistan*, 21.
18. Iser, *The Act of Reading*, 168–69.
19. Ibid., p. 194.
20. This is Chaman Nahal's second novel, and by far his most popular work. He was also awarded the Sahitya Akademi Award (India's highest literary honour) for this book in 1978. Before he himself started writing in English, Nahal was very critical of those Indians who wrote in the coloniser's language. A decade after his bitter attacks on the writings of R.K. Narayan and Khushwant Singh, he started writing in English. A detailed account of his turnaround is examined in O.P. Mathur's 'The Novels of Chaman Nahal—A Penultimate View', in A.N. Dwivedi (ed.), *Studies in Contemporary Fiction in English*, (Allahabad, Kitab Mahal, 1987), 319–33.
21. Mohan Jha, 'Chaman Nahal's *Azadi*: A Search for Identity', in G.S. Balarama Gupta (ed.), *Studies in Indian Fiction* (Gulbarga: Jiwe Publication, 1989).
22. Chaman Nahal, *Azadi* (New Delhi: Orient Paperbacks, 1979), 24.
23. Ibid., p. 40.
24. Ibid., p. 66.
25. Ibid., p. 64.
26. Ibid., p. 40
27. Ibid., p. 43.
28. Ibid., pp. 69–71.
29. Ibid., p. 74.
30. Ibid., p. 125.
31. Ibid., p. 139.

32. Ibid., pp. 185–86.
33. Ibid., pp. 225–56.
34. Ibid., pp. 307–11.
35. Ibid., p. 338.
36. Benita Parry, 'The Content and Discontents of Kipling's Imperialism', *New Formations*, 6 (Winter 1988), 49–64.

'We are all equal': Young British Punjabis' and Gujaratis' Perceptions of Caste

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Published statements representing Sikh and Hindu attitudes to the caste system suggest that Sikhs reject the system as contrary to their religious principles or live uncomfortably with it whereas Hindus accept its existence and—at least in some ideal, primal form—the rightness of it too. Moreover, Gujaratis are sometimes presented as holding more firmly to cultural tradition, including caste, than Punjabis. Social anthropologists' discourse on caste has moved from a Dumontian essentialist understanding of a distinctively Indian traditional encompassing hierarchy (based on purity and pollution) towards understanding caste as 'one among several principles of classification which can be drawn upon for particular purposes.'[1] Ethnographic research, largely among young people in the Midlands, suggests a complex situation in which caste membership is integral to identity and situationally significant for both Gujaratis and Punjabis, whether Sikh or Hindu. For the Valmikis and Ravidasis, belonging to a higher caste is essential to being a 'proper' Sikh or Hindu. It is suggested that in Britain a sense of caste as a Dumontian vertical hierarchy persists no less among Punjabis than Gujaratis. Reasons for this situation may include migration history and the caste composition of Gujarati and Punjabi populations in urban Britain.

Terms and Concepts

As fieldworker my understanding of 'caste' (owing much to Dumont) referred to a hierarchical social structure consisting of endogamous groups (*jati* in Hindi, *zat* in Punjabi), each associated with a traditional occupation, to which members were ascribed by birth. In this understanding, members situated their own *jati* with reference to others above or below them on a scale of varnas, whose ranking was determined by

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the relative degree of purity or pollution traditionally (if not currently) attributed to the *jati*–specific occupations. This was my prior, 'experience distant' concept for which I used the term 'caste'.[2]

However, the young people whom I interviewed used terms differently. For example, the Gujaratis used the term 'community', not 'caste', for their *jati*. To quote a nineteen-year-old Gujarati Prajapati man: 'We don't use the word 'caste', we use the word 'community', and only ... recently did I become aware that what I was regarding as my community was my caste.'[3]

When referring to their 'community' (*jati*) as an organisation with membership lists, a caste association, they termed it *samaj* (a word more generally translated as 'society').

The young people did use the English word caste, but to include other larger ascribed social groupings for which 'ethnic group' or 'faith community' are current in academic discourse. A nineteen-year-old Gujarati man from a Brahmin *jati* pinpointed the different understandings of the word: 'There is two sort of definitions of caste. There is one where it is basically the important Gujaratis, the medium Gujaratis and the lower Gujarati—that sort of caste. [Or] do you mean caste as in English/Gujarati?'

Consistently with the larger scale of this second understanding of caste, two young Punjabis (a Rajput and a Valmiki) used caste to refer to Muslims (as distinct from Hindus or Sikhs). This wider usage continues a subcontinental usage and is particularly interesting in view of anthropological discussions of whether caste groups are, or are like, ethnic groups.[4]

In this paper the young people's understanding of 'other castes' as people of other faith traditions or ethnic groups is not addressed. The focus is upon their experience and understanding of belonging to a caste, in the sense of *jati* or (in the case of Brahmins and Khatris) varna, and how this relates to academic formulations of caste and to 'official' statements on caste by Hindus and Sikhs.[5]

The ethnographic research underlying this article was conducted between 1979 and 1996 and has included studies of Sikhs in Nottingham and Coventry, and of Hindus in Coventry.[6] In terms of *jati/zat* the research has comprised studies of five Punjabi *zats*: Bhatra, Jat, Ramgarhia (in Nottingham), Ravidasi and Valmiki (in Coventry).[7] An ongoing longitudinal study of Hindus (in Coventry) includes 16–23-year-old members of some ten *jatis*—among them Punjabi Khatri and Rajput, and Gujarati Brahmin, Lohana, Patidar, Prajapati, Mochi and both Kathiawari

and Surati Soni. Individual Ravidasis and Valmikis quoted below are described as Hindu or Sikh according to their own preferred identification: neither group can be categorised unproblematically as Hindu or Sikh.[8]

The data is considered in the light of two recently published statements which follow, the first based on scholarly observation, the second coming from 'representatives' of a faith community:[9]

> The overall salience of caste distinctions among Punjabis in Britain, and in India itself, is arguably less marked than those associated with other regional social structures . . . . Among British Gujaratis, in contrast, there are many significant levels or spheres of differentiation.[10]

> Sikhism teaches that there are no distinctions between people and rejects the concept of caste (or *zat*), which therefore has no religious significance for Sikhs. The terms which appear in the title of some *Gurdwaras*, such as Ramgarhia and Bhatra, are historically related to economic categories and are rooted in the history of the forbears of the families concerned.[11]

Thus, scholarly opinion suggests that caste differentiation is more marked among Gujarati than Punjabi Hindus. Moreover, among Punjabis, Sikhs—unlike Hindus—find no religious basis for caste distinctions and, in this public statement at least, avoid admitting that Ramgarhia and Bhatra are the titles for two *zats*. Their statement contrasts with the Hindus' which defines varna and *jati* and acknowledges that 'Caste groups do . . . remain a significant social and economic factor for many aspects of Hindu life in the UK'.[12] However, the Sikhs' statement does not explain why *zat* names should be perpetuated in the names of British gurdwaras.

Based on recent fieldwork in Southall a third assessment of the situation suggests that in fact Sikh congregations conform more closely than Hindu ones to particular caste constituencies: 'Where the Sikh community divides into caste–articulated congregational communities, the multi–caste Hindu community shades into an encompassing set of practices which defies hermetic community boundaries.'[13]

Caste among Sikhs

In practice, caste remains an observable dynamic in Sikh society. This is true despite the fact, first, that the Gurus, like such *Bhakti sants* as

Ravidas and Kabir, taught the irrelevance of one's birthright status to *mukti* (liberation from future rebirth), and, second, that the *langar* (corporate cooking and dining) and the *Khalsa* (initiated, committed Sikhs) are institutions which symbolise and demonstrate equality. In most Sikh marriages *zat* remains a criterion for selecting spouses, with the result that there are structurally discrete Sikh communities. Many scholars have noted the role of caste among Sikhs in India[14] and in the diaspora[15], including Britain[16]. Ballard notes caste as a factor in the personal rivalry and factionalism endemic among Sikhs.[17] Many gurdwaras' congregations, or at least committees, correlate strongly with local Jat, Ramgarhia, Bhatra or Ravidasi *zats*. There are, for instance, Ramgarhia associations; Moliner provides details of one Ramgarhia Welfare Association.[18] Events in a gurdwara's annual calendar sometimes indicate *zat*–specific (in this instance Ramgarhia) loyalties; 'Maharaja Jassa Singh Ramgarhia's Day' or 'Baba Vishvakarma Day'.[19]

Caste differentiation among Sikhs in Britain has been reinforced by their migration histories: Bhachu describes the particular case of 'East African' (in fact Ramgarhia) Sikhs.[20] The impact of homeland politics has shown a correlation with caste; Moliner noted 'les khalistanis et leurs sympathisants se recrutent surtout chez les jats, tandis que les ramgarhias sont les plus sceptiques à leur egard'.[21] Caste consciousness is perpetuated in stereotypes and stigma.[22] Arguably, when the economic and educational gap between *zats* closes or reverses, caste consciousness and competition become keener.[23] Ballard has highlighted the tendency of Sikh society to fragment into competing factions.[24] In the context of a society that is more egalitarian and urban than migrants' rural Punjab homeland, caste has provided a basis for family pride (*izzat*) in relation to others, a response to realising that members of 'lower' castes have caught up with or overtaken educationally, occupationally or economically.

Despite (or because of) the evidence of caste as a continuing factor in social and religious life, it is a sensitive issue for many Sikhs. They present the Gurus as social reformers who abolished the caste system. McLeod's critical examination of the role of Jats in the *Panth* drew an angry reaction from concerned Sikhs of the 'traditional' as opposed to the 'sceptical' school of historians.[25]

Caste among Hindus

While it is relatively uncontroversial to discuss caste as integral to

Hindu society, scholarly understanding of it changes. Parallel with new interpretations are shifts in the role of caste in India and the diaspora—for example, as competing communities in a political democracy.[26] Searle–Chatterjee and Sharma question the dominating persistence of Dumont's influence on western social scientists. The fact that caste is distinctive (and that too, only from a western viewpoint) of Indian society need not, they argue, mean that it is central to it.[27] Moreover, the brahminical criterion of purity and pollution may not be the decisive factor in every local caste hierarchy. Furthermore, they caution against any tendency to dichotomise 'traditional' and 'modern' societies.

Studies of Hindu communities outside India have shown several tendencies at work. In some societies (notably those based on the migration of identured labour, for instance, to Trinidad and Fiji following the abolition of slavery) caste boundaries have largely disappeared, except for recognition of priestly and—at the other extreme—very low status castes.[28]

Studies of Hindus in the UK (a community a century younger than the Caribbean and other island communities) suggest the correlation of caste with migration,[29] with *sampradaya* allegiance,[30] as well as its association, in some instances, with occupation,[31] and its strength as expressed in marriage, kinship networks and caste associations.[32]

In accordance with Searle–Chatterjee's and Sharma's understanding of caste these studies cumulatively suggest that caste is one element or resource, along with such factors as ethnicity, language, region, *sampradaya* and previous migration history, which interact in the evolution of Hindu groups and individual identity in Britain. Less clear is these Hindus' perceptions of the 'caste system' as a whole or of their own caste's place in it.

Young Hindus' Conception of Caste as Vertical Ranking

Searle–Chatterjee and Sharma suggest that caste is what people do rather than what they are. With this in mind the Midlands Sikh and Hindu data can be interrogated to detect any of the five ways in which caste discrimination was traditionally manifest: pollution, commensality, endogamy, heredity and occupation and economic interdependence.[33] None of the young Hindus or Sikhs in my studies made statements connecting varna or *jati* status with purity or pollution or with exclusion from eating or worshipping together, although senior Valmikis and Ravidasis articulated experiences of having had to sit apart from pupils of higher

castes during their schooling.[34] No one mentioned economic interdependence but occupational equations were frequent—whether with 'fighter' (a young Khatri), 'farmer' (the Patels), 'carpenter' (the Prajapati) or 'goldsmith' (the Sonis), even though it was only the Sonis who had relatives who still carried on the traditional craft, and they themselves were part of the drift away from it for economic reasons. However (see below) young people did understand caste as hereditary, and they referred to the requirement (whether they regarded it as desirable or otherwise) of caste endogamy.

Only one young Hindu, a Gujarati man (Kathiawari Soni) voiced the traditional respect for Brahmins: 'I know that Brahmins are classed as a very high class people . . . . A lot of Brahmins go further into more depth in religion.'

However, when speaking of their own *jati* or family name in relation to another, others also used the words conveying vertical gradation. All the following speakers are Gujarati:

> 'Being Lohanas we're higher than Kumbhars.' (Lohana woman)

> 'Desais are basically Naiks as well . . . but we are just a touch lower.' (Brahmin man)

> 'People lower down in caste say they drink and smoke, but they say that because we are the highest caste we are not supposed to.' (Gujarati Brahmin woman)

> 'We have, like, different levels of caste and ours is like not the highest, but it is quite high.' (Surati Soni woman)

> 'We are not the highest but we are on a respected position on the scale.' (Matiya Patel woman)

> 'A farmer's not exactly bottom, but it's not . . . top. It's middle and then you have Brahmin and business men at the top.' (Patel man)

In all the above cases the speakers were quoting what their elders told them whilst rejecting, or at least distancing themselves from this gradation: '[A Rana] is a Thakur . . . My mum was telling me in India they are quite a high caste . . . but I'm not really too bothered.' (Punjabi Rajput man)

A nineteen-year-old Gujarati Brahmin man provided an overview of the system (which he strongly condemned as 'racism'):

> You collect these points [for doing bad things] and obviously the more points you get the crapper life you get next time round. If you get maximum points for being a total, total bad person then you come out in the next life something like an ant. And if you are really, really good then you become someone in a higher caste . . . Naik, Desai, above that you've got priests and then you've got the whole caste system, then right at the bottom you start going into animals . . . and you come down to an ant as the lowest.[35]

Here he envisages a continuous gradation, encompassing both the animal kingdom and human (or at least Indian) society, with karma as the determining principle of individual placement.

Young Hindus' Attitudes to the Caste System

Young Hindus' attitudes to the caste system ranged from outright rejection to an almost uncritical acceptance. Condemnation was voiced by members of very disparate castes: a Punjabi Valmiki woman, a Ravidasi man, a Gujarati Patidar woman and the Gujarati Brahmin man who said: 'I don't like saying like, "I'm above someone else and you're above me" . . . It's wrong . . . It is basically just like racism.'

The Patidar woman expressed the view that the caste system 'is the main downfall of Hinduism really' and the Valmiki woman declared: 'I don't believe in the caste system. We are all equal because it is labelling someone for what they used to do in past life.'

A Prajapati male with traditionalist, conservative views on social issues suggested that the present character of the caste system fell short of earlier ideal when he used it as an analogy for differentiated gender roles:

> It is similar to how the caste system was supposed to work, in that some people were meant to do some jobs, others were meant to do different jobs. It's not that this person does this job and he is hence lower than this person. All people were supposed to be equal, doing different jobs.

Probably a similar view of a Vedic golden age underlay a Punjabi Khatri man's comment that 'A caste system is defined by your actions of how you actually proceed yourself in your life.'

The former envisages the caste system as a social harmony of people in differentiated but equally valued hereditary occupations. He is critical, not of the hereditary principle, but of caste-based discrimination against some people on the grounds that their caste is 'lower'. The second interviewee, however, is suggesting that one's position in the caste system should be (used to be) ideally determined by one's conduct, not by heredity. In practice, both young men seemed at ease with caste (even in its fallen state) and were ready to marry within their *jati*. It is likely that each of these young men, in part at least, owed his acceptance of the caste system to Hindu youth organisations to which (exceptionally) they belonged.[36] Acceptance of a bygone, ideal caste system (as taught by these organisations) may well have predisposed them more, not less, to the institution.

Caste, Friendship and Marriage

Repeatedly, young Hindus declared that caste was immaterial to friendship. A Gujarati Soni man articulated the irrelevance of caste to friendship: 'We have friends of all different castes—*dhobi* as well .... One of my dad's friends he's like a brother to me .... It's just when it comes to that marriage point.'

For a male Gujarati Patidar, caste provided a source of joking: 'I had a friend who is a Brahmin .... I only found out to the end of my schooldays ... .I goes "Well I can't talk to you then" ... We just joke around about it.' Presented like this, caste among British Hindus emerged as vertically imaged but carrying no ill feelings or discrimination.

However, in the selection of marriage partners, as opposed to friends, the young people knew that caste was traditionally a decisive criterion. Many accepted this for themselves, with reasons ranging from a Gujarati Patidar woman's 'because I've been brought up expecting that' and 'it's not like a complete change, because I suppose if you marry into a higher caste just the way that they behave and everything is going to be different', to the more reluctant:

> The only reason why I'd probably get married to say a Gujarati Naik ... would be ... 'cos my parents go 'you shouldn't marry this, you shouldn't marry that' and it would be just like shameful to them. (Gujarati Brahmin man)

Interestingly, for this article, a Gujarati Soni woman contrasted her perception of 'Sikh' and 'Gujarati' practice:

> You can marry any other Sikh person, within limits, whereas with us the Hindu caste itself is subdivided again . . . . so it's not like I can marry a Gujarati person, it has got to be a Gujarati person with this surname or who is this profession, so it really narrows things down.

A minority totally rejected their family's expectation or preference that they marry within caste. These included 'low' caste Punjabis—a Ravidasi man and a Valmiki woman—as well as 'higher' caste Gujaratis, a Patidar and an Oshwal woman.

Some told stories of contemporaries, including relatives, who had married out—whether into another caste (e.g., a Kumbhar with a Lohana, a Patidar with a Mistri), or into another caste and religious community (a Punjabi Hindu with a Sikh Tarkhan) or into a different ethnic and religious community (a Punjabi Valmiki with a Gujarati Muslim). In each case the couple had met with initial objections, which in some cases had meant continuing rejection from their families.

To some young people (including several eldest siblings with a sense of responsibility for the impact of their behaviour on the freedom of younger siblings and cousins) the likely cost of rejection by their families and of bringing shame upon their parents was not a price worth risking for the uncertain gain of flouting family expectation of a marriage arranged within caste. Others (both men and women, both Gujarati and Punjabi) were prepared to risk marrying across caste boundaries, and in some families there had already been a precedent which had won some level of acceptance. Indeed, one Gujarati Soni woman had already, with her family's full approval, married a Vaniya whose brother had married her cousin.

She had heard no adverse comment, regarded such marriages nowadays as commonplace, and saw the difference between the Sonis and Vaniyas as simply a matter of seeing a different set of people at 'occasions'. A widely held view was that attitudes to inter-caste marriages were softening and that caste restrictions on spouse selection would fade away.

Attitude to their own Caste

Some young people expressed pride in their own caste, or at least satisfaction

with it. For example, the Khatri man was happy that 'Lord Krishna was a Khatri' like him, and his sister's experience had confirmed the impression that:

> When we do meet a lot of Khatri families they are very nice families and you want to know them. And I am not saying that lower caste families are no good, or higher caste families are no good, but it is amazing how many Khatri families we know and they are very nice people.

The Gujarati Lohana man's assessment of his Lohana caste was strikingly different:

> I'm ashamed of being a Lohana because I've never met so many back-stabbing people in all my life . . . . How come all the other Hindus . . . all the different castes can go to one hall and celebrate all together and yet the Lohanas have to be separate?

The young Gujaratis make frequent reference to their 'community' or *samaj* (caste association). Some commend the institution: 'I suppose it [*samaj*] is a good thing because it keeps us in contact . . . because they usually organise a trip in the summer.'

Others castigate their *samaj* as gossiping and interfering. In this respect a Gujarati Patidar woman speaks for others: 'It is just gossip, gossip, gossip that it all boils down to . . . . If something happens in the family then the parents just get it from the community.' Another criticism was the elders' unwillingness to share control of the *samaj* with younger people.

Young Sikhs' Articulation of Caste Ranking

Among young Jat and Ramgarhia Sikhs (as well as the low caste Punjabi Valmikis and Ravidasis) repeated reference was made to 'proper', 'pure', 'real' and 'true' Sikhs and Hindus. These qualifiers were used by the young Sikhs to refer to *amritdharis* and *keshdharis*, but caste was also a contributory factor.[37] For example, when a Punjabi Jat girl was shown a picture of the *panj piare* (five traditionally accoutred male Sikhs) in a procession and asked what sort of people they must be, instead of describing them (as anticipated) as Sikhs who observed the Khalsa

discipline she replied, without hesitation, that 'of course' they would be Jat.

