INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF

PUNJAB STUDIES

Vol. 5 No. 1
January–June 1998

International Journal of Punjab Studies

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ISSN: 0971-5223

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6 Bonhill Street
London, EC2A 4PU

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symbol of *izzat* among the Punjabis.

While the development of the nine canal colonies, land reclamation and allotment consummated feudatory interests in the province, the government felt at ease with a guaranteed loyalty from such dynasties. The nationalist movements could not make any headway into the province until the very last years of the Raj, and that too eventually came to be dominated by the landed groups. Not to speak of a *national* role, within the province localist affiliations did not even allow the evolution of an all-encompassing *regional* identity. Segmentation on the basis of *ilaqa*, religion and *biradari* remained the order of the day. The urban intelligentsia, lower middle class political activists and ideologues belonging to various shades of opinions were constantly vetoed by overpowering forces like the PNUP who kept both the infantile middle class and the masses at bay. Land grants to former soldiers as *jagirs* made military service a matter of pride and status for the Punjabis specially in north-western Punjab—something which has been rigorously retained by the successive regimes in Pakistan. The generous land allotments in the 1950s and 1960s especially in Sindh have only intensified—not unjustifiably—Sindhi resentment against the Punjabis and others.

Pakistan, where most of these canal colonies originated, inherited an entrenched, opportunistic feudal class, politically localist and socially oppressive. On the other hand, the segmented masses and a stagnant agricultural economy suffering from serious technical and human problems did not help the ruralist Punjabi economy mature into the bourgeoisie capitalism. The co-optive and collaborative triad of landed elite, bureaucracy and military can certainly be traced from the pre-1947 era, which has, over the subsequent decades, consolidated its hold on the fractious polity, and in the process has multiplied strains on a fragile pluralism. However, it needs to be emphasised that, unlike other areas, the Pothowar region in northern Punjab, owing to the military factor, transformed itself from a localist, rural to a lower middle class, mobile society—a process absent form the Saraiki-speaking region in south-western Punjab or in neighbouring rural Sindh and Balochistan.

Muslim Politics in the British Punjab: From Cultural Reawakening to Political Sovereignty

Within the above revisionist perspective on the instrumentation of the politics of loyalty, factionalism and patronage, the twin-faceted societal

stratagem emerged in the forms of peasants' revolts and a moderate introspection combining modernity with tradition. The duality of rural localism and urban trans-regionalism in the communitarian Muslim experience turned sharper during the 'high noon of empire'. Whereas the rural areas underwent significant transformation through canalisation and settlements, the towns started to reorient themselves to a cultural self-definition. The debate about Muslim identity in northern India since the later Mughals did have its due ramifications for regions like Punjab, and we see its early articulation taking place in reference to determinants, such as religion and language. Both these factors, seeking commonalities with other trans-regional communities and concurrently espousing historical congruities are concurrently extrapolated in the traditionalist and modernist formulations.[18] The urban Muslim bourgeois pioneered the debate and early organisational efforts around the markers of religion, language and historical traditions. As a consequence, a number of Muslim *anjumans* and *tanzims* emerged in various urban areas aimed at educational improvement, protection of religious places and preservation of cultural symbols. Such associations aimed at inculcating a greater understanding of Islam simultaneous with an enhanced acquisition of western knowledge. A greater sense of loss, largely shared by the Muslim elites following the revolt of 1857, British vengeance against Muslims in particular, missionary enterprise in northern India and more so in the Punjab,[19] created a convergence between indigenous and extra-regional incentives.[20] The revivalists would hark back to the Word by shunning modernity, whereas the modernists would attempt for a synthesis.[21] The support for Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's educational activities largely came from the Punjabi Muslims like Khan Barkat Ali Khan, Muhammad Hayat Khan and Khalifa Muhammad Hasan.[22] The cultural definitions of communitarian entities came about owing to the *tanzims*, which, despite their unchallenged affirmation of loyalty to the Raj and a visible subservience to the officialdom, tried to create a 'separate' niche for the Muslims. Following Benedict Anderson's model of print capitalism, these *anjumans* eventually became the harbingers of political activism.[23] Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala were the earliest centres of such charity organisations initially started as modest *biradari*-based projects. The Kashmiri, Sheikh and Mian (Arayeen) families played a pioneering role in the Punjab during 1860-90 accounting for 42 *anjumans* out of a total of 83 for entire Muslim India.[24] While there has been sufficient documentary information about the Aligarh movement and All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference[25] led by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, the other socio-educational organisations remain

largely unknown. Within the British Punjab,[26] the Lahore-based Anjuman-i-Islamiyah—the earliest Muslim body to protect religious places—and the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam, the pre-eminent of all such associations, are the only two which have received occasional academic references despite the availability of their underutilised massive archives, contemporary press reports and miscellaneous autobiographical records.[27]

The Anjuman-i-Islamiyah, originally mentioned as Sadr Anjuman-i-Musalmanan-i-Punjab by Sir Syed,[28] was the first Muslim organisation to be established in October 1869 to take over the Badshahi Mosque's administration from the British which had incurred extensive damages during the Punjab wars.[29] Maintenance of the mosque at the cost of one lakh rupees and that of the shops adjacent to the Golden Mosque in Lahore were the early objectives of the Anjuman, founded mainly by Khan Barkat Ali Khan in league with several other Muslim notables. It subsequently extended its activities to improve the socio-academic conditions of the 'Muhammadans of the Punjab and to further Muhammadan interests generally'.[30] It looked after the Prophet's relics kept in the Lahore Fort and established a few scholarships for Muslim students. In 1888, the Anjuman made extensive arrangements for the holding of the session of the Muhammadan Educational Conference in Lahore and continued to look after the Badshahi Mosque all through the British period. However, the Anjuman remained dominated by an aristocratic Muslim elite—upper few[31]—whereas the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam had been a predominantly middle class organisation with populist appeal and a non-sectarian character. Established in September 1884, it owed its existence to Khalifa Hameed-ud-Din, Ghulam Ullah Qasuri, Munshi Peer Bakhsh and Munshi Abdur Rahim. Due to the painstaking efforts by Professor Ahmed Saeed, we now have a complete history of the Anjuman, its early founders, various activities, annual sessions, and most significantly, of its major institution, the Islamia College, Lahore.[32] Initially begun with a modest collection of 54 rupees, the Anjuman was able to solicit extensive funds through selfless members and opened its schools and orphanages in the old city of Lahore. Its Islamia College, 'the Aligarh of the Punjab', initially based in the Railway Road and then transferred to the Civil Lines, eventually emerged as the pre-eminent institution.[33] It was headed, in the early phase, by the British and then by Muslim principals, and over the last one century has grown into one of the major post-graduate institutions in this part of South Asia. At times, it was headed by Fazl-i-Husain, Allama Yusuf Ali, Sir Abdul Qadir and Dr Muhammad Taseer.[34] A number of Muslim notables like Amir Habibullah Khan of Afghanistan,

Justice Shah Din, Sir Muhammad Shafi, Mian Fazl-i-Husain, Allama Muhammad Iqbal, the Nawabs of Bahawalpur and Bhopal, Malik Barkat Ali, Sir Abdul Qadir and several others patronised its ever-expansive socio-academic functions.[35]

Given the concentration of Pakistan's nationalist historiography on Aligarh, it is only in recent years that the *indigenous* roots of Muslim socio-cultural and political movements have assumed some significance. In fact, by the 1880s, Lahore had already replaced Delhi and Lucknow as the major centre of Muslim intellectual activities leading to the assembly of well-known teachers, writers, reformers and artists.[36] However, besides Lahore, Amritsar had also evolved as another major area of Muslim associational activities though its contributions remain largely unacknowledged. It was here that an active group of Kashmiri Muslims laid the foundation of the Anjuman-i-Islamiyah in April 1873 aimed at (*a*) the propagation of religious and mundane education (*b*) social welfare of the Muslim *qaum* (*c*) representation of the *qaum*'s problems to the government (*d*) occasional deliberation on political issues, and (*e*) the establishment of scholarships for higher education. The sources of income included individual donations, official grants and donations by the Muslim princely states like Bahawalpur, and the tuition fee and subsequent property investments. The government, on various educational and religious matters such as during the Hunter Committee proceedings or annual Haj arrangements, sought the advice from the Anjuman. Though unlike the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam, it lacked its own magazines and annual public gatherings, coverage of the activities by Anjuman-i-Islamiyah in the contemporary Muslim press like *Paisa Akhbar*, *Al Wakeel*, *Inquilab* and *Nawa-i-Waqt* remained quite extensive. Its members—called *kaarkun*—met once a month and the accounts were regularly audited. The Anjuman not only built schools for boys and girls but mediated with other Muslim organisations across India and effectively cooperated with the Aligarh movement. The contacts with Sir Syed had begun as early as 1873 and more than any other Indian organisation, Anjuman-i-Islamiah of Amritsar proved to be the most generous supporter of Sir Syed's Aligarh Fund and All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference.[37]

Sharing a strong tradition of loyalty to the Raj but committed towards the Muslim welfare, the leaders of the Anjuman played a major part in the 'reawakening' of the community especially during the competitive late nineteenth century. Mindful of the cleavages between the Aligarh movement and *Dar-ul-Uloom*, Deoband, several Amritsari Muslims became ardent supporters of *Nadwat-ul-Ulama* which was established in 1892 to

bridge the ideological gap between the two contemporary major Muslim institutions. Nadwah's first major annual session outside the United Provinces took place in Amritsar owing to the efforts and interests shared by the Anjuman-i-Islamiyah's leadership. Another similar session was held in 1927 with the Anjuman operating as the host. In-between, the Anjuman provided funds and institutional support to Aligarh and Nadwah beside hosting the convention of All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference in 1907.

The leaders of the Anjuman-i-Islamiyah represented their community in various significant political developments including the Shimla Deputation, formation of the League in Dhaka and the Lucknow Pact. Its school, subsequently to become M.A.O. College, Amritsar, was equally accessible to non-Muslim students and had been headed by various leading scholars. The first Iqbal Day in 1938 was celebrated in the college with the efforts of Sheikh Sadiq Hasan and Sufi Ghulam Mustafa Tabbussum. Many of the students and alumni of the college were involved in the formation of Punjab Muslim Students Federation which, in the 1940s, played a vanguard role in the propagation of the idea of Pakistan amongst the north Indian Muslims. Several Amritsari students participated actively in seeking support for Pakistan in the referendum held in 1947 in the NWFP.[38]

Presumably, the political role of the above-mentioned and similar other associations[39] left politics to a few loyalist individuals who would be intermittently nominated to so-called advisory official committees until the Act of 1919 allowed a modicum of party politics. Both the Indian National Congress (INC) and the All India Muslim League (AIML) have had their branches in the Punjab beside the parallel communitarian organisations espousing socio-religious causes. With the establishment of diarchy and transfer of some powers to the provincial governments, participation in the electoral politics became a coveted status symbol for the indigenous elite. In the Indus Basin and especially Punjab, the Unionist Party emerged out of the collaborative interests of Punjabi notables of diverse communities sharing a similar class background. The Party was the brainchild of an urban politician with high ambition and corresponding calibre and provided a needed forum for Punjab's landed interests to augment localist influence under a larger official panoply.[40] Sir Fazl-i-Husain's party initially included some middle class Muslims like Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Malik Barkat Ali[41] and others largely due to an almost complete absence of effective India-wide parties and also because the middle class itself was quite fragile in size and resources. The post-First World War fragmentation of party politics amidst various anxieties solidified a Unionist

oligarchy of similar interests. The continued peripheralisation of Muslim middle class, artisans, peasantry and religious elites contrasted with the salience of the landed intermediaries, was retaliated through various new parties like the Majlis-i-Ahrar[42] and Tehreek-i-Khaksar.[43] However, by the early 1940s, their confrontational rhetoric, unclear political programmes, dispersal of energies on several simultaneous causes, personality cultism and official stubbornness had collectively deflated their emotive appeals.

Fazl-i-Husain's premier role in establishing the Unionist Party coupled with his concern for Punjabi and *Muslim* interests did not pose any visible threat to any other non-Muslim communitarian interests, but rather, aimed at establishing a needed equilibrium. His tripolar politics allowed him to play a wider and effective role both as a Punjabi politician and an India-wide Muslim statesman. Sir Fazl-i-Husain was thus a representative of a Muslim middle class, rooted in the *local* cultural identity project of the *anjumans* besides straddling a trans-regional domain. Such a policy operated successfully both in the interests of the Punjabis and the Indian Muslims though not without causing criticism from the Punjab Muslim League and the non-Muslim Punjabi press. His cool, calculating and persuasive strategies, as reflected in his speeches, writings or political manoeuvres granted him a larger-than-life stature, besides denying any major initiatives to his opponents.[44] Husain was not simply a mentor for rural Muslims, he was equally respected by the urban middle class and newspapers like *Inquilab*, *Ahsaan* and *Shahbaz* projected his case in the largest interests of the province and Muslims.[45] Husain's interest in the Punjab was not simply ethnic or mere political expediency. His effort to promote education amongst the Punjabi Muslims was meant to eradicate imbalances within the pluralism. His forays into Indian politics sprang from the above prerogative and also from his genuine concern for the Indian Muslims.[46] His view of Islam was historical and essentially cultural without being sectarian or theocratic.[47] His establishment of the Unionist Party was rooted in realpolitik since following diarchy party politics had become an imperative. In addition, through this predominantly elitist platform Husain could simultaneously control both the rural and urban elites. In addition, by quarantining provincial politics, it could also operate as a bulwark against any trans-regional forces intent upon destabilising the oligarchy.[48]

Fazl-i-Husain[49] was able to manoeuvre political forces both within the Punjab and outside through a complex system of individual and institutional arrangements and triumphantly thwarted both the INC and the League. Simultaneously, he could afford to ignore other parties like the

Ahrars and Khaksars, representing the Muslim petty bourgeois and peasantry. However, a lack of mediatory politics involving the three parallel spectrums of the middle class from Punjab's three major communities only added to resentment against the Unionist monopoly. The Khaksars, Sikh radicals, Mahasabhais and eventually the Leaguers and their cohorts in the Muslim Students Federation tried to wrest political control from the Unionists and the resultant polarisation only intensified the communalist politicking.[50] No wonder, when confronted with the League's civil disobedience movement, the Khizr ministry simply packed up, leaving urban politics totally to the whims of parochial forces. Sikandar Hayat, after Husain's death in 1936, had exhibited a pragmatic approach by co-opting the League which, for the time being, served both of them in their respective strategies against the INC.[51] With Sikandar gone in 1942 and the urban Muslim middle class becoming more assertive and trans-territorial in its linkages and programmes, it was successful in rupturing Unionist elitism. By that time, an eager Muslim bourgeois was able to transform culture identity into a full-fledged nationalist creed. Pakistan's utopia, promising an economic deliverance, a trans-regional sovereign statehood, the reassertion of a 'lost' history, a salience of middle class and redefinition as *Muslim* over and above local and sectarian demarcation, had assumed a super-arching destiny. The quarantining of the Punjab— its Hindu and Muslim populations in particular—lay in tatters intensifying worries in the official corridors besides exacerbating apprehensions among all the three communities.

Khizr suffered at the hands of some of his own former Unionist colleagues and refused to join the bandwagon, despite various opportunities and temptation. Such a political aloofness only added an indifference towards an individual who had challenged an all-India leader like Jinnah on his *native* turf and had refused to budge until the events caught up with him in March 1947. With his resignation as the Premier ended the long Unionist hegemony over the Punjab and communalism engulfed its diverse religious communities. Khizr could have been rehabilitated like Dr Khan Sahib or several other of his contemporaries. They had opposed the Muslim League but, latterly realising its powerful mystique and growing strength, had joined its ranks.

Khizr was a traditional aristocrat, a reluctant politician and a straightforward individual lacking credentials in *realpolitik*—occasionally defined as pragmatism—and thus unable to fend against his adversaries. He became the 'other' in Pakistan's quest for nationhood and through his own aloofness, became an easy scapegoat. His loyalty towards the Raj

and its functionaries like Glancy, Wavell and Brayne was unquestionably naive and reflected his inability to see significant changes on the horizon. Initially, he thought that the British were there to stay and began to espouse the case for an independent, united Punjab. This, despite its colourful and romantic attraction, was merely a charade. His departure from the scene soon after his resignation, while he might at least have been able to save the non-Muslims in his native Kalra state, was quite dramatic. Leaving the estate and properties to the whim of his retinue of servants or the new functionaries in the young states of India and Pakistan reinforces the image of a Shakespearean tragedy where Khizr tiptoes as a Hamlet, marginalised and humbled by those very individuals who might have been his own protégés. Khizr, until his death in 1975, could see all the crucial dramas unfolding in the young Muslim republic, but by his refusal to participate in politics and then his reluctance to pen down his own personal accounts, has added to a great mystery about the man who, despite his principles, has remained so vulnerable to various attacks. As Talbot quite meticulously proves, we have very little documentary evidence on Khizr in terms of family papers or personal correspondence, except for official reports.[52] Khizr, despite being so recent, seems so distant.

In 1944, Khizr flatly refused to toe Jinnah's exhortation for the amalgamation of his party into the League, suggesting that it would only lead to communal discord. By then, the League's avowal of Pakistan as the Muslim utopia and its campaign for the co-option of rural and religious influentials had been successful. This was later confirmed in the elections of 1946. Khizr, in the electoral campaign, had challenged slogans like 'Islam in danger' and tried to hold back the clock. The League, despite a clear majority, was not asked by the Governor to form the ministry, and instead, Khizr carried on with the support from the Congress and the Akalis, something which totally antagonised the Muslim Punjabis. In early 1947, the official restrictions on the militias proved to be the last straw and the League began its active defiance.

Khizr was a transitional figure and, unlike Husain and Sikandar, did not build bridges with other parties or leaders across the subcontinent. He was not a political ideologue and his loyalty was irksome to the nationalists. It is a great 'if' whether asking the League to form the provincial government following its victory in the 1946 elections would have changed the course of history, with the Muslim party seeking non-Muslim allies to form a coalition government in the Punjab. Sir Jenkins could have given the opportunity to the League before asking Khizr (with his own 13 supporters) to form a coalition. Khizr could have equally refused so as to

save himself from all the latent frustration and denigration. But all this is now hypothetical.

Pakistan in the Remaking of Punjab

Pakistan was a long march from the days of a guarded cultural definition of the 1860s to an assertive political articulation of the 1940s. Inherent of various regional and sectarian tensions, the trans-regional associations did generate a soothing role and a greater sense of secure belonging at a time when Muslim political and economic power lay in shambles. The growth of cultural societies—*anjumans*—eventually led to full-fledged political parties like the Muslim League, PNUP, Khaksars and Ahrars. However, the League's historic session at Lahore 58 years ago, turned to be a major turning-point for South Asian Muslims. Retrospectively, significant developments during the subsequent decades may appear sobering, traumatising and even exhilarating depending upon one's own perception. As a *cause celébrè* within the seven years of the session, the Indian Muslims led by M.A. Jinnah were able to establish the largest Muslim state in the world in the very teeth of multidimensional opposition and a pervasive scepticism. Pakistan, true to its generic name, evolved as a superordinate identity espousing Muslim nationalism through co-opting regionalist and localist forces. In a powerful sense, it was a progressive ideal promising a cohesive, positive and consensual identity to avoid the two other feared possibilities stipulating a total marginalisation as 'a permanent minority', or a sheer balkanisation through a reversal to localist tribalisation. Pakistan was thus visualised as the best possible solution between these two unenviable extremities and was seen by downtrodden Muslim peasantry as a utopia, while for religious elements it was an escape from the 'Andalusia syndrome'.

More than a mere new territorial arrangement, Pakistan, as envisioned by Jinnah and his colleagues, was to enshrine democratic institutions, peaceful co-existence, social welfare, respect for human rights and progress for *all* irrespective of their sectarian, lingual, regional or religious affiliations. The League's Lahore Resolution was neither a counsel of despair, nor an exclusive rhetoric. Rather, it embodied a broad commitment to the community's welfare through an affirmation of its political sovereignty. The resolution, despite its apparent simplicity, marshalled a broad-based consensus on pluralism and constitutionalism. The successive resolutions further reiterated the League's commitment for plurality and distributive

justice as was reflected in the unquestionable personal integrity of Jinnah and his commitment to constitutionalism, peace and co-existence. Jinnah's vision of a sovereign Muslim state based on the primacy of the people and principles rather than of certain regional specificities, pressure groups, sects or classes, remains largely uncomprehended and unimplemented mainly because of superimposed statist unilateralism and also due to the simplification of the Pakistan movement itself. Within Punjab—the flagship of Pakistani nationalism—there is a greater need to understand and reiterate the plural and constitutional prerogatives of quest for identity as envisioned and experienced by various other communities and regions. Attitudes based on abeyance, self-negation and defensiveness must give way to a vigorous, cathartic and multidimensional debate 50 years after independence. A multiple, genuine and overdue Indo-Pakistani dialogue to deconstruct the pervasive cold war can immensely help such an overdue discourse among the diverse communities of South Asia.

Notes

1. This article was originally presented at the international conference on Partition organised by the National Institute of Punjab Studies, New Delhi, August 1997. For this quote see Gazdar and Mazhar Zaidi, 'Barriers at the Border', *The News International* (London), 4 July 1997.
2. This refers to the well-known interpretation of the early phase in the country's political economy when the 'insiders' and 'outsiders' (Punjabis and Urdu-speaking Muhajireen) built up the powerful nexus in the young country which led to the marginalisation of the Bengalis. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Muhajir middle class felt being left out with the erstwhile rural Sindhis becoming more vocal and eager to play a mainstream role in the provincial and national politics. See Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto*, 1971-1977 (London: Macmillan, 1988 reprint); also, Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity* (London: St Antony's/Macmillan Series, 1997).
3. This, however, cannot be overemphasised in view of the Sunni-Shia conflict especially during the month of Muharram. But, that too is linked with the local politics and economic competition, and shows class-based characteristics.
4. One cannot be sure whether the debate regarding Partition resulting into communal violence or vice versa will ever be resolved. The literary celebrities including Saadat Hasan Manto, Khushwant Singh, Amrita Pritam, Krishan Chandar and several others seem to lament the human consequences of Partition. On the contrary, Qudratullah Shahab, Ashfaq Ahmed, Mashkoor Hussain Yaad and Mumtaz Mufti, without condoning violence, envision Pakistan only as a cherished utopia acquired after multiple sacrifices which has to be safeguarded at any cost. Their views in Pakistani Punjab somehow resonate a pervasive political creed affirming the indispensability of Pakistan.

5. It is curious to note that the traditional socio-cultural infrastructures at the *local* level in *mofussil* areas in the Indus Basin region escaped communalist violence. Wherever people knew one another, the primordial factors more often precluded the possibility of any communalist attack. It was in towns, cities or during their migrations that the refugees were ambushed or brutally attacked. In Sindh, Balochistan and tribal parts of the Frontier—like in the rural Punjab—local patriarchal hierarchies assisted non-Muslim families in their outward migration. The post-exodus incidents of looting were/are narrated to describe the 'immoralness' of the perpetrators. In the Punjabi folk parlance, it is still identified as *ghadar*—a horrendous catastrophe. Sometimes, it appears as if official and other hostile establishments in both India and Pakistan exaggerate the travails of the migrants to refurbish their own nationalist credentials by zeroing on the travesty of the 'other'. Hindu-Muslim relations, at a painful level, have become a priori for both justifying and negating several ideological outlooks.
6. This is not an affirmation of the 'crowd mentality' thesis; rather, it is a reflection on the bankruptcy of statist and elitist oligarchies. These issues have been capably discussed by Ian Talbot in his *Freedom's Cry: The Popular Dimensions in the Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in North-West India* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996).
7. I am aware of the fact that an unintended or even unavailability of 'correct' paradigmatic and lexiconic alternatives may lead to imperialism of categories but, in my view, the non-judgemental use of such lexicons as community, communalism, secularism, nation or ethnicity can be allowed. See Ashish Nandy, 'An Anti-Secularist Manifesto', *Seminar*, No. 314.
8. More than religion, it is the economic utopianism that becomes the engine for the Pakistan movement where the Muslim League is able to establish its credentials well ahead of other contending parties. In case of Bengal, following the various peasants revolts and the famine, the Muslim laity saw a breakthrough in Pakistan providing a much sought-after deliverance from *bhadralok*. See Taj Hashmi, *Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia: Communalization of Class Politics in East Bengal* (Boulder: Westview, 1992). In case of Sindh, the demand for separation of Sindh and then affirmation of Pakistan also displayed strong class- and community-based factors. *Waderas* like G.M. Syed, Ayub Khuro or Shahnawaz Bhutto were joined by urban industrialists like the Haroons or a small Muslim bourgeoisie competing with powerful non-Muslim counterparts in Bombay, Karachi, Hyderabad and Shikarpur. Studies by Stephen Dale, Claude Markovitz, Sarah Ansari, H. Lari, Hamida Khuro and Mushtaqur Rahman on the international and indigenous nature of Sindhi capitalist formation prove that this economic unevenness was quite apparent within Sindh in the decades before independence. On the Frontier, while the Red Shirts led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan reflected a peasant's unrest rooted through Pushtun identity, its subservience to the Congress, largely viewed as a party of urban moneyed Hindus, deflated its popularity in latter years. Both Rittenberg and Jansson have emphasised the ethnic aspects of the Frontier politics in the larger context of India-wide party politics but somehow the class dimension underwriting communal fissures seems to not have been properly emphasised. These and such other subsequent studies end up vacillating between high politics of British India and medium politics of the regions/provinces without reaching the lower echelons. The studies end up concentrating on personalities like Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan or Jinnah rather than the transformative forces within the plural societies in these regions. For a useful compendium on the 'high

politics' of pre-1947 Muslim majority provinces, see D.A. Low, ed., *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Also, Erland Jansson, *India, Pakistan, or Pakhtunistan? The Nationalist Movement in the North-West Frontier Province*, Stockholm, 1981; Stephen Rittenberg, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Pakhtuns. The Independence Movement in India's North-West Frontier Province* (Durham: Durham University Press, 1988); M. Korejo, *The Frontier Gandhi* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992); Hamida Khuro (ed.), *Sindh through the Centuries* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987); Mustaqur Rahman, *Land and Life in Sindh, Pakistan* (Lahore: Ferozesons, 1993); and, Suhail Zaheer Lari, *A History of Sindh* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996).

