

'Great Game' as a 'Game Changer': Transformation of Polity, Economy, and Society of Punjab (1809-1907)

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The Great Game was played by the British for commercial primacy and political supremacy in Afghanistan. They wanted to secure their Indian Empire from overland continental threats that were a natural extension of the European power politics between the British, French, and Russians towards the Indian sub-continent. To counter them, the British interfered in the internal and external affairs of states lying around the north-western frontier region. Punjab was one such state, which was annexed by the British to extend their commercial and political permeation in and across Afghanistan. The present study explores how the British interference in the affairs of Punjab that started with the Treaty of Amritsar in 1809, due to the threat of a Franco-Russian invasion of India, proved to be a 'game-changer' in concern to the complex polity, economy, and society of Punjab.

Introduction

The Great Game could rightly be regarded as the 'game-changer' in the modern history of Punjab. British attempts to use Punjab as a buffer state through friendly relations with Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and their later decision to make Punjab part of British India following his death, was largely determined by the compulsions of the Great Game. Punjab's transformation as a 'garrison state'¹, with the largest number of troops stationed in the province, had a direct relation to the Russian intervention on the cards. Punjab's transformation and progress in diverse spheres as a model and 'orderly' province coupled with British efforts to retain it without any mayhem also had a direct correlation with this game. Even the paternalistic approach adopted towards the landlords and other elites directed at ensuring their support for the empire and insulating rural population from 'disruptive' external influences while simultaneously

providing prosperity through an expansion of agriculture and new avenues of employment can be attributed to the Great Game.

The Great Game was played by the British to secure commercial primacy and political supremacy across the North-West Frontier of Punjab with an apparent motive to secure their Indian Empire from threats converging in Afghanistan. These threats were a natural extension of the European power struggle between the British, French, and Russians towards the Indian sub-continent. To isolate their Indian Empire from European politics, British interference in the internal and external affairs of states lying around the north-west frontier region gradually led to the merger of these states into the British Indian Empire. Punjab was one such state, which was seized by the British in the 1840s along with Sindh to extend their commercial and political penetration in and across Afghanistan after First Anglo-Afghan War. British interference in the affairs of Punjab started with the signing of the treaty of Amritsar in 1809 due to the combined, imagined or real threat of a Franco-Russian invasion of India, which proved to be a 'game-changer' in concern to the polity, economy, and society of Punjab. The classic era of the great game ended with the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention² or Entente of 1907 but it left indelible imprints on Punjab.

Colonizing an Ally: Punjab's Way into British India

The East India Company initially did not have much interest in establishing dominion over the Punjab. They were happy to have arrangements through negotiations and treaties from time to time with Maharaja Ranjit Singh and other players to safeguard their interests in the region like the Treaty of Amritsar (1809). As a result of this treaty between Ranjit Singh and Charles Metcalfe, the former relinquished claim over territories subdued by him in the Cis-Sutlej region and agreed to never have any advance on the left bank of Sutlej. The British in turn agreed not to interfere in the affairs in the north of the river Sutlej. This agreement however put an end to the dream of Ranjit Singh to consolidate the whole of the Sikh nation, by bringing the entire region of Punjab between Yamuna and Indus, under one ruler.³

The British didn't meddle in the affairs of Punjab for almost two decades after the Treaty of Amritsar. They were busy consolidating their position in other parts of India and their wars with Burma and Nepal. In this period, the British secured their hold on their new possessions in the

Indian sub-continent and emerged out free from any significant opposition in India. However, by 1827, developments beyond the Hindu Kush Mountains had turned their attention towards the unexplored region of Central Asia and Afghanistan. Russian danger to British Indian Empire loomed large on the horizon with the defeats of Persia, and Turkey successively. These developments beyond Punjab had ramifications on Anglo-Sikh relations in subsequent years.⁴

Threatened and perturbed by Russian advances, the British decided to counter them by commercial penetration of superior English goods into these regions.⁵ This idea of commercial incursion had the backing of some British explorers who reconnoitred the region beyond the Indus and gave positive reports about the prospect of profitable Central Asian trade.⁶ The hitherto neglected British commercial interest in Afghanistan, Sindh, and Baluchistan, now had an apparent political agenda. They wanted to establish trading relations with the intention of gradually converting it into political relations.⁷ The British, thus, had their own strategies ready for these territories. So, they checkmated Maharaja Ranjit Singh's plans of subduing Sindh and Baluchistan and sent Alexander Burnes with gifts for him from King William IV through Indus in 1831. Burnes explored the navigability of Indus, a pre-requisite for the commercial and military penetration of the British into Afghanistan and Central Asia.⁸ He reported that there was "perhaps no inland country in this world," which possessed greater facilities for commerce than Punjab as all its rivers were more or less navigable.⁹

The British thereupon negotiated treaties, to facilitate navigation through river Indus and Sutlej, with the Amir of Sindh and the Maharaja of Punjab through their envoys, Henry Pottinger and Claude Martine Wade. Initially, Maharaja Ranjit Singh was apprehensive about British intentions which they apparently projected as 'purely commercial', but Wade cleared his misgivings by convincing him of the economic benefits of this project and secured his consent for the treaty. This agreement was signed in 1832, modified in 1834, and in 1839, it opened the rivers of Punjab for British commerce.¹⁰ Subsequent to this, Ranjit Singh got busy in the campaigns and administration of the north-west frontier as Amir Dost Muhammad started a religious war against the Sikhs to reclaim Peshawar. The British took advantage of the situation by occupying Ferozepur in 1835, over which they had already accepted Ranjit Singh's influence. Later they converted it into a military cantonment in 1838.¹¹ In response to this move, Ranjit Singh decided to build a fort on his side of

river Sutlej at Kasur.¹² In 1836, the British stopped him from adding Shikarpur to his empire; Shikarpur was considered as the gateway to Khorasan and important for the industry and trade of India and Asia.¹³ Maharaja Ranjit Singh along with his nobles and ministers felt offended, but he avoided confrontation with the British due to pragmatic considerations. He calculated that his reaction would lead to the formation of a joint front against him by Afghans and British, as Dost Muhammad was looking forward to recapturing Peshawar and British were free from any significant military involvement in India.¹⁴