Whereas none of the young Gujarati Hindus regarded membership of a particular caste as making an individual more or less Hindu, and none referred to proper or pure Hindus whether on the basis of caste, conduct, initiation or belief, the young Sikhs, whatever their *zat*, distinguished 'Sikhs' from 'proper Sikhs' and, in some instances, associated *zat* membership with this.[38] A thirteen-year-old Jat girl explained: 'We're Jats, they're top of the caste. We don't usually believe in caste, but we're Jats and there's Ramgarhie, Churhe.' According to another Jat girl' 'If there's a Jat and a Tarkhan, a Tarkhan is a carpenter and a Jat is a farmer. The Tarkhan is the Indian and the Jat is a Sikh.'

This summary interestingly links *zat* with occupation, national origin and faith tradition. By using derogatory terms such as 'Churhe' and 'Tarkhan' and referring to occupations linked to *zats*, young Sikhs demonstrated the perpetuation of hierarchy through disparaging caste-labels and folk memory of presumed ancestral (if not current) employment. This is consistent with the stereotypes of Bhatras, Ramgarhias and Jats volunteered by older informants in Nottingham.[39]

Young Jat Sikhs' differentiation between themselves and members of 'lower' *zats* also alluded to the land of Punjab. Jats were those who worked it as farmers and who owned it. Other *zats* were perceived as landless. Moreover, the Ramgarhias ('Tarkhans') were regarded as coming from Africa, rather than directly from Punjab. By contrast, while many readily equated their own *jati* with an ancestral occupation, none of the young Hindus distinguished between *jatis* either on the basis of land ownership/landlessness or on the basis of closer links with Africa or India.

Valmiki and Ravidasi Voices

The young Valmikis and Ravidasis echoed the higher caste Sikhs' caste-related ranking of 'Sikhs' and 'proper Sikhs'. Thus a Ravidasi boy reported:

> There's three castes. The first one is—I've forgotten. The second is Jat and the third is the Chamar. And the first one are true Sikhs, like they carry the Ks at all times . . . they say their prayers. I'm not one of those: I'm not high caste.

Similarly, a Ravidasi girl who identified herself as Hindu clearly distinguished between her own community ('We are more free than they are') and 'true Hindus'.[40]

According to 'Shukra' (also from her caste), 'I have yet to come across a *dalit* who thinks that people are born superior and inferior'.[41] Tellingly, for his autobiographical account of his life as 'a member of the *dalit* caste of Chamars' 'Shukra' covers his identity with a pseudonym. Although none of the young people interviewed spoke in terms of superiority and inferiority, their 'real', 'proper', 'pure' and 'true' are arguably value-laden qualifiers.

Together with this awareness of caste as a vertical hierarchy went experience or fear of suffering prejudice. For example, the Ravidasi woman expressed the fear that at school children from other castes might have been nasty if she had said what her caste was when they asked her. Her brother recalled his father warning him of making friends with Jats and that when a Jat had invited the family to dinner, 'my dad said because they're Jat we shouldn't really go down their house, because he's afraid that one day they might say "We don't want to know you".' His sister expressed the view that if they had known her caste 'Pure Hindus—like the higher castes of Hinduism, like Brahmins' would have 'judged' them.

Alone among the young people interviewed some of the Valmikis and Ravidasis mentioned that their parents had taught them, when asked what their caste was, to say 'Hindu Punjabi' or that they didn't believe in caste. A Ravidasi family avoided using their family name. To quote the young woman, 'All I know is . . . apparently our surname indicates that we are one of the lowest castes, but I don't use it. None of my family does.'

Growing Awareness

Aged 8–13 years, both Sikhs and Hindus identified other children by their caste. The longitudinal study of young Hindus indicates that during their teens young people learn more of the implications of caste membership—principally the expectation that they will marry endogamously. This may also be the time when they discover what their caste is—as happened with the Ravidasi woman when her parents informed her at the age of 16.

School also contributes to their awareness: Valmiki and Ravidasi interviewees mentioned being asked by their peers there what their

caste was. Religious education provided information about Hinduism in general and the caste system in particular, a source cited by the same Ravidasi woman. The influence of social studies at school or university is discernible in her explanation of caste as part of a more general social phenomenon, 'There is always someone in a religion who believes they are higher than others. Like in the olden times it was the priests above all the lowly peasants.'

Involvement in marriages, and preparation for their own, had made young women especially aware of the expectations of their family and community, including the adverse effect of any social deviation on younger siblings and cousins.

Conclusion

This paper challenges the view that caste persists less strongly among Punjabis than Gujaratis in Britain, or among Sikhs than Hindus. Caste recurs as a motif in the literature and in my Midlands data, but in ever-shifting patterns. For example, in 1992, of my volunteer interviewees from the Ramgarhia gurdwara most proved to be Jat, possibly from families alienated by the political tenor of the predominantly Jat gurdwara. (In 1979, in Nottingham, all those who volunteered for interview from the Ramgarhia gurdwara were themselves Ramgarhias.)

Caste was generally regarded as irrelevant to friendship but of central concern (at least to their elders) in the matter of marriage. Mixed caste marriages were mentioned by both Punjabis and Gujaratis as increasing. Ironically, it was these negations of the caste principle which precipitated their relatives' most unambiguous displays of loyalty to the system.

Members of the 'lowest' Punjabi castes were defying the perceived status quo: a young Ravidasi man disputed his father's wariness of humiliation by Jats: 'I go "If everyone thought like that, then we won't get anywhere with this problem".' At about the same time *The Guardian*, quoting a prominent member of the Valmiki community, reported that the Action Committee for the Campaign against Caste Discrimination had protested against the statement in a draft harmony guide devised for Coventry Council staff that 'Hindus in Britain may wish to observe the caste system and wish to avoid dining or inter-marriage with members of other castes'.[42] Searle–Chatterjee and Sharma suggest that:

> If the low castes can be shown to reject the notion of ritual hierarchy then the thesis of the centrality of hierarchy in Hindu society takes a

body blow. If, however, the 'untouchables' can be shown to accept hierarchy in some sense or other, then the coherence of Hindu society is vindicated.[43]

The very fact of organising any such rejection can perpetuate one dimension of what it seeks to overthrow. In this respect the Punjabis' caste-based places of worship, Bhatra, Ramgarhia, Ravidasi and Valmiki may contribute to structural separateness and to a tendency to stereotype. Among Gujaratis, too, *jati* and *sampradaya* are in some instances mutually reinforcing (for example the correlation between being Lohana and Pushtimargi).

Higher caste Punjabi Hindus do not have a *samaj* to organise *jati*-based activities, nor is there a parallel to the Gujaratis' annual celebration of Navaratri in *samaj*-specific venues, but the Punjabis appeared at least equally aware of caste and marriages are expected to be within the *jati*. In fact, among Valmikis and Ravidasis and Sikhs—if not among higher caste Hindus—caste awareness seems as strong as among Gujarati Hindus, carrying the potential for intense pride or shame, which surfaces most clearly in relation to sexual relations/matrimonial alliances.

The Gujaratis emphasised horizontal solidarity, rather than vertical hierarchy—except when inter-caste marriage occurs. Negative stereotypes of other castes are strikingly absent from the Gujarati data.

For the persistence of caste among Sikhs, despite the lack of religious sanction, one needs to bear in mind the almost caste-specific emigration histories of Bhatras, Jats and Ramgarhias and the rivalry of Jat and Ramgarhia. Furthermore, Sikh emigration has been mainly from the villages of a relatively small area, the Jalandhar Doaba, with families in Britain well aware of each other's *zat* background. This compact geographical/cultural base, coupled with the relative fewness of sizeable Punjabi castes in Britain, contrasts with the complexities of caste divisions among Gujaratis.[44] Including, as the Punjabi diaspora does, both the most numerous and economically most powerful *zat* (the Jats) and the socially most stigmatised (the Valmikis and Ravidasis) one may find parallels with other diaspora communities such as Trinidad and Mauritius where distinction persists at the two extremes of a scale but collapses in the middle.[45] In these cases (arguably) the Brahmins' priestly status parallels the economic and numerical clout of the Jats.

Gujarati *jatis* in Britain are far more numerous, defying easy ranking. Moreover, as Knott points out, the Mochis of Gujarat were not seen as *chamar*.[46] Thus, although the 'highest' castes (Brahmins) are represented

in Britain, the scale does not include any low caste group as stigmatised as the Punjabi Valmikis and Ravidasis.

Also peculiar to the Punjabis' experience is the period of political unrest in Punjab during the 1980s. The Jat Sikhs' characteristic identification with the soil of Punjab and instinctive distrust of the (more urban) Hindu castes predisposed many to sympathise with separatist, Khalistani agitation which found little support from other castes.

The equalising influence (or ideal) of the Khalsa and the *langar* does not stop people 'doing' caste in other ways. Indeed, Khalsa Sikhs (for example the Akhand Kirtani Jatha) may limit commensality with non-*amritdhari* Sikhs, thereby adopting a classic principle of caste differentiation.[47] At least as strictly as, for example, the Gujarati Hindu Pushtimargis, the Jatha emphasises rules regarding what is eaten, from what utensil and with whom.[48]

The Gurus' rejection of caste in terms of purity and pollution has not overthrown it as a hierarchy of territoriality or descent. The very fact that, routinely, Sikh rhetoric links the caste system with Hinduism and portrays Sikhs as reformers who abolished caste, rather than challenging the continuing structure, may contribute to its persistence in the British diaspora.

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Notes

1. See L. Dumont, *Homo-Hierarchicus: The Caste System and its Implications* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and M. Searle–Chatterjee and U. Sharma, *Contextualising Caste: Post-Dumontian Approaches* (Oxford: 1994) 20.
2. See C. Geertz *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
3. In a personal communication Lilamani Woolrych recalled being discouraged as a child in Sri Lanka from thinking or talking about 'caste' as it was divisive.
4. See D. Killingley, 'Varna and Caste in Hindu Apologetic' in D. Killingley, W. Menski

and S. Firth, *Hindu Ritual and Society* (Newcastle upon Tyne: S.Y. Killingley, 1991) and Searle–Chatterjee and Sharma, *Contextualising Caste*.

5. The *jati*/varna distinction does not hold up unproblematically, since it oversimplifies the contested interrelationship of different endogamous and exogamous groups. See Searle–Chatterjee and Sharma (1994: 4).
6. The studies were not strictly comparative, and were conducted at different times and with different age groups, but in each case observation of caste groupings and attention to references to caste provided significant data. For the Sikh studies see E.M. Nesbitt, *Aspects of Sikh Tradition in Nottingham* (unpublished M.Phil thesis, University of Nottingham, 1980); *idem, The Religious Lives of Sikh Children in Coventry* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Warwick, 1995). For the Hindu studies see R. Jackson and E.M. Nesbitt, *Hindu Children in Britain*, (Stoke on Trent: Trentham, 1993) and E.M. Nesbitt, *'My Dad's Hindu; My Mum's Side are Sikhs': Issues in Religious Identity* (Charlbury: National Foundation for Arts Education, 1991).
7. Ramgarhia, Ravidasi and Valmiki are the terms preferred by leading members of these *zats*, whose occupation-linked names they find (particularly in the latter two cases) deeply offensive. Young Valmikis and Ravidasis did not use these terms to identify their *zats*.
8. E.M. Nesbitt, 'Pitfalls in Religious Taxonomy: Hindus and Sikhs, Valmikis and Ravidasis', *Religion Today*, 6, 1 (1990), 9–12.
9. Directory entries were the result of an extensive consultation process with informed members of the faith communities concerned as well as with academics.
10. See S. Vertovec, 'On the Reproduction and Representation of "Hinduism" in Britain' in T. Ranger, Y. Samad and O. Stuart (eds), *Culture, Identity and Politics: Ethnic Minorities in Britain* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996), 79.
11. P. Weller (ed.), *Religions in the UK: A Multi-Faith Directory* (Derby: University of Derby and the Inter Faith Network for the United Kingdom, 1993), 533.
12. Weller, *Religions in the UK*, 234.
13. G. Baumann, *Contesting Culture: Discourses of Identity in Multi-Ethnic London* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 122.
14. Examples are E.K. Marenco, *The Transformation of Sikh Society* (Oregon: Hapi Press, 1974); and W.H. McLeod, *The Evolution of the Sikh Community* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
15. For example H.S. Morris, 'Caste among the Indians of Uganda' in B.M. Schwartz (ed.), *Caste in Overseas Indian Communities* (Chandler, 1967), 267–82.
16. S.S. Kalsi, *The Evolution of a Sikh Community in Britain: Religious and Social Change among the Sikhs of Leeds and Bradford* (Leeds: Community Religions Project, University of Leeds, 1992) and Nesbitt, *Aspects of Sikh Tradition*.
17. R. Ballard, 'Differentiation and Disjunction amongst the Sikhs in Britain' in R. Ballard (ed.) *Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain* (London: Hurst, 1994) 109–12.
18. C. Moliner, *Expérience Diasporique et Construction Identitaire: La Communauté Sikhe de Grande Bretagne* (unpublished memoire de DEA, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1993–94), Appendix vii.

19. Gurpal Singh, 'Mainstream Sikhs in South Wales', *Sikh Bulletin* 12 (1995).
20. P. Bhachu, *Twice Migrants: East African Sikh Settlers in Britain* (London: Tavistock, 1985).
21. Moliner, *Experiénce Diasporique*, 40.
22. Nesbitt, *Aspects of Sikh Tradition; idem, The Religious Lives of Sikh Children*.
23. A. Purewal, *Home–School Relationships of Punjabis in Bedford* (unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Cranfield Institute of Technology, 1976).
24. Ballard, 'Differentiation and Disjunction'.
25. For opposition to McLeod's analysis see Jagjit Singh, *Perspectives on Sikh Studies* (New Delhi: Guru Nanak Foundation, 1985). For McLeod's characterisation of 'traditionalist' and 'sceptical' historians see W.H. McLeod, *Historical Dictionary of Sikhism* (Lanham: Scarecrow, 1995).
26. S. Mitra, 'Caste, democracy and the Politics of Community Formation in India' in Searle–Chatterjee and Sharma, *Contextualising Caste*, 49–71.
27. Searle–Chatterjee and Sharma, *Contextualising Caste*, 6.
28. S. Vertovec, *Hindu Trinidad: Religion, Ethnicity and Socio-Economic Change* (London: Macmillan, 1992).
29. S. Warrier, 'Gujarati Prajapatis in London: Family Roles and Sociability Networks', in Ballard, *Desh Pardesh*, 191–212.
30. R. Dwyer, 'Caste, Religion and Sect in Gujarat', in Ballard, *Desh Pardesh*, 165–90; M. Michaelson, 'Domestic Hinduism in a Gujarati Trading Caste', in R. Burghart (ed.), *Hinduism in Great Britain: The Perpetuation of Religion in an Alien Cultural Milieu* (London: Tavistock, 1987) 32–49; E.M. Nesbitt, 'Valmikis in Coventry: The Revival and Reconstruction of a Community', in Ballard, *Desh Pardesh*, 117–41; D. Pocock, 'Preservation of the Religious Life: Hindu Immigrants in England', *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 10, 2 (1976) 341–65.
31. K. Knott, 'The Gujarati Mochis in Leeds: From Leather Stockings to Surgical Boots and Beyond', in Ballard, *Desh Pardesh*, 213–30.
32. Warrier, 'Gujarati Prajapatis'.
33. H. Kanitkar, 'Caste in Contemporary Hindu Society', in D. Bowen (ed.), *Hinduism in England* (Bradford: Bradford College, 1981) 86.
34. This was in India. Similarly Knott, 'The Gujarati Mochis' (228) cites the older *mochis*' memory of discrimination in Gujarat, corroborated by Naina Parmar (verbal communication).
35. Dermot Killingley cites Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 1.4 as a scriptural precedent for relegating the ant to the bottom of the scale (oral communication).
36. The Punjabi belonged to the National Hindu Students' Forum, attended the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh and had heard weekly ISKCON homilies during his childhood. In addition to formal nurture in the *bal vikas* run by devotees of Sathya Sai Baba, the Gujarati also took part in Sangh activities.
37. E.M. Nesbitt, 'Sikhs and Proper Sikhs: Young British Sikhs' Perceptions of their Identity', in Pashaura Singh and N.G. Barrier (eds), *Sikh Identity: Continuity and Change* (Delhi: Manohar, 1998).

38. Nesbitt 'Sikhs and Proper Sikhs'. As pointed out by Naina Parmar (letter) some Gujarati Brahmins do regard Brahmins as more Hindu than others.
39. Nesbitt, *Aspects of Sikh Tradition*.
40. Nesbitt, *My Dad's Hindu*.
41. A. Shukra, 'Caste—A Personal Perspective' in Searle-Chatterjee and Sharma, *Contextualising Caste*, 169–178.
42. J. Meikle, 'Harmony Guide Offends Hindus', *Guardian*, 5 July, 1996.
43. Searle-Chatterjee and Sharma, *Contextualising Caste*, 16.
44. Dwyer, 'Caste, Religions and Sect', 169.
45. Vertovec, *Hindu Trinidad*.
46. Knott, 'The Gujarati Mochis', 216.
47. McLeod, *Historical Dictionary*.
48. E.M. Nesbitt, 'Akhand Kirtani Jatha', in J. Bowker (ed.), *The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

Staying on in 1846: The Orchestration of the Treaty of Bhyrowal

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In March 1846, at the conclusion of the First Sikh War, the Treaty of Lahore established a British presence in the Punjab that was ostensibly temporary, and allowed the Punjabis to govern their own internal affairs. As the time for the British withdrawal approached, Lord Hardinge, who, from the beginning, intended a permanent British presence in the province, began a campaign of pressure and persuasion to ensure that the British would not only remain, but, consistent with policy throughout India during this period, assume a more interventionist role in the indirect governance of the Punjab. The Treaty of Bhyrowal, concluded in December 1846, brought Punjabi independence to an end even before the formal annexation of the province in 1849.

In late February, 1846, British troops marched through the imposing entrance to the outer walls of the great Moghul fort and palace of Lahore, majestically sited on high ground on the north-west side of the city, overlooking the river Ravi. They continued uphill through the Elephant Foot's Gate on to the central high ground containing living quarters and audience pavilions. Shah Jahan's throne room, the *Takht*, which also served as his audience hall, the *Diwan-i-Aam*, was taken over as a barrack, along with other buildings in the square. The emperor's sleeping pavilion became the garrison church, and the officers of the new occupying power scrambled for accommodation in apartments not occupied by Maharani Jind Kaur and the young Maharajah Duleep Singh, or found quarters in the houses of Durbar chiefs requisitioned in the town below. Not long afterwards, in early March, the Durbar and their new masters gathered in the Palace of Mirrors, the *Shish Mahal*, where Ranjit Singh had been

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accustomed to hold receptions, to watch the formal transfer of power in the Punjab to the British government.[1]

The instruments for this transfer were two documents, the Treaty of Lahore of 9 March 1846, and the Articles of Agreement of 11 March 1846.[2] In the aftermath of the battle of Sobraon and the collapse of the Khalsa army, the Durbar had appointed Golab Singh Dogra to negotiate a treaty of peace, hoping to preserve, if possible, some scrap of independence. On the other hand, the Governor-General, Sir Henry Hardinge, was determined to reduce the Punjabi army, deprive the kingdom of territory and wealth, and make it a client state of British India.[3] On these issues, Hardinge prevailed. Consequently, the terms of the Treaty of Lahore required the Durbar to pay a war indemnity of one-and-a-crore rupees, reduce its army to 20,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, cede control of both banks of the Sutlej River, and give up the Jullundur Doab, a territory which afforded considerable revenue and allowed the British to extend their military frontier to the Beas River. Unable to pay the full war indemnity, the Durbar instead ceded the hill territories between the Beas and the Indus, including Kashmir and Hazara. Hardinge, realising that he could not extend his military establishment over such a wide region, retained for the Punjab the hill regions that encompassed Kulu, Mandi, Nurpur and Kangra. The rest was made over to Golab Singh in return for 75 lakh rupees of tribute. Golab Singh, a consummate politician who had already established himself as a virtually independent ruler in Jammu, was now recognised as Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir. The Punjab Ranjit Singh had spent a lifetime putting together was now a diminished and subject remnant of its former self.