9. Talbot, *Freedom's Cry*, p. 48. Suranjan Das also highlights the violence in the 1930s not being directed against the person but against the accounts books of the money-lender. Suranjan Das, *Communal Riots in Bengal 1905-1947* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 113.
10. I am not sure whether I fully agree with the ascriptive nature of communalism as posited by Pandey, nor do I feel comfortable with its presumed givenness. I do agree with Pandey when he says that both the colonial and nationalist discourses have equally internalised its usage with all the portents of continuity but to simply suggest that it is a statist project somehow falls within the less persuasive paradigm of the 'colonial challenge and the Indian response'. Communalism may be a new term and in the modern British and post-1947 South Asian history it has specifically become an antithesis to humanism and co-existence. However, in its original sense, it simply means organisation of groups of people which is definitely an unchallengeable reality. Thus, the South Asians did have various organisational strategies and edifices all through these years accruing out of identification with determinants like family, *biradari*, *qaum*, *zat*, *mohallah*, village, tribe, town, profession, religion, sect, racial ascription and trans-regional nostalgia. Simply negating these aggregate identities due to their modernist props or solely because of communal riots may smack of a rather reactive discourse, not so far from the mainstream nationalist historiography. See Gyanendra Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992).
11. Several scholars would attribute the rise of various forms of fundamentalism, amongst other factors, to the bankruptcy of post-colonial elites and their failure in delivering the goods. See David Westerlund (ed.), *Questioning the Secular State: The World-wide Resurgence of Religion in Politics* (London: 1996). But curiously, the divide between the fundamentalists and modernists is quite hazy as both seem to apply similar tactics and objectives in their campaigns to dislodge each other. For an interesting case study, see Ervand Abrahmian, *Khomeinism*, London, 1993. In case of Muslim South Asia, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revolution*, London, 1996.
12. See Aitzaz Ahsan, *The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1996. The author is a known barrister from Lahore and a close associate of Benazir Bhutto. He, in the last two tenures of the Pakistan People's Party-led regime, held important cabinet positions and rigorously represents a new, vibrant, self-assured but angry and a bit over-romanticised view of Pakistani nationalism in its *volksgeist* roots.
13. P.M.H. van den Dungen, *The Punjab Tradition: Influence and Tradition in Nineteenth Century India*, London, 1972; David Page, *Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control, 1920-1932*, Delhi, 1982; and,

Imran Ali, *Punjab under Imperialism, 1885-1947*, London, 1989.

14. See, Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Identity Formation and Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 1897-1936: A Retrospective Analysis', *Modern Asian Studies*, 29, 2 (1995).
15. Ian Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj, 1849-1947* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988); David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988); and Sarah F. D. Ansari, *Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sindh, 1843-1947* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
16. Imran Ali, *Punjab under Imperialism*, p. 2.
17. Norman G. Barrier, 'The Formation and Enactment of the Punjab Alienation of Land Bill', *The Punjab Past and Present*, 12, 1 (1978).
18. I have discussed this in greater length at another place. See Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Muslim Nationalism and Ethno-regional Postulations: Sir Fazl-i-Husain and Party Politics in the Punjab', in Pritam Singh and Shinder S. Thandi (eds), *Globalization and the Region: Explorations in Punjabi Identity* (Coventry: International Association of Punjab Studies, 1996).
19. For further information on the establishment of early Presbyterian activities, see Iftikhar H. Malik, *US-South Asia Relations, 1784-1940: A Historical Perspective* (Islamabad: Area Study Centre, 1988), pp. 32-90.
20. It is only in the late 1880s that the British attitudes towards Muslims underwent some minor changes; otherwise, they remained the focus of official and missionary stigmatisation. See K.K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India: A Study of British Public Opinion vis-à-vis the Development of Muslim Nationalism in India, 1857-1947*, London, 1962.
21. It is quite common on the part of liberals to attack the *ulama* as proponents of orthodoxy and extremism, and rightly, there have been several such cases. But, at another dispassionate level, one does notice several of them being strongly anti-colonial. It may not be totally unjust to assume that intellectually they may have been 'regressive' but politically they were 'progressive'.
22. Khan Barkat Ali Khan, called as 'the Patriarch of the Lahore Muhammadans' and a 'fair scholar', was originally a Pathan from Shahjahanpur who had rendered numerous services to the British. Until his death in 1905, he was the leading voice of the Punjabi Muslims and supported Syed Ahmed's visits (1873 and 1884) to the Punjab. Khan Barkat Ali Khan was the Vice President of the Lahore branch of the Indian Association which was headed by Sardar Dayal Singh Majithia, the founder of the Dayal Singh Trust and *The Tribune*. Writing about Ali Khan, Justice Shah Din had observed: 'Khan Bahadur Muhammad Barkat Ali Khan is the guiding genius of the Anjuman-i-Islamia. It is he who, like a beneficent taskmaster, is driving the *rais*' of Lahore, the slave of indolence and luxury, on to their work'. Bashir Ahmad, *Justice Shah Din: His Life and Writings*, Lahore, 1962, p. 252. Sardar Majithia not only received Syed Ahmed at the railway station but also made a handsome donation to the Aligarh Fund. Muhammad Hayat Khan, the doyen of the Wah family in Attock and the father of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, was a former official who enthusiastically supported educational activities amongst the Muslims besides exhibiting interest in regional history. Khalifa Muhammad Hasan was the Chief Minister of Patiala.
23. Anil Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 196.
24. See *The Report of All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference 1888*, Agra, 1890, pp. 56 and 68.

25. Similar to the Aligarh movement, All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference was established in December 1886 to promote education amongst the Muslims outside Aligarh. In his commitment to an apolitical creed, Sir Syed used this forum to prohibit Muslims from joining the Indian National Congress (INC). Its well-known session in Lahore in 1888 brought Sir Syed back to the Punjab on his second visit. It is interesting to note that eventually the forum itself proved an incubator for the All-India Muslim League (AIML).
26. Following the introduction of modern western education a number of pre-eminent associations across India, especially in the presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, were organised in the 1850s espousing the cause for social reforms through modern education. The earliest such organisation was the Indian Association, established on 29 October 1851, which remained confined to Hindus but started attracting Muslim members after 1859.
27. Most of such material is in Urdu as the proceedings were carried out in Urdu with occasional usage of Persian in *Sipasnamah*—the special welcome address presented to dignitaries like the Amir of Afghanistan, Viceroys and provincial governors. As late as the 1930s, at such special fund-raising events aimed at promoting institutional activities, the leaders of Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam would prefer Persian over Urdu and English. Not only did it symbolise a gloried history through an elitist, class-based bias, it equally showed a greater sense of fraternity with the Muslim Ummah.
28. See his *Tehzeeb-ul-Akhlaq*, Vol. IV, p. 182.
29. Ikram Ali Malik, 'Anjuman-i-Islamiyah, Lahore', *Al-Muaarif* (Lahore), July 1983, pp. 16-20.
30. Quoted in S.M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan* (Lahore: Research Society, 1995 reprint), p. 203.
31. Ibid., p. 207.
32. According to Saeed, the idea of having a Muslim association for the promotion of education and a defence of Islamic values vis-à-vis the missionary attacks was already in currency amongst the concerned Lahori Muslims. In addition, the displacement of Persian resulting in unemployment of a number of Muslim 'vernacular' teachers and the onslaught from revivalists resulted in a soul-searching that culminated in the establishment of the Anjuman. In March 1884, outside the Delhi Gate in Lahore, an evangelist, to the chagrin of Munshi Chiragh Din, a member of the audience made derogatory remarks about Islam. On his protest, Chiragh Din was expelled from the gathering. Din, along with his friends including Munshi Muhammad Kazim, Shams-ud-Din Shaiq and Mir Shams-ud-Din finally organised a meeting in Masjid Bakkan Khan on 24 September 1884, which resulted in the formation of the Anjuman. See Ahmed Saeed, *Islamia College Lahore ki Sadd Sala Tarikh, 1892-1992* (Urdu), Vol. 1 (Lahore: Research Society, 1992), p. 3.
33. 'The small Madrasat-ul-Muslimin which was established in 1886 rose to the position of a High School in 1889 and had more than 700 students on its rolls in 1893 with an annual expenditure of about Rs 10,000. In 1892, the Anjuman laid the foundation of a college by opening a first-year class of eleven students....Of great importance in the history of the province have been its annual sessions, which were addressed by topmost national leaders, and where Iqbal first recited some of major poems'. S.M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India*, p. 209.
34. Sir Muhammad Iqbal was closely associated with Islamia College and was largely instrumental in requesting Allama Yusuf Ali to return from London to head the

college in the 1930s. Yusuf Ali, the famous translator of the Quran and author of several books on India and Islamic studies, was former ICS, who after a very productive intellectual career died in London in 1953. To Ali, the happiest and the most productive time ever spent by him was in Lahore. For a recent and perhaps the only study of this eminent South Asian scholar, see A.A. Sherif, *Searching for Solace: A Biography of Allama Yusuf Ali*, London, 1994.

35. For more on its committee functions and recent leadership, see Mian Amir-ud-Din, *Yaad-i-Ayyam* (Urdu), Lahore, 1983.
36. I owe this information to Frances Pritchett of Columbia University who made it the subject matter of her presentation at the Smithsonian International Conference on Pakistan in Washington, D.C., in August 1996.
37. Its leader Khwaja Yusuf Shah was present in Aligarh at the opening of M.A.O. School in 1875. Yusuf Shah and Shaikh Ghulam Sadiq, the two founding members of the association were also on the board of the trustees of M.A.O. College. Sir Syed received moral support from Amritsari Muslims in his stance over the Albert Bill in the Imperial Legislative Council. On his second tour of the Punjab, he was given a very warm welcome at the Amritsar railway station, in January 1884. Ahmed Saeed, *Anjuman-i-Islamiyah Amritsar, 1873-1947* (Urdu) (Lahore: Research Society, 1986), pp. 21-31.
38. Due to Partition and migration, the Anjuman's long-held pursuit in institution-building came to an end. Its business was wound up with the leaders having to migrate to Pakistan, and the archives were nearly destroyed in the communal riots. However, it is largely due to the untiring efforts of Professor Ahmed Saeed of the M.A.O. College, Lahore, that a major study of the activities and leaders of the Anjuman have been penned down. See Saeed, *Anjuman*.
39. There were quite a few localised associations in urban centres purported to look after mosques and shrines with a few devoted to establishing religious *madrasas*, dispensaries, orphanages or small-scale libraries. However, their role may not be overemphasised due to pervasive economic and educational underdevelopment of Punjab's Muslims, unlike their counterparts in Bombay. However, a mention must be made of the Taj Company and Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf of Lahore whose Quranic publications and such other literature played an enhancive role amongst the educated Muslims. The subscription to the Punjab-based Urdu newspapers, and newspapers from elsewhere, especially during the Khilafat movement, did register a major increase.
40. The party and its leadership have received quite some academic attention so, now, there is greater need to study the second-tier leadership, its class transformation and inter-communal bargaining.
41. For a useful and perhaps the only biography of Malik Barkat Ali, see M. Rafique Afzal, *Malik Barkat Ali: His Life and Writings* (Lahore: Research Society, 1969); also, *Guftaar-i-Iqbal* (Urdu), (Lahore: Research Society, 1969).
42. The Majlis-i-Ahrar, established in 1929, is still waiting for a serious, comprehensive scholarly study though there is sufficient primary source material on the movement and its various ventures varying from the Kashmir Jihad movement to Shahidganj issue. There are several Urdu books on the subject mostly written by former Ahraris including Janbaz Mirza, *Karavan-i-Ahrar* (Urdu), 2 Vols, Lahore, 1975, 1977; Shorish Kashmiri, *Chihrey* (Urdu), Lahore, 1965; *Pass-i-Diwar-i-Zindaan*, Lahore, 1971; and Afzal Haq, *Tarikh-i-Ahrar* (Urdu), Lahore, n.d.

43. Comparatively, the Khaksars have received some if not enough scholarly attention in Pakistan. Their archives, though contested for their possession, are still available in Lahore and, accompanied with the official reports at the India Office Library, provide new grounds for further research. A recent Ph.D. thesis at Multan University is the first full-length scholarly effort on Allama Mashriqi and his Tehreek-i-Khaksar. See Muhammad Aslam Malik, 'Allama Inayatullah Khan Mashriqi (1888-1963): A Political Biography', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Baha-ud-Din Zakariya University, Multan, 1996. In 1996, I attempted some work on the movement dealing with the thematic and interpretative issues; see, 'Regionalism or Personality Cult? Allama Mashriqi and the Tehreek-i-Khaksar in pre-1947 Punjab', Paper presented at the International Conference on South Asia, Copenhagen University, August 1996. (The paper is included in a forthcoming compilation by Gurharpal Singh and Ian Talbot, to be published by Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1998.)
44. For instance, see his 'Punjab Politics', in Azim Husain (ed.), *Mian Fazl-i-Husain: Glimpses of Life and Works, 1898-1936*, Lahore, pp. 391-438.
45. Sir Husain cultivated a whole generation of Muslim journalists and intellectuals in Lahore who helped him in his various projects. It is interesting to note that one of the earliest and so far the best study on him in Urdu was done by Nur Ahmad, a protégé in Punjab's Information Department, who, especially during the Shahidganj and Qadiani issues of the 1930s, projected his case quite meticulously. See Syed Nur Ahmed, *Martial Law Se Martial Law Tak* (Urdu), Lahore, 1967. Its English translation by Mahmud Ali and edited by Craig Baxter was published by Westview in 1988. Also see, Syed Nur Ahmad, *Mian Fazl-i-Husain: A Review of His Life and Work*, Lahore, 1936.
46. Qalb-i-Abid, 'Mian Fazl-i-Husain ki Pahli Wazarat Aur Musalmano ke Huquq ki Nigahdasht, 1921-23', *The Journal of Research Society of Pakistan*, 19,4 (1982).
47. This is quite obvious from his correspondence and diaries. See Waheed Ahmed (ed.), *Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain* (Lahore: Research Society, 1976); and, *Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-i-Husain* (Lahore: Research Society, 1977).
48. In other words, it could be called a consociational arrangement linking localism with the class-based interests but definitely avoiding serious, long-term ideological commitments.
49. Research on Husain needs to acquire a mainstream profile though the contestation between the League and the Unionists still remains the favourite subject of 'high politics' of the Muslim Punjab in the pre-1947 period. Husain, sadly, despite his astounding professional and personal calibre and services, remains the 'other' in a rather simplified Pakistani historiography and awaits a full-fledged, fresher outlook. For an early work, see Azim Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain: A Political Biography*, Bombay, 1946; also, Muhammad Khurshid, 'The Role of the Unionist Party in the Punjab Politics, 1923-1936', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Islamia University, Bahawalpur, 1992.
50. For more information on the students and anti-Khizr agitation see Jahanara Shahnawaz, *Father and Daughter*, Lahore, 1971; Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza, *Muslim Women's Role in the Pakistan Movement*, Lahore, 1969; and, *The Punjab Muslim Students' Federation: An Annotated Documentary Survey*, Lahore, 1978.
51. For more information on him see Iftikhar H. Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan: A Political Biography* (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1985).
52. See, Ian Talbot, *Khizr Tiwana: The Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India* (London: Curzon, 1996).

The Determinants of Employment in Rural Non-Farm Activities in India: The Experience of Own Account Enterprises in Jalandhar District, Punjab

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The purpose of this article is to examine the determinants of employment in Rural Non-farm Activities (RNAs). Using dedicated household enterprise level data collected from three villages in Rurka Kalan development block in Jalandhar, Punjab, we identify the variables of RNA employment and highlight some of their key characteristics. We model the process of employment generation. The quantitative and qualitative aspects of RNAs have received considerable attention in the literature over recent years. These activities have been held to be important in those circumstances where the permanent absorption of labour in agriculture is nearing it limits and the scope for jobs in urban-based large-scale industry is restricted. We seek to provide a grass-roots perspective on this problem.

Introduction

Over the next 35 years the World Bank predicts that the Indian labour force will grow from 343 to 555 million, or at an annual rate of 1.61 per cent.[1] This suggests that within the course of a single generation an additional 212 million new jobs will need to be found. Clearly, this poses a major challenge to those responsible for national economic planning. The pressure to generate employment is particularly acute in Punjab. This is because its agriculture has already absorbed a sizable absolute volume of workers since the green revolution of the mid-1960s. There is now plenty of evidence that the labour-absorptive power of this sector is either approaching or has in fact exceeded its effective capacity.[2] The

International Journal of Punjab Studies, 5,1 (1998)
Sage Publications New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London

number of male cultivators and agricultural labourers has grown by 2.7 million over the period 1961–91 and, given the fragmentation of holdings and the tendency to ever more land- and capital-intensive methods of farming, the prospects for further absorption are strictly limited. An obvious alternative, at least theoretically, is the urban sector. However, since both national and state level policy has been tilted in favour of the primary sector, modern industry has failed to provide a sufficiently large source of fresh employment opportunities.[3] In urban Punjab, the problem is compounded by the free movement of labour within the Indian Union. Large inflows of migrant workers have become commonplace in Punjabi agriculture, and nearly 250,000 seasonal workers enter Punjab each year from labour-surplus districts in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Many migrants choose to settle permanently. They now reside in the cities and towns where many have secured wage employment either in formal industrial establishments or in the informal economy. It has been estimated authoritatively that just over 10 per cent of the permanent population of the state originates from other parts of India.[4] Often these in-migrants are preferred to indigenous persons because of their considerably lower reservation wage.[5] The obvious consequence of this cheap and abundant supply of workers is a ceiling on the availability of jobs for Punjabis. Since large-scale emigration, out-migration and employment in the armed forces is no longer possible, the pressure to find alternatives has intensified. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suppose that these circumstances have fuelled the upsurge of terrorism which has affected the state so seriously over the last 15 years.[6]

One potential avenue of employment for the rural population is engagement in Rural Non-farm Activities (RNAs). For this reason, over the last decade this sector has attracted increasing scholarly interest. Although the literature on this subject has generally expanded, for Punjab we still possess only a sketchy picture, and one confined to the state as a whole.[7] In order to identify the determinants of RNA employment and highlight its key characteristics, we undertook dedicated fieldwork investigation in three villages of Jalandhar district in the early 1990s. We chose a representative sample of RNAs and collected primary data from randomly selected households. This material was then subjected to a rigorous modelling exercise. Our aim was to examine the process of employment generation at the household enterprise level. This unit of analysis provides a very useful grass-roots view. From such a 'bottom-up' perspective, we argue that there are grounds for scepticism concerning the development potential of RNAs in this agriculturally advantaged

environment. To this end, we have structured the remainder of this article in the following way. We begin by providing a definition of RNAs and RNA households, an introduction to our study area, and then outline the methodology in the selection of our sample. This enables us to profile what is essentially a micro-scale sector and ascertain the actual numbers at work. We then provide a foundation for modelling by presenting the selection of variables used. Next, we develop probit models which seek to isolate those factors explaining the quantitative dimensions of employment creation. The penultimate section examines the chief qualitative characteristics of the RNAs in our study area. In particular, we focus upon capital, skills, location and the availability of power. Finally, we present some general conclusions.

Definitions and Methodology

The field investigation was based upon a cross-sectional sample of a hundred households, each having at least one adult member engaged in RNAs, and was carried out between late 1991 and early 1992.[8] RNAs were defined as those activities undertaken in rural areas covered by the Census of India (CoI) occupational categories IV–IX.[9] This enables us to define an 'RNA household' as one where a simple majority of working persons pursued such activities. There were two types of RNA households: those which had historically followed RNAs, in that both the parents and grandparents of the current head of household (always male) were non-agriculturists; and those who had recently diversified into these activities but hailed from a cultivating background. The sample households were drawn from three villages in Rurka Kalan block of Jalandhar district (see Map).[10] This block was selected on the basis of a ranking system originally devised by N. Singh who deployed several development indicators including agricultural, industrial and socio-economic variables in the scheme.[11] The villages were chosen on the basis of the proportion of working population engaged in RNAs.[12] Three broad groups of villages were identified: those with a participation rate lower, the same, and higher than the block average.

Table 1 provides a breakdown of our sample Own Account Enterprises (OAEs) households. Of the original sample of RNA households, 89 were found to operate OAEs.[13] The 11 remaining households also participated in RNAs, but only in so far as providing wage workers.[14] These households were therefore excluded from the analysis. The number

Location of Sample Villages



of households selected from each village was on the basis of actual population size, and chosen randomly.

Table 1
Distribution of Sample Household Occupations

Number of Households	89
Total Population	594
Number of Persons of Working Age	432
Total Working Population	213
Crude Participation Rate (%)	73
'Actual' Participation Rate (%)	49
Total Persons in Agriculture	16
(Full-time)	14
(Part-time)	2
Proportion of Total Population in Agriculture (%)	8
Total Persons in RNAs	197

Source: Fieldwork data.

As may be seen in Table 1, the total population of these households was 594 persons. Of these, 432 (73 per cent) were of working age, taken as those between 15 and 70.[15] However, only 213 were actually working, either on a full- or part-time basis. Thus, the 'actual' participation rate was 49 per cent.[16] Of our total working population, 16 (8 per cent) participated in agriculture, while the remaining 197 persons were engaged in RNAs.[17] Excluding these agriculturists, a little over 92 per cent of total workers participated in RNAs. The pattern of employment is shown in Table 2.

Table 2
Composition of Employment in Own Account Enterprises

	Family	*Waged*	*Total*
Full-time	122	92	214
Part-time	20	4	24
Casual	14	(48–66)*	(62–80)*
Total	156	(144–162)*	(300–318)*

Note: The number of persons employed on a casual basis obviously varied, so two figures are recorded; these represent the minimum and maximum numbers.
Source: Fieldwork data.

These enterprises employed a total of 156 family workers and a maximum of 162 wage employees. In all, therefore, these RNAs created jobs for 318 persons. Incremental employment opportunities for 229 persons were generated. The composition of family employment was as follows: 122 persons participated in RNAs on a full-time basis; 20 were part-time; and 14 were 'casually' employed, that is, during periods of peak labour demand in the agricultural cycle. A third (32) of OAEs generated wage employment. In Table 2, we may observe that 92 persons worked full-time, and only four were part-time. Casual employment varied from a low of 48 to a high of 66 persons.[18] In all, an additional 162 persons found employment in these enterprises.

There was a wide spectrum of RNAs, as may be seen from Table 3 where 53 separate types are identified. Several were rooted in traditional pursuits and served to provide customary goods and services for the rural community. Examples include, blacksmiths (8), tailors (29), barbers (30), cobblers (33 and 34), goldsmiths (35), cloth merchants (38), *raggi*'s (singers) (45), general construction labourers (46), masons (47), sawmill operators (50), carpenters (51) and sweepers (53). In general, these activities were undertaken by the poorer households of the villages. Other RNAs were more 'modern' in orientation. There were greater barriers to entry, and were largely confined to those households with sufficient human and financial capital. Good examples included soft drinks manufacturers and sellers (1), radio and electrical repairers (15), taxi owners and drivers (20 and 21), video and cassette sellers (19) and cable television providers (43).[19]

Table 3
Rural Non-farm Occupations of Respondents and Family Members

		Family	*Wage*'	*Total*
1	Soft Drinks Manufacturing & Sales	3	4	7
2	Welding Workshop (Household)	2	3	5
3	Welding Workshop	6	2	8
4	*Karyana* (Dry Goods) Store	7	0	7
5	General Store	7	0	7
6	*Halwai* (Sweets)	4	0	4
7	Baker	2	4	6
8	Blacksmith	4	3	7
9	Rope-making	2	0	2
10	Hardware Store	1	2	3
11	Watch Sales and Repair	2	0	2
12	Vegetable Store	3	0	3
13	Vegetable Seller (Mobile)	1	0	1

Table 3 Continued

14	Sweet Seller (Mobile)	1	0	1
15	Radio/Electrical Repair	1	2	3
16	Electrical Store	2	2	4
17	Electrical Motor Repair and Sales	3	5	8
18	House Electrics Installation & Repair	1	2	3
19	Video/Cassette Sales	2	1	3
20	Taxi Owner	1	2	3
21	Taxi Driver	2	2	4
22	Transporters	4	7	11
23	Cycle Repair	4	0	4
24	Engine Mechanics	2	5	7
25	Scooter Repair	2	2	4
26	Tractor Spare Parts (Sales)	1	1	2
27	Tractor Repair	3	5	8
28	Automotive Battery Servicing	1	0	1
29	Tailoring	8	10	18
30	Barbers	7	1	8
31	Tent House	4	36	40
32	Photo Framer	2	0	2
33	Cobbler (Mfg., Sales & Repair)	1	0	1
34	Cobbler (Repair)	2	0	2
35	Goldsmith	1	0	1
36	Pharmacist	4	4	8
37	Tea-stall	3	2	5
38	Cloth Merchant	4	0	4
39	Cook	2	14	16
40	Dry Cleaning	2	1	3
41	Private Tuition	2	0	2
42	Property Management	1	0	1
43	Cable TV	1	2	3
44	Photography	4	2	6
45	*Raggi* (Singer)	1	0	1
46	General Construction Labour	4	0	4
47	Masons	8	5	13
48	Paint Contractor	1	25	26
49	Painters	4	0	4
50	Saw-mills	6	4	10
51	Carpentry	6	2	8
52	Brickworks	3	0	3
53	Cleaner	1	0	1
	Total	156	162	318

* *Note:* Includes 'casual' wage labour.
Source: Fieldwork data.

The majority of RNAs were concerned with services and repairs, and only a few were in manufacturing proper. Furthermore, the numbers having direct linkages with agriculture proved to be surprisingly few. This finding is important because Rurka Kalan block is located in a green revolution area. This suggests that the direct linkages with agriculture were rather less than anticipated. Part of the explanation for such attenuation may be attributed to the fact that most processing of agricultural commodities is not undertaken in the rural areas themselves; on the demand side, the presence of the urban centres of Phagwara, Jalandhar city and even Ludhiana had an impact on the number and type of village-based RNAs. Further, most OAEs providing wage employment were engaged in servicing activities. This indicates that a stage of development has been reached whereby the tertiary sector is generating most of the additional wage employment. The likely explanation for this observation is that the level of income per capita in the state is more than double of that of the Indian Union.[20]

Taken literally, scarcely any women were participants in RNAs. In fact, we found that only four out of 156 of the workers reported in Table 3 were females; this is under 5 per cent of the total. Two were sweepers (53), a tailor mistress who assisted her cloth merchant husband (38), whilst the fourth worked in a tea stall (36). Even this compares favourably with the provisional official Census participation rate for rural Jalandhar of just 2 per cent in 1991, according to the *Census of India*, 1991. However, our findings conceal the real situation. In general, the extraordinarily low 'reported' incidence of female participation in both the Census returns as well as our survey is surely a reflection of the particular socio-cultural milieu of rural Punjab. Although females undertake a great many valuable economic tasks, the prevalent ethos means that this contribution tends to be hidden. Indeed, their vital role is seldom openly acknowledged and virtually the entire range of economic functions which they perform are simply lumped together under the misleading category of 'housework'. Even where an activity clearly constituted marketed work, a stigma was attached to admitting this. Such reluctance to acknowledge this fact was regrettable because RNAs offer opportunities for females who have had limited access to education and training. Moreover, many females were unable to take up employment outside the home, especially in urban centres, on account of their reproductive and child-rearing duties. RNAs offered a convenient and flexible means of combining housework with employment which, in many cases, could be undertaken at home.