In 1836, Lord Auckland sent Alexander Burnes to Afghanistan to counter the Russo-Persian manoeuvres against the British Indian Empire. The mission failed as the British were not receptive to the tenacious demand of recovering Peshawar for Dost Muhammad from their ally Maharaja Ranjit Singh.¹⁵ The Afghan King promptly reached out to the Russians which made the British anxious about the security of the north-west frontier of their empire. In response, the British decided to replace Dost Muhammad with the friendly exiled ruler of Afghanistan, Shah Shuja, with the help of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. A tripartite treaty signed with this objective, whereby Shah Shuja conceded the perpetual Afghan control over Kashmir, Attock, Hazara, Peshawar, Khyber, Bannu, Tank, Kalabagh, Derajat, Waziri territories, and Multan to Maharaja Ranjit Singh.¹⁶ However, Ranjit Singh was persuaded to renounce his claim over Shikarpur in return of compensation of Rs. 15 lakhs. In addition to that the British and Sikh governments were entrusted with the power of jointly controlling the external relations of Afghanistan.¹⁷

As evident, it was the Russian scare that had driven the British to the tripartite alliance and sought the friendship of the Sikh state of Punjab under Ranjit Singh in an attempt to bring Punjab, north-west frontier and Afghanistan under their sphere of influence. However, following the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1839, the Sikh Empire fell into chaos due to internal feuds. As a result, British strategies about the Punjab changed. They started advocating the restoration of Peshawar to Shah Shuja and even stopped the Sikh governor of Peshawar from collecting tax.¹⁸ The British also started to gather war material in Cis-Sutlej territories particularly at Ferozepur cantonment and strengthened its garrison. In Multan, the British tried to purchase food grain without the consent of Diwan Sawan Mall. Out of resentment, he ordered the people not to sell any grain to the British officers.¹⁹ But Maharaja Kharak Singh intervened and issued a letter to Diwan on August 19, 1839, to co-operate with the

British and let them procure food grain and other commodities from his jurisdiction.²⁰ Later Sawan Mall started constructing a small fort at Mithan Kot as a precautionary measure as the British line of advance from Sindh to Afghanistan passes near to his territory.²¹ In 1841, when the Sikh army conquered Iskardo and marched upon Tibet, the British Government resented this move and began to interfere in the expansion of the Sikh Empire. The British forced them to retreat to Ladakh and sign a treaty in October 1841 whereby Maharaja Sher Singh agreed not to extend his influence beyond Ladakh.²² By all indications, the political relationship between the Sikh Empire and the British was entering into a turbulent phase.

Despite these differences, the Sikh Empire of Punjab under Maharaja Sher Singh contributed more than 50% of troops in the First Anglo-Afghan war, a fact that was acknowledged by Henry Lawrence in a letter to J C Marshman, an English journalist and historian, dated April 11, 1842.²³ While Maharaja Sher Singh co-operated whole heartedly with the British in the Afghan war, the idea to annex Punjab began to take hold within the British administrative apparatus. In addition, the British were promoting internal dissensions to destabilize Sher Singh as evident from the fact they were involved in corrupting the officers of Sher Singh against him with promises of territories.²⁴ Dhian Singh and Gulab Singh were encouraged towards disloyalty to the Sikh Empire. Later Lal Singh and Tej Singh also joined the British conspiracies against Punjab. In this way, British intrigues in Punjab reached a climax as these people "betrayed the cause of Punjab".²⁵

In 1843, with the murder of Maharaja Sher Singh, his sons Prince Partap Singh and Dhian Singh by Sandhawalia Sardars, the Sikh Empire descended into a state of anarchy. The situation further deteriorated as the Sikh army's loyalty was purchased by the slain Dhian Singh's son, Hira Singh, against the Sandhawalia Sardars. Thus, factionalism and disenchantment emerged²⁶ and the British used this to achieve their goal of bringing the Punjab into the British Indian Empire. Ellenborough, the Governor-General, wrote to the British Queen on October 20, 1843:

"It is impossible not to perceive that the ultimate tendency of the late events at Lahore is, without any effort on our part, to bring the plains first and at somewhat later period hills under our protection or control."²⁷

Ellenborough also wrote to the Duke of Wellington that “time cannot be too far distant when Punjab will fall into our management”; in the existing situation he saw the possibility of hills being ruled by the Dogra chief Gulab Singh and the plains by the Sikhs and eventually Multan breaking away.²⁸

Strategically it could be accepted that the Empire, in which an alien minority rules like the British, could not tolerate anarchy on its frontier.²⁹ With the Russian scare in their mind, the British did not want an unstable frontier which would welcome external advances. Initially, Ellenborough increased the strength of the British troops in the Cis-Sutlej area, particularly at Ludhiana and Ferozepur. He also constructed a supply Depot at Basian near Raikot and also made arrangements for pontoons at Ferozepur to cross Sutlej.³⁰ Sir Henry Hardinge who replaced Lord Ellenborough, increased the strength of troops and ammunitions from 17,612 to 40,523 and guns from 66 to 94.³¹ After the annexation of Sindh in 1843, these preparations flared-up the threat perceived by the Sikhs from British ‘encirclement’ of Punjab which led to the First Anglo-Sikh War in 1845-46.³² The War was lost by the Sikh army because of the treachery of Prime Minister Lal Singh, the Commander-in-Chief Tej Singh and the governor of Jammu, Gulab Singh.³³

The Treaty of Lahore signed on March 9, 1846, crippled the Sikh Empire economically and militarily. Governor-General Hardinge reduced the Sikh army to 32,000 troops - 20,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalries, annexed territories between river Beas and Sutlej, and secured the surrender of guns that were not captured in war and control of the rivers Beas and Sutlej up to Mithan Kot where Sutlej confluence with Indus.³⁴ Later, Kashmir and Hazara were annexed by the British and handed over to Gulab Singh of Jammu as non-payment of a war indemnity of Nanak Shahi one and a half million rupees to them.³⁵ By annexing the revenue-generating richest territories of Punjab, Hardinge rendered the Sikh Empire economically weak, apart from destroying its political existence. He also broke the military strength by reducing the strength of troops and by capturing the guns in an attempt to alleviate any future threat from the Sikh Army.³⁶