There were further provisions of the two documents that are of central importance to the events to be described in this paper. First, in the Treaty itself, Article 15 stated that 'the British Government will not exercise any interference in the internal administration of the Lahore State.'[4] Second, in the Articles of Agreement, the preamble noted that the Lahore Government 'has solicited the Governor-General to leave a British force at Lahore, for the protection of the Maharajah's person and of the capital, till the reorganisation of the Lahore army.'[5] Article One stated that the British accordingly would leave 'such force as shall seem to the Governor-General adequate for the purpose of protecting the person of the Maharajah and the inhabitants of the City of Lahore', a force that would be withdrawn at the close of the current year, 1846.[6] The force could be withdrawn earlier if the Durbar desired, but would not be kept in Lahore beyond the end of 1846. The reduction of the

Khalsa army and its neutralisation, as well as the re-establishment of fiscal and administrative stability were the central aims of these and related articles of the treaty. From the beginning, the prospect of withdrawal of the British garrison was seen by Hardinge as his major means of exerting pressure on both the Maharani and the Durbar.

Henry Lawrence, the political agent for the Governor-General in the Punjab and North-West Frontier, now wielded central authority in the Punjab, and his brother John served under him as chief commissioner of the newly annexed Jullundur Doab. Such nominal independence as the court retained was centred in the Rani, who continued as regent for Maharajah Duleep Singh; in Lal Singh, who continued as *wazir*; in Dewan Deena Nath, chief administrator of the native government; and in a handful of influential chieftains. The Khalsa army, long feared by the Durbar, was no longer the dominant force in Punjabi politics, and was supplanted by the British, a situation that required the chief players in the court to redefine and reassert their positions. The factions that had survived the struggle for power after Ranjit Singh's death continued to survive as best as they could under the British. Golab Singh, the most successful of the three Dogra Hindu brothers and their faction, had parlayed his early overtures to the British into the governorship of Kashmir and Jammu. The major families of the Sikh aristocracy, chief among whom were the Sandhawalias, the Attariwalas and the Majithias, were also making their accommodation with the reality of British power, and would choose its promise of security—however onerous the price—over the exhortation to defiance made by the Rani. The third group of survivors—among them Diwan Deena Nath, Fakir Nur-ud-Din and Sirdar Tej Singh—raised to their *parvenu* chieftainships by Ranjit Singh, continued to feel their way delicately between Dogra and aristocrat, Rani and resident.[7] In the Punjab of 1846, the struggles of all these groups were as much for self-preservation as for power.

I

In August, the Governor-General turned his thoughts towards the question of the December deadline for withdrawal of the British garrison in Lahore, and the conditions under which the British should extend their stay. When Henry Lawrence was forced by his health to retire to the salubrious ridges of Simla, Hardinge sent John Lawrence to Lahore as Acting Resident, charging him to assess the performance of the Lahore

government, and to remind them that the Treaty of Lahore required that the British withdraw at the end of the year. On 10 September, the Governor-General, writing himself from Simla, and relying heavily on John's reports and recommendations, set forth to the Secret Committee his strategy for staying on. 'The British garrison', he wrote, 'ought not to remain beyond the stipulated period, if a Native Government continues to administer the affairs of the Punjab', because, in Hardinge's view, effective government was proving impossible under the present arrangement.[8] Because he believed that withdrawal of the troops would bring anarchy to the country, he thought it better for the British to continue to rule Lahore in the name of the Maharajah during the period of his minority, 'placing a British minister at the head of the Government, assisted by a Native Council, composed of the ablest and most influential chiefs.'[9] Although he did not state them in numerical order, Hardinge believed that three conditions were necessary to bring the Punjabis to a similar conclusion: (i) the Durbar and the chiefs would have to be convinced 'that the Government, without such as alternative, would fall to pieces on the retirement of the British garrison'; (ii) that even if the Maharani surrendered her regency, her acquiescence would have to be 'cordially and publicly assented to by the great majority of the chiefs'; and finally, (iii) that the Durbar would have to believe that the British were really willing to withdraw if their proposals were not accepted.[10] 'If no such proposal leading to modifications of the treaty should be made', Hardinge informed the Secret Committee,

> it is my intention to withdraw the British force from Lahore the latter end of December, in accordance with the agreement. I shall, in this case, have afforded the Lahore Durbar every facility in my power to avert the misfortune which the Vizier and his colleagues anticipate on the retirement of the troops.[11]

Hardinge had no intention of withdrawing his troops, as further evidence will demonstrate, but rather, exploiting the divisions between the Rani and Lal Singh on the one hand and the chiefs on the other, mounted a skillful campaign to achieve his terms. The centrepiece of his campaign, the public position on intended withdrawal, would be maintained right up to the eve of the new agreement on the continued British presence.

The first moves in Hardinge's campaign, then, were assigned to John Lawrence, who provided a continuing flow of ammunition for the Governor-General on the inadequacies of the present regime, and who

first informed the Durbar collectively and individually that the British were not prepared to leave a resident and troops in Lahore when the Durbar refused to accept advice and effect reforms that would ensure the stability of the state. Making the same point to the Maharani in early September, John Lawrence recapitulated the nagging problems of arrears of pay to the army, the employment of Afghan troops as a personal bodyguard by Lal Singh, neglect of the internal affairs of the country, and the disorganisation of its finances. 'Notwithstanding all my remonstrances', John Lawrence said to Jind Kaur,

> little or nothing had been done in consequence; that the Rajah always promised but seldom performed, and that I considered that our honour and good name would be involved if we remained, and allowed affairs to be conducted as they had been.[12]

The Maharani replied that she and the Durbar had been wrestling with the threat of withdrawal by the British ever since the Acting Resident had raised it, and now concluded that 'the existence of the Government, indeed of her own life and that of the Maharajah depended on its presence and that of the British representative in Lahore.'[13] The Durbar, she continued, would agree to any terms which the Government might choose to impose. 'I concluded the interview', John Lawrence noted, 'by saying that the Durbar had better write to government ... but that I had no authority to hold out any hope of a successful result to their application.'[14] In fact, neither the Rani nor the Durbar proved quite so eager to acquiesce, but the threat of withdrawal had now been openly and convincingly expressed.

It was also John Lawrence who suggested the political solution that Hardinge pressed upon the Durbar, and he who first floated the proposition in Lahore, surely at the instruction of Hardinge. Shortly before offering the Maharani the bleak prospect of virtual desertion by the British, John Lawrence had, a few days earlier, suggested an alternative possibility to Sirdar Runjoor Singh Majithia. 'Suppose', he said to Runjoor Singh,

> that the British government were to undertake to manage the country until the young Maharajah arrives at years of discretion, suppose there was no Vizier but a Sahib at Lahore to control affairs, with the Sirdars to consult. Suppose he managed the country, appointed and removed the officers of Government, superintended the army, determined the

> expenses of the state, collected the revenue, and in short was Vizier himself . . . How would it answer?[15]

Runjoor Singh replied that the chiefs would be happy with such an arrangement, but that Lal Singh and the Maharani would be dissatisfied. John Lawrence reported to Hardinge that the Durbar really believed the army would be withdrawn, but, he continued, 'it seems that the mass of the people are still incredulous, thinking that it is impossible that we would give up so rich a country.'[16] One can only applaud the good sense of the people of Lahore, and wonder if the chiefs were really so credulous. 'The Maharanee and most of the Durbar', John continued,

> would wish that things remain just as they are, the army being retained until things are settled, that is—for an indefinite period: that is—that they should rule the country, and the British Government keep it in order.[17]

The initial proposal for a regency may have been made to John Lawrence by a chieftain,[18] but Lawrence, probably after consultation with Hardinge on 3 September, and two days after Hardinge's letter of 9 September to the Secret Committee, put forward the proposal in an official communication to the Governor-General. Hardinge, in his letter to the Secret Committee, had noted that the idea of a British regency 'has constantly occupied my attention since the 3rd of September.'[19] Lawrence's subsequent letter (of 11th September) began with a passage setting out his fears of what would happen if the British withdrew from Lahore, an opinion already passed on by Hardinge to the Secret Committee. Lawrence did not believe that the Maharani and Rajah Lal Singh would survive the first month of a British withdrawal, and thought that Bhai Ram Singh, Sirdar Tej Singh, and Dewan Deena Nath were all unfit to govern. He prophesied the death of the Maharani and Lal Singh, a struggle for the custody of Duleep Singh, discontent and disaffection in the provinces, disturbances everywhere, governors unable to collect revenue, and mutiny in the army.[20] Following this apocalyptic sketch of the fate of the moral order in the Punjab if the British withdrew, Lawrence proceeded to his proposal. At the risk of stepping beyond the line of duty, he wrote, he recommended that the Government undertake the management of the country in trust for Duleep

Singh. 'It will not', he thought, 'be politic, it will not be just, that we leave it to fall into anarchy.'[21]

John Lawrence believed that most people would welcome or at least acquiesce in British control. He did not think such a step would be popular with the chiefs and other holders of jaghirs, nor did he think that the clerkly classes, who accumulated fortunes under the present system, would be pleased. In short, he saw the regency scheme as a way of removing the two major financial and moral abuses he had been forced to tolerate during his term as acting resident. He was prepared to maintain the present aristocracy, and much of the army, but

> we should reserve the disbursement of the revenue and the appointment of offices in our own hands; we should limit the expenses of the state, curtail the present lavish waste of the court, and put a stop to all the corruption which now exists.[22]

John Lawrence's desire for control over domestic finances and appointment of offices pushed his interpretation of indirect rule towards a much more interventionist stance than either Henry Lawrence or Lord Hardinge envisioned in respect of the daily administration of the province. When he assumed the acting residency again in 1847, this was the agenda he would pursue.

In early October, Henry Lawrence had left Simla to take charge of the expedition to remove the recalcitrant Sheikh Imam-ud-Din from Kashmir and replace him with Golab Singh. In November, his mission accomplished, Henry was engaged in correspondence with Frederick Currie, Secretary to the Government of India, over the newly discovered evidence of Lal Singh's sedition in supporting Imam-ud-Din, and also over the question of the new treaty to be concluded the following month. Henry, whose loose tongue occasionally unnerved his superiors, felt obliged to reassure Currie that he had not given the game away, but continued to maintain the public line on British willingness to withdraw from the Punjab. 'In regard to Lahore matters', he wrote,

> I don't think that I have either written or spoken otherwise than might be printed, the gist of it being that Government will be delighted as will every individual in our service at Lahore to retire, but that if those concerned wish us to stay, they must say so in time to enable Government to decide and to state the conditions . . . . Whatever is to be done let me or John have orders in good time.[23]

On the same day, 6 November, Henry wrote to John, who was still in Lahore, in language that makes it evident that, contrary to their public stance, the British expected to stay in the Punjab, with Henry continuing as resident, and with enhanced powers. 'The less said about the Lahore plans the better for the present', Henry wrote,

> I should like you to be deputy, not simply for Lahore, but to take up portions of my work occasionally and dispose of letters in my absence. I should like to get Edgeworth or if not him Montgomery or Cox for revenue, George [Lawrence] for pay, and Edwardes would perhaps do for police . . . . The three at Lahore would be a sort of council, Edgeworth or George as president. I should like to have Christian and Lumsden as personal assistants, one civil, the other military . . . . If Christian does not like the idea and you wish to have him for the settlements instead of Cust it can be managed.[24]

The shape of Henry's projected establishment is closer to the 1849 post-annexation administration of the Punjab than it would be of his residency, but he and Hardinge certainly had been discussing the governance of the Punjab after 1846, and certainly were in no doubt about staying on.

By December, Lal Singh's guilt in secretly encouraging Sheikh Imam-ud-Din to resist was established, making both the Maharani and the Durbar even more vulnerable to the charge that they could not provide a stable and secure administration. 'The guilt of the Vizier being established', Hardinge wrote privately to Frederick Currie, 'strengthens the necessity of our refusing to leave British troops in Lahore under a Native government.'[25] Hardinge claimed the moral high ground in describing Lal Singh's intrigue as one against the very government that protected and nurtured him. British forbearance in not holding the entire state responsible for Lal Singh's sedition was to be presented as proof of the sincerity of British intentions, and 'a useful prelude to the discussion now about to take place.'[26] On 9 December, Hardinge sent a letter to the Durbar reminding them that the time was fast approaching for the departure of British troops.

According to Henry, now back at his post in Lahore, the majority of Sirdars were filled with alarm at the prospect of an immediate withdrawal. The Maharani, hitherto anxious for the troops to stay, and grief-stricken over the exile of Lal Singh, had told Henry she would leave with the troops. Now, however, she had second thoughts, he

reported, and during the last two days had been trying to persuade the Sirdars to agree to a scheme of independent government, of which she would be the head. Her chief counsellor in this effort appeared to him to have been Dewan Deena Nath, 'ever ill-disposed to the English' in Henry's view, and probably contemplating with alarm the possibility of the British as guardians of Duleep Singh. At this stage in their relationship, Henry Lawrence's view of Deena Nath was ambivalent. On the one hand, he saw him as an avaricious survivor of revolutions who thought his own advantage lay in continuing to have power under the Maharani. On the other hand, Henry thought,

> it may be that perceiving himself not only in the minority, but that he almost stood alone for the Maharani, he considered it a point of honour not to abandon her. He is a man both of courage and ability, and has his own notions of fidelity, however they may be opposed to ours.[27]

By 1847, Henry and Dewan Deena Nath had become friends.

There followed a heated debate between the Sirdars, the Maharani, and Dewan Deena Nath. Henry's sources reported to him that Tej Singh, the Commander-in-Chief, and Sher Singh Attariwallah, the young Maharajah's brother-in-law, took the lead in refusing to sign a paper declaring the Maharani as head of government. The debate continued for two days, Henry noted,

> eliciting strange Philippics and recriminations and even abuse within the palace, and usually with the Sirdars rising and retiring in a body, saying that the queen wished to bring ruin on her son and all the Khalsa; that she might act as she pleased, but for their part the palace was no place for respectable men, and that they would cross the Sutlej with the British troops.[28]

In a last, desperate, attempt to retain the status quo, on the 14th of December the Durbar finally decided that in reply to Hardinge's letter of the 9th of December that Deena Nath should write to Frederick Currie, still in Lahore after Lal Singh's trial and now acting as Hardinge's principal agent in the present negotiations, to ask that the British agent with two battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry and one battery of artillery remain in Lahore for some months.[29] Hardinge, already at Bhyrowal, on the right bank of the Beas, where he could keep in close touch with Currie, received this request on the same day and, pressing

his advantage, called the Durbar's bluff. 'The proposal made', he wrote to Currie, 'is so absurd, that I consider it as equivalent to the desire to undertake the management of their own affairs without our intervention.'[30] In other words, Hardinge, refusing to compromise on his demands, insisted that he would withdraw the garrison rather than remain on the same terms as the Treaty of Lahore. He was, quite rightly, convinced that the Durbar wanted a garrison badly enough to be willing to accept not only a British regency but also a resident with new powers over internal administration. Their rejection of the Maharani's leadership left them with no other choice.

On the 10th of December, Hardinge instructed Currie that the objective in Lahore should be not only to achieve the Government's aim of a regency, but also to make sure that the change of policy came as a request from the Durbar. The Articles of Agreement had stated that the British were in Lahore at the request of the Durbar; Hardinge wished to continue to represent the British as invited guests of the Lahore government. 'The coyness of the Durbar and the Sirdars is very natural', Hardinge wrote,

> but it is very important that the proposal should originate with them, and in any documents proceeding from them this admission must be stated in clear and unqualified terms; our reluctance to undertake a heavy responsibility must be set forth.[31]

Hardinge, anxious to make the most of the Durbar's split with the Maharani, believed that if the leading members of the Durbar, and especially the Attariwalah family, urged the British government to be Duleep Singh's guardian, the Maharani's power would cease 'silently and quietly'. Confident of the outcome, he discussed appointments in the new government, which included the continuance of Tej Singh as commander-in-chief, and Dewan Deena Nath as chief minister. He had spoken with John Lawrence on the morning of the 10 December, and apparently raised the possibility of annexation, perhaps as an alternative if the Durbar baulked at the present demands. John, now on his way to pick up his wife at Jullundur and return to Bhyrowal for a ceremony apparently planned already, was 'stout' against it, largely, it may be assumed, for financial reasons.[32] Hardinge then continued to bring pressure against the chiefs by arranging for a series of troop movements that would give the impression of a withdrawal, his object being 'to give the Lahore Durbar a hint that the garrison is on the move.'[33]

The Governor-General's rejection of the terms of the Durbar's letter of 14 December was matched on the other side by a stream of Sirdars pouring into Henry's tent to disown the proposal to maintain the status quo. It also emerged that Sher Singh Attariwalah had done precisely what Hardinge hoped for, and endorsed a British regency for his prospective brother-in-law Duleep Singh, a marriage he believed would make the Attariwalahs the most powerful family in the Punjab. With the Attariwalahs now favouring his proposal, Hardinge moved to neutralise the voice of the already isolated Maharani and take advantage of the emerging consensus among the Sirdars for a British regency. He instructed Currie to call a meeting of all the chiefs on 15 December, so that, as Henry put it in his official account for Currie, the Governor-General could get 'an honest expression of the wants, wishes, and opinions of the great body of the chiefs . . . unbiased by the Maharani's persuasion and abuse.'[34] Hardinge then advised Currie that at the meeting he should take his ground 'on the amount of force and the amount of money to be paid by the Lahore Government for its expense before you enter into other matters.'[35] At the meeting, Currie distributed a paper, translated into both Hindustani and Persian, informing the chiefs that if the British continued to assist them, 'they must understand that his interference would be complete, i.e., he would occupy Lahore, or any other part of the Punjab with what force he thought advisable.' The expense of the British garrison would be fixed, and the British resident would have full control over every department in the state until the maturity of the young Maharajah in 1854.[36]

Following Currie's request, Dewan Deena Nath asked for adjournement so that the Maharani might be consulted. Currie refused this request, and stipulated that the Sirdars and others must discuss the matter amongst themselves, and retired with Henry to another tent, to await the outcome of the Durbar's deliberations. They were informed shortly thereafter that the only point under debate was the amount of money for the maintenance of the troops, which Currie had placed at Rupees 24 lakhs. A deputation from the assembly appeared before Currie and Lawrence to argue for a reduction, and Currie eventually agreed to a sum of Rs 22 lakhs. The consent of each member of the deputation was asked, and duly inscribed by Henry's munshi. Currie, Lawrence, and Edwardes then returned to the assembly and took a similar statement from every Sirdar and officer of the court, of whom 51 were considered eligible to vote.[37] On the following day, 16 December, the treaty was signed.

Hardinge had got precisely what he wanted, and in the manner he had expected to get it.