Household Variables

A variety of household variables were collected during our fieldwork. Our choice was made on the basis of a pilot survey. These provided valuable information about employment and their general circumstances which are presented in Chart 1.

Chart 1

List of Variables

Extended household	EXTDHH
Nuclear household	NUCHH
Size of household (no. of persons)	HHSIZE
Males in household (no.)	MAL
Females in household (no.)	FEM
Persons of working age (no.)	WRKAGE
Males of working age (no.)	MALAGE
Religion (Sikh, Hindu, Muslim)	REL
Education of head of household (years)	HOHEDN
Education (no. of years)	YRSEDN
Type of training (by type)	TRAIN
Household member participating in agriculture	INAG
Household with more than one source of finance	ADDHHY
Years established (no.)	YRSEST
Agriculture traditional to household	TRAG
Household original business	OBISS
Type of ownership	OWN
Location of activity (by site)	LOC
Electricity supply	ELECSS
Water supply	WATSS
If RNA is seasonal	SEASL
Source of finance (by type)	FIN
Reported RNA income (Rs per month)	INC

The first set of variables focused upon household composition and size. Our initial point of departure was whether they were extended (EXTDHH) or nuclear (NUCHH). In addition to the total number of household members (HHSIZE) we also incorporated gender structure, that is, number of males (MAL) and females (FEM). Since the focus of the study was employment, it was necessary to identify the actual labour force. Thus, the number of persons of working age (WRKAGE) in a household was incorporated on the grounds that the family is the main unit of socio-economic cohesion. Although it is necessary to consider the total household labour force, we decided that a more appropriate measure would be the number of males of working age (MALAGE)—given the attitudes to

female employment. We then proceeded to consider religion (REL). In view of the institutional constraints associated with caste and *jati* (hereditary jobs), the occupational structure of rural India is clearly affected by the socio-religious background of households. In Punjab, occupations have in part been dictated by historical tradition with Jat Sikhs confining themselves to cultivation whilst Hindus and Muslims engaged in RNAs.

The position of the head of the household is widely acknowledged to be of paramount importance with regard to determining occupation in traditional societies such as India. For this reason, the educational level of the head (HOHEDN) as given by the number of years of schooling, was also considered. Where the OAE was undertaken by a family member, the education of these individuals—their number of years of schooling (YRSEDN) –was considered separately. Formal education is not always an appropriate indicator of skill or business acumen, especially in developing countries. Therefore, an alternative measure of these qualities was considered. One method of RNA skill acquisition was through training programmes. There were a variety of ways in which this was obtained and each separate avenue was taken as a variable (TRAIN).

Another important determinant of employment in OAEs was the employment situation of other household members. In circumstances where other members were active in alternative occupations, the necessity of creating employment within households diminished. This was particularly true where these persons participated in agriculture (INAG). The pilot survey also suggested that we consider other sources of household income. Households having access to additional income (ADDHHY) arising from employment, or from other assets, would yield a different job structure.

We also identified variables relating to the OAEs themselves. Time is an important element in any business undertaking, and in order to ascertain its importance for employment, the number of years which an OAE had been established (YRSEST) was incorporated. Some households in the sample had shifted out of cultivation altogether. In order to determine whether these households were associated with differing levels of employment generation, a variable focusing on these households (TRAG) was included. We learnt that other households had switched between RNAs. In some cases this was because their traditional occupations had disappeared under the weight of change in rural areas. Good examples of obsolescent craft-based RNAs include water carrying, basket weaving and pottery.[21] For this reason, whether the current RNA undertaken by a household was its original (OBISS) activity or not was also investigated.

Ownership patterns (OWN) invariably differed. Some OAEs were family-run whilst others operated as partnerships involving persons from outside the sample household. Since each type of ownership conferred varying degrees of property rights, the structure and level of employment varied. The physical location of OAEs, particularly the site at which they were undertaken (LOC), was considered next. Here we attempted to ascertain the relationship between location and employment. Differing infrastructure provision is frequently cited as an important element in effecting the potential level of employment.[22] Access to overhead capital such as electricity (ELECSS) and water (WATSS) were selected as appropriate indicators. Furthermore, in a predominantly agricultural environment, the degree of seasonality associated with the crop cycle—both directly and indirectly—influences employment. Thus, those activities that are typically seasonal may be expected to display employment patterns different from those that operate round the year. The influence of seasonality (SEASL) was taken on board and its impact also considered.

Perhaps one of the more important variables is access to capital. This is required both for the start-up and subsequent development of OAEs. To reflect this, two financial variables were identified. The first featured the sources of finance (FIN), and our pilot study revealed a broad spectrum of institutional and non-institutional suppliers. The second was the monthly reported income (INC) derived from the RNA. Despite the obvious difficulties in collecting accurate information on income, we decided to utilise this data after expending considerable time and effort in checking for consistency. Generally, two sets of accounts were maintained: one for tax officials and the other for family eyes only. We were not able to obtain permission to look at the second set. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to assume that our data underestimates the true financial revenues of the OAEs we sampled. This has been borne in mind in the sifting of the data, but we do not think that this 'black money' unduly affected the *relative* position of the village enterprises. In the absence of an alternative income series for OAE households, we decided to make use of this information and believe it provides an indication of their financial status.

The Determinants of Employment

At the outset, our preliminary modelling exercises suggested that there were two quite distinct categories of employment, waged and family. We found that it was not useful to lump these together. This is an important

result on several counts. First, any attempt to treat employment in the OAEs as a single entity is misleading. This has implications for the economic analysis of employment generation and the effective targeting of public policy. Second, the two categories have a different set of characteristics, and this influences the range of variables that promote employment. Third, in order to capture the dynamics of growth and decline, entry and exit, it seems necessary to distinguish between them. Thus, two models incorporating a mix of variables appropriate to each were developed. Chart 2 reveals the variables selected for each model.

Chart 2
The Models and the Variables Tested

The Wage Employment Model:

No. of persons of working age (+)
Additional household income (–)
Traditionally in agriculture (–)
Monthly Reported Income (+)
Education (+)
Seasonality (–)
Ownership (+)
Original Business (+)
No. of Years Established (+)

The Family Employment Model:

Household Size (+)
No. of Persons of Working Age (+)
Monthly Reported Income (+)
Seasonality (–)
Location 1, house (+)
Finance 5, reinvested (+)
Original Business (+)
No. of years established (+)
Traditionally in Agriculture (–)
Religion (–)
No. of years education of head of household (+)
In agriculture (–)
Additional household income (–)

The Model for Wage Employment

In seeking to capture those variables that were responsible for wage employment, a number of models were devised and then tested. Although we present the probit versions, logit forms were also tried systematically.

However, since there was little variation between them, only the probits are reported here. The most successful probit model is: WAGEEMP = ONE (WRKAGE, ADDHHY, TRAG, INAG, INC, SEASL, OBISS, YRSEST). The results are given in Table 4.

Table 4
The Wage Employment Model

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*t-ratio*	*Prob*	*Mean of X*	*Std. Dev of X*
Constant	-1.5714	0.5952	-2.60**	0.0082		
WRKAGE	0.1642	0.9046E–01	1.86*	0.0694	4.8864	2.5390
ADDHHY	-0.2747	0.5111	-0.54	0.5908	0.5340	0.5017
TRAG	-0.8044	0.4033	-1.96**	0.0460	0.7613	0.4286
INAG	-1.4548	0.6816	-2.13**	0.0328	0.1250	0.3326
INC	0.2674E–03	0.1266E–03	2.11**	0.0345	2620.5	1581.7
SEASL	-2.20135	0.3531	-0.57	0.5685	0.2954	0.4588
OBISS	0.5844	0.3615	1.62*	0.1059	0.2613	0.4419
YRSEST	0.3665E–01	0.1764E–01	2.08**	0.0377	11.557	8.5807

** Significant at the 95 per cent confidence level.
* Significant at the 90 per cent confidence level.

Frequencies of actual and predicted outcomes (predicted outcome has maximum probability) are shown in Chart 3.

Chart 3

	Predicted		
Actual	0	1	*Total*
0	51	6	57
1	16	15	31
Total	67	21	88

The results are such: the statistical significance of each of the eight variables used in the modelling are presented first, with the overall predictability given by the frequencies of the actual and predicted outcomes provided underneath. Four variables were revealed as being significant. The Chi-squared test of the hypothesis that this pattern was random was rejected at the 0.1 per cent level. The model was able to predict successfully wage employment in 75 per cent of the cases.

The INAG (household member[s] participating in agriculture) variable had a t-ratio was (-) 2.13 showing it to be the most important determinant.

Those OAEs in which other household members were employed in agriculture displayed a greater propensity for wage employment compared to the rest of the sample. As predicted, this variable was inversely related to the incidence of wage labour. We anticipate that when the demand for labour increases, work that might well be undertaken by other family members was instead done by wage labour.

The next most statistically significant variable reported was monthly income (INC) which as predicted, and was found to be positively related to waged employment. Those OAEs reporting the largest income receipts were more likely to employ wage labour. The importance of this variable is clear. Income can be considered as a proxy of the level of business activity and is therefore ultimately linked, through a more buoyant final product market, to the demand for wage labour.

The age of an OAE, the number of years which it had been established (YRSEST), was revealed as both significant and positively correlated with wage employment. This result implies that informal investment in human capital may be of considerable importance, with time and experience acting as mechanisms for raising the level of business acumen within the OAEs; indeed, such a route can often be more appropriate than formal education or training. Thus, older OAEs were more likely to offer wage employment since the longer they had been established, the greater was their level of business competency.

Another pertinent factor in the capacity of an OAE household to offer wage employment was its traditional occupational background. The model shows that the incidence of wage labour was highest in those OAEs operated by households who had already pursued off-farm occupations. This variable, TRAG, was found to be statistically significant. Those households which had only diversified recently into RNAs from cultivation were also those least likely to be familiar with the culture of business.

Although positively associated with the incidence of wage labour, but only at the 90 per cent level of significance, was the number of persons of working age (WRKAGE). We had initially expected that wage employment would be lower in those cases where the number of household members of working age was greatest. Since such persons can be thought of as constituting a 'reservoir' of workers, they may act as substitutes for more expensive wage labour. However, by no means are all of these household members readily available, and so there was need to take recourse to wage labour. This applied particularly to females and children on the one hand, and those without appropriate training on the other. Naturally, the suitability of household labour depended upon the RNAs undertaken.

Activities such as rope-making and tailoring for example, which were normally conducted in the home, could make use of unskilled family members. Wage labour was relied upon in the case of activities located away from the residence and which required a background level of competency.

Original family business (OBISS) was the last variable of significance. Those OAEs which had always engaged in the existing business offered prospects for a greater level of wage employment than more recent entrants. Well-established OAEs were more likely to generate such employment since they had managed to overcome many of the teething problems encountered in the difficult start-up and early development phases.

The Model for Family Employment

Our second task was to model the employment of family labour. Several were devised and estimated. The most successful family employment model was: FAMEMP = f (HHSIZE, WRKAGE, INC, SEASL, LOC1, FIN5, OBISS, YRSEST, TRAG, REL, HOHEDN, INAG, ADDHHY). The results are given in Table 5.

Table 5
The Family Employment Model

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*t-ratio*	*Prob of X*	*Mean of X*	*Std. Dev of X*
Constant	[illegible]1.667E–01	0.8903	-0.02	0.9850		
HHSIZE	-0.219E–01	0.1054	-0.21	0.8352	6.7045	3.0330
WRKAGE	0.1471	0.1185	1.24	0.2144	4.8864	2.5390
INC	0.144E–03	0.1517E–03	0.96	0.3391	2620.5	1581.7
SEASL	[illegible]0.3493	0.3976	0.89	0.3795	0.2954	0.4588
LOC1	-0.2287	0.5140	-0.45	0.6562	0.7727	0.4214
FIN5	-4.0323	90.13	-0.05	0.9643	0.2272E–01	0.1498
OBISS	-0.4585	0.4318	-0.06	0.2882	0.2613	0.4419
YRSEST	-0.5121E–01	0.2470E–01	-2.07**	0.0381	11.557	8.5807
TRAG	0.35776	0.4553	0.80	0.4208	0.7613	0.4286
REL	5.6725	43.27	0.13	0.8956	0.2386	0.4286
HOHEDN	-0.2821E–01	0.5063E–01	-0.56	0.5773	7.2727	3.8914
INAG	-3.7884	43.27	0.09	0.9302	0.1250	0.3326
ADDHHY	-0.9613	0.5202	-1.88*	0.0646	0.5340	0.5017

** Significant at the 95 per cent confidence level.
* Significant at the 90 per cent confidence level.

Frequencies of actual and predicted outcomes (predicted outcome has maximum probability) are shown in Chart 4.

Chart 4

	Predicted		
Actual	0	1	*Total*
0	31	10	41
1	14	33	47
Total	45	43	88

Again, the statistical significance of each of the 13 variables is presented first, and the overall predictability is revealed in the frequencies of the 'actual' and 'predicted' outcomes given beneath. We may observe that only one variable was significant at the 95 per cent confidence level, and one at the 90 per cent level. However, the Chi-squared test of the hypothesis that this pattern was random was rejected at the 0.1 per cent level of significance (that is, its chance of being random was less than one in a thousand). In 73 per cent cases the model predicted correctly the incidence of family employment.

One significant variable proved to be the number of years that an OAE had been established (YRSEST). Its sign was negative indicating that the employment of family labour was related inversely to the number of years of establishment. This implies that over the course of time OAEs substitute wage for family labour. Our finding is consistent with the expectation that household members are generally called upon when additional labour is required in the short run.

The employment of family labour was lower in those households which had access to an additional source of income (ADDHHY). In these instances, other household members were employed in different activities, and so there was no need to generate employment for them within the household OAE. Where this additional stream of income originated as a result of the assets held by the household, such as rents from property, employment provision for other members was not deemed necessary.

Although the number of persons of working age (WRKAGE) was not found to be statistically significant, other forms of the model indicated that this variable may be of some relevance. The higher their number, the greater the pressure to find employment. Where there were few opportunities, such persons either out-migrated or were absorbed in the household OAE. Here the level of family employment was affected by the particular circumstances of the household.

Most of the variables which we had selected on the basis of a priori reasoning and the information we collected in our pilot study did not prove to be statistically significant. For example, we expected the model

to reveal a clear inverse relationship between the level of formal education of the head of household and the dependent variable. Furthermore, we predicted that the lower the level of educational attainment, the greater the likelihood of family labour being employed. However, these outcomes were not realised. The most likely explanation is that education was apparently not a good predictor of household-based RNAs. In rural Punjab, such occupations are still determined partly by *jati*. Although the link between jobs and *jati* has attenuated in recent years as a result of greater mobility, it still seems to be a factor of significance.[23] Another example of a variable which we expected to figure prominently was finance. We anticipated that those households with only limited access, and which therefore tended to rely upon non-institutional and informal sources, would be more inclined to participate in RNAs which generated family employment. But this did not show up in the results. The various sources of capital to which households could turn was more important than the model was able to reveal.

Even armed with micro-level data obtained from dedicated fieldwork, it proved difficult to model family employment. This must cast a shadow over the explanatory power of some existing theory on the one hand, and policy prescription on the other.[24] We suggest that the principal reason for this state of affairs stems from the fact that the employment of family labour does not necessarily reflect effective demand for products and services; rather, its incidence results from a lack of alternative and more remunerative employment opportunities. The discussion of a 'reserve army' of surplus unemployed and underemployed labour in the rural areas has been confined to the agricultural sector. There are few references to the level of underemployment within OAEs. Bhaduri observes that among the self-employed in the informal sector, each family member often has a lighter workload compared with average workers in the organised sector.[25] This raises the possibility of 'time disposition-wise', as opposed to the more common notion of 'income-wise', unemployment. This work may be regarded as the analogue of the notion of 'surplus labour' operating in the primary sector.[26] Family employment may thus be a symptom of distress.[27]

Useful insights into the process of employment generation were provided by the wage and family employment models. However, econometric exercises have well acknowledged limitations. In particular, they do not address questions of context, structure and the performance of these small-scale enterprises; these, in turn, affect the quality of employment which they can offer. In order to tackle such issues we conducted a series of in-depth interviews with the owners of the OAEs. This also enabled us to probe

those variables which did not exhibit strong correlation coefficients with employment but which nevertheless featured prominently during the course of the fieldwork. In particular, we identified capital, skill, place and power.

Features of Rural Non-farm Activities

Capital

The principal sources of OAE finance is given in Table 6.

Table 6
Principal Sources of OAE Finance

	No.	*(%)*
Family and Friends	51	57
Institutions	16	18
Domestic and Overseas Employment	6	7
Agriculture	5	6
Inheritance	4	5
Overseas Remittances	3	3
From Previous RNAs	2	2
Revolving Credit	2	2
Total	89	100

Source: Fieldwork data.

Over half of the OAEs in our sample were reliant upon friends and relatives for their start-up capital and was the most common source. There were good reasons for its popularity. Since the person behind the OAE was well known, the question of collateral rarely arose. Creditors were usually familiar with the business and therefore well-informed about repayment viability. This offered an attractive degree of discretion and flexibility; and in those instances where an interest payment was required, we found that it was usually pitched below the prevailing market rates charged by commercial banks or the *banias* (moneylenders). There were also cases where family and friends waived interest altogether. Lengthy procedures associated with institutional borrowing could be avoided. OAEs were able to obtain funding speedily and without the 'customary' bribe. There were, however, drawbacks with this source. The principal limitation concerned the small sums that could be obtained relative to loans made by institutions. Nonetheless, those OAEs reliant upon this source were generally unable to secure institutional funding. For these

OAEs, *banias* were the only other alternative to securing funding if capital from family and friends was not available.

Some 20 per cent of OAEs were dependent upon institutional sources for their capital requirements. These included commercial banks located at rural or urban sites, and government sponsored schemes such as the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP). Taken together, this was the second-most important source (18 per cent). We were able to identify three separate constraints: time, access and cost. Reports of delays involved in the processing of paperwork were commonplace among applicants. Procedures were cumbersome due to the sheer amount and complexity of the necessary documentation that had to accompany even the most modest application. There was considerable red-tape involved in the drawing-up of legal papers needed to guarantee security, and further time had to be expended in obtaining estimates of costings.

As far as access was concerned, a deterrent was the need to furnish adequate collateral to secure the loan. From the point of view of the bank, the need for security was of course absolute, but applicants argued that the amount demanded was often unrealistic. The most common form of collateral was land and property, provided title was secure. In its absence, it was sometimes possible to obtain loans using an intermediary to act as guarantor. However, the difficulties in persuading family or friends to act in this capacity and place their own property as security were obvious, and so this course of action was rare. A further barrier to access included the requirement that applicants have sufficient *jankari* (experience) in their chosen activity prior to a loan being sanctioned.

With respect to cost, another set of hurdles were encountered. One was the requirement that applicants operate a fixed deposit with the bank from which the loan was sought. Applicants not running such deposits or who had not operated such an account for two years prior to lodging their request were rejected out of hand. This problem was most acute in the case of IRDP applicants. Since all were below the official poverty datum line, they did not have sufficient savings to operate fixed deposit accounts. This banking practice actually contravened government policy since neither security nor a banking history was required.[28] However, we found that the reality was quite different on the ground.[29] Further costs included legal fees and travelling. Apart from these direct costs, there were indirect expenses such as *chai-pani* (entertaining) and bribing bank and government officers. The problem of *budhi* (bribery) was not only encountered in the courts but sums of money had to be paid to the *patwari* (village accountant) who held the relevant property deeds. Even with IRDP loans,

beneficiaries were required to bribe the village *sarpanch* (village head) as well as Rural Development Department officials. This was necessary in order to obtain a *peela*-card (yellow card), a pre-requisite for acquiring IRDP funding.[30] These problems meant that many interviewees were discouraged from applying for institutional loans and chose instead to rely upon other options.

A variety of other capital channels, in addition to these two principal sources, were also used by our respondents. Savings from wage employment, both overseas and domestic, was one such avenue. A compelling motive for seeking work abroad, especially those travelling to the Gulf, was to accumulate capital to establish an OAE. Two individuals in our survey had managed to obtain the funds in this way.[31] The first person invested in a 'tent house' business, that is, providing marquee for use at marriages and other religious ceremonies, while the second established a truck and private taxi service. Other OAEs generated funds from the sale of previous businesses, and so properly speaking, this source was capital- rather than savings-based. The two remaining OAEs had built up savings from previous domestic employment.

Another avenue was cultivation. Those persons operating OAEs who had a history of farming could obtain funding for their activities from agriculture by diverting income from farm work; making use of rentals where assets had been retained; and occasionally, and reluctantly, from the sale of land. Together, these methods accounted for less than 6 per cent of the total. The remittances of family and relatives who had emigrated was a third minor avenue. The large numbers of out-migrants who return to Punjab for holidays or business purposes sometimes provided friends and relatives with finance for their OAEs. However, in recent years the importance of remittances has fallen as links between emigrants and those remaining behind have weakened.

Skill

The most common means of skill acquisition are listed in Table 7. Relatives and family members were the predominant method of acquiring training. If younger members took up the same trade as their parents, the new entrants obtained the skills for that trade from other household members or close relatives. This was appropriate for those traditional occupations which had not undergone dramatic change, for example, carpentry and masonry. Other occupations that had witnessed improvements in their techniques or the greater use of machinery, but where the trade

had not been wholly transformed, as in the case of iron-mongering, skills needed to be updated. Only in exceptional cases was formal retraining necessary. It was more usually picked up informally, through a process of trial and error.

Table 7
Common Means of Skill Acquisition

	No.	*(%)*
Relatives or Family	40	45
Apprenticeship	34	38
Past Employment	8	9
Learning-by-doing	7	8
Total	89	100

Source: Fieldwork data.

In cases where demand had declined, for example pottery and basket making, or had disappeared completely, such as water carrying, new skills had to be acquired. In these circumstances, individuals obtained apprenticeships. The duration of these was normally between one and three years, and generally without payment. If a wage was given, this was only after the apprentice had gained sufficient competency to make an effective contribution. Where apprenticeship was not considered, the basic level of skills could be gleaned informally from other people in the village following the same activity. Activities such as cycle repair, photography and videoing did not require protracted training since the degree of competency was low. In these instances, new entrants sought rudimentary advice from those versed in their chosen trade, and skill specifications were acquired on-the-job, that is, learning-by-doing.

In cases where formal qualifications were needed—sometimes necessary for obtaining loans—individuals had little alternative but to resort to institutional training. However, while a number of public and private agencies existed to deliver this service, the number of seats was limited. They were also located inconveniently in urban areas. While a publicly funded training centre for rural youth had once existed in Rurka Kalan, it had been closed for two years. It was reported to us that only 20 places had been available and older persons had not qualified for admission. Restricted access to formal training inhibited the formation of skills and entrepreneurship. This restricted many RNAs to 'traditional' status pursuits and constrained their capacity to absorb additional labour.

Place

OAEs operated from a number of different locations. These are summarised in Table 8.

Table 8
Different Locations of OAEs

	No.	*(%)*
House or its Precincts	67	75
Retail Conglomerations (*adda*)	14	16
Out-of-home Villages	6	7
Mobile Locations	2	2
Total	89	100

Source: Fieldwork data.

The *pucca* house, to which no special modifications had been made to accommodate the OAE, was the most common location. Good examples of activities conducted from the home included electrical motor repairs, carpentry and ironsmithing. A shortage of funds was one of the main reasons why enterprises were not located in dedicated premises. Other OAEs were undertaken within the domestic domain. Here, one or more rooms had been set aside or constructed specifically for that purpose. In such cases, the existing fabric of the house was deemed inappropriate and required modification and/or extension. Financial constraints were widely reported to be the reason why this option was taken instead of renting premises. Taken together, three-quarters of OAEs were located either in the house or its immediate precincts. For some, operating from these locations represented a serious limitation to their potential level of business activity. For example, tailoring from home relied upon attracting customers by word-of-mouth. This limitation may be contrasted with tailor OAEs who operated from *adda* (bus stops) and retail concentrations who were able to attract a passing trade. The problems of home-based OAEs were compounded by their lower levels of stock. This constrained further the potential customer base. The opportunity cost of operating from the home was the loss of potential customers due to the lower throughput of persons; this confined employment to family members and placed an upper limit on their number. For other activities such as goldsmithing, rope-making and private tutoring, operating from the home did not represent a serious constraint. Generally, it was not necessary for them to be located at busy retail centres since these services were independent of location,

or, as in the example of goldsmithing, clients clearly knew where to go.

OAEs conducted at conglomerations of retail premises situated alongside bus stops, crossroads and markets formed our second group. There were 14 such OAEs, 16 per cent of the total. They included tea/sweet shops, vegetable and *karyana* (dry goods) stores, and cycle repairs. Their over-riding characteristic was reliance upon high customer throughput. All goods and services supplied were in frequent demand usually on a daily basis. Their location permitted greater employment of both wage and family labour due to relatively higher turnover compared with those operating from the home.

Rented premises in villages other than the one in which interviewees resided was the third group from which they were undertaken. There were six such OAEs (7 per cent). The most frequently reported reason for this location was competition. If similar activities were already conducted within a village too small to support additional units, OAEs relocated elsewhere. Insufficient demand was cited as a further reason for operating in another village. This situation arose when the level of demand derived from a cluster of villages. Here, a central location was the preferred choice. The manner in which training had been acquired also affected out-of-home village location. If entrepreneurs of OAEs had completed apprenticeships in one village, there was an unwritten code that their trade be plied elsewhere.

Several OAEs were not pursued from any fixed location. These included hawkers who travelled from village to village by cycle, selling vegetables or trinkets. Painters and building contractors similarly had no fixed location. In such cases, the RNAs were undertaken where work was forthcoming rather than tied to a specific place. If these OAEs offered employment, it was wage work and could be quite considerable, as in the case of the paint contractor.

Power

It was hardly surprising that in an advanced district such as Jalandhar, almost all of the OAEs sampled relied upon electricity as the principal source of power. However, they all encountered a major difficulty, that is, an uncertain and irregular supply. All the OAEs reported that this problem had a serious effect on the running of their businesses. One example was that of an OAE engaged in the repair and maintenance of agricultural machinery. In fact, during the interview, the unit was not operating but awaiting the resumption of power supply in order to effect a welding repair to a combine harvester blade. The owner complained of suffering

a considerable loss of revenue as a result of the interruption, and his farmer client informed us that he still had to pay the wages of 50 dependent labourers who were idle as a result of this faulty harvester. Generally, we were informed that power cuts were in part responsible for an exodus of business from rural to urban locations. Repairs which farmers would otherwise have done locally were completed in workshops situated in towns and cities where there was more certainty of meeting time constraints.