The Treaty of Lahore trifurcated the Sikh Empire -- hill tracts between Indus and Beas including Hazara and Kashmir were separated and placed under Raja Gulab Singh, plains between Sutlej and Beas including trans-Beas areas of Kulu and Noorpur were placed under Commissionership of John Lawrence, and the plains between Beas and Indus were put under

infant Maharaja Dalip Singh but governed by Rani Jindan and his Prime Minister Lal Singh.³⁷ As it happened in the case of many other Princely states in the Indian subcontinent, in the guise of supporting the government of infant Dalip Singh, Henry Lawrence became the Resident along with the contingent of British troops till the year-end at Lahore. This resident-ship gave him space to keep the kingdom under his control and dictate its policies. Subsequently, the Treaty of Bhairawal was signed on December 16, 1846, whereby a Regency Council of eight members was constituted which was headed by Henry Lawrence to oversee the administration. The treaty also allowed the maintenance of British garrisons in the state for eight years.³⁸ In this way, Henry Lawrence became the real ruler of the Sikh state as the treaty conferred upon him "to look after the tranquility and peace of state during adolescence age of Dalip Singh".³⁹ He was vested with unlimited powers in all matters of external and internal nature. Thus, internal and external independence of the Sikh Empire ceased to exist and it had been reduced to just a nominal political expression.⁴⁰ Political sovereignty had been stolen from the state and the crown became hollow. There were adjustments and balancing acts too as part of the colonial expediency from time to time. On July 3, 1847, for instance, Hardinge instructed Henry Lawrence to pay attention to the feelings of the people, to preserve the national institutions and customs and rights of all classes in Punjab.⁴¹ Thereafter Henry Lawrence directed his officers to extend equal rights to all the religions impartially.⁴²

Henry Lawrence viewed the existence of Punjab as a buffer between the "savage" tribal regions of North-west frontier and East India Company's territory as extremely beneficial.⁴³ Thus the hilly and turbulent frontier of Punjab caught the attention of Lawrence. He started the work of "civilizing" Punjab's frontier society with the help of his famous staff of 'frontier officers' - his brothers George and John Lawrence, Abbott, Nicholson, Edwardes, Hodson and Lumsden.⁴⁴ Henry Lumsden raised an irregular corps of troops, both cavalry, and infantry, known as the 'Guides' in 1846 to support the army by providing intelligence about the activities of tribes.⁴⁵ At Bannu, Edwardes changed the Sikh policy of collecting the revenue by introducing anti-plunder regulations and peacefully collected the tax. Within a short period, he successfully persuaded the tribes to destroy their forts, somewhere around four hundred in Bannu.⁴⁶ His rapprochement with the tribes later helped him in the Second Anglo-Sikh war, when he marched upon Multan with these tribesmen.⁴⁷ Even a Sikh regiment was raised in southern Punjab in 1846

as the first Anglo-Sikh war brought out the fighting qualities of Sikhs to the British especially as gunners and engineers.⁴⁸ Besides these, the crusade against social evils like punishment by mutilation, Sati, and female infanticide was initiated.⁴⁹ The dominance of the British over the tribal region was thus ensured through multiple strategies of coercion and persuasion by generating a significant amount of consent from the dominated.

Different from Lawrence's policy of "hollowing the crown" and driving the administration from the back seat, apart from civilizing the tribal groups in the frontier, his successor Frederick Curie wanted to annex Punjab. The idea received the support of Governor-General Lord Dalhousie. He created the circumstances for the Second Anglo-Sikh war by removing Governor Mulraj from Multan which led to the start of disturbances in Multan and other parts of the Punjab. This war was lost by the Sikhs and subsequently, Punjab was added to British dominion on March 29, 1849.⁵⁰ Maharaja Dalip Singh was pensioned off in return for relinquishing his title, claim, and right over Punjab and even of his heirs and successors. He was put under the tutelage of Dr. John Login and sent to England in 1854 after being baptized and converting to Christianity. The treasure of the Lahore kingdom was confiscated and valuable articles and jewels were sent to England. Even the famous *Kohinoor* diamond, which Maharaja Ranjit Singh apparently got from Afghan King Shah Shuja, was presented to Queen of England. Many of the historical and antique goods were sent to the East India Company's Museum.⁵¹

After the annexation of Punjab, Governor-General Lord Dalhousie's intention was to pacify and integrate it into the thread of the British Indian Empire. He embarked upon the projects to disarm the natives and turn its "warlike people" into peaceful business mainly into agriculture as farmers or peasants, under the established government of the East India Company.⁵² A Board of Administration with three members was constituted to govern the newly acquired province. Sir Henry Lawrence was its President and looked after the political affairs, which included negotiation with the Sikh chiefs, the disarming of the country, and raising the new regiments of local recruits. Lawrence was assisted by his brother John Lawrence and Charles Mansel who took care of the settlement of land revenue and judiciary respectively.⁵³

Right from the beginning, the Board of Administration was focused on the subjugation and suppression of "warlike people" of Punjab and in totality, destruction of all anti-British elements from the state with the

help of 60000 soldiers and 15000 policemen. The first act that Board performed was the liquidation of the Sikh army and the disarmament of the people.⁵⁴ All kinds of weapons were annexed from the people of Punjab, except in the Peshawar.⁵⁵ The Sikh chiefs who abstained from taking part in the war were allowed to settle in their hereditary village with a suitable pension according to their rank.⁵⁶ Nearly 50000 of Sikh soldiers were disbanded and pensioned off. This would have led to unemployment and distress in the state that would create problems for the British.⁵⁷ Therefore, Punjab Irregular Force (Piffers) was raised by Sir Henry Lawrence with three Mountain batteries, five regiments of cavalry, and five regiments of infantry and placed under the control of the Board of Administration. A significant number of the disbanded Sikh army's soldiers made their way into the Piffers. It was primarily raised to protect the British subjects from attacks of marauding bands, to keep trade route trouble-free and as far as possible to secure peace at borders and to maintain law and order in the frontier districts. To support them a chain of forts and garrisons were constructed along the border and were connected by the military roads.⁵⁸ Later in 1866, the title of Piffers was changed to 'Punjab Frontier Force' which was mainly recruited from Sikhs, Pathans, Gurkhas, and Punjabi Muslims.⁵⁹ In 1851 four battalions were added to Sikh Infantry which was raised in southern Punjab in 1846. Thus the British succeeded, not only, in controlling the Sikh army but recruited them for their service.⁶⁰ In 1852 just after three years of the second Anglo-Sikh war, the Sikh regiment volunteered to go to Burma and fight under the British flag.⁶¹ Later this regiment and 'Punjab Frontier Force' proved so helpful in crushing the mutiny of 1857.⁶²