However, in a letter to Currie that same day, there is a strong hint that Hardinge had been giving serious thought to the alternative of annexation. He congratulated Currie on 'realising all the objects I had in view', and expressed himself pleased with 'the moral effect of the Sikh Chiefs entreating the British Government to become the guardian of their Prince', which he believed would 'raise the reputation and [extend] the influence of the British character.'[38] But 'personally', he continued,

> I may regret that it has not been my fate to plant the British standard on the banks of the Indus. I have taken the less ambitious course, and I am consoled by the reflexion that I have acted right for the interests of England and of India. Be the judgment what it may, as far as I am concerned the struggle between Military feeling Political Duty is over—and I will refer to matters of business.[39]

The thrust of these remarks would appear to be that Hardinge as soldier believed that the best way to secure a stable and tranquil frontier was to annex the Punjab. In a letter written shortly afterwards to Henry Hobhouse, he reckoned that the Punjab would slide gradually into annexation.[40] However, John and Henry Lawrence, Frederick Currie, and perhaps others, convinced him that at this stage, at least, an interventionist form of indirect rule was politically, financially, and even militarily more practical. Hardinge had always believed that once it set foot in the Punjab, Britain should be the controlling power in the province. 'By the Treaty of Lahore, March 1846', he wrote to Henry Lawrence in 1847, 'the Punjab never was intended to be an independent state . . . . The native prince is in fetters, and under our protection, and must do our bidding.'[41] Of the Treaty of Bhyrowal, Hardinge wrote to Sir John Hobhouse that 'It is in reality annexation brought about by the suppression of the Sikhs, without entailing upon us the present expense and future inconvenience of a doubtful acquisition.'[42]

On the 26th of December, as John Lawrence had suggested to the Governor-General, Maharajah Duleep Singh journeyed to Hardinge's camp at Bhyrowal, where the ratification of the treaty was marked by a salute of British guns, a salute that to some, as a contemporary British historian remarked, 'must have sounded like the boom of minute guns over the grave of a once-powerful nation.'[43] Their years of bloody struggle

after the death of Ranjit Singh, and their disunity and defeat in the war with Britain had reduced them to a bleak choice between self-preservation, however, humiliating the terms, or the destructive chimera of independence offered by the Maharani. Obedient, in the end, to the realities of power in the Punjab, they understood fully the bitter fruit they would now taste. 'If the English stay, we will be ciphers', Fakir Nur-ud-Din told Henry Lawrence, some of the chiefs were saying. 'I replied', Henry said, 'that there was much truth in the observation, that such was generally the case whoever was in power; that he or they ruled and the other obeyed.'[44]

Henry Lawrence, of course, was now chief ruler in the Punjab, and surely delighted that Hardinge's course of action had elevated Lahore into an even more prestigious and powerful residency, a venue in which he could continue to exercise his political skills. In the summer of 1846, commenting on a tract by Edwardes on the functions of the political officer, Henry noted that Edwardes had failed to mention that such a person performed magisterial and fiscal duties as well as political, but that such duties came after conquest. When a territory was annexed, he said, it no longer had political relations with other kingdoms, and,

> though the same officers may be left to rule it, who formerly watched it when without our borders, yet to all intents and purposes they have become mere civilians. As a short distinction between the civil servant and the political agent, it may suffice to say that the duties of the latter lie between the period of connection and conquest; those of the former commence with conquest and extend over possession.[45]

Henry was in no doubt that he preferred to be a political agent before conquest, i.e., annexation. The day after the new treaty was signed in Lahore, Henry, obliged to write to Captain James Abbott on the matter of a new revenue survey for Khytul, brushed this civil matter aside as quickly as possible. 'I'll write again soon', he said, 'but I'm busy, just having been made Grand Vuzeer of the Lahore.'[46] That was the life for him.

II

It remains to summarise the terms of the Treaty of Bhyrowal, and to comment briefly on their implications in the context of the brief era of indirect rule in the Punjab.

True to Hardinge's intent, the preamble to the new treaty states that the Durbar and principal chiefs have communicated 'their anxious desire' that the Governor-General maintain the administration of Lahore State during the minority of Duleep Singh.[47] Article 1 reaffirms the validity of the Treaty of Lahore, but notes the key modification to Article 15, which, as mentioned above, had stated that 'the British Government will not exercise any interference in the internal administration of the Lahore State.' In the new treaty, Article 2 states that the British resident, with assistants, 'shall have full authority to direct and control all matters in every Department of State', a proposition repeated in Article 6. The details of administration were still to be conducted by native officials, who would now answer to the eight members of a Council of Regency, acting under the control and guidance of the resident. Five of these members, named in the treaty, were from the old Punjabi aristocracy: Shere Singh Attariwalah, Runjore Singh Majithia, Shumshere Singh Sindhanwalla, Utter Singh Kalewallah, and Bhae Nidhan Singh. The remaining three vacancies were taken up by Ranjit Singh's appointees: Tej Singh, Dewan Deena Nath, and Fakir Nur-ud-Din. The Rani, the only person removed from this shadow of a Punjabi power structure, ceased to be regent, and was pensioned off. Finally, in an extension of the second important provision noted earlier in the Treaty of Lahore, British troops were to remain not only in Lahore, but now allowed to occupy any fort or military post throughout the territory. The treaty was to be effective until the September, 1854, when Duleep Singh attained the age of 16 years. The young Maharajah was to be treated as the heir to a client state, still ruled only indirectly by the British, but in a much more interventionist manner than before Bhyrowal.

Michael Fisher has recently surveyed indirect rule in India, and has provided a historical framework of three periods up to 1857.[48] In the third period, 1841–57, Fisher notes that by the 1840s the Company had reached the geographical limits of its capacity to establish indirect rule, as witnessed by its failure to establish effective residencies in Afghanistan, Nepal, and Burma.[49] Disillusion and debate over the quality of internal administration a residency system could achieve resulted in a general tendency towards intervention and annexation during this period. The British ideal, Fisher remarks, was 'a tranquil, prosperous, but indigenous state governed by an "enlightened" ruler who anticipated and fulfilled every British policy with little or no need for the Resident's intervention.'[50] When this did not occur in the Punjab in 1846, Hardinge imposed a more interventionist policy but stopped short of complete

annexation, satisfying himself with the annexation of the Cis–Sutlej states. Dalhousie, who replaced Hardinge in 1848, took the opportunity of the Second Sikh War to bring the province into direct rule. However, even Dalhousie, noted for his annexationist bent, did not push this policy as far as the Court of Directors wished, and refused to annex all of Hyderabad or intervene in Bahawalpur. There was still debate over the relative virtues of indirect and direct rule throughout the 1850s. Following 1857, however, annexation ceased, and stable, indirect rule was re-established as a desirable policy for the residencies still in existence.

The history of indirect rule in the Punjab during the years 1846–48 reflects the general tendency towards greater intervention as sketched out above. The authority given by the Treaty of Bhyrowal to the resident allowed John Lawrence, when he replaced Henry again in 1847, to intervene in virtually every department of administration, pushing indirect rule much closer towards direct rule than either Hardinge or Henry Lawrence had intended. By 1848, John was already beginning to agitate for the abolition of the presentation of khilats, arguing that this aspect of court ritual was simply an unnecessary expense.[51] Thus the article of the Treaty of Lahore that promised to preserve native customs was beginning to be eroded even before formal annexation.

In summary, then, indirect rule in the Punjab began with the moderately interventionist Treaty of Lahore, became more strongly interventionist under the Treaty of Bhyrowal, and moved further towards the boundaries of direct rule during John Lawrence's acting residency in 1847–48. Hardinge was right in thinking that the Punjab was bound to be annexed in time. The combination of John Lawrence's impatience with native administration and the strategic position of the Punjab as a frontier state were pushing the British to ever greater degrees of intervention even before the uprising of 1848. That uprising may simply have meant that annexation came sooner rather than later to a state that by December 1846 had already effectively lost its independence.

Notes

1. See *Lahore District Gazetteer* (Lahore, 1883–84), 178–80.
2. These documents are reproduced in Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), Vol. 2, 326–33.
3. Ibid., p. 55.

4. Ibid., p. 330.
5. Ibid., p. 331.
6. Ibid.
7. See Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, 3–39, and Andrew J. Major, 'The Punjabi Chieftains and the Transition from Sikh to British Rule', in D.A. Low (ed.) *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan* (London: Macmillan, 1991), 53–85.
8. H. Hardinge to Secret Committee, Dispatch No. 2, 10 September 1846. Reproduced in Henry Lawrence, 'Lord Hardinge's Indian Administration', in *Essays Military and Political* (London: W.H. Allen, 1859), p. 312. This essay was originally published in *The Calcutta Review* in 1847.
9. Ibid., p. 314.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 315.
12. J. Lawrence to F. Currie, 11 September 1846, Punjab Government Records (Hereafter PGR), Book 174A, Nr. 16, pp. 73–80. These records, housed in the Punjab Archives in Lahore, are catalogued in *Press Lists of Old Records in the Punjab Secretariat* (Lahore, 1915), Vol. IX, Lahore Agency and Residency, 1846–47.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. J. Lawrence to F. Currie, 9 September 1846, ibid., 174A, 14, pp. 64–70.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Andrew Major, in 'The Punjabi Chieftains', p. 64, notes that Hardinge reported this to the Secret Committee. See Foreign Secret Proceedings (hereafter FSP), 26 December 1846, No. 1041, National Archives of India, New Delhi.
19. Lawrence, 'Administration of Lord Hardinge', p. 312.
20. J. Lawrence to F. Currie, 11 September 1846, PGR 174A, 16, pp. 73–80.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. H. Lawrence to F. Currie, 6 November 1846, in *Henry Lawrence Papers* (Hereafter HLP) India Office Library, London, MSS Eur F. 85, Vol. 6, pp. 63–64. Available only on microfilm, IOR Neg. 20879.
24. H. Lawrence to J. Lawrence, 6 November 1846, HLP, 6, p. 66.
25. H. Hardinge to F. Currie, 6 December 1846. Cited from a selection of Hardinge's letters in Jagmohan Mahajan, *Annexation of the Punjab* (Delhi: Spantech Publishers, Revised Edition, 1990), 104.
26. Ibid.
27. H. Lawrence to F. Currie, 17 December 1846, PGR 174, 121, pp. 144–51.
28. Ibid.
29. See Mahajan, *Annexation of the Punjab*, 44–45. For another account of this episode based on Mahajan, see N.M. Khilnani, *Rise of the Sikh Power in the Punjab* (Delhi: Independent Publishing Co., 1990), 76–82.

30. H. Hardinge to F. Currie, 14 December 1846, in Mahajan, *Annexation of the Punjab*, 112.
31. H. Hardinge to F. Currie, 10 December 1846, ibid., p. 107.
32. Ibid.
33. H. Hardinge to F. Currie, 12 December 1846, in Mahajan, *Annexation of the Punjab*, 43.
34. H. Lawrence to F. Currie, 17 December 1846, PGR 174, 121, pp. 144–51.
35. H. Hardinge to F. Currie, 14 December 1846, in Mahajan, *Annexation of the Punjab*, 113.
36. H. Lawrence to F. Currie, 17 December 1846, PGR 174, 121, pp. 144–51; Mahajan, *Annexation of the Punjab*, 47.
37. Ibid.
38. H. Hardinge to F. Currie, 16 December 1846, in Mahajan, *Annexation of the Punjab*, 114.
39. Ibid.
40. Andrew Major, 'The Punjabi Chieftains', 65. See H. Hardinge to H. Hobhouse, 21 January 1847, in Hasrat (ed.), *The Punjab Papers*, 117.
41. H. Hardinge to H. Lawrence, 14 August 1847, cited in Singh, *History of the Sikhs*, 56.
42. Cited in Singh, *History of the Sikhs*, 60.
43. Mahajan, *Annexation of the Punjab*, 48.
44. H. Lawrence to F. Currie, 10 December 1846, PGR 174, 119.
45. Undated letters, August 1846, HLP, 6, 44.
46. H. Lawrence to J. Abbott, 17 December 1846, HLP, p. 74.
47. This passage and those following are cited from the text reproduced in Singh, *History of the Sikhs*, 334–37.
48. Michael H. Fisher, *Indirect Rule in India: Residents and the Residency System* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991), 123–68.
49. Ibid., p. 242.
50. Ibid., p. 243.
51. J. Lawrence to H. Elliott, 1 March 1848, PGR 178, 40, pp. 31–36.

Marxism, Indian State and Punjab

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Randhir Singh, *Of Marxism And Indian Politics* (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1990), 80 pp., Rs. 40 (hb), ISBN 81-202-0267-8.
Randhir Singh, *Five Lectures In Marxist Mode* (Delhi, Ajanta Publications, 1993), 131 pp., Rs. 115 (hb), ISBN 81-202-0395-X.
Shashi Joshi, *Struggle for Hegemony in India 1920–47: The Colonial State, the Left and the National Movement, Vol. I: 1920–34* (New Delhi, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd, 1992), 376 pp., Rs. 325 (hb), ISBN 81–7036–259–8 (India) & 0–8039–9405–2 (US).
Bhagwan Josh, *Struggle for Hegemony in India 1920–47: The Colonial State, the Left and the National Movement, Vol. II: 1934–41* (New Delhi, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd, 1992), 331 pp., Rs. 325 (hb), ISBN 81–7036–295–4 (India) & 0–8039–9439–7 (US).
Shashi Joshi, Bhagwan Josh, *Struggle for Hegemony in India 1920–47: Culture, Community and Power, Vol. III: 1941–47* (New Delhi, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., 1994), 403 pp., Rs. 375 (hb), ISBN 8–1703–6295–4 (India) & 0–8309–9439–7 (US).
K.V.R. (ed.) *Prison House: Rose Garden, Seminar Papers on the Nationality Question in India* (Bangalore, AILRC, 1993). 111 pp., Rs. 15 (pb), No ISBN.

The authors of these books (Randhir Singh, Bhagwan Josh and Shashi Joshi) and of the two papers in the edited volume reviewed here (Gurbir Singh and Darshan Sharma) have several things in common with each other: one, they all belong to the different shades of the Left–Marxist tradition in India; two, they are all Punjabis but not living in Punjab (except Sharma who, I believe, lives in Punjab). Randhir Singh is a political scientist and Bhagwan Josh and Shashi Joshi are historians. They are based in Delhi though Randhir Singh has recently shifted to Chandigarh after retirement. Gurbir Singh is a journalist for The *Economic*

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Times in Bombay. They have all dealt with Punjab in their books/papers as a part of their work dealing with India as a whole. The differences in their approaches to the question of state, ethnicity, nationalism and culture in India are a reflection of the interesting diversity on the viewpoints in the Marxist tradition in India, and particularly in the Punjab.

I

Randhir Singh, who is more well-known in the world of political science for his powerful and widely reviewed critique of Michael Oakeshott,[1] has provided a brief overview of his academic and political life in an essay 'In Lieu of Bio-Data' in his *Of Marxism and Indian Politics*. This is a welcome addition to the autobiographical literature in Punjab. In this book, his paper on 'Marxists and the Sikh Extremist Movement in Punjab' is likely to be of most interest for the readers of this journal. Published originally in *Economic and Political Weekly* in 1987, this paper is still the best Marxist critique of what he calls 'the Ribeiro–Giri Lal Jain–Bipan Chandra line' of resolving the Punjab crisis by using the repressive power of the Indian State to liquidate the Sikh extremists. The ridiculous spectacle of CPI and CPI(M) joining the BJP in the 'united all-party rallies' against Sikh extremism, he demonstrates, was a direct consequence of following this suicidal line, and he argues that this line not only reinforces the class rule of the Indian State but also feeds the aggressive Hindu-chauvinist nationalism. The subsequent events prove that the BJP-led forces have been the main beneficiary of this disastrous line.

The focus of Randhir Singh's criticism of the Sikh extremists is the 'pro-Dilli Sarkar consequences of their ideological–political practice'. For a Marxist, the central thrust of a theoretical critique of Sikh extremists ought to be, in my view, the theocratic vision of Khalistan espoused by the Sikh extremists. If theocracy, instead of secessionism (the distinction is vital in spite of its overlap in the case of the Khalistan movement), is made the focus of the critique of the Sikh extremists, it provides us a common theoretical standpoint to criticise all forms of political visions based on theocracy—Hindutva, Islamic or Khalistani. The dominant Left tendency (CPI–CPI(M) and some Naxalite groups and many individuals allied to this tendency) instead focused on secessionism as the basis of its critique of Khalistan. From a rigorous Marxist point of view, secessionism and nationalism are not ideologically different phenomena,[2] they can be both historically progressive as well

as retrogressive. A secessionist movement in a specific historical juncture may be progressive and the one for keeping the existing nation together may be retrogressive as much as the reverse may be true in another historical juncture.

Of the several gaps identified by Randhir Singh himself in his paper, the most serious ones relate to the questions of 'culture, religion and language, ethnicity and nationality'. I may add the related question of centre–state relations/federalism because this question raises the issue of multiple nationalisms in India and the potential for a critique of one unitary nationalism to which Randhir Singh subscribes in a qualified form (p. 42). His paper is a very valuable part of the literature on the Sikh militant movement because it was one of the few to postulate a 'third path', critical of the discourse both of the Indian State as well as that of the Sikh extremists.

His paper on 'In Memory of Punjab Revolutionaries of 1914-15' in his *Five Lectures in the Marxist Mode* is replete with illuminating reflections on the subjective motivations of the Punjab revolutionaries and is a fascinating addition to our understanding of the Ghadar movement. Inspired by the memory of the Ghadar heroes, Randhir Singh tears apart the discourse of Indian nationalism after 1947 and ridicules the mainstream Indian Left for its 'failure to develop an independent alternative politics' (p. 110). Some of his remarks are worth quoting to give the reader a flavour of his ideas:

> Nationalism has virtually disarmed the Communist Left ideologically .... Joining in the competitive nationalism of the dominant bourgeois politics, speaking the same language and loudmouthing the same slogans of 'national development', 'national integration', 'national mainstream', 'unity and integrity of India', and sharing the same fears of 'destabilisation', etc., has led this Left again and again to an 'appealing' or 'deploring', more or less active, tailist alignment with one or the other ruling class political formation .... (p. 111).

Both these books have some other papers on issues like communalism, state terrorism and democratic rights which would be of interest to Punjab scholars. In terms of moral and intellectual qualities, Randhir Singh is one of the tallest intellectuals India has produced in the last few decades and Punjabis can be genuinely proud of him. I hope that he is able to write more on Punjab than he has done in the past.

II

The three-volume study by Shashi Joshi and Bhagwan Josh is a refreshing treatment of their subject of study and, therefore, enjoyable to read. The first two volumes are more historical in nature in terms of disciplinary boundaries while the third one is comparatively footloose: a mixture of historical generalisations and observations covering more than five centuries of Indian history from the medieval period to the demolition of the Ayodhya mosque on December 6, 1992, imaginative and daring claims, innovative introductions to some subjects of enquiry (e.g., the chapter on 'Women and Sexuality in the Discourse of Communalism and Communal Violence') and a highly problematic set of positions on the contemporary Indian political reality. The first two volumes examine the relationship between the Left (more specifically the Stalinist–Communist movement) and the nationalist movement (more specifically the Gandhi–Nehru led Congress movement) in India from 1920 to 1947. The rupture between the first two volumes and the third one is so stark that it appeared to be written not by the same authors. I even wondered after reading the third volume whether they would have liked to rewrite or rather they should have rewritten the first two volumes. However, there could be a reasonable justification for considering the existing three volumes as a set: there is a continuity of the theoretical enterprise they undertook to launch.

For the readers of this journal, this study may be of interest from two angles. One, the theoretical framework they have used and two, the observations on the Punjabi Communist movement in the first two volumes and on the Sikh Gurus and Maharaja Ranjit Singh in the third volume as a part of their over all project. The central concept of their theoretical framework is hegemony, which they have used in an adapted form of the concept of hegemony developed by the Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci.[3] It is around this concept of hegemony that they have tried to examine how a particular state (Moghul, Ranjit Singh, British colonial and the Indian nationalist state) establishes or secures its hegemony, how different political movements (e.g., left, nationalist, secular and 'communal') contest for hegemony, how culture plays a central role in the state's or political movement's contest for hegemony and how religion occupies the overarching role in this cultural contest for hegemony. They have used concepts like 'cultural faultline' or 'cultural internality' in their endeavour to demonstrate the centrality of religion in the cultural contest of hegemony and since all contests for

hegemony are about power, the relationships of power and hierarchy between different communities and cultures are brought in for examining the character of cultural contests within a culture and between cultures.

In the first two volumes, they have examined the character of the British colonial state in India and how the Left and the nationalist movements developed their political strategies towards each other and towards the state and how the state responded to these movements. Their argument is that the British colonial state did not rule only by using the repressive state apparatus but also by trying constantly to win the consent of the Indian people. The central core of the strategy to win the consent of the Indian people involved building a regime based on the rule of law and on the politics of accommodation with the Indian elite. They argue that the Communists in India devised their political strategy, organisational structures and tactical methods on the pattern of the Leninist theory of the underground and centralist party which had evolved out of a special historical experience of responding to a very authoritarian Czarist state. The Congress Party strategy, in comparison, based on building a mass movement with the long-term perspective of seeking hegemony over the minds and hearts of Indian people, was a more appropriate way of winning power in a society ruled by a 'semi-hegemonic State' like the British colonial state. They have suggested that had the Communists, instead of organising themselves into a separate party, worked within the Congress, they would have contributed to transforming the character of the Congress party and the national movement towards a more socialistically-oriented organisation and movement.