An example of an OAE operating one (of the three) village flour mills is another telling instance of the effect of poor electricity provision. The owner informed us that when he constructed his mill in the late 1970s, after having sold land to raise sufficient capital to fund this venture, his original investment amounted to Rs 2 lakhs. Six years later (in 1985) he was forced to close down. He claimed that difficulties in procuring an adequate or reliable supply of electricity was the main cause. Power cuts are especially serious in rural areas. During the course of our fieldwork we found that there was no supply at all for an average of two days each week. When supply recommenced, it was generally restricted to early mornings, late at night and the early hours. During the daytime, supply either came to a halt, or the voltage was too low to effectively drive or operate machinery. Although a diesel or petrol generator might have solved this problem, the purchase price of Rs 50,000 was too high for most OAEs to contemplate.

There were also seasonal problems. Electricity shortages are particularly acute during the peak agricultural harvest periods. These are April–May and October–November. It was precisely these times when the demand from agriculture was at its highest and supplies were diverted to farming. These examples illustrate how the operation and success of OAEs were constrained by deficiencies in electricity supply. At worst, some OAEs had ceased trading whilst others experienced reduced demand. The ability of OAEs to absorb greater additional labour or compete with urban manufactures and services was seriously impeded by difficulties experienced with power. This, in turn, meant that expansion was restricted, and thus the potential to generate greater employment was limited.

General Conclusions

In this article we have seen that the majority of rural non-agricultural OAEs were engaged in repairs and services. There were few genuine

manufacturing enterprises. Upon examination of the RNA sample, scarcely any of the OAEs had obvious linkages with either agriculture or agro-processing activities. Most of the wage employment was casual, and service-based activities accounted for the greater number of jobs. There were few obvious openings for females and children, although we did encounter severe difficulties in obtaining sufficiently reliable information to venture a firm judgement on this. We were able to identify two types of employment among our sample: waged and family. The need to distinguish between these categories was revealed during the course of modelling. Most existing work lumps these together, but we found this was not a useful procedure. Our first model of wage employment proved fruitful in identifying the key variables. This was a result of our choice of the household as the main unit of analysis. One-third of the OAEs offered wage opportunities. It is this category of work which proximates most closely to the World Bank's notion of 'productive employment'.[32] Such employment, however, had a highly seasonal character and was therefore susceptible to considerable intra-annual fluctuation. The second model, concerning family employment, was rather less successful in that few of the variables turned out to be statistically significant. The cause was 'the noise' from a range of socio-cultural influences. However, the model did show that lack of alternative employment opportunities were responsible for absorbing family members. Such absorption may be explained by recourse to the long-standing notion in development economics of 'surplus labour'. This is because family employment is largely motivated by distress—rather than any clear 'pull' or obvious 'incentive' forces. Just over half of the OAEs utilised family members, and one-third offered wage opportunities. Clearly planners will need to take these considerations on board if they are to develop a coherent policy of helping to promote employment generation in rural Punjab.

Acknowledgements : We appreciate the helpful advice and comments of our colleagues David Forest and Robert Ward; the usual disclaimer applies.

Notes

1. World Bank, *Annual Development Report 1995* (Washington: World Bank, 1995), 145.
2. H.K. Manmohan Singh, 'Population Pressure and Labour Absorbability in Agriculture and Related Activities: Analysis and Suggestions Based on Field Studies

Conducted in Punjab', in R.S. Johar and J.S. Khanna, *Studies in Punjab Economy* (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1983), 399–413.

3. See G.K. Chadha, *The State and Rural Economic Transformation: The Case of the Punjab, 1950–85* (New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 1986), and 'Problems and Processes of Industrialising Punjab', A Collection of Unpublished Papers Presented at a Seminar held at Guru Nanak Dev University, 28/29 April 1981.
4. P. Brass, *Politics of India Since Independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 233.
5. In the early 1990s we found that the average monthly wage in industries such as tanneries, rubber and sports goods located in Jalandhar city averaged Rs 800; but many Punjabis and in particular Jat Sikhs will simply not work for this level of remuneration.
6. J. Alam, 'Political Implications of Economic Contradictions in Punjab', *Social Scientist*, 15,10 (1986), 3–26.
7. Some initial work has been undertaken by G.K. Chadha, 'The Off Farm Economic Structure of Agriculturally Growing Regions: A Study of Indian Punjab', in R.T. Shand (ed.), *Off-Farm Employment in the Development of Rural Asia, Vol.2* (Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University, 1986); S.S. Grewal et al., *A Study on Rural Employment in Punjab 1985–86*, (Ludhiana: Punjab Agricultural University, 1988); and S. Singh, 'Non-Farm Employment in Punjab: A Perspective', *Indian Journal of Labour Economics* (hereafter *IJLE*), 34,1 (1991), 41–53.
8. At the time of the survey the terrorist problem was still evident. This affected the scope of the fieldwork and exerted a generally negative influence on the functioning of the sector. For a general discussion of this issue, see S.S. Gill, 'Contradictions of Punjab Model of Growth and Search for an Alternative', *Economic and Political Weekly* (hereafter *EPW*), 23, 42 (1988), 2167–73.
9. *Census of India* 1991, Series–1 India, Provisional Population Tables: Workers and their Distribution, Paper 3 of 1991 (no date), 1. There is no formal official definition of 'RNAs.' It has often been treated as a residual category lying somewhere between agriculture (generally stopping at the harvest–marketing stage but occasionally proceeding upstream to agro-processing), and the secondary and tertiary sectors. As a result, there is little agreement over the use of the term 'RNAs', which is often used interchangeably with 'rural non-agricultural activities', 'rural non-farm activities', 'rural industries' and 'off-farm activities'. While there are subtle differences between these terms, we have chosen to treat them as synonymous since the employment dimension is the focus of this article. Cf. E. Chuta and C. Liedholm, *Rural Non-Farm Employment: A Review of the State of the Art* (Michigan: MSU Rural Development Paper No. 4, 1979); R. T. Shand, *Off-Farm Employment in the Development of Rural Asia, Vol.2*; R. Islam, 'Rural Industrialisation and Employment in Asia: Issues and Evidence', in R. Islam (ed.), *Rural Industrialisation and Employment in Asia* (Delhi: ILO-ARTEP, 1987); A. Saith, *The Rural Non-Farm Economy: Processes and Policies* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1992); and G. Ranis and F. Stewart, 'Rural Non-agricultural Activities in Development: Theory and Application', *Journal of Development Economics*, 40,1 (1993), 75–101.
10. The CoI 1991 (provisional figures) reveal that 24 per cent (1,028,707 persons) of rural main workers were engaged in RNAs in Punjab—occupational categories III–IX. The participation was higher in Jalandhar district where the proportion was 39 per cent.

11. N. Singh, *An Appraisal of Methodology of District Planning in India: A Case Study of Jullundur*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 1985.
12. A village-wise distribution was derived from the Census of India 1981, Series–17, Punjab, *District Census Handbook: Jullundur*, n.d.
13. The Economic Census 1980, *Statewise Report* (New Delhi: Central Statistical Office, 1985), defines an OAE as an 'enterprise engaged in economic activities with the assistance of at least one hired worker on a fairly regular basis'. For our purposes this was too restrictive since it precluded single person-run units. We feel more at ease with the official definition of an enterprise as 'an undertaking engaged in the production and/or distribution of goods and/or services not for the sole purpose of consumption'. The term 'OAE' is therefore the basic unit of enterprise in this article, whilst 'RNA' refers to the activity undertaken by the household.
14. A typical example of wage employment was hired labour in factories and workshops. Of course, salaried government officials such as teachers and nurses were excluded by virtue of their not operating OAEs.
15. The conventional upper age limit of 60 (for females) and 65 (for males) is more appropriate in developed countries. Similarly, the lower limit of 15 is also questionable. The absence of a universal system of social security in the developing world means that persons often work beyond the 'normal' retirement age, and children below 15 certainly give assistance for varying durations.
16. This 'actual' participation rate differs from the conventional measure used by the *Census of India, 1991*. It is defined as the 'proportion of the total number of workers to the total population' (p.5). Our definition, however, refers to the total number of working persons as a percentage of the total number of persons of working age, i.e., 15 to 70.
17. Even full-time cultivators spent some time participating in RNAs, usually assisting other household members.
18. Casual employment undertaken by other family members revolved around jobs dominated by females and children. These operated for only relatively short periods. Participation was marginal and on an irregular basis—a good example was *karyana* stores (dry goods). These workers are the true 'labour reserve'. Cooks are a good example of casual wage labour since their services were required only on certain religious and social occasions.
19. The former group proximates to Mukhopadhay and Lim's 'sub-sector II', whilst the latter is closer to 'sub-sector I'. S. Mukhopadhyay and C. Lim, *Development and Diversification of Rural Industries in Asia* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Asian and Pacific Development Centre, 1985).
20. Economic Advisor to Government, *Statistical Abstract of Punjab 1990* (Chandigarh: Government of Punjab, 1991), 106f. This is an inference since no figures are available for the Block, still less for the villages. It seems a reasonable supposition because Jalandhar district is one of the most developed in the state.
21. For details see T. Kessinger, *Vilyatpur 1848–1969: Social and Economic Change in a North Indian Village* (New Delhi: South Asia Publications, 1979); and S.S. Gill, 'Impact of Economic Development on Rural Artisans in Punjab', *IJLE*, 23, 3 (1980), 154–65.
22. V. Shukla, 'Rural Non-Farm Activity: A Regional Model and its Empirical Applicability to Maharashtra', *EPW*, 26, 45 (1991), 2587–95.

23. The historical relationship between caste and occupation has been examined at length by Kessinger, *Vilyatpur 1848–1969*. He argues that the rigidities that once prevailed have diminished in the wake of Punjab's economic development.
24. This observation clearly highlights the need to consider employment generation in RNAs at the house level. In many developing countries, the most useful unit of analysis is the household. For a discussion of neo-classical applications see G. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981) and J. Stiglitz, 'Economic Organisation, Information and Development', in H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan (eds). *Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 1* (The Netherlands: North Holland, 1988).
25. A. Bhaduri, 'Disguised Unemployment', in J. Eatwell, M. Millgate and P. Newman (eds), *The New Palgrave: Economic Development* (London: Macmillan Reference Books, 1990).
26. An indication of the extent of unemployment and underemployment in India is provided by S. Paul, 'Unemployment and Underemployment in Rural India', *EPW*, 23,29 (1998), 1475–83.
27. For an elaboration of this idea see A. Vaidyanathan, 'Labour Use in Rural India: A Study of Spatial and Temporal Variations', *EPW*, 21, 52 (1986), A–130–A–146; R. Islam, 'Non-Farm Employment in Rural Asia: Dynamic Growth or Proletarianisation?'; and C. Simmons and S. Supri, 'Participation in Rural Non-Farm Activity in India: A Case Study of Cultivating Households in Jalandhar District', *International Journal of Punjab Studies*, 2,2 (1995), pp. 133–54.
28. Since the annual income of these persons was below Rs 3,500, their material situation did not allow them to meet the normal security requirements.
29. Interviews with bank managers revealed that while security was not always demanded, the policy was nevertheless to keep such loans to a minimum. Government targets were largely ignored.
30. The *peela*-card is a document which identifies individuals as potential IRDP beneficiaries. Our respondents reported having to pay Rs 100 before it was issued.
31. Incomes earned abroad are significantly higher than those that can be secured from employment within India. This enabled higher savings to be made and allowed greater investment in OAEs.
32. World Bank, *Annual Development Report 1995*, 12.

Female Work Participation: Caste, Class and Gender Analysis in Rural Indian Punjab

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In this article an attempt has been made to empirically analyse the extent of female labour involvement in productive as well as reproductive work in rural Punjab. Female work participation of women has been analysed in a socio-economic and regional perspective. The present study suggests that official statistics underestimate women's contribution in Punjab's agrarian structure. The process of agricultural development in Punjab is increasingly leading to women becoming 'invisible' in the so-called 'productive' work in the agricultural sector. The total work burden of women is, however, increasing because of increase in domestic work within the household.

Introduction

In the present article an attempt has been made to empirically analyse the extent of female labour involvement in productive as well as reproductive work. The study is particularly focused on rural Punjab. Female work participation of women has been analysed in a socio-economic and regional perspective. The article is divided into four parts. Section I highlights the importance of the problem under discussion and includes a discussion of the various possible factors affecting female work participation. Section II deals with some methodological issues, database and sampling design. Various aspects of female work participation are analysed in Section III. Concluding remarks and policy implications are presented in Section IV. An important implication emerging from the present study is the need to scrutinise official statistics which grossly underestimate women's contributions in economic activity. Second, with development, women are increasingly becoming 'invisible' in the so-called

International Journal of Punjab Studies, 5,1 (1998)
Sage Publications New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London

'productive' work. But, at the same time, total work burden is increasing as compared with men in the household. It is basically because of reproductive and maintenance activities.

It has been observed by the United Nations Development Programme that though women carry more than half of the total work burden, yet only one-third of their work is in paid market activities, compared with three-fourths of men's work.[1] As a result, men receive the lion's share of income and recognition for their economic contribution, whilst most of women's work remains unpaid, unrecognised and undervalued. The perception of men as 'breadwinners' and women as 'housekeepers' prevent women being fully recognised and integrated into the development process.

However, the differential impact of the development process classically was studied in the context of the class structure of the society. Analysis of its differential impact on gender and vice versa is a relatively recent phenomenon. Gender differences have been widely observed across the space as well as temporally in labour force participation. In fact, female work participation is influenced both by supply as well as demand factors. Socio-cultural as well as economic factors influence the female labour supply in productive work outside the household. Demand for labour is also affected by the changes in production technology and the level of development.

Industrialisation and agricultural development leads to the changes in production structure and skill requirements of the economy. Women, as compared with men, having fewer avenues open to them for acquiring skill and lack of mobility, are generally affected more adversely.[2] As Ghosh has rightly pointed out, the impact of social structure is reflected not merely in the data, but in the actual determination of explicit labour market participation by women.[3] In the Indian context, caste is an important factor which influences the social behaviour, especially when the decisions regarding female participation outside the household, and in different occupations, is on the agenda. Value system and cultural norms of a particular caste or class greatly influence women's position and roles assigned to them in society. Darling, writing in 1920s about the united Punjab, presented a brilliant picture of the behaviour of Rajputs and Jats towards female participation in workforce. He wrote that '... the Rajput's regard for his *izzat* forbids him to take any help from his wife.... She can do nothing outside the house and very little within. She cannot even draw water from the well and being a "lady" must have servants to help her in all domestic tasks'.[4] The wife of the Jat, he remarks, does almost as much as her husband and sometimes more. 'The wife of a Rajput is an economic

burden, the *Jutni* is an economic treasure'.[5] Another study, by Dube,[6] of a village from Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh, discovered that both caste and class are an important determinant in the division of work in the community.

Female employment patterns are influenced by both caste and class structure. In fact, in India, caste status and class of the people are invariably associated. Those at the lowest rung in the caste hierarchy are either landless or small farmers. Thus, inequality of both kinds strengthens each other. Control over land may influence female employment pattern in two ways. Availability of higher amount of land will generate more employment for the family which may lead to increase in employment of family females in agriculture. But the negative status effect of the class may be stronger than its positive employment effect. But at the same time, lack of resources may enforce women to participate in the labour force. This fact of surviving needs has been corroborated by other studies.[7]

While estimating the impact of agricultural development as a result of adoption of new technology on labour demand, most of the studies ignore the gender aspect. This neglect, according to Agarwal,[8] reflects an uncritical acceptance of the assumption that the household is a unit, that all its members will share equally in the benefits and burden of technological change. In fact, there may be significant differences between men and women as far as their involvement in field and non-fieldwork (such as processing, animal husbandry, poultry, etc.) is concerned.

However, some studies have assessed, separately, the impact of agricultural modernisation on female employment structure.[9] But no uniform conclusion can be drawn from these studies. In fact, the impact of new technology is influenced by many factors such as regional, cultural and class differences as well as the extent and nature of technological changes.

In India, technological change has been the most advanced in the state of Punjab. Moreover, influenced by the initial inequitable distribution of land, there has been excessive emphasis placed on mechanisation in this state. Thus, the impact of technological change on employment structure is expected to be much wider in Punjab as compared with other areas.

Some Methodological Issues

A consensus is emerging among the researchers that western definitions of work do not capture the large part of the work done by women in

developing countries. The concept of employment is relatively simple in developed countries where wage employment is widespread. But concepts and methods of collecting data regarding labour force participation based on western experience have proved inadequate when applied to developing countries. In economies where labour relations are comparatively weakly developed and where self-employment and unpaid family labour are common, these concepts lose their relevance. The criterion of wage earner does not apply because in agrarian economies, most of the work women do in agriculture, household industry and the processing of agricultural products is unpaid and therefore unrecognised. Moreover, work is seasonal rather than all year round. People in general are underemployed rather than unemployed and engage themselves in multiple economic activities. In such a situation, identification of a person as worker or non-worker becomes difficult. The problem is more serious in the case of women. Moreover, many women play roles which are either preparatory or supportive to the production process and much of this also remains unrecorded.

A change in the definition of work has become absolutely necessary so as to include women's substantial contributions in the unorganised sectors of the economy, especially in rural areas. Specific case studies of women's work show that the degree of women's involvement in economic activity other than domestic work is high, even in cases where women are secluded, but official statistics do not often capture the degree of their involvement.[10] Different definitions of work used by different data-collecting agencies have further complicated the problem. The fact that the product of women's labour is entirely utilised for home consumption ought not to exclude it from being considered as economic activity. The Census of India recognises production for own consumption in cultivation as economic activity but does not include the other non-market economic activities as work. On the other hand, the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) has defined 'gainful activity' in such a way that it includes all activities in the 'agricultural sector' in which a part or all the agricultural production is used for own consumption and does not go for sale. However, as the census data also reveals, 'attending to household chores' does not constitute work or gainful activity.[11] The International Standards Definition, recommended by the Thirteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (1982), clarifies that 'economic activity' also includes all production and processing of primary products, whether for the market, for barter or for own consumption.[12] Thus, according to the above definition, most of the subsistence-oriented

production and processing, other than household chores, that women do in rural societies is to be considered as part of 'economic activity'.

It may be argued that including all subsistence-oriented production and the processing of primary products dilutes the concept of economic activity, thus weakening its usefulness as an indicator of development processes. Yet, there are good reasons for the inclusion of such activities, especially from the perspective of assessing women's contributions. Not only is female labour likely to be concentrated in the subsistence sector but a thriving subsistence sector can make an important contribution to development through the provision of food, clothing and other necessities of life that improve the health and well being of the population and raise the productivity of labour.[13]

In Punjab, animal husbandry is an important and flourishing activity. Our sample data shows that person–days spent in animal husbandry constitute around one-third to one-half of the total person–days spent in all other gainful activities.[14] Moreover, it is increasingly becoming a commercial and semi-commercial activity, although in some cases it is still run on purely subsistence lines. Following National Sample Survey and International Standards Definitions of economic activity, the present study recognises as economic activity not only the subsistence work outside the home which, in fact, is generally performed by men, but also the production of goods in the primary sector by women inside the home. Among other activities, it also includes the labour employed on the care of milch cattle even if the product is used for home consumption.

Database and Sampling Design

In this article primary data has been gathered in the crop year 1988–89 from 270 households of the two regions of the Punjab representing different levels of technological development. The central Punjab, with the most fertile land and widespread tubewell irrigation, has witnessed the most profound change in its agricultural technology and is the seedbed of the green revolution in the state. Amritsar, Jalandhar, Kapurthala, Ludhiana and Patiala districts belong to this most developed region. The north-eastern part of the state comprising three torrents or *cho*-infested foothill districts of Ropar, Hoshiarpur and Gurdaspur adjoining the Siwalik hills, has lagged behind the rest of the state in the adoption of new agricultural technology. The use of modern inputs and machines is the lowest in this region. Landholdings in general are small in this area. Mixed

cropping is quite common in the most backward areas of this region. In the present study, this foothill area has been named as the 'North-Eastern' region, and the most developed central Punjab as the 'Central' region.

Two villages from each region were selected for the field survey. To make the comparison between backward and developed regions more sharp, the villages selected from the developed region were from the most developed tahsil of the region (Khanna) and in the case of the North-Eastern backward region, villages were chosen from the most backward tahsil of the region (Anandpur Sahib).[15] The number of households to be surveyed from each region was on the basis of the proportion of the population of the particular region in the state. In this way, 100 households from the North-Eastern region and 170 from the Central region were selected.

To have an accurate record of female labour force participation, an effort has been made to redefine the concept of economic activity. All activities associated with agricultural production, whether commercial or subsistence, are included in gainful work. An attempt has also been made to evolve a methodology so as to minimise some of the problems of data collection.[16]

The questions asked were specific rather than general. Women themselves often view a wide range of productive activities performed inside or outside the house as 'housework'. Instead of posing direct questions like 'What is your main activity? Are you working?', information was collected about their participation in a wide range of activities[17] through 'time use' survey. On the basis of the work definition discussed above, we decided about the nature of different activities, that is, whether gainful or domestic.

To capture the impact of class and caste on female work participation, households have been divided into five landholding classes (on the basis of operational holdings) and three caste groups. The lowest in the class hierarchy are the households without having any land (landless). The second group is of those with land up to one hectare. They are classified as marginal farmers. In the North-Eastern region, where a large majority of the households come under this class, they have been divided into two subgroups, that is, lower marginal (0.01 to 0.50 hectare) and upper marginal (0.51 to 1.00 hectare). The remaining three landholding classes are small farmers (1.01 to 2.00 hectare), medium farmers (2.01 to 6.00 hectares) and large farmers (above 6.00 hectares).

For analytical purpose, sample households are divided into three main caste groups. These caste groups are upper castes, middle castes and

Scheduled Castes. Brahmans and Rajputs, having more or less similar attitude towards women's participation in outside work, have been clubbed together in the category of upper castes. Jats (numerically the largest caste in rural Punjab) and other intermediate castes having different characteristics than upper castes have been classified as middle castes. Scheduled Castes (there is no Scheduled Tribe household in the sample data) are the third caste group. However, in case of the Central region, out of the total 305 adult women studied, there are only three belonging to the upper castes.[18] So, only two caste groups, that is, middle castes and Scheduled Castes are considered for the Central region.

Female Work Participation

Labour force participation rate is an important indicator for making an assessment of women's contribution in the economy. To comprehend the exact contribution of women workers, the total number of days spent by them in all economic activities (as defined earlier) has been calculated. The participation rate is measured on the basis of the number of days per annum devoted to these activities.

On the basis of work-days per annum, the 1981 Census has divided the working population into two categories, that is, 'main' and 'marginal' workers. Those who get work for 183 or more days in a year are defined as main workers whereas others who are employed for less than 183 days in a year are designated as marginal workers. In the present study, to get further insight into the work intensity, marginal workers have been divided into two subcategories with work-days in economic activity as follows:

(*i*) 101 to 182 days;
(*ii*) up to 100 days.

Table 1 shows that nearly 82 per cent of the females from age group 15–59 years in the state do participate in economic activity and around 27 per cent are main workers. If marginal workers with a substantial number of work-days (101–182) per year are added to the main workers, their proportion crosses 50 per cent. Thus, on the whole more than half of the females belonging to the age group of 15 to 59 years spend more than 100 days each (per year) in economic activity. It is quite substantial, in spite of the seasonality and work availability. Comparison of the estimates of the present study with National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) and census data for rural Punjab brings out the glaring underestimation of female work participation in official statistics. NSSO-based female

participation rates (48th Round) for main as well as total workers are just around 10 per cent and 31 per cent respectively, much lower compared to the estimates of the present study.

Table 1
Region-wise Distribution of Females of Age-group 15–59 Years on the Basis of Work-days Per Year

(Percentage)

Work-days in economic activity	*Region* North-Eastern	*Central*	*Total*
183 & Above	28.48	25.90	26.75
101–182	29.80	23.28	25.44
Up to 100	31.12	28.85	29.61
Never Participating	10.60	21.97	18.20
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
Total No.	151	305	456

Source: Based on Field Survey Data, 1988–89.

In the census, while calculating female participation rates, total female population, rather than females of working age-group, are taken into account. To make the estimates of the present study comparable with census estimates both numerator (female workforce) and denominator (female population) have been changed accordingly. On this basis, female participation rates in our study turn out to be 17 per cent for total workers compared with just 4 per cent and 7 per cent respectively in the case of Census (1991) in rural Punjab.[19]

Regional Pattern

Region-wise there are not many differences in the proportion of main workers (Table 1). Actually, women's participation in economic activity is quite intensive in both regions though the nature and place of work differ.[20] For example, in the Central region, women's participation in economic activity is largely in animal husbandry, and that also within the house, whereas in the backward North-Eastern region sizeable proportion of women do participate in economic activity outside the house. Nevertheless, the proportion of non-workers (those who never participate in economic activity) is lowest in the backward North-Eastern region and highest in the most developed Central region. Thus, with the development

of an area, the proportion of those who never participate in any kind of economic activity has increased.

Distribution of Total Work-days

For analysing the contribution of women within the household on the basis of nature of activity, the total work done is divided into gainful and non-gainful domestic work. Gainful work is further divided into paid and unpaid work.

Gainful work performed for payment is put under the category of gainful paid work whereas the work done by family members on their farm, dairy and other household enterprises is included in gainful unpaid work. Depending upon the level of commercialisation, gainful unpaid work is divided into three subcategories, that is, subsistence, semi-commercial and commercial. The activity is considered commercial if more than 80 per cent of the produce is marketed, and it is subsistence in case it is less than 10 per cent. The other cases, where proportion of output marketed lies between 10 to 80 per cent, are treated as semi-commercial.

Regional Pattern

Table 2 brings out the region-wise share of women–days in total person–days on the basis of nature of work. In both the regions, women's share is around one-third in total gainful work. Within gainful work, they contribute a major share in semi-commercial and subsistence part of gainful unpaid work. But their proportion is very small in gainful paid work and the commercialised part of gainful unpaid work. In unpaid commercialised work, women's share is much lower in case of the Central region. Women, in general, spend more days in animal husbandry work which is largely semi-commercial or subsistence activity. In the Central region, their concentration in animal husbandry is much higher. Contrary to this, in gainful unpaid work, men are generally working either in cultivation or in some other family enterprises, and in the most developed region these activities are run on completely commercial lines. This perhaps explains the lower share of women in unpaid commercial work in general and the Central region in particular. In commercial agriculture, the role of cultivating households is basically that of supervision and managing inputs and output, which is done by male members only. In the landless households, most of the male members have shifted to non-agricultural occupations.[21] As Bhalla

has rightly pointed out, because of increasing mechanisation, family teams have been displaced. Women find difficult to work with other men, which is basically migratory labour. Moreover, landlords also prefer migratory labour. First, it is trained for rice cultivation, which is new in this area; second, it is cheap as compared with local labour.[22]

Table 2

Share of Female Days in Total Person–Days on the Basis of Nature of Work

(Percentages)

Nature of work	*Region*	
	North-Eastern	*Central*
Gainful Paid	16.62	16.14
Gainful Unpaid		
Commercial	16.71	4.63
Semi-commercial	65.45	73.25
Subsistence	68.43	71.58
Sub-total	52.96	42.86
Total Gainful	32.56	31.61
Non-Gainful Domestic Work	99.54	99.73
Total (gainful & non-gainful)	57.64	63.68

Source: Based on Field Survey Data, 1988–89.