Domesticating the Tribes: Conciliation and Policing

From the outset, Lord Dalhousie wanted to make the Punjab a profitable possession for the Company. He wanted to stop at the left bank of Indus as he and John Lawrence considered the trans-Indus territories as a bad investment and "worst legacy" of the Sikh rule. However, he retained it apparently for the sake of prestige of the Company.⁶³ The trans-Indus territories dominated by the unruly tribes became a regular part of Punjab province in 1850 when these districts were formed into a Division under a Commissioner.⁶⁴ Of the frontier districts of the Punjab, Hazara, Peshawar, and Kohat were brought under the Commissioner of Peshawar, and Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, and Bannu under the

Commissioner of Derajat. All the contacts with the frontier tribes were made through local chiefs who liaised with political officers and tribesmen.⁶⁵ Lord Dalhousie didn't extend the boundaries of Punjab beyond the Sikh conquest and respected the independence of trans-frontier tracts. But soon the regular inroads of these tribesmen rendered the Guide Corps and the Punjab Frontier Force helpless in curtailing the tribal raids.⁶⁶ British officials decided to intervene and respond to the challenge. The possible options were two: first, the annexation of tribal areas into Punjab so that the frontier would be extended beyond the Sikh frontier to western side of the mountains and the other, a policy of non-intervention in tribal affairs except punitive action against the tribal raids. John Lawrence didn't depend on force to preserve the border peace but was conciliatory to give allowances, subsidies, the grant of land, etc. to win over sections of tribes.⁶⁷

The Board of Administration first adopted defensive measures, which were followed by conciliatory steps to show the benefit of friendly relations to the tribesmen. The measures like granting permission to conventional trade, provision of medical treatment, and other assistance to tribesmen were taken with a motive to pacify them and to promote friendly relations. The Punjab administration also prevented its officers from entering into tribal territories, which was strictly followed for 25 years except in the time of punitive action, as they love their independence and didn't like interference in their way of life.⁶⁸ Later on, the tribesmen were allowed to trade within the British Indian Empire without frontier duties and capitation taxes. A system of complete freedom of trade was instituted and commercial integration was encouraged which was declined due to heavy taxes during Ranjit Singh's reign as traders adopted the southern route through Gomal Pass and Bolan Pass instead old route via Khyber Pass.⁶⁹ Even Trade fairs were held for exchange of goods and commodities at regular intervals. The physical infrastructure was set-up to promote commerce like roads from the passes to the nearest bazaars. Thus, Powindah trade (a trade carried by well-armed *Ghilzai* tribe) increased in the Punjab which brought items from Afghanistan, Persia, and Central Asia to sell in Punjab and in return, purchased the Indian items to sell in Central Asia and Afghanistan.⁷⁰ Streamer communication was extended up to the upper Indus. Hospitals and dispensaries were established at various points along the frontier to provide medical treatment to the tribesmen.⁷¹ Tribal *Maliks* (tribal leaders) and *Jirgas* (assembly of tribal elders who took decisions by consensus) were

encouraged to settle their disputes in their own way within the British territory, in order to develop the peaceful relations with the tribesmen. Further, attempts were made to colonize wastelands in Punjab by tribal families as tribesmen had very limited fertile land to live peacefully from its cultivation, because of which they plunder the neighbouring Punjab plains and also used to take a toll from caravan trade passing through their territory.⁷² Therefore, colonies of Afridis, Wazaris, Gurchanis, Bhittannis, and Bugtis were created to make them agriculturists in Punjab.⁷³

This was coincided with the creation of strong policing, surveillance and judicial mechanisms to make the anti-social elements docile citizens through coercive measures. The creation of Punjab Frontier Force gave employment to many soldiers, but many of the disbanded soldiers who were loyal to the old regime apparently resorted to dacoity and robbery.⁷⁴ To curb their "anti-social activities" and to "protect the public from their menace," the local revenue collectors and Tehsildars were given the additional duty of policing in their Jurisdiction.⁷⁵ A separate police force was also created to support them. These endeavours of the British, justified for maintaining tranquility and peace, was further facilitated by a sound judicial system.⁷⁶ The adopted judicial system was based on the simplicity of courts, their cheapness, accessibility, promptness, exclusion of pleaders, and the recognition of village panchayats.⁷⁷ It was pointed out that the procedures were kept so simple that even a person could plead his own cause against his opponents and prosecute and conduct his defence.⁷⁸ The Tehsildars were also given judicial authority in addition to police authority as they had local knowledge and insight into the character of local people and local norms of justice.⁷⁹

'Model Agricultural Province': Punjab's Makeover

In addition to such political, military, and judicial measures aimed at keeping the conquered territory and people under its firm grip, the Board of Administration started to work on land settlement and revenue as initiated by John Lawrence. It is famously said that the British exchanged the sword of disbanded Sikh Soldier with plough.⁸⁰ Elaborate attempts were made to know the territory and its people by collecting information through surveys and other measures in order to create a knowledge grid about Punjab. The settlement officers were appointed who noted down the economic condition of the cultivators, their habits, customs, and the

character, and even the right of every holder was recorded.⁸¹ The land settlements were accordingly done with the actual holder. Through this, John Lawrence not only tightened the grip over the land tax but concomitantly suppressed the aristocracy or *Jagirdars*, as he didn't want anyone to intervene between the people and them. It also helped in curtailing any aristocratic mobilization against the British.⁸² He also reduced the land tax to about a quarter of the produce from half, though it has to be paid in cash.⁸³ Even though John Lawrence made efforts to support the peasants, but the transition from grain payment to cash payment towards tax turned out to be worse for the peasants. They were still unable to pay the tax as the market prices of the produced fell down drastically due to the increased production in years after the annexation. This caused the unrest among the peasants to come to the attention of Henry Lawrence who pleaded, unsuccessfully, with John Lawrence for temporary suspension of the new system of cash.⁸⁴