Their conceptualisation of the British colonial state as a semi-hegemonic state and their arguments about the inappropriateness of the Leninist insurrectionary party organisation and strategy to India are persuasive. However, their insistence that the Communists should have dissolved their separate organisational identity and merged with the Congress is not convincingly justified. Two different strands of criticism of the Indian Communists have been mixed up. For example, in Volume 1, it is argued that 'the organisational victory of a *separate, independent "left" party* and a *popular armed insurrection* were an imperative necessity as the Communists believed to the point of obsession.'(p. 32, emphasis mine). One strand of criticism of the Indian Communists is that they believed in armed insurrectionary strategy. The other strand of criticism of the Indian Communists is their strategy of keeping a distinct and separate party identity. The second strand of criticism seems to

have been deduced from the first. One may accept that a strategy based on popular insurrection was historically inappropriate and still may argue that the Communist party needed to have an independent identity even to build a non-violent mass movement.

In their defence of the Gandhian strategy of non-violence, their treatment of the armed forms of resistance to the British colonial state as obstacles in the Indian people's struggle for independence seems to be similar to those who, from the opposite side, over emphasise the contribution of armed struggle and criticise Gandhi and Nehru as 'collaborators' and obstacles.[4]

A more fruitful approach may be to abandon the doctrinaire position on violence vs non-violence and investigate the complementarity (as well as the conflict) between the two forms of struggle. One may argue that the revolutionary terrorists acquired great popularity because of the existence of popular nationalist consciousness generated by the non-violent mass movement and, in turn, their bravery and sacrifices heightened the mass popular consciousness which contributed to expanding the popular base of the non-violent mass movement. The complementarity between the two forms of struggle may also be seen in the response of the state to the two movements. The threat of a revolutionary armed uprising compels the state to be more conciliatory towards moderate leadership and expands its mass appeal. On the other hand, the existence of a mass movement may restrain the state from using too repressive a policy towards armed revolutionary groups and individuals for fear of escalating the mass movement. As an example of an armed uprising forcing the state to be more conciliatory towards moderate leadership, one may refer to the naval mutiny of 1946 and the general strike in Bombay in sympathy with the mutineers which played a decisive role in accelerating the transfer of power to the moderate nationalist leadership in 1947. I am not suggesting that the violent and non-violent forms of struggle cannot be mutually competitive and antagonistic. What I am suggesting is that *their mutual complementarity also needs to be explored* which the participants in the two forms of struggle may not be consciously aware of but the historian with the benefit of hindsight can capture. The exploration of complementarity between non-violent and violent forms of struggle may add an entirely new dimension to our understanding of India's freedom struggle and, perhaps, even that of post-independent politics. From the authors' perspective too, the complementarity view of contests may contribute to constructing a more complex and richer view of hegemonic contests

than one conceptualised as merely conflictual and competitive. In the third volume, the authors have focused on the state both as a site for cultural contest between competing religious communities as well as an instrument of building cultural hegemony of religious communities in control of the state, over other religious communities. The Moghul state, the British colonial state and the Indian nationalist state are examined from this perspective. The Moghul state with all its diversities from Akbar to Aurangzeb is seen as the vehicle of Muslim cultural hegemony. Similarly, the Punjabi state of Maharaja Ranjit Singh is seen as the carrier and builder of Sikh cultural hegemony. The British state is posited as acting and being seen as acting as a 'neutral' one between the two major religious communities of India—Hindus and Muslims. The authors argue that the British state did not attempt Christian cultural hegemony and, is, therefore, a different kind of state from the Moghul state. The prospect of freedom from the British state is seen as opening the terrain for cultural contests for hegemony between Hindus and Muslims. Seen in this perspective, the emergence of a Muslim-hegemonic Pakistan appears to be not a product of some developments in the 1940's or 1930's but almost as pre-ordained in the five centuries of Indian history beginning with the Moghul rule. The independent Indian state is therefore called upon to deal with the question of the quest for Hindu cultural hegemony and the book concludes by saying that after what the BJP 'did on 6 December 1992, India can never be the same again'. This indeed is an enigmatic and problematic conclusion.

A fruitful exercise may be to map out typologies of hegemonies—not only those which have existed in history but also those which *can* be projected onto the present and eventually, to the future. An enquiry in this direction may produce a spectrum of hegemonies varying in a sliding scale from an authoritarian one to an accommodative one and eventually to an almost non-existent one (which may be the closest to the egalitarian vision of an end to all forms of hegemonies and domination). The study of hegemony can become the basis for legitimising hegemony but it may not necessarily be so. The study of hegemony may well be the prerequisite for a critique of hegemony and eventually for transcendence of all hegemonies—national, racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, sexual, etc.

Their enterprise to take up religion as a subject for serious study in the formulation of state policy is laudable and a welcome departure from the rigid polarisation between 'secularist' and 'communalist' policies, which has characterised the dominant currents in the nationalist

historiography in India. One may argue that in the India of 1950s, 60s and 70s, Nehruvian secularism was the ideology of the Indian State and the historical interpretations of the Moghul rule which underplayed the 'muslimness' of the Moghul state may have been compatible with the ideological needs of the Indian State in that period. Therefore, 'secular' historians through 'secular' interpretations of the Moghul state were also legitimising the 'secular' ideology of the Indian State. An exercise in demystifying that secularism may be necessary from the viewpoint of historical correction if a correction is at all possible. But the question, however, does arise: whose needs will this 'correction' fulfil in the India of the 1990s where aggressive Hindutva is roaring like a lion? Could one say that as secular mystification fulfilled the needs of the 'secular' Indian State till the 1970s, its attempted demystification in 1990s may fulfil the needs of the rising Hindutva ideology? If the claim by Benedetto Croce, the Italian philosopher and literary critic, that all history is contemporary history is accepted even as a partial truth, the political implications for present day India of the exercise the authors have undertaken need to be carefully pondered over.

Like it happens to any academic enterprise which views itself as a break from the existing world of knowledge, they seem to have overdone it. In opposition to the relative neglect of religion in the writings of many 'secular' historians, they have attached over-importance to religion in explaining political contest and conflict. In defining cultural contest for hegemony, religion has been unproblematically chosen as the overarching force over all other forms of social identity viz., class, caste, region, nationality, language, ethnicity and gender. As a result, many of their formulations end up as assertions or opinions. Some of their formulations are vulnerable to being characterised as essentialist about some religious communities and as suggestive of the inevitability of religious and ethnic conflicts. Their reference to Ireland, Lebanon and Punjab as situations of 'permanent civil war' (Vol. 3, pp. 77–78) could be considered as examples of this essentialism and inevitability. In the light of this, it appears as if they were arguing that the political projects of pluralism, coexistence, secularism and egalitarianism are fundamentally flawed.

The value of their work may be seen more in terms of their point of departure than in their point of arrival. It is hoped that in the further development of their work, they will clarify many doubts raised by their work and that they will look more carefully at many of their contentions and claims which require historical substantiation. They

may also like to amplify some of their more notable contributions, e.g., on the question of sexuality as a part of the cultural contest. More research in this area has the potentiality of not only bringing new dimensions to the understanding of religious sectarianism but also of contributing to enlarge the scope of gender studies. However, given the sensitive nature of the research in this area in terms of its implications for relations between communities, it is necessary to be extra cautious in selecting and rejecting stories and narratives. I wondered why considerations on homosexuality in their treatment of sexuality as contest were completely missing. I also felt that in their over-reaction against economic reductionism, they have tended to throw the baby out with the bath water by not giving due consideration to material conditions. While rejecting economic reductionism, it is important to integrate the economic dimension with the cultural one rather than ignore the economic one altogether. Otherwise, there is a risk of falling into the trap of cultural reductionism. I would also suggest more respect for other academic scholars. One is indebted to other scholars more than one is self-consciously aware of even when one is attempting a critique of those scholars. More care also needs to be given to editing.

I am fearfully conscious of the fact that in trying to summarise in order to assess their work in a very limited space, I might have done injustice to the full flavour of the richness and complexity of their work which can only be enjoyed by reading the whole set. There are several brilliant passages, many penetrating insights and excellent formulations. On the whole, this represents an admirable piece of academic output and one hopes that they will soon work out the implications of their work for the study of Punjab in greater detail. That is not asking for too much, at least from Bhagwan Josh, who produced the first authoritative study of Punjabi communism.[5]

III

Prison House: Rose Garden, edited by K.V.R. is a collection of papers presented at a seminar on 'The Question of Nationality in India' organised by the All-India League for Revolutionary Culture (AILRC) at Bangalore in October 1992. There are three papers—one each by K.V.R., P.J. James and Darshan Sharma which attempt a general overview of the nationality question in India. Two papers on Punjab—one each by Darshan Sharma and Gurbir Singh, one paper on Kashmir by Tapan Bose, one on Northeast India by Naren Sharma, two on the Jharkhand Movement—one

by B.P. Keshari and one by the Krantikari Buddhijeevi Sangh of Bihar, and one on the Kannada Nationality Struggle (Swatantra Karnataka) by Karnataka Vimochana Ranga. In the Publishers' Note, it is mentioned that a paper on the Tamil Nationality Question was presented but no explanation is given for that paper not being included in this collection.

Gurbir Singh's paper 'The Khalistan Question' is, perhaps, the most direct engagement by a Punjabi Marxist with this question. The first sentence of his paper makes a very contentious and sharp claim: 'No other political question in India is as thick with ideological confusion as is the question of Khalistan' (p. 29). He, then, brilliantly sums up the position of the different shades of the Indian Left on the Khalistan movement: 'The parliamentary Left of course sees the movement as a communal–fascist operation instigated by Pakistan and the CIA to dismember the country. The Revolutionary Left is completely divided on the issue. While some factions virtually endorse the CPI–CPI(M) stand and land up tacitly supporting state repression, the other end of the spectrum has given critical support seeing it as part of the national question, and even upholding the right of the 'Sikh nationality' to secede' (p. 29). In this exercise of mapping out the different political positions, he ropes in the human rights movement also and makes a scathing attack on it: 'In between the two poles is a cauldron of confusion—so great, that even civil liberties activists who would gladly intervene on the issue of Kashmir, Jharkhand and Nagaland, hesitate to touch Punjab with a bargepole' (p. 29). He then identifies three questions for consideration: are the Sikhs a nationality? Is the movement today a nationality movement or a communal–fascist outbreak? What should be the stand of the revolutionary Left? In order to answer the first question, he sketches out a brief historical overview of the Punjab from the 1947 partition to 1992, covering issues like the heritage of common Punjabi identity, its fracture on religious lines, and the demand raised for Khalistan in the 1940s,[6] the Punjabi Suba Movement and the language controversy in post-1947 Punjab, the rise of 'regional bourgeoisie' in Punjab, the pattern of the dismissal of all Akali ministries by the Centre, the Anandpur Sahib resolution, the rise of Bhindranwala, Operation Blue Star and its aftermath. This leads him to claim that his account 'clearly goes to prove that the Punjabi nation not only has deep roots in history, but that its peculiar "frontier" character and the rise of a vigorous regional bourgeoisie from the nineteenth century, gave Punjabi nationalism a fighting edge. The early development of a language and a script, a productive agrarian economy and territorial contours, a distinct culture

and history clearly discernible for five centuries made Punjabi nationalism not only very assertive but a strong force against British imperialism' (pp. 39–40). He, however, quickly goes on to highlight that 'Punjabi identity' is not all that 'homogenous' and he proposes an interesting and potentially fruitful formulation on the vicissitudes of Punjabi identity:

> In history, we see the swings of the 'Punjabi identity' from a much wider concept as in the Guru Nanak or Ranjit Singh periods, and then the linguistic states agitation, to more narrow definitions like the case of Guru Gobind, the Gurudwara reform movement, and the current phase, where the 'Khalsa', the 'panth' and other Sikh religious overtones are spoken in synonym with the Punjabi identity. (pp. 41–42).

On the basis of the latter developments, he considers that in 1992, when he wrote the paper, 'As the circumstances are now developing, it may not be far when a "Sikh nation" as distinct from Punjabi Hindus may develop. As we have seen, an economic basis is already there for a separate *nation-state* (p. 42, emphasis in original). Having stated that, he quickly qualifies his assertion: 'But 500 years of Punjabi acculturation cannot be wiped out in a decade. The peoples' identity even today—both Sikh and Punjabi Hindu—is still that of wider Punjabi.' (page 42)

If one were to extend the use of this 'swings of the Punjabi identity' formulation to the post-1992 period which Gurbir Singh's paper does not cover, one can reasonably argue that the swing is now in the direction of wider Punjabi identity especially after the Akali–BJP coalition's victory in the 1997 Punjab Assembly elections.

After all these longish deliberations, one still does not get a clear answer to Gurbir Singh's first question on Sikhs as a nationality. One can only deduce an ambiguous answer that Sikhs are not a nationality but they could become one. Perhaps, the ambiguity of this deduced answer is rooted in the ambiguity of the material reality of today's Punjab. Gurbir Singh gives a relatively clearer answer to his second question by stating that 'there is a strong reactionary trend in the current "Khalistan" leadership' (p. 43), and he condemns the Khalistan movement for 'the indiscriminate killings' of innocent Hindus. He also states that a Khalistan where Hindus will be second class citizens is unacceptable.

Gurbir Singh states that the Sikh state or Khalistan put forward as a proposal during the 1940s negotiations regarding India's partition

'was a broader "Punjabi entity" *where no single community—Muslim, Hindu or Sikh—was in absolute majority*' (p. 30, emphasis in original). It seems puzzling that such a multi-community plural state could be visualised and characterised as 'Khalistan'.

In his answer to his third question, he suggests that the revolutionary Left must 'support and actively participate with the people of Punjab in their struggle for self-determination, including secession' (p. 41), and the fact that there were serious distortions in the Khalistan movement, he argues, is 'all the more reason for revolutionaries to join the movement to influence its direction and policies. Not to give the movement critical support, would not only mean aiding state terrorism, but denying the very right of self-determination of a nation!' (p. 44).

Gurbir Singh does not specify anywhere the 'direction and policies' which the revolutionary Left could provide to the Khalistan movement to make the movement get rid of its 'strong reactionary trend'. This is the most serious gap in his paper. His paper is, however, engaging as a departure from the well-known positions of the mainstream Indian Punjabi Left on two accounts: (i) he does not view secession as treason (ii) he considers armed struggle as a legitimate form of struggle.

Darshan Sharma's paper 'Punjab: A Distorted Nationality' is a short statement of his position that 'the solution to the economic problems as well as to the aspirations of free development of Punjabi language and culture lay in the autonomy for the Punjabi nationality which could keep out imperialist interests'.(p. 48), and his view is that the lack of a proper understanding on the part of the Punjabi communists regarding 'the complexities of Punjab society and deviations—both Right and Left' has made the Communist movement 'incapable of providing a revolutionary alternative to the dynamic Punjabi society' (p. 46). This, in turn, he argues, has 'provided a fertile soil for the unchecked growth of communal and fundamentalists forces'. He criticises 'the Congress along with Hindu fundamentalist forces' for their campaign to ask Punjabi Hindus to register Hindi as their mother tongue in the census of 1951 and 1961 and highlights that the Punjabi-speaking state was achieved in 1966 'by the militant struggles of the Sikhs alone against the opposition of the Hindu communalist forces'. He blames the Sikh fundamentalists for propagating the slogan 'Sikhs are a nation'. This ideology, along with the Congress government's repression of Sikhs from 1984 onwards, has resulted in the rise of what Sharma calls 'fanatic Khalistani forces'. This is a familiar story. I wish Sharma had elaborated on what he considers could be a proper understanding of the complexity of Punjabi

society, and which could enable the Punjabi communists 'to provide a revolutionary alternative to the dynamic Punjabi society'. As in Gurbir Singh, this remains the main weakness of his paper.

In spite of some of the shortcomings of the papers by Gurbir Singh and Darshan Sharma, they are useful in providing us knowledge about a relatively less known tendency in Left-wing politics in current Punjab.

IV

By way of an overall conclusion to this review article, I wish to make three points: one, the books and papers reviewed here are an illustration of the fact that some Marxist scholars and activists writing on Punjab are increasingly becoming aware of the issues of ethnicity, nationalism and culture in understanding the dynamics of contemporary Punjabi society and politics; two, the works reviewed here demonstrate the vibrant diversity that exists in the Marxist intellectual tradition in Punjab; and three, the works reviewed here are only a small sample of the Marxist writings on contemporary Punjab. For this review, I chose the work of those scholars whose positions are different from those of the two mainstream communist parties—CPI and CPI(M)—because the viewpoints of the CPI and CPI(M) are mistakenly understood as the position of 'the Left'. However, for a comprehensive assessment of the Left-wing writings on Punjab, all shades of Left-wing views need to be taken into account. I hope that this review article makes a small beginning towards such a comprehensive assessment.

Notes

1. See Randhir Singh, *Reason, Revolution and Political Theory* (Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1967).
2. For an excellent Marxist elaboration of this theme, see J. Blaut, *The National Question* (London: Zed Books, 1987). For my review of this, see *Journal of Development Studies*, 26, 3 (1990), 551–52.
3. Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, (ed.), Quintin Hoare and G.N. Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971). For my elaboration of Gramsci's concept of hegemony and its implications for understanding the Indian policy, see Pritam Singh Gill, 'Gramsci's Concept of Hegemony', *Frontier*, Annual Number, 1974, Calcutta.
4. See Tariq Ali's review of Peter Ward Fay, *The Forgotten Army: India's Armed Struggle for Independence 1942–45*, University of Michigan, in *The Guardian*, May 24, 1994, p. 12.
5. Bhagwan Josh, *Communist Movement in Punjab* (Delhi: Anupma Publications, 1979).

6. For an excellent historical account of this issue, see Sukhmani Riar, 'Khalistan: The Origins of the Demand and Its Pursuit Prior to Independence, 1940–45', in Pritam Singh and Shinder Thandi (ed.), *Globalisation and the Region: Explorations in Punjabi Identity* (Coventry, Association for Punjab Studies, UK, 1996).

Book Reviews

Contents

Gurinder Singh Mann, *The Goindval Pothis: The Earliest Extant Source of the Sikh Canon* (Harvard University: Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, 1996), xiv + 219 pp., ISBN 1–674–35618–7

This book derives importance as much from its scholarly merit as from the recent controversy in Sikh studies in which the authenticity of the Kartarpur Manuscript, believed to have been prepared by Guru Arjan in A.D. 1603–1604, is being debated. We do not propose to go into the details of this controversy, but the scholar who is familiar with it will not miss the significance of this book.

Gurinder Singh Mann accepts the authenticity of the *Kartarpur Pothi* without going into any argument. But this may be because of his intention to reserve such arguments for his forthcoming book, *The Making of Sikh Scripture*. His basic conclusions in the present volume are: one, that the *Goindval Pothis* were compiled within the lifetime of Guru Amar Das, and two, that these *pothis* served as the primary source for the *Kartarpur Pothi*.

It is a measure of Mann's scholarly concern that the bulk of his book is meant to provide support for his basic conclusions. Apart from over 50 pages of explanatory notes and references, a glossary of Punjabi terms, and bibliography of the works in Punjabi, Hindi and English cited in the volume, it contains facsimiles of those pages of the *Goindval Pothis* which are crucial to one or another point made in the text. Furthermore, the second chapter gives 'by far the most detailed presentation of the actual text of these *pothis* that has yet been attempted'; it contains the opening and the concluding verses of all the hymns. Thirty-six hymns of the *Goindval Pothis* do not figure in the *Kartarpur Pothi*. The complete text of these 'non-canonical compositions' is given in the last chapter of the book.