Non-gainful domestic work is almost exclusively performed by women. The total load of work, gainful plus non-gainful, is much higher on women than men. This is in spite of the fact that the number of women is less than men in our sample (female sex ratio is low in the state). Moreover, this work burden is increasing with agricultural development. In the Central region, women contribute around 64 per cent of total person–days spent on total work. Since in the Central region, the share of women in gainful work is slightly less compared with the North-Eastern region, possibly this increased contribution of women is due to increased domestic work.

Land-size and Female Work Participation

Size of landholding is an important factor which may influence the intensity of female work participation in the rural areas. Tables 3 and 4 give the landholding size--class-wise percentage distribution of female workers on the basis of number of work-days (per year) in both the regions.

Regional Pattern

No clear trend emerges in case of North-Eastern region (Table 3). But the proportion of main workers (with above 182 days of work) is higher in small, medium and to a certain extent in landless households, and lower among marginal landholding size-groups. Non-availability of sufficient family-based employment due to lower level of assets[23] (land, milch cattle, etc.) and higher proportion of upper caste households, who generally prohibit their women from taking part in economic activity outside the home, are the main factors responsible for relatively low proportion of main workers in the marginal landholding size-group.

Table 3

Distribution of Females of Age-group 15–59 Years on the Basis of Work-days Per Year and by Landholding Size-class (N–E Region)

Work-days in economic activity		*Landholding Size-Class*				
		Landless	*Lower Marginal*	*Upper Marginal*	*Small*	*Medium*
183 and	No	8	23	2	5	5
Above	%	29.63	25.55	11.76	83.33	45.46
101–182	No.	9	28	6	0	2
	%	33.33	31.11	35.29	0.00	18.18
51–100	No.	4	16	3	0	2
	%	14.81	17.78	17.65	0.00	18.18
Up to 50	No.	2	15	3	1	1
	%	7.41	16.67	17.65	16.67	9.09
Never	No.	4	8	3	0	1
Participating	%	14.82	8.89	17.65	0.00	9.09
Total	No.	27	90	17	6	11
	%	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Based on Field Survey Data, 1988–89.

In the Central region, except for marginal landholding size-group, proportion of female main workers declines with increase in landholding size (Table 4). Behaviour of marginal landholding size-group is more akin to medium and large farmers because many households belonging to this landholding size-group are in fact medium or large owners who have leased out major share of their land due to their involvement in non-agricultural business/jobs, etc. The proportion of main workers is around 39 per cent among the landless and only around 7 per cent in the case of

large landholding size-group. In fact, in large landholding size-group just around one-fourth of the adult females (of 15 to 59 year age group) engage themselves in gainful work for more than 100 days in a year; the rest are either non-workers or work for less than 100 days a year. This proportion is roughly 60 per cent in case of landless and varies between 42 to 51 per cent in other landholding size-groups. This is in spite of the fact that the average number of milch cattle is around 6.2 per household in large landholding size-group and less than 3.5 in all other size-groups.

Table 4
Distribution of Females of Age-group 15–59 Years on the Basis of Work-days Per Year and by Landholding Size-class (Central Region)

Work-days in economic activity		*Landholding Size-Class*				
		Landless	*Marginal*	*Small*	*Medium*	*Large*
183 and Above	No.	51	5	4	16	3
	%	39.23	16.67	22.22	19.05	6.98
101–182	No.	26	9	7	21	8
	%	20.00	30.00	38.89	25.00	18.60
51–100	No.	21	6	3	25	17
	%	16.15	20.00	16.67	29.76	39.53
Up to 50	No.	4	3	0	4	5
	%	3.08	10.00	0.00	4.76	11.63
Never Participating	No.	28	7	4	18	10
	%	21.54	23.33	22.22	21.43	23.26
Total	No.	130	30	18	84	43
	%	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Based on Field Survey Data, 1988–89.

With the installation of milk plants in almost every district (some districts have more than one) and increased demand for milk by the urban consumers, dairy is becoming an important activity in almost all the villages of Punjab. Most of the villages have milk collection centres, and, moreover, every village is connected to the urban centre with roads. In such a situation, farmers, capable of devoting some area to fodder crops, take up animal husbandry as an important secondary occupation in addition to cultivation and main responsibility of the care of milch cattle lies with the women. It seems that in the developed Central region, women from large land operating households perform only a small part of the animal husbandry work and are in the process of withdrawing completely from animal husbandry which is being replaced by male wage labour.

Other reasons responsible for lower female involvement in economic activity may be the increase in the burden of domestic work in households from large landholding size-group and the power of seclusion ideology in this agrarian class. Our data shows that the burden of domestic work is 8.13 hours per day per adult woman in case of land-operating households compared to 5.91 hours in case of landless households. At higher levels of income, cooking becomes a much more elaborate and time-consuming process. Time spent on maintenance of relatively bigger houses and on child care and their education also increases. This probably is the reason behind the increase in total time spent on domestic work by the females of land-operating households.

The growing role of hired (male) labour in animal husbandry and increase in the burden of household work with rise in land-size may be the reasons responsible for lower female involvement in gainful work. As discussed elsewhere, in the Central region, women in land-operating households have almost completely withdrawn from cultivation.[24] In large landholding size-group their role is declining even in animal husbandry.

Caste and Female Work Participation

Caste is another important factor which influences the work participation of women. Value system and cultural norms of a particular caste or class greatly influence women's position and roles assigned to them in society. The code of conduct of a particular caste and the rigidity with which it is followed depends upon its position in the caste hierarchy. Generally, the higher castes such as Brahman, Rajput etc., impose strict restrictions on extra mural work by their women. Contrary to this, spatial mobility is invariably higher among women from lower castes who face relatively few restrictions. These restrictions on spatial mobility may result in lower level of work participation among the upper caste women.

Regional Pattern

Table 5 brings out the caste-wise percentage distribution of female workers of the two regions on the basis of days worked. As expected, in the backward North-Eastern region, low caste status is associated with highest proportions of main workers. However, the caste-wise differences are relatively small, and even among upper castes, around one-fourth of the females of 15 to 59 years age group are main workers. Actually, it is the

class position of these upper caste families which modifies the economic participation of their women. It has been observed that in the backward North-Eastern region, the few upper caste women from landless and marginal landholding size-groups are compelled by poverty to take up work outside the home (as family workers).[25] This is in addition to paid work (spinning) and unpaid work performed by them within the house. But, in spite of all this the average participation of upper caste women is lower than that of the women from other castes. The aggregate negative relationship becomes clear if the first two categories of workers, that is, main workers and marginal workers with more than 100 work-days per year, are clubbed together. The proportion of female workers with more than 100 work-days is around 44 per cent, 68 per cent and 85 per cent respectively among upper castes, middle castes and Scheduled Castes. Similarly, the proportion of non-workers to total females of working age group is directly associated with caste status.

Table 5

Region-wise Distribution of Females of Age-group 15–59 Years on the Basis of Caste-group and Work-days Per Year.

(Percentage)

Work-days in Economic Activity	*Region*				
	North-Eastern			*Central*	
	Upper Castes	*Middle Castes*	*Scheduled Castes*	*Middle Castes*	*Scheduled Castes*
183 & Above	26.25	28.29	34.62	19.23	41.49
101–182	17.50	40.00	50.00	22.12	26.60
Up to 100	40.00	24.44	15.38	34.13	15.95
Never Participating	16.25	6.67	0.00	24.52	15.96
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Total No.	80	45	26	208	94

Source: Based on Field Survey Data, 1988–89.

In the developed Central region, as stated earlier, upper caste group has been left out from the analysis due to insufficient observations. Among the other two caste groups, the proportion of main workers is more than double in case of Scheduled Castes compared to the middle castes (Table 5). The proportion of non-workers is also lower among the Scheduled Castes. Women of Scheduled Castes families, who are invariably landless, also have to work hard to earn the subsistence requirement of their families.

Moreover, not many restrictions are imposed on their working outside the home.

Comparison of the backward region with that of the developed one emphasises the effect of technological change in agriculture. In case of both middle castes and Scheduled Castes, the proportion of females with more than 100 work-days per annum (around 68 per cent and 85 per cent respectively) in the backward region, is higher, compared to the developed Central region (with around 41 per cent and 68 per cent). This regional difference is more conspicuous among these two caste groups when one looks at the proportion of non-workers.

Conclusions

The following broad conclusions emerge from the analysis:

1. On an aggregate level, the primary data shows almost no difference in female work participation in backward and developed parts of the Punjab state.
2. However, disaggregated data shows that, in the developed region, female work participation is lower among land-operating households, especially among the large cultivators, than it is in landless households.
3. The female work participation rate also varies inversely with the caste status of the households in both regions. But the inter-regional comparison of two caste groups (middle castes and Scheduled Castes)[26] brings out clearly that the intensity of female work participation is lower in the developed region. The lack of regional difference in the overall participation rate of women in both regions is because of higher proportion of upper castes in the backward region and their virtual absence in the developed region. The regional comparison of middle castes and Scheduled Castes establishes that development is associated here with a decline in the female work participation.
4. The decline in the female work participation among the landholding castes is accompanied by increasing burden of domestic work for women.
5. The present study suggests that the official statistics underestimate the women's contributions in economic activity. By using such data, planners and policy makers can reach misleading conclusions and they may result in inappropriate policies and programmes. Our study highlights the need for both commercial and subsistence productive activities performed by women within and outside the house to be included in data collection and policy formulation.

Acknowledgements: The author is a consultant at the National Council of Applied Economic Research. The views expressed in this article are of the author, not of the affiliate Institute. The author is grateful to Dr Barbara Harriss-White for her useful comments on the first draft of this article. The author would also like to express sincere thanks to Ms Ratna M. Sudarshan for her continuous moral support and encouragement.

Notes

1. For a detailed discussion see *Human Development Report*, United Nations Development Programme (New York: United Nations, 1995), 6.
2. A number of studies confirm these findings. See, for instance, the following: D.R. Gadgil, *Women in the Working Force in India* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965); Kamala Nath, 'Women in the Working Force in India', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 21, 3 (1968), 1205–13; E. Boserup, *Women's Role in Economic Development* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970); Government of India, *Towards Equality: Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in India* (New Delhi: Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, 1974); and N. Banerjee, *Women Workers in the Unorganized Sector* (Hyderabad: Sangam Books, 1985).
3. For details see Jayati Ghosh, 'Trends in Female Employment in Developing Countries: Emerging Issues', unpublished paper for UNDP, New York, 1995.
4. See M.L. Darling, *The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), 33.
5. Ibid., pp. 33, 35.
6. For details see S.C. Dube, *Indian Villages* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1967).
7. For details of these studies see, N. Banerjee, 'Women Workers and Development', *Social Scientist*, 6, 8 (1978), 3–15; Kalpana Bardhan, 'Work Patterns and Social Differentiations: Rural Women of West Bengal', in H.P. Binswanger and M.R. Rosenaweig (eds), *Contractual Arrangements and Wages in Rural Labour Market in Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); and S. Mukhopadhyay, 'Women in the Informal Sector', Paper presented at the National Seminar on Employment in the Informal Sector organised by the Institute of Applied Manpower Research, 14–15 December 1995, New Delhi.
8. For details see Bina Agarwal, 'Gender Issues in the Agricultural Modernization of India', in J.H. Momsen and J.G. Townsend (eds), *Geography of Gender in Third World* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1987), 334–36.
9. The specific studies referred to here are: I Ahmed (ed.), *Technology and Rural Women: Conceptual and Empirical Issues* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985); Bina Agarwal, 'Women and Technological Change in Agriculture: The Asian and African Experience', in I. Ahmed (ed.), *Technology and Rural Women. Conceptual and Empirical Issues* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985); *idem*, 'Rural Women and the High Yielding Variety Rice Technology', *EPW*, Review of Agriculture, 19, 13 (1984), A39–52; J. Mencher, 'Landless Women Agricultural Labourers in India: Some Observations from Tamil Nadu, Kerala and West Bengal', in *Women in Rice Cultivation* (IRRI, Manila: Gower Press, 1985); M. Mies, *Indian Women in Subsistence and Agricultural Labour* (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1987); T.M. Dak and M.L. Sharma, 'Social Framework of Female Labour Participation Rate', in T.M.

Dak (ed.), *Women and Work in Indian Society* (Delhi: Discovery Publishing House, 1988), 25–47; and Sheila Bhalla, 'Technological Change and Women Workers: Evidence from the Expansionary Phase in Haryana Agriculture', *EPW*, 24, 43, 28 October (1989), WS67–WS78.

10. See the works of the following to understand the issues: C.D. Deere and M.L. de Leal, *Women in Andean Agriculture* (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1982); M. Mies, 'Women Lace Workers of Narsapur', *EPW*, 16, 10, 11 and 12 (1981), 487–500; and K. Bardhan, 'Gender and Labour Allocation in Structural Adjustment in South Asia', in *Labour Markets in an Era of Adjustment*, Vol. 1 (ed.) by S. Horten, R. Kanbur and D. Mazumdar (Washington, EDI Development Studies, 1994).
11. See *Census of India* (1991), Series 1, India's Provisional Population Totals: Workers and their Distributions, Paper 3 of 1991, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, New Delhi, pp. 6–7.
12. For a discussion on this see R. Dixon–Muller and R. Anker, *Assessing Women's Economic Contributions to Development* (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1988), 29–30.
13. Ibid., 31
14. This is discussed further in the author's doctoral research, R. Kaur, Women and Agricultural Development: A Spatial Analysis of Changing Structure of Employment of Women in Rural Punjab, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1993.
15. Choice of the most backward and the advanced tahsil from the respective regions was based on certain indicators representing agricultural development, such as per hectare use of chemical fertilisers, percentage of net cultivated area irrigated, number of tubewells and tractors per thousand hectares of operated area, cropping intensity and wheat yields. By giving equal weight to each indicator, a composite index of technological development was prepared for the North-Eastern region and the Central region with the help of these indicators. Anandpur Sahib tahsil of Ropar district from the North-Eastern region emerged as the most backward tahsil whereas the most developed tahsil from the Central region was Khanna (district Ludhiana). For further details of sampling design and methods of data collection, see Kaur, *Women and Agricultural Development*, chap. 1.
16. An important source of inaccuracy in official statistics regarding women workers is due to the faulty method of data collection as well as cultural, ideological and religious biases of enumerators and respondents.

    Having pre-conceived notions based on inaccurate stereotypical social attitudes, interviewers generally assume that wives are not economically active. In respect of women's contribution to some female-specific tasks in agriculture, they are generally perceived as non-workers. The respondents' answers also reflect the socio-cultural norms of their community. Information regarding women's work outside the home is withheld where family's social status is at stake. Moreover, the information regarding the work participation of the family members is invariably obtained from the head of the household or other male members. Answers to questions relating to women's work status and their availability for work tend to reflect a male perspective rather than their actual work status, thus leading to the underestimation of female work participation.
17. We had gathered information about this before starting the data collection in each area.

18. Proportion of upper caste households in the two villages surveyed from the Central region is almost negligible and the situation is more or less similar even in other parts of the rural Central Punjab.
19. See Kaur, *Women and Agricultural Development*, 195–96.
20. For a discussion of this, see R. Kaur, 'Agricultural Development, Occupational Structure and Gender: A Case Study of Punjab', *The Indian Journal of Labour Economics*, 39, 4 (1996), 827–40.
21. Ibid.
22. See Bhalla, 'Technological Change'.
23. As compared with small and medium landholding size-groups.
24. See Kaur, *Women and Agricultural Development*, 214–15.
25. According to respondents this is a recent phenomenon.
26. The third caste group, upper castes, is almost non-existent in the developed region.

The Worship of Baba Balaknath

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The regional folk cult of Baba Balaknath which is popular in the villages of the Jalandhar Doab has been transported into Britain through the processes of migration. The presence of such Punjabi folk traditions in the cities of the West Midlands provides a unique opportunity to explore important issues in the study of religion such as the nature of Sikh identity and the way in which a regional Hindu tradition authenticates and legitimises itself by integrating a complex weave of myth and history into its narrative.

Introduction

The research carried out for this article forms part of a larger study on the religious tradition of Baba Balaknath. The research began in 1994, and has focused on the Baba Balaknath temples in Walsall and Wolverhampton, and at the temple in Shahtalai, Himachal Pradesh, which was visited on two occasions, in 1996 and 1997. During the first visit to Shahtalai, field-work was also carried out in the village of Danda, near Jalandhar. The research has involved participant observation and interviews with the priests of Baba Balaknath in the Punjab and Britain. There were also many unstructured interviews with pilgrims at Shahtalai and devotees of Baba Balaknath in Danda. There is very little literature on Baba Balaknath, except for that which is produced by the priest in Walsall.[1]

The intentions of the wider research are fourfold: (*i*) to supply information on the relationship between ethnicity and religion in Britain by providing a study of a relatively small group of people who mostly originated from the same region of the Punjab; (*ii*) to throw light on the question of Sikh identity and the religious diversity that Sikhs have historically manifested, and whether this remains pertinent today; (*iii*) to

throw light on the complexity of religious eclecticism existing in the Punjab; (*iv*) to provide an insight into the phenomenon of spiritual or religious healing.

The material contained here explores the origins of the Baba Balaknath faith community and its transmigration to Britain within the background of Punjabi eclecticism. In particular, it will focus upon the forms of worship unique to Baba Balaknath's devotees. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate the complex relationship between history and myth and the process of integration of a variety of traditions that takes place within popular Hinduism in order to construct and legitimise a particular tradition. As Brockington has stated concerning the formation process of Hindu religious movements: 'Tradition is not always just what it seems, but has constantly been undergoing reinterpretation to accommodate new understandings and changed circumstances. Innovation is not the enemy of tradition but that by which it maintains its relevance.'[2]

Who is Baba Balaknath?

The official cult of Baba Balaknath is centred around the *gufa* (cave) in Shahtalai, north of Hoshiarpur, high in the foothills of Himachal Pradesh. The temple is located on a mountain and functions as a strong regional centre of pilgrimage. The religion of the area is rooted in Hindu Shaivism and Shakti worship. Historically, the Punjab has always been a strong area of Shiva worship, which predates the arrival of Sikhism. The north-eastern hill regions of the province above Hoshiarpur extending into Himachal Pradesh contain thousands of Shiva temples and important shrines to the goddess who is usually invoked as Shiva's consort. Singh (1995) notes that even Guru Gobind Singh invoked the one God worshipped by Sikhs as Shiva and his consort.[3]

There is nothing to indicate the eclecticism of Baba Balaknath's devotees at the temple itself. In all aspects, the temple demonstrates its allegiance to an old tradition of Shaivite Hinduism. It is believed that Baba Balaknath, who was blessed by Shiva to remain immortal in child form, made his final resting place on the mountain. The top temple is said to mark the spot where he landed. Baba Balaknath is believed by devotees to be a *sidh* (one of the legendary holy men with special powers who are believed to live in the Himalayas as immortals) and arrived on the mountain utilising his miraculous ability to fly.

The legend, which probably embellishes with hagiography a historical

event which took place about 700 years ago, states that Baba Balaknath worked as a goatherd for a woman landowner who fed him *roti*s (bread) and yoghurt in payment. Because Baba Balaknath was a *sidh*, he spent much time in meditation and allowed the goats to roam free on the mountain. The local people began to complain to the woman that their crops were being eaten by her goats. Babaji's employer accused him of neglecting his duties. In reply, he showed her that he had not taken his wages, since all the *roti*s she had given him were stored in a hollow tree and the yoghurt had become a lake at the foot of the mountain. This is still reflected in the name Shahtalai (*talai* is curd, in the local dialect) given to the village which serves the pilgrims before their climb up to the summit of the mountain. The woman then realised that Babaji was a *sidh* and became his first devotee. Babaji is believed to have retired to a cave near the summit of the mountain.

The legend recounts that the cave where Baba Balaknath retired in order to meditate was already inhabited by a demon named Lodh. The villagers would bring goats to the demon in order to pacify him. When Babaji evicted Lodh from the cave, he complained that the goats would no longer be presented to him and that his livelihood was ruined. Babaji then agreed that his devotees would always come to the mountain to bring *roti*s for himself and goats for the demon.

This part of the legend is still reflected in the worship of Baba Balaknath. All the pilgrims bring *roti*s with them (or buy them at the temple itself) to offer to the *murti* (idol) of Baba Balaknath in the cave-mouth, but some still come with goats. If the goats shake when they are in Babaji's presence, they are deemed to be accepted by him. These goats are then auctioned to the pilgrims. Since the priests, as part of the offering ritual, pour water on the goats' backs, they always shake and are consequently accepted by the deity.

Below the *gufa* shrine is another shrine to Baba Balaknath where the *babhuti* (sacred ash) is made by continuously burning wood in a *havan* (fire sacrifice ceremony). The pilgrims receive the ash which they take home with water blessed by the god and known as *amrit* (nectar).[4] These are used to cure a variety of ailments. Traditionally, the most common ailment is barrenness or inability to bear sons. The devotees believe that Baba Balaknath disappeared into the bowels of the mountain through the cave and still remains there in immortal child form. Many claim to experience seeing him whilst on pilgrimage to the *gufa*.

Women are not allowed to approach within twenty-five feet of the deity and approach only by another route which does not bring them as

close to the *gufa* as men. At the *gufa* there is a story that a man who had wanted a child prayed to Baba Balaknath and his wife finally produced a daughter. He was so thankful that he took the baby girl up the steps on the *gufa*. On the way, he tripped and dropped the baby, who died. The incident is interpreted as evidence of Baba Balaknath's displeasure.

The reason given for women being denied access to Baba Balaknath is that as a yogi he renounced the company of women. It is believed that in an earlier incarnation Baba Balaknath was the son of Shiva and Parvati. He and his brother, Ganesh, were told by Shiva that the first of them to go around the world would be given a bride. Baba Balaknath set off immediately and travelled over land and sea. When he returned, he found that his brother Ganesh was already married. On enquiring how Ganesh completed the task so quickly, he was told that Ganesh merely walked around his parents declaring, 'my parents are the world to me'. Baba Balaknath was so enraged that he swore never to have anything to do with women, and became a celibate or *brahmacharya*. It is important to note that this legend is well-known in Hinduism but is usually attributed to Skanda and not to Baba Balaknath. By identifying Baba Balaknath as the son of Shiva, the rural folk tradition is linked into the mythology of mainstream Shaivism so prevalent in the area.

However, there is probably some historical origin to Baba Balaknath's legend which states that he was blessed by Gorakhnath who came to see him and invited the *sidh* to become his disciple. The 'nath' suffix and the legend of a meeting with the most famous of the Nath yogis suggest that Baba Balaknath may have been one of their number. The Nath tradition is not separate from Shaivism as it relates the legends of nine great yogis, of whom Shiva is believed to have been the first. Nath yogis attained perfection by particular yogic techniques which gave them power over death. Such a belief ties in well with the Baba Balaknath tradition, since he is believed to be immortal. This is also reflected in the traditional depiction of Baba Balaknath as a child yogi complete with long hair, loin-cloth and *yoga danda* (staff of power). If Baba Balaknath was originally a Nath ascetic living on the mountain top, the strong emphasis on no contact with women may reflect the prevalent view of women as tempt- resses of yogis as expressed in the Gorakhnath and Mahendranath legend in which the former rescues the latter from a land of women warriors whose queen has ensnared him by her beauty.

As one comes down the mountains into the Punjab, the Shaivite cult of Baba Balaknath with its Nath influences mixes with the Sant traditions of the Punjab.[5] Most of the villages around Hoshiarpur and Jalandhar

contain a Baba Balaknath temple frequented by as many Sikhs as Hindus. Most of them have been started by devotees who believe that they have been given the power to channel the god's healing power. Although they acknowledge the *gufa* as the main centre of pilgrimage, they are completely independent of the official cult. These charismatic healers are as likely to define themselves as Sikh as Hindu. The Sikhs do not always identify with the official cult and very often believe Baba Balaknath to have been a fourteenth century predecessor of Guru Nanak, noted for his healing powers. They refer to an historical figure who wandered the Punjab and collected a following of devotees due to his devotion to God and healing prowess. This may refer to the Nath roots of the legend or to any one of several prominent healing saints of the Punjab whose narratives may have been fused with that of Baba Balaknath. Oberoi (1994) mentioned Sikhs who worshipped a miracle saint by the name of Sakhi Sarvar, who was renowned for healing. His followers were known by a variety of names in different localities and the phenomenon was widespread among Sikhs at least until the late nineteenth century.[6] It is not known whether the saint was historical or mythological but further research needs to be done on the oral tradition surrounding him to see whether the healing stories parallel those associated with the hagiography of Baba Balaknath.

The beliefs expressed at the *gufa* link Baba Balaknath into the mythological roots of Shaivite Hinduism whereas the accounts of Punjabi villagers connect the phenomenon to the *bhakti/sant* tradition which is so strong in the Punjab, and to the 'enchanted universe' of popular Punjab folk religion associated with miracles, magical healing, exorcism and the aid of supernatural powers to resolve misfortune as explored in Oberoi's work on the construction of religious boundaries in the Punjab. Oberoi's work can provide discrete categories to explore the intricate complexity of Baba Balaknath's identity and the religious affiliation of his devotees.

Many of the Sikhs who attend the Baba Balaknath *mandirs* (temples) cite the following reasons for doing so: (*i*) they have been cured of illnesses or resolved problems not accessible to more conventional solutions; (*ii*) they believe that Sikhism is rooted in an eternal tradition maintained by *avatars* who incarnate to restore the tradition to its original purity. Even the Sikh Gurus are perceived as avatars of Vishnu or Shiva;[7] (*iii*) they have family (*biradari*) networks which have traditionally worshipped Baba Balaknath for generations. The relationship between *biradari*, *sanatan* Sikhism and village folk religion is complex.[8] The Baba Balaknath phenomenon can demonstrate how in practice *sanatan* Sikhism and village folk worship have entwined in a relationship which Ginzburg

(1982) describes as 'circularity'.[9]

The prevalence of the worship of Baba Balaknath in the Punjab demonstrates the strength of popular religion in the villages of the region. In the village of Danda near Jalandhar, I observed the activities of the Baba Balaknath priest every evening after *arti* (ceremony in which lighted *ghee* lamps and incense are swung on a tray, in offering to the deity). Villagers, mostly women, would queue to seek solutions to the everyday problems of village life. The priest advised but also carried out magic rituals designed to ensure successful resolution of the problems brought to him. One evening, I observed the healing of a child which was carried out by sweeping the earth around Baba Balaknath's shrine and then sweeping the air above the child's head. These observations combined with the stories of the pilgrimage recounted by devotees indicated the prevalence of Oberoi's 'enchanted universe'. Although there is now a road to the *gufa*, traditionally devotees began their pilgrimage through the jungle-covered hills by releasing a consecrated goat which had been presented by the temple on an earlier visit. They claim that the goat always led the groups of pilgrims directly to the *gufa*. The pilgrimage itself is an indication of the eclecticism of Punjabi religious life. It takes place during the month of *Chet* (March/April) and lasts for a period of three weeks. On the way to the *gufa*, thousands of Punjabi pilgrims, including hundreds from Britain, visit Shiva and Durga temples and the tomb of a Sufi before arriving at their destination in Shahtalai.