The Board also supported the construction of canals to make agriculture the main stay of the province and to support farmers against the uncertainty of monsoons. Bari Doab canal was the first project started by the Board which was completed in 1859.⁸⁵ Lower Jhelum and Chenab followed this project, which transformed the Jhang, Lyallpur, and Shahpur districts, and subsequently the 'Canal colonies' emerged in western Punjab. The making of canal colonies through a network irrigation canals transformed around six million acres of the desert like land had been crucial in the transformation of Punjab into one of the richest agrarian regions of Asia.⁸⁶ These colonies began to be populated mostly by the Sikhs from Central Punjab who were encouraged to resettle there. Millions of Punjabi peasants immigrated to these colonies. Thus Canal colonies not only generated employment opportunities for them in the agriculture sector but also transformed the economy of the region. The massive migration and settlement also helped in changing the Muslim dominated demography of western Punjab.⁸⁷ Punjab had emerged as the pace-setter of India's agricultural development and by 1920 it contributed as much as one-tenth of British India's cotton production and one-third of wheat.⁸⁸

Next to canals, the roads captured the attention of the Board. Roads were seen necessary not only for the movements of troops but also for transporting agrarian surplus and facilitating trade and commerce. For this purpose, the great arterial highway, Grand Trunk Road was extended to Peshawar from Lahore under the stewardship of Robert Napier. All the

local roads were connected to this new highway which ultimately helped in linking the cantonments in the province and major cities/towns and commercial hubs. Even the prominent city Dera Ismail Khan was connected to Lahore to facilitate the trade between Central Asia and Punjab.⁸⁹ The transition of the state was clearly reflected in the trade statistics. By 1854, export had risen to £ 604000 from a meagre £1010 in 1843, and imports to £ 629000 from £121000 during the same period.⁹⁰ In 1854, the imported goods includes Manchester cotton goods of £294,000, Silk from Persia and Central Asia of value £28000 and the exported good includes Wheat of value £ 66000, oil seeds of £ 137000, sheep wool of value £ 221000.⁹¹ The province was getting truly integrated into a larger capitalist economy.

In 1853, the Board of Administration was dissolved due to the differences between Lawrence brothers. Upon the eviction of Henry Lawrence, John Lawrence became the first Chief Commissioner of Punjab. This opened-up a new chapter in the history of Punjab. John inherited all the powers and functions of the Board of Administration, even the defence and management of trans-Indus frontier districts excluding Peshawar. He divided Punjab into seven Divisions which were further divided into twenty-seven Districts headed a commissioner, who was assisted by the Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, and Extra commissioner. While for the post of Extra Commissioner both European and Indian could be selected but remaining positions were reserved for Europeans only.⁹² He not only completed and perfected the entire project initiated earlier during the time of Henry Lawrence but also chalked out many more, ranging from imperial, military, political, economic, and to social. He initiated the construction of railways, roads, navigation of rivers, education including that of females, horticulture, etc.⁹³ The colonial attempts to create a dossier for administration got a fillip with the Census of Punjab held in December 1854. The province was also brought under the colonial communication grid with the extension of the telegraph into Punjab that linked the imperial capital Calcutta up to Peshawar.⁹⁴

John Lawrence tried to improve the educational system, which was considered to be "primitive and of religious" in nature.⁹⁵ He created an education department in 1854. He arranged the opening of the 30 schools at district headquarters, 100 village schools in rural areas, and four normal schools as the earlier schools were having no proper premises, and even the teachers were not given fixed remunerations. A cess of 1% on the land

revenue was charged to support the education system. Persian and Urdu were promoted and as a result, Punjabi rapidly fell into destitute.⁹⁶ Female education also received the attention of the British since the annexation of Punjab, though the progress was slow and the response was meagre. In spite of 52 girls schools opened in the state, the number of girl students was only 1168 in 1862. The British as a result embarked on a mission to generate interest among the people towards female education, particularly the Punjabi nobility was targeted in an attempt to convince them to provide education to their daughters.⁹⁷ In 1864, Government College at Lahore was opened along with another one at Delhi which was closed in 1877 because of financial consideration and also to have a fully equipped college at Lahore. The Mayo School of Industrial Art was established in 1875 at Lahore. Subsequently, in 1881, Central Training College was established for supplying trained teachers for English schools. An association Anjuman-i-Panjab was founded in 1864 that advocated the opening of an Oriental University. Though a university was proposed by Punjab Government, but it was finally established in 1882 at Lahore to affiliate the colleges and schools in the states which were earlier associated with Calcutta University.⁹⁸

‘Punjablization of Indian Army’ and its Compulsions

The constructive works started since the annexation to pacify the people of Punjab strengthened the British hands during the Crimean War and 1857 Rebellion.⁹⁹ By the time of the 1857 rebellion, the abundant harvest and flourishing trade supported by a good judicial system had put the people into comfort.¹⁰⁰ Punjab largely didn’t support the Rebellion but helped the British to suppress it. During the Rebellion, most of military centres and cantonments in Punjab were held by native troops of the Bengal Army (Bengal Presidency). They were near about 36000 in the number whose sympathies lie with fellow Mutineers. John Lawrence took timely action with the help of ‘Punjab Irregular Force’ and disbanded these troops throughout Punjab.¹⁰¹ Thereafter, he recruited more troops from Punjab. The princely states of Punjab also provided troops for the imperial defence of Punjab and Delhi. The Rebellion was suppressed by the year-end and thereafter Delhi and Hissar were incorporated into Punjab. The rewards in terms of territories were bestowed upon the rulers of princely states for their support. The troops raised during the Rebellion were recruited into the Bengal army.¹⁰²