We are, thus, left with the first chapter of 50 pages, called 'Introduction to the Goindval Pothis'. This chapter consists of seven sections. In view of the recent controversy we propose to give a fair idea of the argument developed in each section. The *Goindval Pothis* attracted the attention of Sikh writers not because of any merit of their own but because of their connection with the the Adi Granth (the *Kartarpur Pothi*). The earliest reference comes from Sarup Das Bhalla's *Mahima Prakash* (1776). By this time, Guruship was believed to have been vested in the Granth and its importance was well established. Sarup Das makes the basic point that the *Goindval Pothis* were prepared by Guru Amar Das

(1552–1574) and used by Guru Arjan (1580–1606) for preparing his Granth (i.e., the *Kartarpur Pothi*). Inscribed by Sahansram, the grandson of Guru Amar Das, when Guru Arjan borrowed them from him after singing a hymn in praise of Mohan. This basic position was repeated or amplified by some other Sikh works of the late eighteenth century—*Sikhan di Bhagatmala, Sri Gurbilas Patshahi 6, Sri Gur Pratap Suraj Granth*. In the well-known commentary of the late-nineteenth century, generally referred to as the *Faridkot Teeka*, Giani Badan Singh interprets the word *khazana* (treasure) in a *chaupada* of Guru Arjan as a reference to the *Goindval Pothis*. He was by no means the last scholar to accept the earlier 'Sikh tradition'. It was accepted by scholars like Bhai Kahn Singh Nabha, Bhai Vir Singh, Bhai Jodh Singh, Teja Singh, Piara Singh Padam and Giani Gurdit Singh.

The first Sikh writer to marginalise the *Goindval Pothis* for the compilation of the Adi Granth was Giani Gian Singh. In his *Tyarikh Guru Khalsa* (1891), he put forth the view that Guru Arjan collected his material from a variety of sources, both written and oral, including the *Goindval Pothis*. Even after seeing two *pothis* at Patiala, he did not change his view.

The Goindval Pothis were made redundant by Sahib Singh who put forth the view that Guru Nanak had prepared a *pothi* of his hymns and left it for his successor, Guru Angad. This lead was followed by Guru Angad, Guru Amar Das and Guru Ram Das, each of whom added a *pothi* of his own hymns for his successor. Thus, Guru Arjan did not have to approach Baba Mohan. The hymn to 'Mohan' was actually a hymn to God, and it was used by some writers to 'invent' Guru Arjan's visit to Goindval, and the use of *Goindval Pothis* for the compilation of the Granth, which are, in fact, two separate issues.

The major flaw in Sahib Singh's hypothesis is the non-existence of the *pothis* postulated by him, and the absence of any reference to them in Sikh literature. In fact, the actual handling of manuscripts started only with Gurbaksh Singh's *Sri Guru Granth Sahib dian Prachin Biran* (1944). He postulated a possible relationship between *Guru Harashai Pothi*, the *Goindval Pothis* and the *Kartarpur Pothi*, but without actually inspecting any of these. A year later, Bawa Prem Singh examined two *Goindval Pothis* and his description remained the primary source for scholars till the publication of Giani Gurdit Singh's *Itihas Sri Guru Granth Sahib, Bhagat Bani Bhag* in 1990. The *Goindval Pothis* were discussed by him in its last section on the basis of their examination. Mann has carried this process a long step forward, giving primacy to empirical evidence.

The *Goindval Pothis* remained in the possession of the descendant of

Guru Amar Das at Goindval. Just as these *pothis* were sent to Guru Arjan for a short internal, so were they sent to Patiala in 1895 for viewing by the royal family. After the formation of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) in the 1920s, however, the Bhallas of Goindval began to fear that the *pothis* might be taken over by the SGPC. They sent one of these to Bawa Dalip Chand Bhalla at Ahiapur in Hoshiarpur district and another to Bawa Bhagat Singh Bhalla at Hoti Mardan near Peshawar. The former *pothi* came to Jalandhar and the latter to Ludhiana, Patiala and Pinjore (moving with the Hoit Mardan Bhallas after the creation of Pakistan in 1947). This history of the *pothis* appears to Mann to be credible.

However, in Mann's view the Jalandhar and the Pinjore *Pothis* are only two of the originally four *pothis* prepared by Guru Amar Das. The two *pothis* seen by Giani Gian Singh at Patiala were described by him. Therefore, it is possible to know that one of them was identical with the *Pinjore Pothi*. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that there was a third *pothi*. If we take into account the volume of matter in each of these three *pothis* in terms of *raga* sections and compare it with what we have in the *Kartarpur Pothi* of *ragas* Gujri, Tukhari, Majh and Bilaval, the *ragas* are missing from the three *Goindval Pothis*. Mann is tempted to make a conjectural suggestion. The number four corresponded to the four collections (*samhitas*) of the Veda and to the four semitic scriptures known as the Torah, the Psalm, the New Testament and the Quran. Guru Amar Das could think of four Pothis as an indicator of an independent Sikh identity (like that of the Jews, Christians, Muslims and Hindus).

Mann accepts 1570–1572 as the years in which Guru Amar Das prepared the four *pothis*. The extant *pothis* contain no colophon. However, the shapes of vowels and consonants in these *pothis* are clearly different from their shapes in the later Gurmukhi manuscripts, indicating an early stage in the evolution of the Gurmukhi script. Two dates have been suggested on the basis of manuscripts related to Guru Amar Das and his descendants: 1565–1574 and 1570–1572. The latter date has been accepted by several scholars. However, Kaliandas Udasi gives 1595 as the date, and his view has been reinforced recently by Piar Singh in his *Gatha Sri Adi Granth*. A brief statement recorded in the Jalandhar *pothi* does bear the date Magh *vadi* 1, Sammat 1652 (A.D. 1595). Mann gives a facsimile of this statement and its English translation. This statement starts on Folio 1 but is completed on Folio 9, the first blank space available after the blank space on Folio 1. That this statement is in the hand of the primary scribe does not present any difficulty for he could have been alive in 1595,

and could indeed be Sahansram. The thrust of the statement is that Guruship stands vested in the family of Guru Amar Das. Indeed, anyone turning away from them 'will surely go to hell'. Mann concludes that this statement was added to the *pothis* in 1595 in the context of the Bhalla–Sodhi competition in order to reinforce the claims of the Bhallas.

Piar Singh has argued that the *Goindval Pothis* could not have been compiled in the time of Guru Amar Das because the *Jalandhar Pothi* contains not only a hymn of Guru Ram Das but also of Guru Arjan. Mann points out that the hymn attributed to Guru Ram Das in the *Kartarpur Pothi* and the *Adi Granth* is attributed to Guru Nanak in the *Jalandhar Pothi*. Since Sikh scholars have pointed out a few other instances of variation in attribution, this hymn could very well be a hymn of Guru Nanak. The hymn attributed to Guru Arjan in the *Kartarpur Pothi* and the *Adi Granth* does not bear any authorship in the *Jalandhar Pothi*. It is not in the hand of the primary scribe. Mann looks upon it as a later addition to the *pothi*. These two hymns do not oblige us to discard the view that the *Goindval Pothis* were compiled in the lifetime of Guru Amar Das. More problematic than these two hymns are the fourteen compositions recorded in the extant *Goindval Pothis* under the name of '*ghulam sadasevak*' or simply '*ghulam*', who uses the signature 'Nanak' too, in the last verse of every composition. On Folio 94 of the *Pinjore Pothi*, the identity of '*ghulam*' appears to be revealed by '*ghulam mast taida*' Jeth Chand. Now, Jeth Chand was the original name of Guru Ram Das. Mann suggests that when Guru Amar Das decided to make Jeth Chand his successor he possibly allowed him to use the signature 'Nanak' in his compositions. Sikh scholars like Giani Badan Singh, Teja Singh and Sahib Singh are not averse to the idea that some hymns of the *Adi Granth* were composed by their authors prior to taking up Guruship.

Mann gives very interesting and useful information about the 'internal structure' of the *Goindval Pothis* which has a bearing on some arguments used by scholars for or against the authenticity of the *Kartarpur Pothi*. But we may only note that the *Goindval Pothis* have close affinity with Arabic and Persian manuscripts. Almost the entire matter was available to the scribe from the very beginning. Classification into *ragas* was the basic principle of organisation, each *raga* starting with the hymns of Guru Nanak, followed by the hymns of Guru Angad, Guru Amar Das, Guru Ram Das and Guru Arjan, followed by the compositions of the non-Sikh saints. The tune (*dhuni*) in which a particular *raga* was to be sung it also indicated at places.

Mann has no doubts that the *Goindval Pothis* were used by Guru Arjan

for preparing the *Kartarpur Pothi*. A *raga*-wise comparison of hymns reveals that the extant *Goindval Pothis* contain only three hymns more and five hymns less than the *Kartarpur Pothi*. The hymns of the non-Sikh saints too are closely reproduced in the *Kartarpur Pothi*, omitting only three hymns in the hand of the primary scribe of the *Goindval Pothis*. The organisational pattern of the *Goindval Pothis* is not discarded in the *Kartarpur Pothi*; it is elaborated further. The difference in the sequence of hymns is only slight and it was partly due to their transference from one *raga* section to another. A music-related classification, *ghar* (literally 'home'), is added in the *Kartarpur Pothi*.

Mann argues further that the Bhallas represent the only group among the dissenting groups not to be excommunicated by Guru Gobind Singh and his Khalsa. This was because the Bhallas had renounced their claims and accepted the Guruship of the Sodhis. The lending of the *Goindval Pothis* to Guru Arjan was a decisive step in this process of reconciliation. Thus, history of the Bhalla and Sodhi families reinforces the internal evidence of the *Goindval* and *Kartarpur Pothis* and the early Sikh tradition about the prominent place of the *Goindval* and *Kartarpur Pothis* in the evolution of the Sikh scripture. This convergence enables us to draw the conclusion that the Goindval Pothis were prepared before the *Kartarpur Pothi* and served as the latter's 'primary source'.

The *Goindval Pothis* and the *Kartarpur Pothi* are 'incalculably precious'. No other major religious tradition possesses manuscripts that make the evolution of its scriptural sources clear in a comparable way. A firm history of the evolution of the text of the *Adi Granth* on the basis of documents can make 'a distinctive contribution to the comparative study of how scriptures are compiled, and canons formed'. Mann is anxious to add that the importance of such documents is 'historical' and not 'religious'. The text of the *Adi Granth* bears the seal of the Sikh community. Nothing can be taken out and nothing can be added. What gives the Sikh canon its present status is not its authenticity alone; more important is the fact that it is sanctified by the authority of the Gurus.

The issue of textual variants, according to Mann, is a little different from that of non-canonical writings. It is legitimate to investigate the reasons for such variants. Piar Singh and Pashaura Singh have tried to do this, but they have taken extreme positions. Piar Singh thinks of the Sikh sacred text as compiled in quite a loose manner. Pashaura Singh ascribes to Guru Arjan an editorial policy that was aimed at making doctrinal and theological changes. Mann does not subscribe to either of these views. In any case, the *Goindval Pothis* and the *Kartarpur Pothi* do not challenge

the central position of the *Adi Granth* in the belief system of the Sikh community. 'To the contrary, they reaffirm it.'

Mann's approach and method are strictly historical. His treatment of the Sikh tradition is sympathetic. His book demonstrates how these two can be fruitfully combined, and enrich each other.

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Ian Talbot, *Khizr Tiwana, the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India* (London: Curzon Press, 1996), pp. xiv + 193, illustrations, £35 (hb), ISBN 0–7007–0427–2

History, Talbot reminds us, is written by the victors, and South Asia is a particularly vicious example of the willingness of historians to distort the past if it serves the interests of the ruling class. After 1947, the overriding need of the political establishments responsible for the partition of India—in the repentant, imperialist West as well as South Asia—was to legitimate the successor-states they set up. Somehow, propagandists had to disguise the fact that India and Pakistan were polyglot empires ruled by déraciné elites just as repressive and almost as alien as the colonialists they replaced. The outcome, as historians rushed to service the politicians, was the freedom-fighter view of South Asia's recent past. A hundred years of history was reduced to a single event: the transfer of power in August 1947. This concentration on a single event solved two of the perennial problems of historians: the problems of relevance and valuation. Everything that led up to the triumph of 'nationalism' in India and the triumph of 'separatism' in Pakistan was significant; everything else could be ignored. Everything that 'encouraged the development of nationalism' was laudatory; everything that retarded it was condemned. The same icons—Gandhi, Iqbal—were constantly invoked; the same organisations—Congress, the League—were constantly analysed; the same campaigns—Civil Disobedience, Quit India, Direct Action—were constantly narrated. There were little local variations. Nehru was the far-sighted statesman in Indian textbooks, Jinnah was the Qaid-i-Azam in Pakistan. But the overall cast-list, good guys and bad guys, remained the same. And with each revolution of the historiographical wheel, each repetition of the authorised version, the obsession with mainstream nationalism seemed a little more inevitable.

At times the freedom-fighter approach came close to discrediting itself: it produced such absurd results. The mutiny became 'the first war of independence', despite the absence of any semblance of national unity; the second world war became the saga of the Indian National Army, a side-show of a side-show. But the greatest distortions were the sins of omission, and the most serious omission was the culture of collaboration. It will not do, to dismiss the millions of Indians who were proud to serve the sircar as absurd anachronisms: as 'toadies' and 'stooges', alternately comic and sinister. They were far too important for that. The fact is that the history of British India is the history of the loyalists. Congress and the League were of no importance, posed no threat and exercised no power, until the closing years of British rule. The classes that mattered, during four-fifths of the British period, were the Indians who made British rule possible. The British conquered India because Indian bankers provided credit, Indian contractors provided supplies, and Indian soldiers provided firepower. They held onto their conquests because eight hundred thousand officials helped them get the revenue in; because landlords and priests placed their influence at the disposal of the district officers; because Indian princes ruled a third of the population on behalf of the paramount power; because the British–Indian army (at the height of the Second World War) was the largest volunteer force the world has ever known; because Indian politicians contested elections to Anglo-Indian legislatures and accepted office in Anglo-Indian ministries. Whatever the subaltern school may wish to believe, complicity was the norm in British India; resistance was the aberration. We have to explain the vitality of the system over two hundred years, not its fall.

Half-a-century after independence, disillusion with the successor-states has liberated historians from the straitjacket of successor-state history. South Asian specialists are free to come to terms with the extent of collaboration: to rescue the loyalists from the massive condescension of historiography. A stream of monographs have treated key groups of collaborators as serious players on the Indian stage. One thinks of Marshall on 'the British breakout from Bengal', of Kolff and Omissi on the martial castes, of Metcalf and Henningham on the landlords, of Gilmartin and Ansari on the Pirs, of Ashton and Copland on the princes. Bayly—characteristically—has drawn the separate strands together in a compelling synthesis. Talbot's contribution to this landslide has been to make the Punjab Unionist Party (PUP) his own. In a series of path-breaking papers, he has shown how the Unionists had claims to be one of the most successful political parties in British India. If one judges the PUP by their

ability to win elections and form ministries, they commanded a majority in the provincial legislature and monopolised every administration from 1923 till 1946 (with one brief interlude). If one judges them by their ability to implement an ambitious programme of reform, their agrarian policies—their 'golden acts'—were far in advance of anything put into practice in other provinces. If one judges them by their ability to construct a stable coalition out of potentially hostile groups in a dangerously fragmented society, the cross-communal and cross-class alliance which they constructed—Muslim martial castes in the western Punjab, Hindu Jat cultivators in the east, and Sikhs in the centre—looks like one of the miracles of modern South Asian politics.

Now Talbot has returned to the charge, with a full-length biography of the last premier of the British Punjab. Mainstream nationalist historians will inevitably ask, does Sir Khizr Hyat Tiwana deserve two hundred pages? No one could reasonably regard him as a political titan: as a world statesman, worthy of study in his own right. If ever a man had greatness thrust upon him, it was Sir Umar Hyat Tiwana's son. He only stood for election to the Punjab legislature out of deference to his father's wishes, he only won his seat after his father bribed his most formidable rival to stand down, he only became a minister thanks to his father's special relationship with Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, and he only became prime minister because Sikander died prematurely in 1942 and the British needed a safe pair of hands willing to pursue the war effort. His entire political career lasted less than ten years, from 1937 till 1946, and it ended in the complete destruction of the party he led. The mobilisation of the rural electorate by Congress and the League in the 1946 elections exposed the weakness of the Unionists' reliance on a small class of local notables to deliver votes; and the Unionists' crushing defeat amounted to a massive repudiation of their vision of a pluralistic society in favour of a successor-state based on religious identity.

Khizr's failure is the key to Talbot's success. *Khizr Tiwana, the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India* is one of the finest studies of a losing side in South Asian history. Talbot's accomplishment is simple: he makes a quintessential loyalist comprehensible—he makes Khizr's attitudes and actions seem as reasonable, as natural, as any mainstream politician's. He does this—not by concentrating on the minutiae of Khizr's life: the washing-list approach to biography—but by setting him in his social and political context. *Khizr Tiwana* shows how the Tiwanas' alliance with the British was the obvious outcome of five centuries of collaboration with every regime which ruled north-western India. The

Tiwanas were military contractors par excellence: they supplied entire units—ready-trained, equipped and officered—to the Mughals, Sikhs and British. They featured in the calculations of Muslim governors; they were sucked into the factional struggles at the Sikh court after the death of Ranjit Singh; they had the entrée to Government Houses and Viceregal Lodges. Their rewards were titles, offices, grants of land, local dominance. The coming of electoral politics strengthened their leverage over the colonial state. Families like the Tiwanas were the only available mediators between the rural electors in their tribal homelands and the world of modern political institutions in Lahore and Delhi. Their control of seats in the provincial legislature forced the British to concede control over the distribution of patronage and the formation of policy. Beneath protestations of mutual affection and regard, a real transfer of power took place, from British officials to 'Punjab Feudalists'—a structural shift which survived the creation of Pakistan.

Khizr's key attribute, from the nationalist perspective, was his immunity to communalism. If only he had made his peace with Jinnah, if only he had accepted the principle of partition, he could have been the first premier of an independent Punjab if not an independent Pakistan. Several of his closest political associates (Qizilbash, Noon) made the transition to high office in the new political order. But he held out in favour of a unitary Punjab, long after the tide had turned. Talbot's research suggests that three factors may have been responsible, factors that shed light on the whole culture of loyalism. Khizr spent his entire life, up to 1946, in environments in which communal cooperation was the norm. He gave his heart to four institutions, and every one of them was pluralist. Most of the administrators on his family estate at Kalra were Hindus; some of his best friends at Aitchison College were the sons of rich Hindus and Sikhs; his family regiment, the Tiwana lancers, contained one squadron of Muslims, one of Hindus, and one of Sikhs; he formed warm working relationships with his Hindu and Sikh colleagues in the Unionist coalition. The same institutions taught him to be proud of the imperial connection, in the same way that Smuts—the defeated Boer—was proud of the imperial connection. The estate at Kalra, a gift from the crown, became immensely valuable because the Pax Britannica made the development of canal irrigation possible—the largest integrated irrigation systems in the world—the key to the first Green Revolution in the Punjab. Aitchison College was a British public school transplanted to the orient: a 'chiefs' college' expressly designed to educate an imperial elite which could function at the highest levels—as ministers, as members of the viceroy's

council, as advisers to the secretary of state. The 15th King George's Own (the Tiwana Lancers) won its battle honours and developed its *esprit-de-corps* fighting the King-Emperor's enemies in two world wars. The Unionist Party derived its raison d'être from the British unification of the Punjab and the agrarian programme of the 'Punjab School'. Khizr must have wondered, what would another backward Muslim state have to offer, a glorified Afghanistan, once the Mullahs and the *maliks* were in charge—compared with membership of the largest, the most progressive empire that the world had ever known? The Tiwanas must have watched the British go, in the same spirit that the Anglo-Romans watched the last legion return to Rome. The third factor is Khizr's personality. He had none of the thirst for power and none of the *izzat*-driven rage and cunning—none of the determination to destroy his enemies and trample on their corpses—that makes Punjabi politicians such unscrupulous survivors and such ruthless partisans. He was too decent, too principled, too loyal. Or, from his opponents' point of view, too stupid. He simply could not believe, until it was too late, that the British would allow religious fanatics to destroy one of their greatest creations: to split a magnificent province in half, with all the carnage it entailed.

Anyone familiar with Talbot's earlier work will be familiar with the virtues of *Khizr Tiwana*. The prose, in an age of jargon, is pellucid. The exposition, in an age of rambling and repetitive books, is wonderfully organised; all the information that the reader needs to know is there, in the right place. The sources include everything one could reasonably expect a biographer to have consulted. The most important collection of all, the Tiwana papers at the University of Southampton, would not have been in a public archive if it had not been for Talbot's initiative. A large part of the narrative and interpretation is original; far more original than most 'mainstream' histories. Above all, the conclusions are transparently based on the 'weight of the evidence' rather than political prejudices or conventional assumptions. If I had to single out *Khizr Tiwana*'s most prominent quality, I should say that it possesses—what Mandell Creighton is supposed to have possessed—common sense amounting to genius.