Arrival in Britain

There are three temples in the West Midlands dedicated to Baba Balaknath which are in Walsall, Wolverhampton and Coventry, but this article will only examine the first two. In addition, there are also groups that meet in houses centred around the charismatic authority of individual devotees who claim to be a channel for the healing power of Baba Balaknath. The *sangat* (community) is usually local and comprised of Hindus and Sikhs who have originated in the Jalandhar Doab, or made up of individuals who have strong loyalties to a particular group as it is there that they have experienced healing. Although all the groups maintain contact with the *gufa* through pilgrimage, the Walsall *mandir* claims to be unique in that it is the only centre of Baba Balaknath worship in Britain which is linked directly to the official cult at Shahtalai. They are proud of this and denounce the other groups as unofficial. The link to Shahtalai is demonstrated by a

plaque in the *mandir* which indicates that the temple was opened by the *mahant* (a monk or priest in charge of an *ashram* or temple) of the *gufa* when he visited Britain in 1983.

In many ways the Baba Balaknath *mandir* in Walsall can best be described as a Hindu place of worship adapted to life in Britain. It is converted from a Methodist church and contains *murtis* from the Hindu pantheon from both the Vaishnavite and Shaivite traditions as is customary in Hindu temples in Britain. However, the focus of worship is Shaivite whereas most temples here are predominantly Vaishnavite, reflecting the dominant Gujarati presence. The image of Baba Balaknath resides at the highest point of the temple but below him are Radha and Krishna, Shiva and Parvati, Durga, Ganesh and Hanuman. Curiosity is aroused by the posters of Guru Nanak, Guru Gobind Singh and the *sant* master, Ravidas, around the walls but these probably reflect the large Sikh constituency in the congregation. The resident priest refused to be described as a *pandit* (Brahman priest) but preferred to be called a *bhagat* (devotee) and he was not a Brahman but a Sikh from the Jat caste. However, the caste system was severely criticised and a *langar* (communal kitchen) functioned to ensure commensality as in a gurudwara.[10]

The exciting question provoked by the visit to the *mandir* concerned how the *bhagat* was defining himself as 'Sikh'. He wore none of the outward signs of the Khalsa except for the *kara* (steel bracelet). He acknowledged the ten Sikh Gurus, but only as a continuation of a line of *avatars* eternally manifesting in the world in order to maintain *sanatan dharma*. He claimed that his family was Sikh but had served Baba Balaknath as priests for generations. Further visits to the Baba Balaknath *mandirs* in Walsall proved to be revealing as they demonstrated that many Sikhs attended both temples, and that many of them did display the outer signs of *Khalsa* Sikhs. Although both Sikhs and Hindus used the *mandirs*, the only common denominator of both groups lay in their ethnic origin. Except for a minority of Gujaratis who came to perform *puja* to the *murtis* of Radha and Krishna in the temple at Wolverhamptom, the dominant ethnic group were Punjabis originating from the Jalandhar and Hoshiarpur districts. As in the Punjab, the membership of the Baba Balaknath congregations continued to raise interesting questions concerning the relationship between religion and ethnicity, but it also provoked questions concerning Sikh identity. It was apparent that the relationship between folk religion, *sanatan* Sikhism and Shaivite Hinduism so prevalent in the Jalandhar Doab village culture had transmigrated and survived in Britain in spite of the dominance of Khalsa Sikhism.

The temple in Walsall maintains a purity of worship which is mainstream Hindu Shaivite in character. It is denied emphatically that Baba Balaknath incarnated in any form other than those recorded in the *Skanda Purana*. The Purana operates as the authoritative text and the temple's forms of worship are based upon it and the traditional forms of worship at the *gufa*. The *Skanda Purana* tells of two sons of Lord Shiva, Ganesh and Kartik who are born in the *Dwapara Yuga* (one of four ages marked by a descending degree of spirituality). The priest in the *mandir* preaches that Kartik became a renunciant and was reborn in the *Kali Yuga* (the age of darkness) as Baba Balaknath. The Walsall devotees of Baba Balaknath also believe that he incarnated as the son of Vyasa and the sage Sukhdeva. They refer to the scriptural tradition that Sukhdeva incarnated to teach the mysteries of the *Bhagavad Gita* which he revealed to King Bhagirath after the king was bitten by a snake. This belief serves the purpose of linking Baba Balaknath to the Vaishnavite tradition through Krishna in addition to the Shaivite tradition. This interweaving of various narratives serves to authenticate the tradition by linking it to classical Vaishnavite and Shaivite mythologies.

Prior to the temple opening, the *bhagat* of the *mandir* had maintained the worship of Baba Balaknath in his home in Walsall since 1964. Although both Sikhs and Hindus use the *mandir*, the worship is Hindu and consists of *arti* and *puja* performed twice daily. Tuesday evening is special to Baba Balaknath and the *bhagat* uses it to counsel and heal. Healing is ascribed to the deity and is achieved by drinking *amrit* and placing *babhuti* on the forehead. The problems brought by the petitioners echo those traditionally treated in the villages of the Punjab. Most often the priest will either suggest that the person is the victim of 'black magic' or a curse. He also believes that many of the sick have broken a vow made to a deity in a previous life. Baba Balaknath has the power to reveal the broken vow and effect a cure by suggesting that the person fulfils the vow. As well as Tuesdays, the *sangat* gathers together on Sunday afternoons and evenings as is usual in Britain in many Hindu *mandirs* and Sikh gurudwaras.

The *mandir* celebrates Diwali, Shivratri, Durga ashtami and the Chet mela dedicated to Baba Balaknath. At this time, about 5,000 devotees pass through. One of the unique forms of worshipping Baba Balaknath on this occasion is the offering of *jhandian* (flags) to the deity. During the Chet mela in December, up to 100 ceremonies may take place. The flag is wrapped in cloth and is taken to the back of the *mandir*. It is brought in procession to the deity. The *bhagat* situates himself in the midst of the

procession and exhorts the devotees towards greater fervour and devotion whilst also chanting traditional mantras and passages from the *Skanda Purana*. Twice a year, the flag which stands ceremonially outside the temple is changed. It is difficult to determine whether the importance of flags is derived from Sikh influences or indicates much older forms of worship associated with the goddess.

The temple in Wolverhampton, known as Ek Niwas, was opened in 1995. It is not connected officially with the *gufa* in Shahtalai and represents a more eclectic strand of Punjabi culture in which the borders between religious traditions are often very fluid. Unlike the *bhagat* at Walsall, the priest has had no formal training. He claims that his authority comes direct from Baba Balaknath in a vision. The vision is a unique one. Unlike the temple at Walsall, Ek Niwas does not identify itself with a particular religious tradition. On the contrary, the ideal is of a centre where all the world's major faiths are represented. In the temple there are Hindu *murtis*, posters of Christ and his mother, and rooms where the Guru Granth Sahib and Qur'an are installed. The inside of the temple is designed so that at the front is a huge duplication of the mountain at Shahtalai. Stuffed animals hide in bushes amidst waterfalls and caves. All this is presided over by Baba Balaknath at the summit. The various caves form shrines to deities or contain scriptures of the world's major traditions.

This has aroused animosity from the local gurudwaras and mosques whose members/leaders do not understand the concept of all the faiths under one roof. However, in spite of the ethos of eclecticism and universalism, the *sangat* still consists predominantly of Sikhs and Hindus from the Jalandhar district. In this context, it should be noted that the healing reputation of Baba Balaknath is slowly spreading even outside the confines of Britain. This has resulted in petitioners, also originating from Jalandhar, arriving from elsewhere in Europe and Canada. The reputation of Baba Balaknath's healing prowess may well be the key to the transformation of the tradition away from its origins in the Punjab to a more universal tradition in Britain which will attract followers who originate beyond the Jalandhar Doab.

Conclusion

The Baba Balaknath groups manifest aspects of Punjabi village folk religion, Hindu Shaivism, *sanatan* Sikhism and North Indian *bhakti/sant* traditions. It is apparent that the phenomenon of Baba Balaknath

demonstrates how a local folk tradition can integrate a variety of traditions both from mythological and historical Hinduism and fuse them into a coherent narrative that provides legitimacy and authenticity to its followers. In the case of Baba Balaknath, this is further facilitated by the rich current of religious eclecticism that exists in the Punjab. The attendance of adherents who define themselves very definitely as Sikhs raises questions that need to be further explored regarding Sikh identity. The Sikh followers of Baba Balaknath see no contradiction between their worship of the deity and regular attendance at the gurudwara. There may be questions from orthodox Khalsa Sikhs concerning the religious beliefs and practices of those who attend Baba Balaknath *mandirs*. However, they must be perceived as a part of the Sikh universe even if denied the right to define themselves as Sikhs by religious affiliation. The very fact that they are certain of their own Sikh identity must raise the question of whether Sikh is a religious or ethnic identity. More quantitative data needs to be established to draw out information on the ethnic question and Sikh identity. Finally, more in-depth fieldwork is required in the Punjab and Britain to answer questions concerning the caste membership of Baba Balaknath devotees.

Notes

1. The only significant article on the Baba Balaknath cult is Ursula Sharma, 'The Immortal Cowherd and the Saintly Carrier: An Essay in the Study of Cults', *Sociological Bulletin*, 19 September 1970, 137–52.
2. J.L. Brockington, *The Sacred Thread* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), 209.
3. G. Singh, *The History of the Sikh People* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1995), 10.
4. The use of the term *amrit*, which means nectar, would be very familiar to the people of the Punjab as it is often used as an expression for the experience of the divine in the poetry of the North Indian *sants*. Sikhs use water and sugar called *amrit* when being initiated into the Khalsa. The followers of Kabir also ritually use water which they also called *amrit*. Both these terminologies reflect the common language of the *sant* poets (R. Geaves, 'From Founder to Institution: Metaphors of Experience and the Sant Tradition', Paper Presented at the British Association for the Study of Religion Conference, Manchester, Harris College, University of Oxford, 12 September 1997).
5. Many of the North Indian *sants* are accepted by Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims. Vaudeville has defined the *sant* tradition as consisting of individual holy men and women who 'whether they be born Shaiva, Vaishnava or Muslim, stress the necessity of devotion to and practice of the divine name (*nama*), devotion to the divine Guru (*satguru*) and the great importance of the "company of the sants (*satsang*)"', cf. C. Vaudeville, 'Sant Mat: Santism as the Universal Path to Sanctity', in K. Schomer

and W.H. McLeod (eds), *The Sants: Studies in a Devotional Tradition of India* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987), 31. Although the phenomenon of Baba Balaknath has no direct references to *sant* practices, the overwhelming influence of the *sants* on Punjabi culture impacts on the movement in the Jalandhar Doab.

6. H. Oberoi, *The Construction of Religious Boundaries* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 148.
7. Although in classical Hindu tradition it is Vishnu that has *avatars*, in popular folk traditions it is often believed that Shiva also incarnates. This is particularly true in areas where Shiva worship is strong, as in South India and Himachal Pradesh. I have interviewed Sikhs in the village of Danda who believed that Guru Gobind Singh was a manifestation of Shiva. Other Hindus have suggested that one of the three brothers of Ram was an avatar of Vishnu. Shankara is also believed to be an incarnation of Shiva as he is popularly believed to have 'destroyed' Buddhism in India. Many devotees of the South Indian guru, Sai Baba, believe him to be an incarnation of Shiva.
8. Oberoi uses the term *sanatan* Sikhism to define those Sikhs who link their tradition to the Hindu concept of *sanatan dharma*. In other words, it is a recent manifestation of the eternal revelation of one truth maintained by sages and *avatars* since the beginning of time. It is not always possible to differentiate their religious practices and beliefs from Hinduism (cf. Oberoi, *The Construction*).
9. Ginzburg explores the relationship between popular or, more specifically, peasant culture and the culture of the dominant classes in pre-industrial Europe. He posits a circular relationship made up of influences which move in both directions. See C. Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), xii.
10. Considerable research needs to be carried out on the caste constituency of Baba Balaknath followers. Vertovec noted that, 'while most British Punjabis are from the adjacent areas of Jalandhar and Ludhiana ... their composition includes various caste groups. However the overall salience of caste distinctions among Punjabis in Britain, and in India itself, is arguably less marked than those associated with other regional social structures'. See S. Vertovec, 'On the Reproduction and Representation of Hinduism in Britain; Workshop on Culture, Identity and Politics: Ethnic Minorities in Britain, in T. Ranger, Y. Samad and O. Stuart (eds), *Culture, Identity and Politics* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996), 77–89.

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The Theme of Partition in Yashpal's Novel *Jhuta Sac* (A False Truth)

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It is increasingly recognised that literature provides important insights into the human dimension of the Partition experience. Novels can unlock the emotions which accompanied the trauma of the Partition-related massacres and migrations in 1947. Authors can also use them to interrogate the official understandings of Partition. This article is a brief attempt to further extend the insights which have emerged from fictional representations by examining the epic novel *Jhuta Sac* written by the Punjabi Hindu author Yashpal. This is less known to English readers than Bhisham Sahni's work on Partition, but it can nevertheless afford some important insights.

The opening section of the article provides the reader with some information on Yashpal's life. It is followed by an examination of some of the themes of the two volumes of the work. In particular attention is directed towards Yashpal's attempts through his characters and plot to reflect on the causes and consequences of Partition.

Before talking about the novel which is the theme of this article, I offer some introductory remarks about the author. Yashpal was born in Ferozepur in 1903. His father ran a small shop while his mother had a job in an Arya Samaj school. The family were poor and Yashpal's early years unsettled and insecure. When he was a small boy his parents sent him to live with relatives in District Naini Tal. But that did not work out and so they took him back, and his mother enrolled him in a school in Gurukul Kangra. Her ambition was for him to follow the ideals of Swami Dayananda, the founder of the Arya Samaj. It was here that he was taught an ascetic lifestyle and came to believe that the country could not make progress until it was freed from the slavery of foreign rule. In 1917, he joined the DAV School in Lahore. That did not work out either, and he continued his education at a school in Ferozepur Cantonment. In 1921,

International Journal of Punjab Studies, 5,1 (1998)
Sage Publications New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London

he won first place in the first class in his matriculation exam and from then began his interest in politics. The Congress Non-Cooperation Movement, launched as a protest against the Rowlatt Act, made a great impression on him. He turned down his scholarship and the chance of free education in a government funded college. However, he became disillusioned with Gandhi after the suspension of the Non-cooperation Movement and joined the National College which had been set up by Lala Lajpat Rai. Here he met the future revolutionaries Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev and Bhagavaticharan Varma. He passed his B.A.; then he tried his hand at teaching and journalism but could settle in neither profession. He was drawn into the revolutionary movement, by now being disaffected from the Arya Samaj as well as from the Congress Party. His complaint against the Arya Samaj was that it encouraged both sexual repression and class discrimination. He was involved in bomb-making but refused to take part in a plot to kill Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In 1932, he was arrested and was given a 14-year jail sentence. He was released in 1936 on condition that he did not return to the Punjab. While in jail he learnt several foreign languages and chose his life's partner Prakashvati. He lived with her without benefit of a marriage ceremony because he did not believe in marriage as an institution. After his time in jail he came to realise that the path of revolutionary violence could not work and so he took to writing instead. He believed that scientific socialism was the only path for humanity. He was never a card-carrying Marxist but was deeply influenced by Marxist thought. His Marxism also led him to believe in the liberation of women. He wrote 17 collections of short stories, eleven novels as well as several volumes of essays, an autobiography and travelogues. He died in 1978.[1]

Literary critics tell us that we must beware of the intentional fallacy—the belief that a text simply reflects the mind of its author. Some contemporary modes of criticism insist that we must look at the text alone and ignore the author altogether. My own position is that the life of its author can illuminate a text even though it must not be allowed to control our inter- pretation of its meaning. I also recognise that I look at this text through the lens of my own prejudices and assumptions, and from my own perspective. What those are I am not going to spell out, but I leave it to you, the audience, to discover them for yourselves.

The novel I am concerned with in this article, *Jhuta Sac*, was published in two volumes in 1958 and 1960.[2] It is on a vast scale, being well over a thousand pages long. The first volume traces the fortunes of several families who lived in Lahore during the 1940s and whose lives were

radically changed by Partition. The second volume tells how these same people built new lives for themselves in Delhi. Indeed, the novel might almost have been called *A Tale of Two Cities*, Lahore and Delhi. Each volume has its own separate subtitle and, at the end of each volume there is a small piece of dialogue which quotes the title and so suggests the main theme of the book. Volume One is called *Vatan aur Desh, Vatan* of course being the Urdu and *Desh* the Hindi word for country. The title therefore suggests India and Pakistan. On the last page of Volume One, a group of Hindu women arrive in a bus, from what has just become Pakistan, at a refugee camp on the Indian side of the border. They have been through the most appalling sufferings. As they arrive, one of them, a simple villager called Kaushalya Devi, says to the others in comforting tones:

> Sisters, we have arrived. Get down! You have lost your *vatan* but you have arrived in your *desh*, among your own people. Give thanks to God!

Among the women is Tara, the real heroine of the book:

> Tara could not understand what Kaushalya Devi had said. Tara could give thanks to Kaushalya Devi but Kaushalya Devi wanted Tara and her companions to give thanks to God for what had happened to them and for leaving their *vatan*. She kept quiet. The words *vatan* and *desh* echoed in her mind.

Tara is not alone in feeling less than enthusiastic at having arrived in her new country. As she gets down from the bus the driver is standing there. He says:

> That convoy (of Muslims moving in the opposite direction) too has left its *vatan* and is going to its *desh*. The *desh* of men have become the *desh* of religions.

He shouts in a loud voice:

> Those whom God made one, God's servants by their mistrust and violence have made two (Vol. 1, p. 482).

With that sentence the first volume ends. That dialogue serves as a summary of all that has happened in the first volume and of much that is

to come in the second. It hints at a theme which Yashpal develops at greater length elsewhere in the book: the causes of the division of the country along communal lines. This division raises a fundamental question about human nature. Is the basis of that nature religion, which divides people from one another, or is it a shared humanity which unites people at a deeper level than religion, and which thus reduces religion to a secondary place in human life? The bus driver gives his own answer to that question: it is a shared humanity and not religion which is the real basis of what we are. The question arises in different ways at other points in Volume One.

At a rally in Lahore, before Partition, a Hindu speaker says:

> From the beginning of Creation this land has been called Aryavarta. It is the land of the gods Rama and Krishna. In the Vedas it is called Pancnad. How can Pakistan be made here! Those who want Pakistan should go to Arabia. The policy of Gandhi and Congress has always been against the Hindus. Congress always sacrifices the rights of Hindus to keep the Muslims happy. Today the Muslims and the League have become so bold that they are demanding half the country (Vol. 1, p. 108).

Here the question is not about humanity; it is about the land. The land is intrinsically Hindu. To divide the land between Hindus and Muslims is an act of violation. The psychoanalyst Sudhir Kakar, in a recent study of communal violence in Hyderabad, has shown how the land is a key issue in much of Hindu self-definition.[3] So, here Yashpal is pointing to something which has significance way beyond the pages of this novel.

The issues seem equally clear-cut if less passionately expressed at the level of national leadership. We are told that 17th August was the last day of Ramadan. The next day which was Eid was also to be a holy day for giving thanks to God for the establishing of Pakistan (Vol. 1, p. 389). In a similar vein, on India's first Independence Day, Dr Rajendra Prasad says in a speech: 'We give thanks to almighty God who controls the fate of nations' (Vol. 1, p. 411). We have just seen how at a much humbler level the same sentiments were expressed by Tara's travelling companion who said she and her friends should give thanks to God for bringing them to India.

During the chaos preceding Partition that view of things is contested in a conversation which takes place on the Frontier Mail. It is a tense journey and Puri, Tara's brother, is travelling west to try and trace his

family who had stayed behind in Lahore, which he had left several weeks previously. The train is very crowded and Puri gives up his seat to an elderly Muslim. A Hindu passenger objects to this but the Muslim says:

> We are all servants of Allah. Religion is the link between Allah and his servant and is a matter of the heart and of trust. On this basis, worldly quarrels ....

He is unable to complete his sentence for a Hindu interrupts:

> What are you saying? Religion is first. Only from religion is man made. When two communities' point of view is different in every way, when eating together and social intercourse are impossible, then to divide them up is natural.

To this, another man replies:

> You don't want them (i.e., the Muslims) to live here and yet for generations the two communities *have* lived together.

The Hindu answers:

> What is the meaning of Muslims staying here now? Now they have got their Pakistan, do they want to have their own part of India too? (Vol. I, pp. 416–17)

In this conversation two arguments for national unity are put forward: first is the Muslim's appeal to the inherent nature of religion as being the link in the heart between Allah and his servant, a link founded on trust. Certainly there is something noble and attractive about this view, but religion is more than that. It is about communities and what binds them together—the 'eating and drinking and social intercourse' to which the Hindu refers. Yet even here the Muslim speaker still has an implicit point: are these divisive social practices fundamental or secondary to what constitutes humanity? The second argument for national unity is based on history. One speaker says rightly that it is a matter of observed fact that Hindus and Muslims have lived amicably side by side for centuries. This argument is countered by the new fact of Pakistan. The implication appears to be that the creation of a separate state for Muslims both shows that whatever this particular Muslim may think, Muslims in general no

longer actually believe in peaceful co-existence, and that this ideal is now no longer practicable anyway (Vol. 2, p. 21).

Later in the story Puri reflects on the horrors of communal violence which he has seen with his own eyes, of which members of each community are equally guilty. He, too, appeals to the argument of history:

> The Muslims were the natural inhabitants of this land. A line had been drawn on the earth. On the other side of the line Hindus were in the same plight as Muslims on this side · Hindus and Muslims who, by family tradition, were one community (Vol. 2, p. 21).

Puri eventually marries Kanak, whom he had known in Lahore, but later, she divorces him. At the very end of the second volume, she reflects on the events of Partition in a rather more abstract vein:

> When and where is the quarrel about differences in religion going to finish? It took and killed the innocent children of Hakikat Rai and of Guru Gobind Singh. Because of this same quarrel these folks had left Lahore and become refugees. Because of *dharma* the [Muslim] people who used to live in this house and *gali* [in Delhi] had had to flee westwards. And all this only because of different claims about the invisible God (Vol. 2, p. 570).

Kanak's quarrel here is with the conflicting truth claims made by those who claim to believe in God. She implicitly agrees with the bus driver and with the Muslim for whom Puri gave up his seat on the train. Religious claims and practices are secondary to and not the basis of humanity. Her father takes a similar line on more pragmatic grounds. He and his family occupy a house belonging to some Muslims in Delhi (to which Kanak refers later in the above quotation). He says to the Muslims before they leave for Pakistan:

> It is our misfortune that we have had to abandon the fruits of the hard work and earnings of our whole life in the shape of our home and printing press and flee here, but we have nothing against you. We want to return to our own country, but whatever is His will (he gestures towards the sky) (Vol. 2. p. 57).

So, in the first volume of this novel there is debate, discussion, reflection on the *causes* of Partition. All of it is implicit in the conversation at the

very end of the volume, which I introduced at the beginning of this article. The second volume deals with the *results* of Partition and of Indian Independence—the two events being of course impossible to separate from one another. Volume Two is entitled *Desh ka Bhavishya* – The Future of the Country, meaning, of course, India. At the very end of the book, a corrupt Congressman has just been defeated in an election. His defeat is celebrated by two Punjabi refugees, Gill and Dr Prananath, both of whom have carved out a new life for themselves in the new India. Prananath says to Gill:

> Now you can believe that the people are not lifeless, nor will they always remain stupid. The 'future of the country' is not in the grasp of the leaders and ministers, it is in the hands of the country's people (Vol. 2, p. 662).

In the light of all that has gone before, the two people who are having this conversation are as significant as what Prananath actually says. I shall have more to say about them in a moment. This final passage gathers up the two main themes of the second volume. First, it challenges what we might call the official version of the story of Partition and Independence. I said at the beginning of this article that before Yashpal turned his hand to writing he had been disillusioned with Gandhi and Congress when Gandhi called off the Non-Cooperation Movement in 1921.[4] This disillusionment was shared by many young Punjabis of the time. Something of that is reflected in this second volume. Yashpal has very little good to say of either Gandhi or Nehru, and still less good to say of their followers; they are corrupt and ambitious. They reap the fruits of Independence while having played no part in the struggle to achieve it, and having had no share in the sufferings which the struggle involved. Yashpal is at pains throughout this novel to tell the story of the victims. They are, first of all, the poor. One of the first people to die in the communal violence which gripped Lahore in 1947 was old Daula Mamu, the Muslim fruit seller, who was well-known to Tara, Puri and their family. He was quickly followed by a Hindu shoe-mender who earned his living sitting at the roadside. On a wider scale, since the new national boundary passed through the Punjab, it was Punjabis who bore the burnt of events. They flocked to Delhi in their thousands as refugees, but their sufferings are not acknowledged by those who have always lived in Delhi. Indeed, one of the Punjabis remarks:

> We people are becoming a sacrifice. These people [i.e., the indigenous inhabitants of Delhi] are gaining the benefit of offering other people in sacrifice.

There is, incidentally, a striking reshaping of traditional language and imagery here. The speaker uses the Sanskrit word which is commonly used to describe the Vedic sacrifice which was the basis of ancient Hinduism. Here, it is personalised and used in a new and historical context.

The Punjabis lost everything, and arrive in Delhi as penniless refugees. They get no welcome, and have to rebuild their lives on their own, without any help from those who were already in Delhi. Among these Punjabis are the revolutionaries whose contribution to the independence struggle is not recognised in the official version of the story. In this, too, we can see a reflection of Yashpal's own life. One such person is a young man called Gill. It was to him, remember, that another Punjabi refugee, Dr Prananath was speaking at the very end of the second volume, when he said that the future of the country was in the hands of the people, not of the politicians and the ministers. Gill was of Sikh parentage, but had cut off his hair and shaved his beared. For this he was expelled from the Communist Party on the grounds that what he had done would alienate ordinary Sikhs from the Party. But he had done this for the sake of the girl he loved, who was not a Sikh, and as a result, he was expelled from his orthodox home as well. His fiancee was killed during the Partition massacres. He meets Kanak—the Hindu refugee from Lahore whose remarks about religious division I have already quoted—when both are about to be interviewed for the same job in Delhi. Gill realises that Kanak is in a far more desperate situation and so needs the job more than he does, and so withdraws his application so that she can get it.