The 1857 Rebellion has forced the British to focus more on the security of their Indian Empire from both external and internal dangers, for which many schemes were initiated. One of them was the reorganization of the military system of India.¹⁰³ Until 1857, the Bengal army comprised the majority of soldiers from Oudh (Awadh) who proved most trustable and loyal instruments for the conquest of various parts of India including Punjab. But in 1857 these soldiers resorted to armed struggle to overthrow British rule and Oudh was one of the major centres of the Rebellion. The uprising failed and most of the regiments of the Bengal army were disbanded and many of the soldiers were exterminated.¹⁰⁴ In response to the rebellion, the British reduced the native troops and increased the strength of the Europeans in the army. In addition to that, they limited the handling of artillery by Europeans only. But these measures proved too inadequate and impractical and later revoked as they had to guard its Indian empire against the emerging threat of Russia, which was advancing through Caspian and Central Asia to the northern border of Afghanistan.¹⁰⁵ Consequently, the British made Punjab, going by their experience of loyalty of native soldiers during Burmese war and rebellion of 1857, the main recruiting base for the British Indian army.¹⁰⁶ The Rebellion also compelled the British to relinquish their plan of further annexation of territories of native states. Instead, the princely states including that of Punjab like Bahawalpur, Faridkot, Jind, Kapurthala, Malerkotla, Nabha, and Patiala were made to contribute for the defence of the Empire. It was a plan to employ the military resources of the native chiefs for imperial purpose, with an intention to enhance its military strength without increasing financial burden.¹⁰⁷ In 1885, Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of the government of British India suggested to raise Imperial Service troops and argued for using only selected states as princes differed materially from each other. He discussed this with General Frederick Roberts (commander-in-chief), C.U. Aitchison (Lt. Governor of Punjab) and Viceroy Lord Dufferin.¹⁰⁸ He further proposed that Punjab could be used primarily for this purpose as there was no doubt in the loyalty and co-operation of the chiefs of Punjab and also it was blessed with "brilliant fighting material suitable for north western frontier campaigns." His proposal received support from General Frederick Roberts and later approval from Lord Dufferin. Subsequently, Major Howard Mellis visited the princely states of Punjab and submitted the report whereby the Punjab government was directed to negotiate with them for this purpose.¹⁰⁹

The Russian scare under the conditions of great game augmented the Punjabization of the Indian army in a big proportion in the 1880s. At the end of the Second Afghan War, the British were expecting the third war soon to be fought in north-west frontier which may involve Russia too. The British wanted to strengthen their army with soldiers who were acquainted with the area and climate of the North Western frontier. At the time of the 1857 rebellion, the Indian army was dominated by the Bengal army and there were only about 30,000 Punjabis in the British Indian army.¹¹⁰ The period from 1875 to 1914 changed the composition of the Indian army, with massive recruitment from Punjab.¹¹¹ At the beginning of this period the proportion of Punjabis was a just third of its strength but increased to three-fifth by the end of this period.¹¹² Punjab had virtually become the nursery of the British Indian army till 1947.¹¹³ The people of Punjab voluntarily joined the British military services to supplement their agriculture income and unsurprisingly the soldiers were mostly hailing from agricultural backgrounds.¹¹⁴

The other reason for recruitment from the region was due to a constructed theory of 'martial race' according to which Punjabis were considered as natural warriors as 'warlike and hardy race'.¹¹⁵ The theory gained further ground under Lord Roberts, Commander-in-Chief, during the period 1885 to 1893. He believed the martial instinct of the people of old recruiting centres; Bengal and Madras had been vanished due to the long "civilizing effect" of the British rule.¹¹⁶ Another reason for this shift was the exemplary loyalty of the native population, especially Muslim and Sikh landowners, during and after the Second Anglo-Sikh war and 1857.¹¹⁷ The entrenched local hierarchies had also proved handy for the British as the feudal lords and rural elites recruited themselves as officers in the army and later enlisted their rural followers as soldiers who naturally obey their village patrons.¹¹⁸ Both on the ground of economy and military efficiency, it was sensible for the British to greatly expand the Punjabi contingent in their Indian Army whose major role by the end of the 19th century was to police the frontier.¹¹⁹

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the region would have assumed importance as a center of colonial military recruitment if it had not been near the Indian Army's main theatre of war in Afghanistan. The Russians were standing just 400 miles away from Punjab.¹²⁰ Thus the proportion of Punjabis in the British Indian army began to grow swiftly. The terrain and climate of the Salt Range hills of the Jhelum and Shahpur districts and of foothills of the Himalayas in the remote north-east of Kangra was similar

to that of the frontier. People recruited from these areas were best suited for fighting in the harsh terrain of the north-west frontier in comparison to soldiers from Bengal and Madras as they hailed from comfortable climatic zones. They could move as swiftly as any Afghan or Pathan tribesman across the narrow ridges and steep hillsides of frontier passes.¹²¹ Since the soldiers serving on the frontier from more distant parts of India had to pay extra 'foreign service' allowances, recruiting from Punjab also proved to be economically beneficial as the Punjabi soldiers will only be qualified for the local service basic rate of pay.¹²² The British reliance on recruitment from Punjab increased progressively in high proportion; Punjabis were 19 percent in the British Indian army in 1880 but increased to 40 percent by 1910 by the time the dust of great game settled.¹²³ The proportion had gone further up to 45 percent by the time the First World War was concluded.¹²⁴ The recruitment was mainly centred on the Punjabi Rajput clans of the Salt Range, Jhelum, and Rawalpindi districts, the Hindu Dogras from Kangra, the Jat Sikhs from Central Punjab, and the Hindu Jats from the 'famine tracts' of Hissar and Rohtak.¹²⁵ Punjab thus contributed manpower and logistic support for imperial conflicts in the north-west frontier and also helped Britain to conquer and police far-flung overseas territories. Punjabi soldiers even proved their bravery in the freezing battlefields of Flanders in the First World War and the blistering North African desert in the Second World War.

Connecting and Colonizing: Security and Commerce

The security of the north-western frontier of India with its rocky regions and fierce and freedom-loving people claimed the constant attention of John Lawrence. So he prepared a scheme to cover the entire region with a network of railways and roads. His imperial vision saw that it would help them to mobilize all the resources, commercial as well as military in the time of trouble.¹²⁶ In the 1860s, Sindh and Punjab Railway started the construction of a northward line from Karachi to Multan and the Lahore-Delhi line. The railway line from Amritsar to Multan was completed by 1865 which was further extended up to Delhi by 1870 via Jalandhar Cantt, Ludhiana, Ambala Cantt, Saharanpur, and Ghaziabad.¹²⁷ The Punjab Northern State Railway built the Lahore-Jhelum line in 1878 and another railway line was laid across the Bolan Pass to mobilize men and material during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Even the Multan-Kotri (a town

near Hyderabad, Sindh) line was completed in the same year. Punjab Northern State Railway line was extended from Jhelum to Peshawar in 1883 and the Attock Bridge across the Indus was constructed. Subsequently, another line that connects Delhi to Samasatta was started in 1883 and was completed by 1899. It passes through Bhatinda, Ferozepur Cantt, and Raiwind.¹²⁸ This network of railways allowed the integration of the region to the rest of British India, facilitated the movement of goods and people, and more importantly proved helpful in swiftly moving troops and arms during exigencies. Unsurprisingly, along with the railway networks the British established military cantonments and concentrated significant chunk of their forces in Punjab that virtually militarized the province.