It is curious to see how the rehabilitation of the Unionists reflects shifts in public opinion. When I first went out to the Punjab, the Unionists were the forgotten men of Indian history. Old men is cafés along the Mall in Lahore spoke in hushed voices about the shadowy, half-forgotten figures of their youth—Sir Fazli this, Sir Sikander that, Sir Khizr Hyat Khan—the bad Muslims who got in Jinnah's way. Now the non-people are drifting

back from their posthumous Gulag. After the loss of the East Wing, after the anarchy in Sind, after the corruption of the politicians and the repression of the generals and the obscurantism of the priests, the lickspittles who had reservations about the creation of Pakistan—who stood for an ideal of religious pluralism—no longer seem so bad. On the other side of the border, a similar *reapproachment* has taken place. Two sympathetic and scholarly biographies of Sir Chhotu Ram, the Unionist leader of the Rohtak Jats, appeared in 1977 and 1984. Sir Chhotu may have retarded the development of Congress in Haryana, but if men like Sir Chhotu had been in the ascendancy in 1947, would a quarter of a million people have died? Would the long-drawn out agony of Khalistan have culminated in Operation Blue Star under a Unionist administration? Looking down the long perspective of Punjabi history, it sometimes seems as if the only people who can be trusted with power are people like Sir Khizr Hyat Tiwana—people who have power thrust upon them—or do not seek it very hard. Sir Khizr will, no doubt, go down in history as a failure; he is the kind of man who is commonly considered a failure by hard-headed men of affairs. But his failure may not have been quite as disastrous as his rivals' success.

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W.H. McLeod, *Historical Dictionary of Sikhism* (Lanham, Md and London: Scarecrow, 1995) xi + 322 pp., £49.90 (hb), ISBN 0–8108–3035–3

This volume, by a scholar of distinction, is an extremely welcome addition to works of reference on Sikhism. In his introduction to the *Dictionary*, which is fifth in Scarecrow Press's 'Religions, Philosophies and Movements' series, McLeod sets out the distinction between the 'sceptical' and the 'traditional' historian. Consistently with this his clear, trenchant, authoritative entries unambiguously indicate whether their subjects stand up to scrutiny by the sceptical historian. Thus 'the existence of Bala is . . . doubtful' (p. 47), 'the tradition that there once existed a third recension of the *Adi Granth* . . . the *Damdami Bir* . . . is incorrect' (p. 65), and little of the 'traditional account' of Guru Nanak's life 'stands up to historical analysis'. Similarly, he indicates that there are problems besetting analysis of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (p. 36).

The dictionary encapsulates and reiterates McLeod's position on such

notably controversial matters as the evolution of the text of the *Adi Granth* (pp. 21–23)—with an entry on *Adi Granth* Manuscript 1245, supportive of the scholars Piar Singh and Pashaura Singh—and the hagiographic nature of the *Janam-Sakhis* (pp. 110–11).

Perhaps surprisingly, in view of this, any minor doubts I have concern the traditionalist, normative, official tone of some entries. For instance, in the entry headed 'orthodoxy' (a notoriously treacherous word for students of religion) the equation of 'orthodox' with 'Khalsa' goes unquestioned. A cross-reference to 'Tat Khalsa' (pp. 208–9) or 'Hindu Origins' (pp. 105–6) would help in revealing the decisive influence of this wing of the Singh Sabha on subsequent twentieth century understandings of Sikh orthodoxy (p. 209). Moreover, if Oberoi's (nineteenth century 'Tat Khalsa') 'litmus test of authentic Sikhism' were applied—namely, acceptance of the three doctrines of the Guru, the *Granth* and the Gurdwara—then McLeod's 'semi-orthodox' would be 'orthodox' (1994). To describe the (*amritdhari*, Khalsa Sikh) *Jatha* of Bhai Randhir Singh as 'semi-orthodox' (and 'unorthodox' on p. 32) invites criticism from another quarter.

McLeod is, of course, well aware of the permeability of such distinctions, as is evident elsewhere in the *Dictionary*—for example under 'Amrit-dhari' he writes 'Strictly speaking, only the *amritdhari* Sikhs constitute the Khalsa, though in practice kes-dhari Sikhs are usually included also' (p. 32). Under the heading 'Sikh Identity' (pp. 11–12), and under the headword 'Identity' (pp. 107–8), McLeod distinguishes five 'groups' (a less problematic term than 'sect') of Sikh, an exercise which may be helpful to readers approaching the community.

Consonant with a 'sceptical', non-traditionalist approach one might also have anticipated more entries to acknowledge a degree of discrepancy between official statements of belief and practice and the situation observable by the ethnographer. Thus, 'unorthodox forms' of *amrit sanskar* are summarised (p. 34), but the entry 'Amrit' could have mentioned the wider range of usage current among many Sikhs, for whom water empowered by proximity to the *Granth* during a *path* is also *amrit*. Similarly, ethnographic evidence from contemporary Sikh communities suggests that, however minimally and however locally, 'Devi worship' cannot be altogether consigned to the past tense (p. 71). In such instances McLeod is scrupulously careful to avoid offending the dominant 'orthodox' understanding of what is and is not Sikh.

What is beyond doubt is that, with its stance and range, the *Dictionary* valuably complements existing one-volume English-language dictionaries.

For instance, it includes entries on some subjects excluded by Cole and Sambhi's *A Popular Dictionary of Sikhism*. These include nineteenth century European interpreters of the tradition: Macauliffe (p. 131), Trumpp (p. 213) and twentieth century makers of Punjabi history: Sant Fateh Singh (p. 79), Harchand Singh Longowal (p. 100) and Master Tara Singh (p. 206).

Like Cole and Sambhi, McLeod refers to minority groupings and to the Sikh diaspora. This includes often-needed clarification of the distinction between the *Nirankaris* (p. 155) and the *Sant Nirankaris* (p. 187), and a substantial entry on *Nanaksar* (pp. 150–51), although 'Nishan Sahib' could have contained a cross-reference to this. Along with Mewa Singh (p. 137) 'a granthi in Vancouver . . . regarded as a martyr', perhaps other diaspora figures deserved inclusion—for example Sant Puran Singh and the Nishkam Sevak Jatha, which was inspired by him.

The *Dictionary*'s usefulness to both specialist and lay person is enhanced by its excellent classified bibliography, principally of works in English, and its introduction. It is a pity that the price may deter some purchasers, but—I hope—not libraries as, all in all, this is an important reference work, accessible, comprehensive and challenging, for all who are interested in Sikhism.

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Gurharpal Singh and Ian Talbot (eds), *Punjabi Identity: Continuity and Change*, (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), pp. 258, Rs. 375, ISBN 81–7304–117–2

In a post-nationalist South Asian historiography, the development of regional and ethnic studies is a long-awaited and extremely significant development. Augmented by interdisciplinary methodologies in the wake of the evolution of greater interest in diasporic communities from the subcontinent, such interpretive works dwell on trans-regional, intra-regional and inter-ethnic relationships. Salient features of Punjab studies, itself a new discipline, include the centrality of the Punjab in the colonial state structures, the regimentation of communalist trajectories leading to partition, inter-regional migration assuming international proportions through an extremely violent ethnic cleansing, plus the fact that Punjab is the bedrock of Pakistani national experience and a redefinition of Punjabi identity (ies) across the world.

Issues of Punjabi identity with reference to primordial and instrumental reasons remain unresolved, yet afford a pertinent opportunity for academic discourse. Papers presented at the 13th Conference on South Asian Studies at Toulouse in 1994—notwithstanding their individual focus—attempted to unravel the question of identity among the three Punjabs and the neighbouring region of Kashmir. By putting them together in a single volume and arranging their prompt publication, the editors have done a superb job. Talbot's own paper on the British Punjab seeks a mediation between the primordial determinants of the identities and their crucial politicisation under the aegis of the colonial administration. The colonial accounts, Talbot argues, did regiment the communal definition of the Punjabi populace on the basis of religious identification, though in the later Mughal period one comes across a supra-communal intermingling. The religious divide in the Punjab was not so clear-cut and the alliances on the basis of mutual economic, territorial or pragmatic reasons did cut across the communal boundaries. For instance, the Khatris of Lahore financed the Sayeds in their fight against the Sikhs and the Hindu Jats of Haryana stood aloof whereas many non-Jat tribes supported the British takeover of the province from the Sikhs.

Gurharpal Singh's interpretive chapter on insurgency in the Punjab challenges the three current interpretations on the Punjab crisis in India. It centres on India as the 'ethnic democracy' accentuating the problems for minorities and reassesses the period since 1984. To him the conventional explanation of the Punjab crisis, by focusing on Nehruvian centralisation, suffers from various limitations exactly the way economic explanation does not seem to respond to the simultaneous economic growth in the Punjab. The third conventional interpretation based on Sikh ethnonationalism is, despite certain reservations, the most viable one he suggests. However, one has to go beyond these views to seek a causation rooted in the very formation and composition of the Indian nationalism and state structures. The hegemonic control of India in a specific ethnic manner—like Samad's interpretation of Pakistani experience is another chapter—exacerbated the cultural marginalisation of the Sikh community and other such minorities. Hegemonic control was pervasive until 1986 when, following the violation of Rajiv–Longowal Agreement, the Indian state opted for total control, even bypassing its own allies in the state through establishing a Congress-led regime. In Singh's view various Union governments since 1986 have tried 'to restructure Sikh politics within the framework of hegemonic control that has characterised the patterns of Punjab politics since 1947'. It is only through a new political

settlement and an overhaul of the Indian policy that the political crisis can be arrested.

Joyce Pettigrew's study of the Sikh militant movements provides us with a picture of complex infighting amongst the various competitive groups and their exploitation by the state. Through her extensive research, especially in the border regions, she establishes the root of the malaise within the context of inter-personal dissensions and their impact on the Khalistan movement. The supply of weapons and desire for localist influence and leadership have made the resistance vulnerable, especially when the state, through its own specific outfits and vast resources, tries to cause jealousies and ill-feelings against the militants and their supporters. All sorts of misdeeds were attributed to the militant groups and ordinary people were shown yearning for normalcy. The post-Bhindranwala leadership crisis, fragmentation of the movement, poignant malignancy, large-scale slaying of the local leaders and interpersonal fights have added to the malady which has facilitated the brutalisation of the state through a well-orchestrated campaign engineered by the security forces.

Shinder Thandi's article, through a number of statistical details, shows the human and material cost of the counter-insurgency measures in the Punjab. He views the armed insurgency in the context of low-intensity conflicts more common in the developing world especially after the cold war. His paper is thematically linked with the preceding two chapters on the recent political activism in the Indian Punjab. The deaths of the civilians in Punjab until recently remained on the increase whereas the destruction of private property has been a major feature more often attributed to the militants. The material cost of this counter-insurgency campaign has resulted in further dwindling of the development sector which may have serious repercussions for Punjab in the years ahead.

'Interrogating Identity' takes us back to the question of identity in the larger dialectics of colonialism, Orientalism and post-colonial constructs by the nationalists. Applying Derrida's critique, Arvind-Pal Singh measures the philosophical and epistemological boundaries of the definitional debate on collectivist identities and sees Ashis Nandy and Upadhaya moving within a similar domain.

The final chapter (Ali, Ellis and Khan) evaluates the growing emphasis on *Kashmiriyat* in the diaspora, away from the Punjabi identity. The liberation struggle against Indian control in the valley and migration have both played a crucial role in this self-definition among the Luton-based Azad Kashmiris whose new generation, despite its identification with the 'Muslim', 'Asian' or 'Pakistani' denominators, is equally disdainful of its

localism. However, according to these scholars, kinship plays a crucial role in lobbying for the Kashmiri cause besides legitimating various Kashmiri political organisations in Azad Kashmir.

Despite an apparent thematic diversity, which also includes Yunas Samad on 'Pakistan or Punjabistan', Sarah Ansari on 'Punjabis in Sind' and Denis Matringe on 'Punjabi Lyricism and Sikh Reformism', the volume is predicated on the centrality of the issues of identity in a multi-tiered discourse. There is nothing static about these multiple identities which allow a wider mobility to the Punjabis in addition to complexity that the traditional markers may not fully explain. *Punjabi Identity* not only adds to an exciting academic debate but enhances the trans-regionality and multidisciplinarity of Punjab studies.

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A. McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996) ix+310 pp., Rs. 375 (hb), ISBN 0–19–577583–X

This work traces the collapse of Pakistan's parliamentary democracy during the post-partition decade. Unlike other writers (see for example Yunas Samad, *A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., 1995) McGrath largely ignores the Pakistan struggle's legacy of the competing pulls of both regionalism and Muslim (i.e., Pakistani) nationalism, and of secularism and the Islamism propounded by the Jamaat-i-Islami. He is also silent on the new state's inheritance of feudalism and patrimonialist politics which a number of scholars have seen as subverting its fledgling democracy. Pakistan's post-partition strategic geo-political context, which Ayesha Jalal has highlighted as a factor in the establishment of 'the state of martial law' (A. Jalal, *The State of Martial Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), is also referred to only in passing.

The author, instead, places the weight of his explanation for the destruction of Pakistan's democracy on the inheritance of a 'viceregal' tradition of bureaucratic authoritarianism. This shaped the careers of such key figures as Ghulam Muhammad (Governor-General, 1951–55) and Iskander Mirza (President, 1956–58).

McGrath is by no means unique in blaming Ghulam Muhammad for

Pakistan's democratic demise, or in pointing out that Ayub Khan's military coup in 1958 merely formalised the bureaucratic–military domination of the state which had dated from the former's dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in October 1954. McGrath emphasises this point by ending his analysis with the ratification of the 1956 Constitution rather than with the coup two years later. He breaks new ground, however, in the examination of Chief Justice Mohammad Munir's role (see especially Chapter 8) in the destruction of Pakistan's democracy. He depicts Munir as possessing a similar viceregal authoritarian outlook to the Governor-General. This prompted him to provide legal legitimacy for Ghulam Muhammad's action in his judgement on the *Tamizuddin Khan vs Federation of Pakistan* legal case. This case was brought by the Constituent Assembly's President, Tamizuddin Khan, initially in the Sindh High Court.

McGrath brings to light a number of important new insights into this key legal case. Not least, the subterfuge required to bring the petition to court which involved a junior attorney disguising himself as a *burqa*–clad woman (p. 158) and the extent to which the case revolved around British legal discussion and precedent, and the role which the constitutional expert Sir Ivor Jennings played in furnishing Ghulam Muhammad's legal arguments. Munir's motives in this and subsequent judgements, which established the basis for authoritarianism (for example the *Dosso vs Federation of Pakistan* case), are exhaustively researched. The judge is placed in the dock along with Ghulam Muhammad, Mirza and Ayub Khan as an anti-democratic subversive.

The author disregards the importance of the politicians' corruption and ill-discipline in the drift towards authoritarianism and chooses rather to pin the blame on a handful of mainly Punjabi officials. McGrath is right to emphasise their influence, but he ignores the wider failings of the political system which provided both the motive and opportunity for their activities. The constitutional history approach which he has adopted, together with his limited range of sources, obscures the realities of Pakistan's early post-partition politics. Ethnic tensions, class and gender related inequities and the inherited political culture of corruption and violence are all glossed over, as is the weak institutionalisation of the Pakistan Muslim League. Democracy itself is never defined, but is implicitly reduced, in McGrath's analysis, to a formal rather than participant process.

The result is that the reader is provided with a welcome addition to Pakistan's constitutional and legal history during the period 1947–54. But

the author views the new state's 'democratic deficit' too narrowly. Pakistan's inherited political economy and culture were as inimical to democracy as the tradition of viceregalism. Moreover, without taking into consideration the new state's geo-political situation, the analysis of the destruction of Pakistan's democracy is incomplete.

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J.S. Grewal, *Sikh Ideology, Polity and Social Order* (Delhi: Manohar, 1996), 172 pp., Rs. 250 (hb), ISBN 81–7304–115–6

The book under review is a work of synthesis including a detailed analysis of a number of contemporary sources in Punjabi and Persian, especially the compositions of Guru Nanak and his successors, the *Vars* of Bhai Gurdas, the *Bachittar Natak*, the *Zafarnama*, the *Gurshoba*, the Persian chronicles of Ahmad Shah Batala, Ganesh Das and Sohan Lal Suri, the Gurmukhi works of Ram Sukh Rao, some official documents of Ranjit Singh in Persian, the Gurmukhi works of Kesar Singh Chhibber and Ratan Singh Bhangu and the *rahitnama* known as the *Prem Sumarg*. The book is divided into three parts: part one and two recall the story of the evolution of the Sikh community till the rise of the Khalsa while the final part deals with the emergence of what the author calls the 'Sikh polity' and 'Sikh social order'. The text works at two levels: first, it narrates the story of the Gurus; second, it places the evolution and invention of Guruship in a complex historical setting to underline the serious problems of contention and dissent. The shift in focus away from mere narration to a contestatory mode of historical reconstruction adds a new dimension and allows the reader to enter the text with a relatively more critical stance.

The author has carefully 'read' into the compositions of Guru Nanak to understand the nature of his critical dialogue with the basic conceptions of Islam, Gorakh Panthis and Vaishnava Bhakti to formulate the social axes of his spiritual discourse. But new and revolutionary ideas must be carried to the wider population by intellectuals who realise their transformatory power. This is not an easy task as it involves multifaceted polemics and arguments against established ideas and practices, individuals and institutions. It is in this context that the work of Bhai Gurdas attains its full significance. It is the first time that a historian has 'read' so carefully the deeper meanings of his verses. Bhai Gurdas has been given the kind

of importance which he genuinely deserved and which has been denied to him so far.

Through immense intellectual labour he persistently demarcated between what he thought were the genuine ideas and practices of Nanak Panth and those of the alternative tradition being forged by the *Minas*. Single-handedly, he virtually launched a tirade against the alien ideas and thus helped the crystallisation of the 'idea of indistinguishability of Gurus and the unity of Guruship'. Bhats followed in the footsteps of Bhai Gurdas and further deepened the idea of the unity of Guruship.

'The strong language' according to the author, 'used by Bhai Gurdas against the *Minas* as well as his preoccupation with them may be taken as a measure of the gravity of situation during the time of Guru Hargobind'. The claims of the *Minas* were much broader than the claims of heredity. They were presenting themselves as the bearers of the early Sikh tradition, not only against Guru Hargobind and his successors but also against other dissenters.

The author traces the sequence of events which began to give a new twist to the Sikh tradition and the way it begins to orient towards the emergence of a more militant response. Through the discussion of two important texts, *Bachittar Natak* and *Gurshoba*, the conception and rationale of the new vision is presented as a legitimate search for finding a new mode of responding to the new situation of oppression and suppression. This ultimately led to the creation of the *Khalsa*. The discussion of 'Sikh' and 'Singh' identities in terms of probabilities is attributed to the fact that there is a paucity of contemporary or near contemporary evidence.

The sources relating to the *misls* and the establishment of the rule of Ranjit Singh have been discussed from various angles, But there are questions the discussion of which remains limited, rather inconclusive. For example, why was it that such a movement, at the end, gave birth to a Mughal-type monarchy under Ranjit Singh even when its motivation and normative structures were qualitatively different? In what sense was Ranjit Singh's rule a 'Sikh rule' or a 'political order' inspired and guided by some of the basic conceptions of Sikhism?

The book is designed for anyone with a serious interest in South Asian religions. Fully aware of the pitfalls of writing positivist–objectivist history, the author pays careful attention to the nature of available evidence, stressing the point that 'tradition can provide useful clues to past probabilities' and it 'seldom leads to certainties about the past'. This fascinating multilayered condensed text will enrich the discipline of Sikh

Studies and remain an important source of both information and understanding for some time to come. Other historians of Sikh history can learn a lot from this self-consciously contestatory mode of historical writing.