Yashpal implies that in the midst of all this horror, mayhem and corruption there are people of integrity who are prepared to make sacrifices for the sake of others, but that suffering is the inevitable price they pay for being the kind of people they are in these sort of circumstances. They are victims—though in the case of Gill, who voluntarily renounces the hope of a job, they are victims not by mere force of circumstances but by their own deliberate choice. They make their stand open-eyed, knowing what the cost will be. They refuse to be simply caught up in events. The story Yashpal tells is their story. He narrates the story of the nation from their point of view and thus subverts the official version in which the Congress Party, Gandhi and Nehru are the heroes.

But the real heroine of the book—there is no real hero—is Tara. We

have already noted that she goes through the most appalling sufferings and that at the end of the first volume she is in a refugee camp for Hindu women just on the Indian side of the border. Yet, paradoxically, she is able to build a new life for herself in Delhi and hold down a responsible job in a way which would have been impossible if Partition had not happened and if she was still in Lahore. She stands as a symbol for Yashpal's belief in the liberation of women.

In the first volume, she is a college student and belongs, with most of her friends, to the left-wing Students' Federation in Lahore. There she falls in love with a young Muslim called Asad. One day, they both attend the naming ceremony of a Sikh baby, the young relative of one of their college friends. Both Asad and Tara find this ceremony totally meaningless, and they catch one another's eye across the boundary line which separates the men from the women in the room where it takes place. The ceremony is ridiculed: Asad, like everyone else is given a lump of sticky sweet *prasada* to eat and has nothing to wipe his hands on. Tara slips him a handkerchief. Behind this description is the implicit claim that if people can shed this ridiculous mumbo-jumbo imposed by traditional forms of religion, then they can find their real unity in a shared humanity. We have already discussed this theme in other contexts. But when it comes to the crunch, Asad does not have the courage to break with tradition and marry Tara. Her family, who are also prisoners of tradition, arrange a marriage for her against her will, with a corrupt, violent, poorly educated and communally-minded young man called Somraj. In many Hindi novels of this period the violent and boorish husband in an arranged marriage is very much a stock and stylised character.

Because of the tense political situation, Tara's marriage is a necessarily low-key affair and is overtaken by violence. Her husband is beating her up on their wedding night when a Muslim mob bursts into the house. She is rescued from the mob and a Muslim family take her into their home. Here, she is treated well but the Muslims try to convert her, and when they see that they will not succeed they send her to a refugee camp for Hindus. Tara goes through the most appalling suffering, including rape, and eventually ends up in Delhi where she struggles, successfully in the end, to build a new life for herself as an independent career woman. She gets a government post, but even so her troubles are by no means over. She supports the unions in demanding better working conditions, including proper time off for domestic servants, and this brings down on her head the wrath of her neighbours in the government quarters where she lives. But her liberation is sealed by the political defeat of Somraj. In the first

volume, Somraj attacks a Muslim University lecturer who catches him cheating in an exam. In the fraught atmosphere of the time, the issue quickly becomes communal and the real issue is forgotten. In the chaos following the arrival of the Muslim mob on her wedding night, Tara loses contact with Somraj. The next time we hear of him, he has escaped from Lahore, crossed over into India, and set up a lucrative truck business. He has also joined the Congress Party. He joins up again with Tara's family who at this time think she is dead.

Tara meets her husband again when she is summoned to her boss' office to discuss a request which a businessman has made for a loan of Rs 25,000. She realises that corruption is involved because all the loans have already been allotted. She goes into the office and sees that the businessman is Somraj. They both recognise each other, and Tara controls herself with difficulty. She looks at Somraj's papers. She sees at once that they are not in order and that his claim is based on a lie. She sends him away with his tail between his legs, and tells him he will get his answer by post. Her boss tries to persuade her to sign the necessary permission but she refuses to do so. Shortly afterwards, she is transferred to another department. She feels this is not demotion, but it is defeat for her integrity. She wins in the end because the faction of Congress which Somraj supports is defeated in a by–election. Tara marries Dr Prananath, having proved that Somraj had deserted her. This seems rather a tame end to the novel. In the light of history, we can see that Yashpal put too much faith in the political process, and too much confidence in a single election result.

Tara is, thus, not only a symbol of Yashpal's belief in the liberation of women, she also embodies in her own story what the author sees as the main effect of Partition. This is summed up in the words of one of his characters towards the end of Volume Two:

> Much destruction happened on account of Partition but the chains which kept society bound were also broken, just as when an earthquake destroys the walls of a jail: the prisoners get hurt by the falling walls but they are free. Many people were killed in the troubles, many could make no progress because of their wounds, but now the Punjabis seem to be standing up with more confidence and courage than before (Vol. 2, p. 563).

Notes

1. This information is taken from Kamala Prasad, *Yashpal* (New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1984), pp. 7–18.
2. Viplav, Lucknow, n.d.
3. Sudhir Kakar, *The Colours of Violence* (New Delhi: Viking, 1995), pp. 47–50.
4. For an account of the background to this movement see, J.M. Brown, *Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 139–75.

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Mazhar Ali Khan, *Pakistan: The First Twelve Years*—The Pakistan Times *Editorials of Mazhar Ali Khan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), xiv + 756 pp. Rs 650 (hb). ISBN 0–19–577676.

Farooq Naseem Bajwa, *Pakistan and the West: The First Decade, 1947–1957* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), xii + 265 pp. Rs 600 (hb). ISBN 0–19–577601–X.

Mazhar Ali Khan, who died in 1993, was one of the most audible voices of Pakistan's secular and liberal intelligentsia. As the editor of the fiercely independent national English daily newspaper *The Pakistan Times* from 1947 to 1959, he provided a mouthpiece for a section of Pakistan's society, which despite its prominence in the nation's educational and cultural circles, has never been at the centre of political power. It is difficult to define the exact composition and outlook of Pakistan's liberal intelligentsia: writers like Faiz Ahmed Faiz, newspapers like *Frontier Post*, organisations like the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, women's movements like the Women's Action Forum, judges like Dorab Patel, journalists like Beena Sarwar, publishers like Vanguard Press, lawyers like Asma Jahangir, actors like Zameena Ahmad, architects like Ali Dada, to name only a few, represent a small, unorganised but nevertheless important social and cultural tradition in Pakistan. Mazhar Ali Khan can be regarded as one of the founding fathers of this cultural tradition and he remained for many decades one of its intellectual cornerstones. To define the content of this tradition in abstract terms is not easy: perhaps it was and is a commitment, which can be found at its core, to democracy, human rights, social justice and the emancipation of politics from sectarianism.

In numerical terms, its representatives have always been a tiny minority. The combined forces of illiteracy, the conservative orientation of the Urdu press and many decades of government controlled mass media and many years of martial law have denied Pakistan's liberal intellectuals any meaningful political representation; nor have they been able to penetrate popular culture. Benazir Bhutto's PPP government in the late 1980s appeared to provide such a political platform, but her return to power in 1993 had been disappointing; her failure to deal with human rights abuses, Islamic extremism, corruption and poverty deprived the liberal intelligentsia

of any hope of political representation.

Mazhar Ali Khan's editorials have, therefore, a disturbingly familiar ring and many of them could be published in the *Dawn* or the *News* today or tomorrow without anybody ever noticing that they were written 40 of 50 years ago. This applies especially to his editorials on civic problems, education, corruption, poverty, vandalism, political oppor- tunism, Islamic extremism and such like, which could all have been written by a liberal journalist in 1997. However, even more disturbing are Mazhar Ali Khan's predictions for the future of Pakistan: unerringly, he foresaw legal and political trends, which have become reality. For instance, in November 1953 he wrote an editorial about a proposed provision in the draft constitution, which imposed various restrictions on religious minorities and which gave the Supreme Court the power to invalidate laws deemed repugnant to Islam:

> [T]he Muslim League leaders have accepted a number of undemocratic and discriminatory proposals. Guided primarily by the desire to retain office, they are, in an effort to placate various pressure groups, accepting even those suggestions which not long ago they themselves characterised as impractical or unnecessary. Instead of trying to build a constitutional structure that would foster the implementation, in actual practice, of the Islamic principles of full democracy and social justice, they have merely sought to use the name of Islam to cloak their real designs. Their duplicity is exposed by the fact that, where the application of Islamic principles threatened their own interests, the issue has been shelved; thus, for twenty-five years money bills will be exempted from the provision that legislations considered repugnant to the Holy Koran and Sunnah may be challenged before the Supreme Court. This provision gives a power to the Supreme Court which may well be misused and, in any case, which the directly elected representatives of the people could be expected to exercise without any extra-parliamentary check. Further, to deny all Pakistani non-Muslims the right to be elected as Head of the State serves no practical purpose and, as was accepted by all concerned, the deletion of this provision would have made no difference at all—except to eliminate a minority grievance [p. 69].

Forty-three years later all this has happened: the Supreme Court's Shariat Bench has the power to invalidate laws on the basis of repugnance to Islam, a case concerning the abolition of all forms of interest is pending

before the same court, virtually all laws on Pakistan's statute book have been Islamised, non-Muslims cannot be Head of State, attempts to introduce land reforms have been declared to be un-Islamic and both the safety and legal status of religious minorities are precarious.

Equally disturbing are Mazhar Ali Khan's views on the decision of Pakistan's leaders to seek an alliance with the US. In numerous editorials he warned against this course, arguing that Pakistan would be reduced to a pawn in the battle between the great powers. Confirmation of these predictions can be found in Farooq Naseem Bajwa's thorough study of the policy of both the UK and the US governments on Pakistan: his book provides much of the evidence unavailable to Mazhar Ali Khan in the 1950s. *Pakistan and the West: The First Decade, 1947–1957* is based on a painstaking analysis of primary sources from US and UK archives on foreign policy formulation and implementation with respect to Pakistan. The focus of the book is dictated by the sources on which it is based; this is not a book about Pakistan's policies, but about US foreign policy at the beginning of the cold war. Hardly any primary sources from Pakistan are quoted, mainly because Pakistani archives covering this period are still off-limits to the public.

However, more use could have been made of the little there is available in Pakistan. One example might suffice: Liaqat Ali Khan's visit to the US in 1950, for instance, was, as Bajwa rightly points out, considered controversial in Pakistan. However, his source for this information is gleaned from a US document, which he found at the US National Archives. A perusal of Mazhar Ali Khan's editorials would have revealed a much more authentic source of this controversy.

Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, Bajwa's book is a very useful source for US policies towards Pakistan. Readers with no immediate concern for the US foreign policy on Pakistan, however, will find it rather dry: virtually all communications ever produced by US officials on Pakistan are described in astonishing and at times, I think, unnecessary detail. Readers pressed for time are therefore well-advised to go straight to Bajwa's last chapter headed 'Reflections and Concluding Remarks', which summarises his findings in a most succinct and readable fashion.

However, it is the collection of Mazhar Ali Khan's editorials to which the reader should turn for a more authentic flavour of the controversies surrounding Pakistan's foreign policies. A few morsels are too irresistible to be left unquoted:

The policy of seeking friendly relations with every country in the world

> is given up and, instead, all Socialist countries are viewed with an unreasoning hostility borrowed from Washington. Strange as it may seem, Pakistan Ministers are found apologising to American Press correspondents for having taken the sane decision of according recognition to the People's Republic of China. It is considered necessary to reiterate their disapproval of the Chinese regime; of course, no such necessity arises in the case of Fascist Spain or of an imperialist State like France, which is engaged in a campaign of ruthless terror that includes the bombing of innocent men, women, and children in a vicious attempt to drown in blood the North African people's determination to be free. [...] Two years ago, in the Paris General Assembly, the Pakistan Foreign Minister 'bowed with deep respect and gratitude' to the delegates from the Social States for their consistent support of the cause of freedom and democracy. Today, without any change in the circumstances which then inspired the Foreign Minister to point out the facts of international life, Chaudri Zafrulla Khan delivered a speech which could have done credit to a McCarthy [8 October 1954; p. 491].

The Pakistan Times was taken over by Ayub Khan's regime in 1959. Mazhar Ali Khan resigned from the paper on the day of the takeover, commenting that the editorial 'The New Leaf', which was to appear in the next day's issue of the paper and which had been written by the information minister Shahab, was 'the stupidest piece of bad writing that has ever disgraced the columns of these journals'. He was effectively silenced for the next ten years, but in 1975 he started his own weekly, *Viewpoint*. The *Viewpoint* became one of the few press outlets of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, and continued to be a thorn in the side of the conservative Muslim League and the Islamic parties after martial law had been lifted. It closed down due to financial difficulties in 1992; Mazhar Ali Khan himself died nine months later.

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Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), 347 pp. £45.00 (hb). ISBN 0–333–644666–5.

This thematic study of Pakistan's 'exciting but traumatic political career' focuses on the relationship between state and society and the politics of identity. There is an attempt to highlight the dysfunction between rapid socio-economic change and the continued political dominance of feudal elites in the legislatures. The reader is also provided with some insights into the power-sharing arrangements between the politicians and the bureaucracy and army in the post-1988 'democratic' era. The material on the intelligence agencies is especially useful in pointing to the invisible levers of power. The author also treats gender issues much more seriously than is the case in standard texts on Pakistan politics.

The volume will thus provide additional information for both students and teachers of post-1947 Pakistan politics. A number of weaknesses prevent it, however, from forming the definitive text which the author intended. These relate to issues of historical and social background, balance of material and, finally, to accuracy. The general reader is not always provided with sufficient background to appreciate either the author's theoretical discussions, or the deep-seated roots of contemporary problems of governance and identity politics. There is, for example, only limited discussion of the 'democratic deficit' arising from the viceregal administrative tradition inherited from the Raj in the Pakistan regions, or of the historical roots of Sindhi and Mohajir ethnicity. Similarly, the social background to Pakistan's clientelistic and opportunistic politics is largely absent.

The problems of ethnic versus national identity are, in fact, treated almost entirely with respect to recent developments in Sind, as if they are pecu- liarly unique to that province. A more historical approach would dispel this misconception. This could draw both on primary material and the published works of Yunus Samad, Haroon-ur-Rashid and others who have argued that ambiguities between regional and national identities were present during the freedom struggle itself. The omission of the critical clash in the 1950s and 1960s between Bengali nationalism and a sense of Pakistani identity is surprising in any post-independence study of the politics of ethnicity. A reader might also legitimately expect a fuller treatment both of the role of Punjab in the self-definition of other Pakistani communities and of the relationship between Islam and the state than is provided here.

A number of slips appear to have escaped the proofreader's eye: for example, the confusion between IJI and IJT on pp. 99–101. There are a number of references to IJT (Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba, the student wing of Jamaat-i-Islami) when the author must intend IJI, the Islamic Democratic Alliance. This will mislead the non-specialist as well as frustrate the expert reader. It highlights the failure to provide a helping hand to the beginner by the inclusion of biographical notes and information on the myriad of parties and organisations mentioned in the text.

The book, because of the problems referred to above, does not achieve what it set out to do, namely, to present a balanced picture and provide a definitive understanding of the politics of authority, ideology and ethnicity in Pakistan. Nevertheless, it provides plenty of interest for readers, albeit of a fact-gathering, rather than thought-provoking character. It is thus a useful addition to the field of Pakistan studies

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A. Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), xi + 276 pp. £14.99 (pb). ISBN 0–415–12126–4.

Cartographies of Diaspora is formally located within the discipline of cultural studies, but its usefulness extends to the related fields of sociology, gender studies, political science, modern history and anthropology. It is a study of late-modern boundaries and spaces, and their dynamic possibilities for the formation of identities and the development of political interests. The emergence of complex identities, focused on ethnicity, race, nation, gender and class, their shifting character, 'intersectionality' and re/positioning is discussed within the framework of academic debates on difference and diaspora. But the book is not merely the result of learning to juggle this wide range of concepts and their contemporary applications; it is also a thoughtful academic autobiography which demonstrates that scholarly and political work emerges from personal experience and involvement. It invites us to reconsider the relationship between subjectivity, collective experience and scholarly representation in our own cases and those of the other researchers and critics with whom we engage. It is interesting to have Avtar Brah's work collected and reflexively revisited in a single volume. Moreover, it is valuable and instructive to

read her theoretical deliberations in the light of her transnational experience and political engagement.

Her introduction sets this up well and frames the following discussion. Brah is a woman of four continents whose own identity (that 'changing core that I recognise as me', p. 10) grew and shifted in engagement with the American civil rights movement, black power, expulsion from Uganda, racism and anti-racism in Britain, feminism, the labour movement and socialism, as well as the academy and cultural studies. As she sees it, this has helped her to examine the relationship between 'race', class, gender and ethnicity, and to deconstruct the essentialised categories associated with them (notably 'Asian woman', 'black', 'culture', etc.).

Most of the chapters which follow were published earlier in edited books and journals, though I think the final two are presented here for the first time. The introduction enables us to understand their biographical and intellectual relationship. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 deal with 'Asian' identities, particularly among women, and with employment, unemployment and racism in 1980s Britain. 'Difference' is explored with regard to global feminism in chapter 4, and is further interrogated in chapter 5 where its multiple meanings are disentangled. There is some overlap between the two chapters, but the discussion on pp. 115–27, of difference 'as experience', 'as social location', 'as subjectivity' and 'as identity' is insightful and useful.

The themes of the early chapters, of gender and labour in Britain, are revisited in chapter 6 where the focus is on young South Asian Muslim women. Their work is contextualised by the nature of the labour market, patriarchal ideologies about women in society (including notions of *purdah* and *izzat*) and racism. This is followed by three more theoretical pieces arising from the author's time at the Center for Cultural Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. They deal, first, with the reframing of Europe in the context of multiple expressions of racism, ethnicity and nationalism; second, with diaspora, border and transnational identities, and; third, with 'the figuration of power in its multiple modalities' (p. 211). By means of an interdisciplinary, feminist reading, the author considers the politics of location, in particular, the idea of 'diaspora space'. The genealogies of dispersal and 'staying put' figure in this analysis, in the context of contemporary transnational communities, markets and cultures. Diaspora spaces and the identities associated with them are dynamic and the source for novel forms of political mobilisation.

Although the book's principal geographical context is Britain, the broader fields of 'Europe' and 'the West' are considered, and other

examples are treated comparatively. Those with an interest in diasporas other than the South Asian and countries other than Britain will find much that can be applied to very different groups and locations.

Despite my admiration for the book, as a reviewer who works on the relationship between religion and the identities considered here, I feel bound to criticise the absence of any serious consideration of religious factors in the formation of such identities and interests. Ethnic and nationalist mobilisation frequently involves the articulation of religious origins, shared beliefs and rites, even millenarian hopes and prophecies. The boundaries between and within many ethnic groups are often explained by stated religious differences (whether these are national, symbolic or substantive remains a matter of opinion and argument). And the concept of diaspora is arguably yet more powerful for explaining contemporary transnational movements and spaces if its religious origin and use are understood.

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I. Alvi, *The Informal Sector in Urban Economy: Low Income Housing in Lahore* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), xxi + 323 pp. Rs 1000 (hb). ISBN 0–19–577664–X

The literature on low income housing of the past few decades has reflected international trends shaped by the two Habitat conferences held in Vancouver in 1976 and Istanbul in 1996, illustrating the dominance of neo-classical and, more recently, neo-liberal development theories in the agenda of most third world countries. The plethora of material available on self-help housing in particular represents the prevalent acceptance of the human resource potential and the market as key factors in overcoming the housing crisis. Imtiaz Alvi has made a significant intervention into these debates around low income housing in third world cities by challenging the orthodoxies of both self-help housing and the heightened importance given to the informal sector as the new panacea to the urban housing crisis. Alvi convincingly makes his case that the informal sector's role in providing housing to the urban poor should not be viewed as a cure for the housing crisis but that it is a causal effect of the structurally marginal position that the poor of third world cities occupy.

The basic premise of the book is that the dualistic economic models

which have become a popular means of addressing poverty in the third world are not sufficient in themselves to understand the dynamics of the low income housing sector. The complexities of capitalist modes of production and petty commodity sectors, separately and in relation to one another, make such a simplification on the basis of 'formal and informal' oftentimes inappropriate. The growing emphasis that has been placed upon the informal economy among housing theorists and practitioners alike has contributed to the ideological basis of the Turner school of self-help housing. Alvi argues that the self-help school places too much importance upon the consumption of housing and not enough on the production of housing. He goes on to say that 'the ability or inability of a self-builder to construct or consolidate his/her dwelling depends largely on his/her capital material, infrastructure, tools, management system, and skilled labour' (p. 14). At the centre of Alvi's argument is this aspect of access to capital and resources. That the poor are forced to live in inadequate housing is not because they are unable to consume appropriate materials, as is upheld by Turner and the other self-help theorists, but because the ability of people to build their own houses is hindered by the inaccessibility of land, building materials, tools and skilled labour.

The particular history of Lahore and the marginal position of the poor in the city's history are examined, highlighting the importance of contextual analysis when applying generalised models of development. The specificities of the experiences of Partition, migration and urbanisation in Lahore have provided the basis for the low income housing production process in the city while also giving shape to the circumstances and marginal position of the urban poor. The apathy of the state towards the poor is a problem which the author sees as an essentially ideological one. Even where the state *has* taken action in the form of ad hoc housing and land projects, its unwillingness to tackle the underlying factors that generate poverty and inequality are at the source of the low income housing crisis. This element of Alvi's thesis is further accentuated in his analysis of the insidious relationship between the state and capitalist development: '...any attempt to improve the conditions of the poor and to facilitate their house-building efforts within the present economic system will essentially benefit the industrial, commercial, and trade capital invested in the construction and property sectors of Lahore' (p. 255).

The dominant discourses on poverty in general and housing more specifically have been preoccupied with the consumption of housing provision and basic needs. This is most evident in the movement towards privatisation of housing development. Imtiaz Alvi criticises the use of the

dualistic economic models as a further justification of the informal sector and a remedy to the 'bottlenecks' of supply-side development economics. Many countries, both industrialised and developing, are implementing national housing programmes which involve more 'economically viable' actions involving the sub-contracting of land and housing development schemes, and in this case, the utilisation of the informal sector production networks. The book is insightful in its reluctance to prescribe solutions and is a refreshing and critical contribution to the small but influential body of neo-marxist low income housing literature. Imtiaz Alvi's study is a timely one in the light of the contemporary debates around the so-called 'impasse' in development studies, giving evidence that despite the current predominance of neo-liberal economic theories, the chapter of the self-help/neo-marxist dialogue is far from closed.

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Pritam Singh, *Political Economy of the Punjab: An Insider's Account* (New Delhi: M.D. Publications, 1997), ix + 332 pp. Rs 575 (hb). ISBN 81-7533-031-7.

I am not reviewing my own book! The author is a retired civil servant of the Punjab government in India. That explains the subtitle of the book. His retirement has apparently allowed him the freedom to make political statements not possible earlier and 'political economy' in the title is supposed to signify that. The book is welcome on both counts, that is, for the effort to give an insider's account of the Punjab economy and for attempting a 'political economy approach' towards studying the dynamics of the pattern of economic development in Punjab. Our understanding of the various sectors of Punjab's economy, politics and society and the forces shaping the formation of the contemporary Punjabi society would be richer if more administrators were to write and publish about their inside experience and knowledge of the modes of state intervention in civil society. The seminal work of the late M.S. Randhawa on the green revolution and some of the writings of M.S. Gill, the present Chief Election Commissioner of India, on Punjab agriculture are examples of very valuable contributions by administrators to the study of Punjab's economy and society. It is necessary to mention here the pioneering work by Malcolm Darling on the dialectics of prosperity and indebtedness among

Punjabi peasants during the colonial period. The fact that one has so few names to mention is indicative of the weakness of the intellectual culture of reflection and writing among Punjabi administrators, especially in the post-1947 period. This book, therefore, acquires added significance in this context.

The main thesis of the book is that Punjab has become an agrarian colony of the Indian state, that Punjab's agricultural development has reached its saturation point and that further progress of Punjab's economy is possible only through industrialisation linked to its agriculture sector. The author argues that the central government is a hindrance to the industrialisation of Punjab because the centre fears that, by moving towards an agro-industry cropping pattern, Punjab will no longer be available to act as a necessary food basket of India. He claims that even the post-1991 economic policy change towards liberalisation does not invalidate his central argument. In itself, this argument is not seriously flawed if it were to stop there. But the author runs into serious trouble when he tries to add another dimension to this explanatory framework for the industrial backwardness of Punjab viz., the central government's alleged politics based on ethnic considerations. He does not situate the agriculture-oriented development pattern of Punjab's economy in the larger historical and global context of Punjab and the Indian economy and verges on explaining the centre's neglect of Punjab's industrialisation as a result of Punjab being a Sikh-majority province in a Hindu-majority country ruled by a Hindu-dominated centre. Although not stated in the direct fashion that I have attributed to him here, he does suggest this explanation in a roundabout way.

In chapter two, which is the main opening chapter, he proves in a convincing manner that an anti-Sikh bias at the centre delayed the acceptance of the demand for the creation of a Punjabi-speaking state. The reader is expected to carry this image of Punjab as a state suffering from discrimination in the subsequent chapters which deal with substantive economic issues, though there is no mention of ethnicity in those chapters. In the concluding chapter, the author returns to reinforcing the image of Punjab as a victim of ethnic discrimination by referring to 'thoughtless homogenising policies pursued by the powerful hegemonic forces' as impediments to Punjab's socio-economic transformation and Punjab being under the spell of 'discrimination, deprivation and dependency syndrome'. I am not suggesting that the argument for the centre adopting anti-Sikh policies at certain junctures is incorrect. On the contrary, there is irrefutable evidence that on the question of Punjabi Suba, Operation Bluestar, the

1984 anti-Sikh massacres and the large-scale violations of human rights in Punjab in the 1980s and 1990s, anti-Sikh sectarian considerations were dominant in the centre's decision-making processes. To argue, on this basis, that the pattern of economic development in Punjab has been shaped by anti-Sikh considerations at the centre, is to commit the error of political reductionism, which is as mistaken as the economic reductionism of vulgar Marxism. Political reductionism, or for that matter, economic reductionism, is certainly not political economy!

A politico-economic explanation of Punjab's agriculture-oriented development pattern would locate its roots in the mode of colonial integration of Punjab into the global capitalist economy through the canal colony policy pursued by the British rulers. This colonial pattern created the necessary historical preconditions for the post-1947 Indian state to launch the green revolution strategy in Punjab for achieving the Indian national goal of food self-sufficiency. For an elaboration of this argument, see my paper 'Political Economy of the British Colonial State and the Indian Nationalist State and the Agrarian-oriented Development Pattern in Punjab', *Indo-British Review*, Vol. XXI, No. 1. If one situates the explanation of Punjab's agrarian-oriented development pattern in a historical, global and structural context, it allows us to de-link the ethnic composition of Punjab from the economic policy of the Indian central government towards Punjab. To sharpen my argument, let me state that even if the entire peasantry of Punjab had been Hindu, everything else being the same, the central government would still have pursued the agrarian-oriented green revolution policy in Punjab.