When Punjab was annexed in 1849, navigation of Punjab Rivers was also an important concern before the newly established Board of Administration since the rivers could facilitate speedy, reliable, effective, and cheap means of connection with the sea. It was important from both the military and commercial point of view. The river navigation was one of their high priorities. In September 1856, a report was submitted on the navigation of Punjab Rivers and a proposal was put forward for starting a steamer service.¹²⁹ A steamer service was started from Karachi to Multan, which was followed by other similar enterprises.¹³⁰ With river navigation, the large military station of Peshawar and Rawalpindi could be easily relieved and economically supplied with every kind of military stores. This also facilitated the transport of British manufactured goods to stimulate commerce with Kashmir, Central Asia, and Afghanistan.¹³¹ The commercial importance of it was reflected in 1857 statement of Bartle Frere, Commissioner in Scinde (Sindh):

“If the triumphs of Great Britain are to be permanent, they must be rendered so by a mutuality of interests, by the material and civilizing influence of expanding commerce. The great battle of the country for the tranquillity of Central Asia must be fought at Manchester and Liverpool. If we would command Central Asia that dominion must be established by opening up a ready market for their raw produce and subjecting them by force of their own material interests.”¹³²

Apparently, the geo-political advantage of the navigation of Punjab Rivers was that it could help in strengthening every position of the

frontier at the shortest possible notice by means of steamers. This measure was also thought to be an important intervention to 'civilize' the frontier tribes and to bring them to contended submission to the British rule. The Inland Navigation Department was established in 1862 with an intention to connect more areas through water transport.¹³³

British aspirations of trade with Central Asia through Punjab were a significant feature of their diplomacy in the latter half of the 19th century. Central Asia becomes a focus of international politics due to the advance of Russians particularly in the 1860s which, as pointed out already, appalled the British.¹³⁴ One of the measures undertaken by the British under Lord Mayo, the Viceroy, to combat the problem of Russian influence in Central Asia was pushing British merchandise northwards. His basic motto in meeting with Amir Sher Ali Khan at Ambala in 1869 was to secure a definite arrangement for facilities for trade in return for their support for a strong and stable government in Afghanistan. It was thought to be a prudent measure instead of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.¹³⁵ The British also signed a treaty with Kashmir in 1870 which gave them exclusive right to trade with Central Asia.¹³⁶ Thereafter, the entire trade of British India with Central Asia was carried through Punjab whether it was via Kashmir or Afghanistan.¹³⁷ It led to the emergence of three major trading entrepôts - Delhi, Amritsar, and Peshawar. Amritsar held a significant position as an entrepot in the Central Asian trade. The merchants of Central Asia and Tibet came to Amritsar via Peshawar and Leh, then proceed to Delhi to sell their products and vice versa. Thus, the merchants of Amritsar had trading relations and penetration into major cities of Central Asia like Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Bokhara, Samarkand, Kashgar, and Yarkand.¹³⁸ In order to promote trade, the British abolished all the frontier tolls imposed during the Sikh Empire.

On the other side in 1873, Russia signed a treaty with Amir of Bokhara for a free flow of trade followed by the annexation of Khiva in Central Asia. The British from their part gave military and financial help to king Sher Ali Khan and made trade and commercial arrangements with him in 1874. The trade and cooperation took a back seat when Lord Lytton, Viceroy, adopted the 'forward policy', which led to the Second Anglo Afghan War in 1878.¹³⁹ The trade to Afghanistan and Central Asia via Afghanistan consequently had fallen to one-fourth. Subsequent viceroy Lord Rippon tried to improve the relations with Afghanistan but Central Asian trade declined with the imposition of heavy taxes by the Russians

on Indian goods which further decreased with the annexation of Merv by the Russians.¹⁴⁰ Under the influence of Russians, the Amir of Afghanistan also imposed a new tax of 3% on Indian goods which were even detained for weeks at custom houses. The export of Indian tea fell extremely as a tax of one rupee and three annas was imposed on a pound of tea valued only four annas.¹⁴¹ By 1888, the penetration of Russian goods into the markets of Central Asia and Afghanistan increased with the extension of their railway network up to Samarkand. Subsequently, the situation worsened when the Amir began exporting items like fruits, ghee, tobacco, and certain import articles like cotton products and sugar under state monopolies. The export of gold to India was banned.¹⁴² In 1894, when the Russians made Bokhara part of its custom zone, the Amir further increased the tax from two and a half percent to five percent on incoming goods from India in the subsequent year. The trade from Punjab to Central Asia and Afghanistan via Peshawar further hit badly due to the insecure conditions during the Pathan revolt of 1897.¹⁴³ The export to Afghanistan through Punjab fell to an insignificant level, which used to be half of the external trade with the creation of North West Frontier Province.¹⁴⁴ The British built roads and railway to compete with the Trans-Caspian Railway network of Russia, but once they were beaten in Central Asia, Punjab trade remained internally bound.¹⁴⁵

Ever since the annexation of Punjab, the British were also trying for social engineering in such a way to create supportive constituencies in the new province. The British were constantly searching for allies amongst the rural population. By supporting the Jat Sikh community in their military and agrarian endeavours the British won their confidence and fealty.¹⁴⁶ As the Sikh society was apparently more egalitarian than other communities, they had exhibited exemplary commitment and deification in British war endeavours particularly during the Afghanistan wars.¹⁴⁷ They also made efforts to identify every important family in each locality and compiled and recorded their history in the district gazetteers and caste handbooks of the Indian Army. Sardar Mangal Singh Ramgarhia, Sardar Shamsher Singh Sandhawalia, Pratap Singh Ahluwalia, and Sunder Singh Majithia had supported the British and earned higher ranks in Police service, Judiciary, and even nominated to Legislative assemblies.¹⁴⁸ Most of the leading Muslim families supported the British during Anglo-Sikh wars and 1857 Rebellion, so they were able to develop close ties with the British. The Hayats, Khattars, and Tiwanas were prominent families who earned the higher ranks in Army and Civil

Services. The British also used the *Sufi Pirs* (religious priests of Muslims) to get the support from rural population in Western Punjab.¹⁴⁹ A close alliance was forged with the princes and big feudal landlords who faithfully supported the British.¹⁵⁰ Such supports were indeed coincided by strong repressive and surveillance measures. The signs of resistance to the British regime were dealt with an iron hand.