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D. Gupta, *The Context of Ethnicity: Sikh Identity in a Comparative Perspective* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), ix + 241 (hb), Rs. 395, ISBN 0-19-56394-5

This is an exceptionally disappointing book; anyone misguided enough to purchase it because of the title or the cover will soon regret it once they read the text. Written in a pretentious and convoluted style, it assaults the reader with constant name-dropping, incoherent sentences, and a range of theories and concepts which are thrown about without sufficient explanation or meaning. Ostensibly, the work is about the *Context of Sikh Ethnicity* but the nearest the author gets to defining ethnicity is to distinguish it from communalism (p. 6). The bombastic claims to conceptual clarity are followed by confusion, ambiguity and a strange declaration that an ethnic situation can be identified only in cases where issues of nation-state, sovereignty and territory are involved. Stranger declarations follow but a general sense of the work can be gained from the author's own confession in the opening sentence: 'This project had already started before I was fully aware that I had embarked upon it' (p. vii).

In reality the volume is a collection of assorted articles that really do not hang together. It is curious, though not entirely unexpected, that the author, for all his claims to intellectual finery, manages to equate the politics of Shiv Sena with that of Sikh militants. Such an equation can be sustained because of the author's ideological belief in the sacred testament of the Indian state: the Nehruvian tendency to mystify the discourse of majoritarian domination in such terms as 'unity-in-diversity'. In fact the determination to defend this position leads the author to ask such questions as 'How can a good *Singh* be differentiated from a bad one?' (p. 103) and whether Sikhs' anti-Hindu militancy was simply 'dictated by the blind and unreasoned passion irrevocably let loose on them by Guru Gobind Singh' (p. 126). The author eventually reveals his true colours when he repeats *ad nauseam* on four occasions (pp. 11, 70, 96, 102) that Sikhs were

the traditional 'sword arm of Hinduism' a position which they held until the 1970s.

Further doubts about this publication as a serious academic effort are warranted by the absence of some bibliographical references (e.g., Brass, p. 95); by the failure to reference sources (p. 27); by the astounding decision to exclude newspaper reports because there were considered 'untrustworthy', an 'exotic frill'; by the use of the term diaspora to refer to partition refugees; by the misleading claim that the Sikh peasantry was converted to Congress by the Ghadars and the Kirti Kisan Party (p. 49); and by the distorted interpretation of Sikh opposition to Pakistan before 1947 as an illustration of the community's commitment to united India.

Overall, one is left deeply frustrated by this publication. The individual chapters add little to our understanding or factual knowledge and, together, they do not cohere or represent a sustained argument. The volume's main achievement—if this is seen as such—is perhaps to enable the author to present very familiar arguments in the garb of an incomprehensible discourse with contemporary writings on ethnicity. In so doing the author has done a great disservice to himself and the general scholarship interested in this field.

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D. Forrest and S.V. Smith, *Lives Under Threat: A Study of Sikhs Coming to the UK from the Punjab* (London: Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, 1996), 31 pp., £2.50, No ISBN

When I was approached to review this slim but extremely important book of 31 pages, I did not realise that the harrowing and brutal experiences of the torture victims from the Punjab seeking asylum in the United Kingdom had echoing parallels with my own personal experiences at the hands of the recently defeated British Tory government and its appendix, the British Home Office. For those interested in making comparisons, I would humbly refer the readers to my book, *From Reporter to Refugee: The Law of Asylum in Great Britain, A Personal Account* (Worldview Press and Refugee Studies Programme, University of Oxford, March 1997), which deals with my seven-year struggle (1987 to 1994) to obtain full refugee status in the United Kingdom, and the sometimes bizarre, sometimes traumatising events along the way.

The book under review by Duncan Forrest, a retired paediatric surgeon, and Sally Verity Smith, a non-practising barrister, examines the persecution of Sikhs in India through a study of 56 Sikh clients of the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture in London. Using India as an example, the report challenges and condemns the late British Government's decision to create a designated list (the so-called 'white list') of supposedly safe countries. The book was released in October 1996 when the defeated British Prime Minister John Major's Conservative government was in power, and implementing some of the most draconian asylum laws in Europe, especially the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996.

Briefly, the so-called 'white list' singles out citizens from seven countries as facing no risk of persecution and who are unlikely to deserve protection in Britain. Under the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 the applications from thousands of would-be refugees from the seven countries—India, Pakistan, Ghana, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Poland and Romania—are presumed to be unsound unless proved otherwise. Their rights of appeal are also severely restricted with the introduction of a new fast-track system. The move, which came into force in October 1996, was fiercely opposed by refugee groups who accused the Conservatives of 'playing the race card'. The number of all cases refused asylum increased by 10,400 to 31,700 in 1996 compared with the previous year.

The three chapters in the book under review provide a general background to the past and present (October 1996) situation in the Punjab; examine the personal testimony and medical evidence of a group of Sikh survivors of torture, most of whom were seeking asylum in the UK; and analyse the reasons why Sikh asylum seekers are rarely granted refugee status in the UK, including the most frequent reasons for refusal given by the Home Office.

In the first chapter, Duncan Forrest graphically and convincingly describes the after-effects shown by Sikh refugees who were tortured in police custody in the Punjab. He had made a special study of the evidence of torture from the many Sikh asylum seekers whom he had examined at the Foundation. The 56 male Sikh asylum seekers, the object of this study, all came from farming, business or professional families. None showed evidence of having come to Great Britain as 'economic migrants'. Since they were such a highly selected group with strong evidence of torture, and all but one subject had a strong medical report submitted to the Home office, one would, according to Forrest, 'have expected that they would have had a smooth passage through the asylum process. This has not proved to be the case, as seen by the high number of refusals for asylum'.

Thus Sally Verity Smith, the legal adviser on asylum matters at the Medical Foundation, describes the legal situation, focusing on how the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 affected the Sikh asylum seekers from India. In the first six months of 1996, 99 per cent of all Indian claims for asylum were refused. In 1995, of 3,255 Indian claims to asylum, only 2 were granted refugee status. She explains the legal meanings and its implication regarding 'The Short Procedure', 'The Designated List', and the 'Refusal and Right of Appeal'. She conclusively shows how the Home Office, in refusing asylum to brutally tortured Sikh asylum seekers, has routinely flouted the criteria enunciated in the 1951 Geneva Convention for refugee status—having a well-founded fear of persecution for reason of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or social group.

According to her, the climate of disbelief towards Sikh claimants at the Home Office 'will only increase with the introduction of the designated list, since the presumption against persecution is now being institutionalised for these claims'. As a way of illustration she cites two cases of Sikh clients of the Medical Foundation. Case I: Mr G. Singh, an asylum seeker with a very strong case, was refused asylum and his appeal was turned down, despite having a medical report documenting the torture he suffered. Case 2: Mr K. Singh, a Sikh from India who was granted asylum on appeal after a medical report found that he had been 'destroyed physically and mentally'. If K had been subjected to fast-tracking and shortened appeals procedures, it is unlikely, according to Smith, there would have been time to draw up a medical report and details of his torture might have never emerged.

Sally Verity Smith had cited these damning cases in October 1996. In May 1997, the Tory government was humiliatingly hounded out of political office at the polls, with its draconian and reviled immigration and asylum policies in tatters.

In late May, the new Labour Home Secretary Jack Straw announced that he will scrap the so-called 'white list' of countries, much to the delight of the anti-Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 groups. The announcement might be a small comfort for those in strife-torn Punjab, who are still routinely tortured and are desperately in need of asylum in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, but for those individuals in Forrest and Smith's book, the defeat of the Tory government came too late.

Their experiences at the hands of the Punjab authorities, and later by the Home Office officials, must however be taken into account by the new British Labour government, if and when it is planning to implement a just,

fair and humane asylum policy towards those fleeing persecution and torture.

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Ian R.G. Spencer, *British Immigration Policy Since 1939: The Making of Multi-Racial Britain* (London: Routledge, 1997), xv+207 pp., £45 (hb), £14.99 (pb), ISBN 0–415–1396–2 (pb), 0–415–13695–4 (hb)

In terms of immigration control, during the course of the past century, Britain has changed from a liberal to a fascist state. Before 1900 anybody who wished to enter Britain could do so, with little interference from anybody on British soil. One hundred years later a person who tries to move to the country has to face a barrage of regulations, especially if they come from the wrong (poor and brown or black) part of the world. While all nation-states have undergone a similar process over the same period of time, the transformation of Britain is especially striking in this sense, because of the contrast between 1860 and 1997. Britain now represents, along with France, the most draconian state in Europe, in terms of immigration control.

The evolution of British immigration policy has been a steady, yet constant process, beginning, most importantly, with the Aliens Act of 1905. The passage of this piece of legislation essentially represents the crossing of the Rubicon in terms of controlling immigration. Since that time numerous measures have followed, most importantly in 1914, 1919, 1962, 1968 and 1971. While Spencer acknowledges the passage of the pre-World War II legislation, his failure to recognise its importance is striking, especially when it is coming from a historian.

In fact, this book suffers from a complete lack of knowledge of the historical traditions of immigration into Britain. Spencer is so obsessed with black and Asian immigration that he seems completely ignorant of the fact that, during the course of the nineteenth century, about one million Irish people and over one hundred thousand Jews settled in mainland Britain. Instead, he chooses to focus upon the few hundred blacks and Asians who lived in the country before the Second World War, even though he acknowledges their minuscule numbers. What he fails to recognise, however, is the continuity in British attitudes to foreigners,

which simply shifts attention from the Irish in the middle of the nineteenth century, to Jews 50 years later and to blacks and Asians after 1945. The language remains the same but the focus changes. In fact, as John A. Garrard recognised over 25 years ago in *The English and Immigration*, the similarities between the campaign for the Aliens Act of 1905 and that for the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 are striking.

The lack of historical context represents one of the fundamental problems of Spencer's book. A second concerns the use of concepts, specifically 'multi-racial'. One can tell that this book is written by a historian because of a complete lack of jargon. While the use of plain English by historians deserves praise, we do need some explanation of a term used in the sub-title of a book. Spencer seems to believe that Britain is 'multi-racial' simply because black and Asian people live in the country. However, the term can only really apply to a state in which minorities have a proportionate share of political and economic power, which may be impossible in any nation-state.

Spencer's book has a third major problem in his use of sources. The bulk of this short book (just 161 pages of text) is essentially concerned with the campaign for the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. It is here that the author displays his empirical skills as a historian, demonstrating evidence of many hours spent in the Public Records Office in the idyllic location of Kew. Unfortunately, Spencer displays little evidence of having spent any time at less idyllic locations such as the dark basement of the British Library of Political and Economic Science with its thousands of volumes of British government documents. Reading the footnotes of chapters two to five one simply sees reference to nothing but government files. Spencer has used virtually nothing else. Any good historian varies his sources.

When we get to the period after 1962, Spencer dispenses with government documents and turns to secondary sources, which leads to my fourth major reservation, concerning the structure of the book. It contains 107 pages on the years 1945–62 and just 22 pages on the period 1962–91. Two possible explanations present themselves for this state of affairs. First, as Spencer's book is so heavily reliant upon government files, these run out because of the 30-year rule, meaning that he had no evidence of the kind he wished to continue with, for his narrative. Second, it could be that the publisher forced him to bring his survey up to date, whereas it may have been better to end in 1962.

Despite my reservations about this book, it still represents a valuable contribution to the study of immigrants in post-War Britain and I would

recommend it to anyone working in this field. The strongest section is that which deals with the early post-War years. Spencer should be congratulated for his narrative outlining the attitudes of British government departments to the influx of immigrants in the immediate post-War years. This is a task which no sociologist or political scientist has summoned up the energy to achieve.

Some of Spencer's conclusions and underlying arguments are also important. For instance, he points to the different ways in which white and black immigrants have been viewed in the post-War period, although this has been recognised by all researchers working in this field. Spencer also points out the different social backgrounds of black and Asian immigrants in Britain, although he could have expanded on this. Nevertheless, this was not his core aim.

Panikos Panayi
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C.H. Kennedy and Rasul Bakhsh Rais (eds) *Pakistan 1995* (Boulder: Westview, 1995) 229 pp., $40 (hb), ISBN 0–8133–8728–0

This collection of nine articles on political developments during the period 1992–94 is the second volume in a series sponsored by the American Institute of Pakistan Studies. Like its predecessor, it contains a useful chronology culled from newspaper sources. Individual chapters cover such varied topics as gender issues and business politics. The more specialised contributions enhance the value of what otherwise would be an unremarkable overview of major domestic political events.

Surprisingly, for a series which purports to cover contemporary issues, the treatment of the 1993 elections which saw Benazir Bhutto return to power is perfunctory. Similarly, the ongoing crisis in Karachi is considered only briefly within the wider context of a discussion on the millitary and ethnic politics. For a more detailed assessment the reader would have to turn to other sources, such as the articles published in *Asian Survey*. The treatment is also thin with respect to Pakistan's growing economic crisis as a result of spiralling domestic and external debts. There are only three references in the main body of the work to Moeen Qureshi's attempts as caretaker Prime Minister to introduce major financial reforms.

The chapter by Stanley Kochanek is of special interest. This reveals the shift in commercial influence from the Gujarati-speaking Memon

trading communities to the Punjabi Chinotis. The progress which began during the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto era gathered pace under Zia. Kochanek provides much useful material on Karachi business politics which, he declares, became increasingly segregated into 'warring ethnic blocks' (p. 139). He demonstrates what the Memons perceived as a Punjabi bias in Nawaz Sharif's privatisation policy. 'In the absence of collective action' Kochanek concludes, 'businessmen depend on *sifarish* (connections) and bribes to secure individual benefits . . . the Memons . . . began to see Nawaz Sharif's policy of privatisation as "Punjabisation" ' (pp. 153 and 150).

Two other chapters which deserve special attention are Anita Weiss' study of the status of women and Tayyab Mahmud's study of the law and the protection of religious minorities. Both reveal the constraints imposed on reform by 'religious orthodoxy' and the continuing legacies of the Zia era. Weiss usefully also draws attention to the phenomenon of the increasing proliferation of NGOs throughout Pakistan. Mahmud maintains that the 3 July 1993 decision by the Pakistan Supreme Court in the Dard case upholding the criminalisation of the public practice of the Ahamdis' faith contradicts the 'foundational constitutional jurisprudence of the country, the implied covenant of freedom of religion between religious minorities and the Pakistan movement and the dictates of international human rights law' (p. 83).

The volume represents a useful addition to material on contemporary Pakistan, although the limited range of topics and the depth at which they are treated mean that it is far from definitive in its scope. The collection's value as a reference source would have been enhanced by the inclusion of biographical notes on the main *dramatis personae*.

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Books Received

Association for Punjab Studies (UK), *Directory of Punjab Scholars in Britain*, (Coventry: APS (UK), 1996) (hb) and (pb), ISBN 1–87–4699–00–3, 1–87–46–9902–x.

Bashir, E. and Israr ud din, Proceedings of the Second International Hindukush Cultural Conference, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996) xxix + 500 pp., Rs 1400 (hb), ISBN 0–19–577571–6.

G.S. Dhillon, *Perspectives on Sikh Religion and History*, (Delhi: National Book Organisation, 1996) x + 130 pp., Rs 195 (hb), ISBN 81–85135–77–0.

S. Gill, G.D'Costa and U. King (eds) *Religion in Europe: Contemporary Perspectives*, (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1994) ix + 213 pp. (pb) ISBN 90–390–0508–7.

J. Holm and J. Bowker (eds) [3 volumes] *Sacred Writings, Attitudes to Nature, Women in Religion*, (London: Pinter, 1994) £29.50 each (hb) xii + 201 pp., ISBN 1–85567–106–9; xii + 172 pp., 1–85567–108–5; and xxii + 182 pp., 1–85567–092–5; and £9.99 each (pb), ISBN 1–85567–107–7; 1–85567–109–3; and 1–85567–093–3.

H.A. Khan, *Orangi Pilot Project Reminiscences and Reflections*, (Karachi: OUP, 1996) xii + 157 pp., Rs 350 (hb), ISBN 0–19–577689–5.

S. Puri, *Advent of Sikh Religion: A Socio-Political Perspective*, (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1993) xx + 251 pp., Rs 250 (hb), ISBN 81–215–0572–0.

J. Singh, *Society, Culture and Socio-Cultural Change*, (Delhi: National Book Organisation, 1996).

D.S. Tatla, *These on Punjab:* Volume 1, *A bibliography of dissertations presented to Universities of Europe, Russia and the Far East 1900–1995*; and Volume 2, *A bibliography of dissertations presented to Universities of North America 1900–1995* (Coventry: APS (UK), 1996) xvi + 135 pp. and xvi + 131 pp. (hb), ISBN 1–874699–03–8 and 1–874699–04–6 and (pb) ISBN 1–874699–06–2 and 1–874699–07–0.

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Forthcoming from Sage

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Anthropological Studies on Contemporary India

R.S. KHARE

A critical anthropological study of contemporary India, this book explicates the cultural roles, presence and limitations of the ordinary, quotidian Indian. It also comments on the distinct challenges that tumultuous India poses to modern anthropology.

In the first part, the author evaluates the relative strengths and weaknesses of recent anthropological approaches and concepts employed by scholars to study contemporary India. In the second part, he discusses major cultural, religious and political conflicts like the status of Untouchable women, the Ayodhya episode, the Deorala *sati*, etc., by employing ethnographic strategies as a descriptive and discursive tool. Carefully designed field encounters based on interrelated and ethnographic field research help to elaborate the discourse.

This book will attract a wide readership, particularly from anthropology, sociology, history, religious studies, political science and women's studies.

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Forthcoming from Sage

BETWEEN TRADITION AND MODERNITY

india's search for identity

Editors: Fred Dallmayr ◆ G N Devy

While many nations and cultures across the globe have encountered colonialism, the editors of this volume believe that India has been particularly sensitive to preserving its traditions and cultural memories, which were severely tested by colonial domination. The book focuses on the existential dimension of this encounter, and the West's role as a catalyst in India's process of self-scrutiny and search for self-rule and cultural identity.

The first part of this volume brings together major voices in India's struggle against colonialism, and the second part presents interpretive essays by intellectuals across various disciplines and interests. Taken as a whole, the volume shows that the process of modernization and so-called 'development' is really a struggle over the heart and soul of India.

Given its interdisciplinary character, hermeneutical approach and broad sweep, this anthology will be of interest to those engaged in the study of Indian politics, history, literature, philosophy and cultural studies, as well as the general reader.

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2. Notes and references are not to be treated separately and should be consecutively numbered and presented at the end of the article, not at the foot of each page. The system of bracketed references embedded in the text or in the notes such as (Tinker 1967; 147) is to be completely avoided.
3. **Referencing Style**
   A. For Published Sources the following examples illustrate the style to be followed:
      On first reference
      (a) *Books:* Ian Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj, 1847–1947* (Delhi: Manohar, 1989), 130–45.
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      (c) *Articles in Journals:* Stephen Oren, 'The Sikhs, Congress, and the Unionists in British Punjab, 1937–45', in *Modern Asian Studies* (hereafter *MAS*), 8, 3 (1974), 397–418.
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      (d) *Articles in Edited Volumes:* N. Buchinani and D.M. Indra, 'Key Issues in Canadian-Sikh Ethnic Relations', in N. Gerald Barrier and V.A. Dusenbery (eds), *The Sikh Diaspora: Migration and Experience beyong Punjab* (New Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1990).
      (e) *Dissertations:* Jeffrey Key, 'Nongovernmental Organisations as Strategic Organisations: The Politics of Voluntarism in Pakistan', unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Texas at Austin, August 1990.
      On subsequent reference (unless immediately following the first reference in which case 'ibid'. will be used) the example at (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) will become:
      (a) Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, 131.
      (b) Barret, *International Dimensions.*
      (c) Oren, 'The Sikhs, Congress, and the Unionists', 413–14.
      (d) Buchinani and Indra, 'Key Issues'.
      (e) Key, 'Nongovernmental Organisations'.
      (f) References to newspapers: The Tribune (Chandigarh), 7 July 1992.
      (g) References to parliamentary debates: HC Debates, 13 July 1959, 42 (UK).
      (h) References to government documents or Parliamentary papers: Economic Advisor to Punjab Government, Statistical Abstract, Chandigarh: 1989.
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Democracy, Self-Determination and a Just Peace

SUMANTRA BOSE

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