Despite my disagreement with the approach of the author, I value very highly his contribution in providing extremely useful statistical information on the Punjab economy. His chapter on Farm Marketing and Agricultural Prices is a piece of outstanding quality. He has put his insider's experience to the most appropriate use in this chapter. However, an error in this chapter needs correction from the viewpoint of the history of economic thought. It was not Bukharin, whom the author has mentioned (p. 156), but Preobrazhensky who propounded the theory of squeezing the agriculture sector to fund industrialisation in the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution. Bukharin, in fact, had argued just the opposite strategy, that is, of letting the peasantry get rich, through a favourable agriculture pricing policy, in order to create an expanded internal market for industrial goods.

In chapters seven and eight, Ecological Crisis and Human Capital respectively, the author has highlighted those aspects of Punjab's economy

which have generally remained neglected in the literature so far. The two appendices to chapter ten on Industrialisation are also very useful. The chapter Roads and Railways highlights the infrastructural deficiencies, especially relating to railways and the chapter on Employment and Unemployment brings to light the often less known dimension of uneducated unemployment in the rural sector. The penultimate chapter, Cultural Dimension, suffers from many inconsistencies and some problematic formulations. Nevertheless, this book will be of benefit to both lay readers as well as specialists on the Punjab economy.

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Ramesh K. Chauhan, *Punjab and Nationality Question in India* (Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), x + 207 pp. Rs 280 (hb). ISBN 81-7100-171-1.

The nationality question has received considerable attention from scholars and political activists in India and abroad. Earlier, this question was discussed and debated as a part of the larger question of the liberation/independence of colonies from imperialist countries. Colonies, being subjugated, were subjected to intense economic exploitation and social oppression. Nationality struggles, therefore, always had some social content making social change/revolution their ultimate objective. Nationalism was used by leaders of the struggles as a vehicle to unite various sections and classes to fight against imperialism. But, in recent periods, the struggle of certain nationalities and ethnic groups (which stake their claim to nationalities) have been geared towards achieving greater autonomy/secession from the dominant nationalities within a larger country. Such a problem has been felt very acutely in some of the countries which are multi-ethnic and home to several nationalities. The South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have experienced such struggles and are seized by this problem.

In the Indian situation this question has gained significance in recent periods. Several areas, such as Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and the North-East have seen violent/militant struggles on issues related to the nationality question. In response to these struggles, two important seminars have been organised within 15 years by the radical left in India, resulting in the publication of two important volumes on this issue. The first was organised

in 1981 by the Andhra Pradesh Radical Students Union which culminated in the volume *Nationality Question in India: Seminar Papers* (1987). The second was organised by the All India People's Resistance Forum in 1996. The proceedings of the seminar were published in the volume *Symphony of Freedom: Papers on Nationality Question* (1996).

The Punjab region remained seriously disturbed during 1982–92 with the focus bordering on autonomy within India and freedom from it. This attracted the attention of eminent scholars, political activists and groups to examine the Punjab crisis in terms of the nationality question. The Akali Dal raised the issue of the Sikh nation in the historic 'Anandpur Sahib Resolution' (1973) and when this resolution was finally passed in 1978, G.S. Tohra, President of the SGPC, declared in a speech that 'Sikhs are a nation'. Later on, during the peak period of Sikh militancy (1982–92), several Sikh organisations declared their commitment to the establishment of an independent state based on Sikh nationalism. Romesh K. Chauhan's book takes cognisance of these issues and examines the question of Punjabi nationality from a secular perspective.

The book is written with the basic premise that India is a land of diversity and is a 'multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-national, multi-lingual and multi-cultural country'. This is the reason why the country is faced with problems of troubled nationalities, some of which are demanding secession, while oppressed ethnic groups are demanding regional autonomy. The issue of Punjabi nationality is examined in the context of the multi-national character of the Indian union.

The author has adopted a historical approach to trace the growth and emergence of Punjabi nationality and explains how, later on, it faced fragmentation when the objective reality was mediated by various subjective factors.

The process of formation of communities in the Punjab, with implications for Punjabi nationality, began after the Muslim invasion of India. This had three features: first, in spite of Muslim domination, degenerated Hinduism of an orthodox Brahmanical variety continued to exist. The interaction of the two religions failed to create a composite/synthetic culture or value system essential for their co-existence. Second, though new converts to Islam were given petty jobs in administration, yet, an average Muslim and an average Hindu continued to share a pathetic socio-economic existence. Third, the dominance of the Sanskrit language, the exclusive monopoly of the Brahmans, was challenged by the Persian language as the latter acquired the status of court and administration language and its influence spread to educated Muslims and Hindus, leading

to the emergence of a hybrid language, Urdu, written in the Persian script. This period also witnessed the development of the local dialect into the Punjabi language, written in Persian script and later in Gurmukhi script, but spoken by the common masses.

The tyranny and oppression of the rulers and the socio-economic crisis in society gave rise to reform movements by the Sufis and Bhaktis. As part of the Bhakti movement, Guru Nanak founded Sikhism at the beginning of the period of Mughal rule. The reform movements created a new awakening among the people. The common historical experience, common struggles, cultural admixture, development of a common spoken language, religious faith and political consciousness of the communities in Punjab shaped a common identity, which later on developed in the form of Punjabi nationality (p. 110). The author holds that ideals preached by Guru Nanak gave birth to Punjabi consciousness and to Punjabi nationalism (p. 115). The author emphasises that the Sikhs in general and Sikh Gurus in particular made a tremendous contribution to Punjabi language and literature and paved the way for the formation of Punjabi nationality (p. 129). Punjabi language and folklore, which were fairly developed before Ranjit Singh established his empire, now became very popular among the three Punjabi communities (Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims). These communities became important components of a composite Punjabi culture and integral constituents of Punjabi nationality. Punjabi romantic stories (Heer–Ranjha, Sassi–Punnu, Siri–Fariyad, Sohni–Mahiwal, Laila–Majnu, Mirja–Sahiba, etc.), ballads of heroism (*vars*) and life stories of the Gurus (*janam sakhis*) became very popular during Ranjit Singh's rule. He patronised and promoted the joint celebration of fairs and festivals and promoted Punjabi folk literature, songs and music to create a composite Punjabi culture. Ranjit Singh brought the scattered people of Punjab under a uniform system of government and evolved a young and vigorous nation which, under his leadership, reached its zenith and blossomed into Punjabi nationality.

The period of British rule, after the annexation of Punjab (1849–1947), led to the fragmentation of Punjabi nationality. Instead of integrating the various religious communities, the British divided Indians on communal lines under the policy of divide and rule. The three communities which were living in harmony earlier started competing with each other, after the entry of Christian missionaries on the scene, in the matter of religious conversions. Soon there developed religious movements of Hindus (Arya Samaj), Sikhs (Singh Sabha) and Muslims which created a communal consciousness and firmly established religious differentiation among these

communities. The policy of proportional representation (on communal lines) promoted this process further with the emergence of political parties, each of them representing solely the interests of one community. The British system of governance promoted and patronised the process of religious representation among the Punjabis. The secular movements opposed to this policy, such as the Ghadar Movement, could not check this tendency. The process of communal differentiation was converted into communal confrontation which culminated in the division of the country when the British left India, leading to the partition of Punjab and Bengal. The largest segment of Punjabi nationality (Muslims) was separated from the rest. The spillover of the pre-Partition period continued during the initial phase of post-independence Indian Punjab when a section of Punjabi-speaking non-Sikhs opposed the formation of a Punjabi-speaking province. With reorganisation of Indian Punjab in 1966, Hindi-speaking areas were separated, and a Punjabi-speaking province came into existence. In due course, the Punjabi language became universally accepted within the Punjab and Punjabiat, in spite of the several difficulties, came to be accepted as a great integrating force among the various communities in the Punjab. In this sense, the author opines, Punjabi nationality has emerged on the Indian scene.

The author has examined several propositions including 'the Sikhs are a nation'. He rejects the proposition and holds the opinion that the Sikhs are a politically conscious community and an ethnic group, but not a nation. They are a significant part of Punjabi nationality which includes all Punjabis living in Punjab.

The book is a welcome addition to the Punjabi nationality debate. One of the difficulties with the book is that the author uses the term 'nationality' without clearly defining it or specifying its various parameters. In the absence of a measuring rod, it becomes difficult to accept or reject the claims of certain communities/ethnic groups to the status of nationality. The author has given several definitions but has failed to mention which definition better captures the ground reality. At the same time, the author lacks a theory for the development of nationality. He has described the course at the empirical level in the case of Punjabi nationality and declares certain stages (the Ranjit Singh period 1800–1849, and post reorganisation Punjab 1966–93) to be phases of Punjabi nationality formation. The author has not posed the question of the implications of nationality formation. Is it logical for a nationality to demand a sovereign state of its own? This emerges as an important question which the author has not posed. He, therefore, avoids bringing out the policy implications of this study. There

is a lot of repetition and padding in the book. Careful editing would have made it a slimmer and more readable volume.

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H. Tinker. *Viceroy: Curzon to Mountbatten* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 266 pp. Rs 600 (hb). ISBN 0–19–577698–4.

Hugh Tinker has had a lifetime association with India as soldier, administrator and scholar, and has written numerous books and articles on the subcontinent and related areas. His present study of the twentieth century viceroys is presented, Tinker writes, as 'a kind of personal retrospect, completed when a lifetime of writing about southern Asia is almost over' (p. xi). Although he has undertaken only limited new research, as he informs us, his accumulated archival research and scholarly reading, salted with shrewd, witty and often acerbic judgments on the personalities and events of the twentieth century Raj, combine to produce an engaging account of the viceroyalty during the final decades of British presence in the subcontinent.

Tinker's book is framed by an introductory chapter, 'The Actors', and a concluding chapter, 'The Larger Perspective'. In-between are chapters devoted to each of the viceroys, with a narrative structure built, on the one hand, largely around the engagement or lack thereof of each viceroy with Indian nationalism, and, on the other hand, each viceroy's often equally contentious relations with the India Office, various secretaries of state and successive prime ministers. In his introduction, Tinker sketches out the structure and authority of the viceroyalty, and notes, following Bagehot, the viceroy's two-fold function as both a working administrator and the personification of the ceremonial aspects of rule over British India. Tinker, whose sympathies plainly lie with the Indian nationalist movement, writes of the India Office that its officials, having passed their entire careers in London, 'tended to view India as it was when they first joined the office and regarded any pressures for change as of transient significance' (p.7).

Tinker sees Curzon and Mountbatten as the two most talented viceroys of the century, both intensely ambitious and ruthless in pursuing their careers, and, of course, both confident carvers-up of political boundaries, even though, at the same time, he acknowledges Curzon's Bengal fiasco

and the controversy caused by Partition. Of the vicereoys in between, Tinker rates Hardinge, Irwin and Wavell as 'above average', crediting them for their acquisition of 'deep sympathy' for Indian aspirations, and chronicling their truly creditable attempts to move both the Crown and the nationalists to further accommodation. The chapter on Wavell is particularly useful in showing the political disarray over Indian policy that Wavell faced at home. Tinker also credits Minto and Reading, although placed at a lower level, for doing similar work. The others—Chelmsford, Willingdon, and Linlithgow—are dismissed as mediocrities. Chelmsford attempted to downplay the Amritsar massacre, Willingdon was detached and embarrassingly uninformed, and Linlithgow was accused by Attlee of 'crude imperialism' (p.157). Mountbatten, whose career is of particular interest to readers of this journal, is praised for his sympathy for the independence movement, but criticised for his 'quick-fix' approach to the end of British rule and his refusal to heed the warning bells of communal slaughter. Tinker believes that Mountbatten may well have been involved in Radcliffe's boundary-drawing, noting that there is evidence that a map of the proposed line may have been put up in Ismay's office.

In his final chapter, Tinker raises the question of why almost all the viceroys were aristocrats, and why John Lawrence was the only person ever chosen for his administrative ability. The answer, if there is one, may be that even Labour prime ministers were mesmerised by the implications of the name of the office itself, and hesitated to remove the ceremonial aspect of the role from the aura of aristocracy. Tinker also notes that the viceregal style is still an influence in India, manifested in the contemporary pageantry of New Delhi.

Tinker's prose occasionally presents difficulties. His chapters are not always sharply focused, Minto remains a shadowy figure upstaged by John Morley (perhaps intended), and it is sometimes difficult to keep track of the particular initiatives on the negotiating table. Also, there is sometimes an imbalance between background text and the individual being discussed. There are a number of run-on sentences, and the book does not have an index. However, in spite of these difficulties, I found Tinker's personal and retrospective re-visit to the viceroyalty engrossing and informative.

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Tara Singh Bains and Hugh Johnston, *The Four Quarters of the Night: The Life Journey of an Emigrant Sikh* (Montreal: McGill Queen's University Press, 1995), xviii + 275 pp. £28.00 (hb), £12.95 (pb). ISBN 0–7735–1265–9 (hb), 0– 7735–1266–5 (pb).

Manmohan Singh (Moni) Minhas, *The Sikh Canadians* (Edmonton: Reidmore Books Inc., 1994), 86 pp. ISBN 1–895073–44-8.

Minhas's short but large format volume provides an illustrated history of Sikhs in Canada. It is a neat, fresh and very readable account, ideally suitable for school pupils. Illustrated with maps, data, arts and cultural life, it is an ideal textbook for the school history curriculum.

Bains and Johnston's book is altogether different in scope and audience. It is devoted to Tara Singh Bains—a Sikh settled in Canada, presenting raw data anthropologists would spend years collecting and analysing. Professor Johnston—a historian—has faithfully recorded Bains' life experiences and we hear Bains' voice throughout the narrative. Johnston seems to have made a wise choice also: Bains is an *amritdhari* Sikh, a peasant from *Doab* Punjab, whose experiences of Canada are typical of the first generation among the new wave of South Asian migrants to Canada. Bains has participated in many community activities and his narrative serves as the testimony of an eye-witness to many crucial events in the Canadian Sikh community. Besides, Johnston tells us, Bains is a 'natural story-teller' and has consciously acted as a role model for the Sikh community as well as others.

Apart from a short introduction and a postscript, Johnston gives a free rein to Bains' thoughts and actions, recording faithfully and arranging his life for the readers' benefit in a chronological sequence. Born in Sarhala Khurd, district Hoshiarpur, in 1923, Bains' father was among the pioneer settlers who went to Canada in 1908 and returned home in 1919. Bains was the second child of his father, his sister was born in Canada and married away to a Canadian Sikh. His mother died soon after his birth, and his father remarried when he was four. The family owned 10 acres of land. He was educated at Mahalpur Khalsa School and soon after passing high school, in 1941, at the age of 15, he was married to a girl in Kultham village. As relations between the father and son soured, Bains ran away to join the army. Enlisted as a Havaldar clerk, he was posted at various stations: Jabalpur in central India, Chhinwara and Rawalpindi just before the Partition. By March 1947, the Partition riots had started and Bains

was able to save a few people's lives. After a sojourn in Roorkee, his regiment was transferred to Jullundur cantonment, where an illness struck him and he was discharged from the army. Because of his father's violent temper, Bains settled in his wife's village, Kultham. He tried his hand at farming and other occupations, including a cooperative, but he was destined to see the New World.

Already, the family was connected overseas: his uncle, who sent money occasionally, but never returned, had settled in Malaya. The call to Canada came through Bains' elder sister who was settled in Vancouver. He arrived at his sister's farm in April 1953. Immediately, he ran into a severe dilemma; family members insisted he should shave as the beard looked odd and they were convinced that Canadians disapproved of it. Bains defied all such pleas, setting himself up independently of his relations by taking a job with a Punjabi lumber contractor in Nanaimo. When rebuked by a Canadian worker, he was instrumental in setting up a union at the factory. This was his first experience of working with Canadians, gaining friendship and serving as the union's secretary. Then followed a string of jobs in the lumber industries in Port Alberni. By the 1960s, he had managed to call a number of his brothers and sisters to Vancouver, and in 1969 his wife and elder son joined him.

While working as a labourer, he also plunged into community activities. Besides working on a Punjabi weekly started by Visva Malhotra, a Punjabi Hindu, for a few months, he became close to events associated with the control of a major gurudwara by two factions, 'modern' versus 'orthodox' Sikhs. At three gurudwaras, at Abbotsford, Hillcrest and Westminster, it was common practice among men to go bareheaded while women would wear skirts instead of their Punjabi dress in the gurudwara. He describes how such practices offended him and others who believed in the traditional ways. He narrates how Teja Singh who, almost half a century earlier, established a gurudwara and Khalsa Diwan Society and had baptised many Sikhs, was also disappointed during his visit. Bains throws much light on the controversy and tactics which marred the Khalsa Diwan Society's proceedings during 1974–76, a crucial period in the Society's history, when it not only debated its membership but also constructed a new gurudwara at Ross Street. Here, his testimony regarding the debate and incidents that took place between the 'modern' and 'traditional' Sikhs will serve many eager specialists.

His activities spanned many other areas: funding, charities and politics. He narrates, for example, how funds were collected for the building of Desh Bhagat Yadgar Hall in Jullundur, following an appeal by Sohan

Singh Bhakna and Gurmukh Singh during their visit to Canada. The latter also admonished cleanshaven Sikhs. As an active community worker, Bains joined the Akali Sikh Society and later participated in the Federation of Sikh Societies. In 1982, as Federation Delegate, he went to New York, presenting a petition to the United Nations on human rights violations in the Punjab. In the aftermath of the Indian army's action in the Golden Temple, he witnessed the formation of the World Sikh Organisation in New York. However, like many Sikhs, he is rather ambivalent on Khalistan, interpreting it in theological terms and, again typically, blames the Sikh leaders for not presenting their case to the international community properly.

Bains' narrative takes us from 1953 to 1987, when he retired back in the Punjab village, visiting Canada only when needed by his large family; his grandchildren are now settled as far away as California. Back home, he describes his involvement in gurudwara affairs, in the village *panchayat* and the local school, as well as providing advice and finance to many worthy causes, punishing a recalcitrant youth and sorting out differences with another famous villager. He has witnessed Punjab deteriorating not only because of militancy after 1984, but also due to a general spiralling of corruption and loose morality, citing a case of police robbery. During a pilgrimage to a historic gurudwara in 1975, his zeal for the regeneration of Sikh faith leads to heated arguments with a Delhi gurudwara manager. He proudly narrates how he arranged a hymn-singing session of American Sikhs at his village. Bains concludes by meditating on what it means to be a Sikh, and elaborates on the concept of Khalsa and Khalistan. He offers his brief thoughts on Punjab politics, Canadian life and society, and reflects on his life.

This 'thick narrative' can be read in several ways. By concentrating on a singular Sikh life, it allows readers to see the relationship between personal thoughts and actions; it also sharpens our understanding of the decision-making process within a Sikh family, and, in the Canadian context, it throws light on a community's normative and structural domain of interaction with the host community. One could also easily interpret how a migrant's life is limited by an interplay of economics, culture and geography. As a labourer, Bains' life is 'spent in North of River Fraser within a five-mile area'; involvement in ethnic community life is partly dictated by his cultural heritage while an attachment to homeland and Bains' catholic outlook derive from his faith, customs and folklore of the Punjab's rural society. Johnston, in a postscript, provides a context for Bains' narrative by providing a summary of Punjab and Canada's ethnic

mosaic from the 1950s to the 1980s. Although one could take issue with certain points, in no way does this detract from the value of his book.

In the introduction, Johnston says, '...a personal document like this one is rare'. One could not agree more: indeed, in the much contested debate about Canadian Sikhs' place in the host society as well in their homeland Punjab, this gentle memorial is a corrective to over-generalisations. The narrative may also humanise a stereotyped image of *amritdhari* Sikhs as fundamentalists and demonic figures. This book and tape recordings deposited with the Simon Fraser University Archives form a unique record of Canada's Sikh ethnic history.

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Michael Ondaatje, *The English Patient* (Vintage International, 1992), 305 pp .$12.00 (pb). ISBN O–394–28013–X.

The English Patient attracted international attention as the title of the Miramax film that came out in 1996, and sent an excited audience back to the infinitely more complicated novel on which it was based. It is usually discomforting to read a book after seeing a film-version; our vision will be distorted by the interpretation we have experienced on the big screen. Did the author really want us to see his characters as that actress of international beauty, or that famous actor? Did he really want us to visualise his discreet descriptions as masterpieces of cinema photography? In the case of *The English Patient*, however, the film actually makes it a lot simpler and quicker to read the novel, because it is a mysterious, tantalising work that reveals its plot and characters very gradually. Every one of the early chapters starts off with a 'he' and a 'she', whose identities are uncovered considerably later. And we are always kept wondering for some time whether the setting is in Italy, north Africa, England, or the Punjab. This blurring of place and identity is, of course, an essential feature of the novel; so we are cheating if we see the film first; but we are also being cheated ourselves, because the simplicity of the film is its greatest distortion. And we are left with an orientalist fantasy of passion and adventure in the Sahara, which is encapsulated in the cover photograph of Ralph Fiennes and Kristin Scott Thomas kissing in the desert that embellishes the Vintage edition of the novel.

The story of the aristocratic Count Ladislaus de Almásy and Katherine

Clifton meeting in the desert and embarking on a doomed attachment that will destroy both of them is, of course, the highest of romantic themes, and in comparison to this, the short-lived affair between an Indian soldier and a Canadian nurse is no more than an interesting sub-plot in the film. It is a little like the affair between two servants that forms a trivial parallel to the romance between a noble couple in so many old European comedies. But when we turn to the novel, we find that Kirpal Singh and Hana are central characters, and that the training of Kirpal (or 'Kip,' as he is known throughout the novel) in England occupies a large part of the plot, though it is quite ignored in the film.

The novel brings Almásy, Hana and Kip together by chance in a ruined Italian convent towards the end of World War II, along with an old friend of Hana's, a Canadian burglar of Italian extraction called Caravaggio. He had worked as a spy for the allies. Caravaggio is the person who cracks the identity of the English Patient, and makes the delirious but brilliantly entertaining polymath and desert explorer recall who he actually is. To some extent, we are reading a spy novel, but this time we are trying to discover the identity of a secret patient, not a secret agent.

The 'English Patient', Almásy, had left behind his aristocratic past and entered the international world of desert exploration between the two world wars that made a mockery of such attempts to escape national identity and create nationless cooperation. For him, the appeal of the desert does not lie in its romantic sights and places, it does not lie in the special identity and nature of the desert. Rather, it lies in the fact that in the desert, identity has no meaning. Cities and nations vanish into the sand, and leave not a trace behind. Even the timeless truths of geography are quite unreliable, as rivers and lakes disappear for a century or so, and just as mysteriously come back again.

This world is torn apart in 1939 as Geoffrey Clifton tries to kill Katherine and Almásy, after learning that they have been lovers; as the other explorers return to their countries to enlist in the war; as the desert itself turns into a theatre of war. Almásy had followed the path of the Persian army under King Cambyses, and now the desert is being crossed again by British and German armies. He ends up helping the Germans, who enable him to find Katherine in 1942, but by now it is too late, because she has died in a desert cave. He is almost burned to death as he tries to fly away with her body in a rickety old plane, and he finally ends up in Italy as the mysterious 'English Patient'. But he is, throughout, what he always wished to be, 'just an international bastard', a man who has no mother country, and does not want one.

This is the source of his friendship with Kip, even though Kip is developing in the opposite direction. The Sikh is someone who has been deprived of his identity and his preferred career, forced to become a British soldier rather than an Indian doctor. He gets solace from pop tunes on the radio, rather than from his own tradition or his personal experiences. Among this group of displaced persons, he is the only one who keeps his uniform, who holds on to this identity, which is not, of course, his own. He is deeply attached to the English superiors who taught him the art of disarming unexploded bombs and land-mines. His English skills are horribly necessary in this war, just as it was necessary for Almásy to sell his desert skills to the Germans. Kip experiences the entire world as a British soldier: he is ever alert for signs of danger, he even looks at Italian works of art through the scope of his rifle. Almásy recognises another lost soul, though Kip's loss is hidden behind uniform and sounds and skills of westernisation. For the time being, in this unreal atmosphere of war, Kip and Almásy both appear to be 'English', though they are in fact men without any national identity.

But the young nurse awakens something in Kip. He has always been aware that he is an outsider, 'ignored', 'anonymous', 'invisible' (p. 196); but she recognises him as a human being, not just a sapper; a Sikh with a name; a visible presence. He can confide to her that his brother is in jail for anti-British activities; he can take pride in telling her about the Punjab, which they plan to visit together. At night, he recovers his identity, and in lyrical rhapsodies, he brings the Golden Temple to life for her, and also for himself again. In the midst of this image, he reasserts that his English mentor was 'someone like a father' (p. 271), but like Almásy, Hana has realised that Kip's allegiance to his British uniform and superiors is temporary. Kip is one 'who has grown up an outsider and so can switch allegiances, can replace loss' (p. 271).

The break comes when Kip learns about the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Hana 'hears a scream emerge from his body which had never raised its voice among them' (p. 283). His silence and invisibility have come to an end. He is suddenly filled with hatred for all Europeans, or rather for his own faith in them: 'How did you fool us into this?' (p. 283). He finally sheds his uniform and embarks on a crazy motor-cycle ride down through Italy, a ride that almost ends in his death when he is catapulted into a river.

Caravaggio returns to his burglary, Hana writes about the quiet waters of Canada, and Kirpal Singh emerges from the river. We are not told whether he, like the first Sikh Guru, received enlightenment from this

Italian river; we only know that he becomes a doctor in India, while Hana returns to Canada. But Ondaatje does not leave things like that. In the beautifully ambiguous sentences that end the novel, he describes how Hana, in a moment of regret, accidentally knocks a glass...and Kirpal quickly catches a fork dropped by his child. Wrong throw, wrong catch, wrong continent we might think. But by now we know that this does not matter so much after all.

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Of related interest

FREEDOM, TRAUMA, CONTINUITIES

NORTHERN INDIA AND INDEPENDENCE

Editors

D.A. LOW ◆ HOWARD BRASTED

A considerable and ever-growing body of literature on Indian independence has focused either on the nationalist compaigns and the role of political leaders, or on the protracted negotiations between Indians and the British. However, there was more to the story of Indian independence; it is these neglected aspects that this volume explores.

The independence of India, and the simultaneous partitioning of the Indian subcontinent, was accompanied by a tremendous social and emotional upheaval. Massacres, abduction, rape and mass migrations comprise the memories of those who were forced to abandon their homes and move to either side of the newly-formed national boundaries in the subcontinent; also, the ensuing process of resettlement of refugees, as well as the integration of the princely states into the sovereign Indian union.

The contributors argue that this upheaval was accompanied not by revolution, as in Indonesia and Vietnam, but by a great many continuities. The earlier militarisation of the Punjab provided the basis of Pakistan's civil-military state, while Indian big business saw the opportunity to fulfil its previously determined interests. Focusing as it does on popular perceptions and the human dimension, this volume significantly widens the perspectives on the crucial decade of the 1940s in the history of the subcontinent. It will be of considerable interest to a wide audience including historians and political scientists, and all those interested in the story of Indian independence.

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220 mm x 140 mm/1998/248pp/hb/pb

Sage Publications
New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London