Conclusion

The transformation of Punjab under the colonial rule was been far-reaching across spheres of its life. The compulsions of the great game made the British to make it an ally and later part of its empire to use it as a base for its operations across the north-west frontier and the players beyond. The intersecting interventions of the British through political, military, diplomatic, commercial, paternalistic, and employment windows made these changes possible. The Russian scare not only resulted in the militarization of the state but also become a measure to ensure order and stability in the province. The new economic opportunities opened up by the British enabled them to win the loyalty of native communities. The rural elite created through agrarian expansion found to be extremely useful as military contractors. The military and commercial requirements also provided the best possible rail and road infrastructure to the province ensuring order. The Great Game ended with a convention in 1907 but the transformations that it brought forth left deep imprints on the colonial and post-colonial Punjab. Thus , the Great Game was a game changer in the history of the Punjab.

Notes

- ¹ See Lasswell, *The Essay on the Garrison State*, 43 (Garrison State is a polity where specialist on violence holds the reign of power, and social and economic life relegated to sub-ordinate position to fighting forces). Yong, *The Garrison State: Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab*.
- ² Anglo-Russian Convention or Entente 1907 resolved the Russian and British Empire's confrontation over Afghanistan, Persia, and Tibet. It acknowledged Afghanistan as a British protectorate, demarcated the spheres of influence in Persia, and status quo in Tibet (non-interference by either power). See Klein, 'The Anglo-Russian Convention and the Problem of Central Asia', 128-29.

- ³ Singh, G., *The British Occupation of the Panjab*, 15; Chhabra, *Advanced History of the Punjab*, 86.
- ⁴ Singh, G., *The British Occupation of the Panjab*, 16-17; Singh, F., *Some Aspects of State and Society under Ranjit Singh*, 347.
- ⁵ Hopkirk, *The Great Game*, 132.
- ⁶ Tytler, *A Study of Political Development in Central and Southern Asia*, 88-89.
- ⁷ Singh, F., *Some Aspects of State and Society under Ranjit Singh*, 349-50.
- ⁸ Hopkirk, *The Great Game*, 132-34; Singh, G., *The British Occupation of the Panjab*, 19.
- ⁹ Arrora, *Commerce by River in the Punjab*, 12.
- ¹⁰ Singh, F., *Some Aspects of State and Society under Ranjit Singh*, 354-55.
- ¹¹ The importance of Ferozepur was highlighted by Captain William Murray, a British officer at Ludhiana. He stated that "the capital Lahore (of the kingdom of Punjab) is distant only 40 miles with a single river to cross, fordable for six months in the year. The fort of Ferozepur from every point of view seems to be of highest importance to the British government, whether as a check on the growing ambition of Lahore or as a post of consequence." See Singh, G., *The British Occupation of the Panjab*, 24 and Mahajan, *India*, 175.
- ¹² Singh, F., *Some Aspects of State and Society under Ranjit Singh*, 358.
- ¹³ Mahajan, *India*, 175.
- ¹⁴ Singh, G., *The British Occupation of the Panjab*, 22-23.
- ¹⁵ Habberton, *Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan*, 10-11.
- ¹⁶ Singh, F., *Some Aspects of State and Society under Ranjit Singh*, 362.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 362-63.
- ¹⁸ Schofield, *North-west Frontier and Afghanistan*, 83; *Ibid.*, 327.
- ¹⁹ Singh, G., *The British Occupation of the Panjab*, 27.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 28.

²² Majumdar, et. al., *History and Culture of the Indian People*, 1060.

²³ Singh, G., *The British Occupation of the Panjab*, 29.

²⁴ Ibid., 32.

²⁵ Ibid., 32-33.

²⁶ Khilnani, *British Power in the Punjab*, 8-9.

²⁷ Singh, G., *The British Occupation of the Panjab*, 41.

²⁸ Ibid., 42; Edwardes, *A history of India from the earliest times to the present day*, 499.

²⁹ Chopra, *A New Advanced History of India*, 301.

³⁰ Singh, G., *The British Occupation of the Panjab*, 52-53.

³¹ Ibid., 50-51.

³² Schofield, *North-west Frontier and Afghanistan*, 83.

³³ Singh, G., *The British Occupation of the Panjab*, 56.

³⁴ Khilnani, *British Power in the Punjab*, 18.

³⁵ Rawlinson, *The British achievement in India*, 73.

³⁶ Khilnani, *British Power in the Punjab*, 18.

³⁷ Ibid., 24-25.

³⁸ Roberts, *History of British India*, 339.

³⁹ Khilnani, *British Power in the Punjab*, 66.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., 67.

- ⁴² Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, 67.
- ⁴³ Khilnani, *British Power in the Punjab*, 68-69.
- ⁴⁴ Roberts, *History of British India*, 339.
- ⁴⁵ Elliott, *The Frontier*, 102.
- ⁴⁶ Schofield, *North-west Frontier and Afghanistan*, 85.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid.
- ⁴⁸ Elliott, *The Frontier*, 103; Roberts, *History of British India*, 338.
- ⁴⁹ Roberts, *History of British India*, 340.
- ⁵⁰ Singh, G., *The British Occupation of the Panjab*, 106-09.
- ⁵¹ Yadav, British Policy towards Sikhs, 186-87.
- ⁵² Rawlinson, *The British achievement in India*, 79.
- ⁵³ Roberts, *History of British India*, 345.
- ⁵⁴ Ghai, *The Partition of Punjab*, 18; Malik, *The History of the Punjab*, 180.
- ⁵⁵ Rawlinson, *The British achievement in India*, 79.
- ⁵⁶ Latif, *History of the Panjáb from the remotest antiquity to the present time*, 573.
- ⁵⁷ Ghai, *The Partition of Punjab*, 18; Malik, *The History of the Punjab*, 180.
- ⁵⁸ Latif, *History of the Panjáb from the remotest antiquity to the present time*, 575; Elliott, *The Frontier*, 103; Davies, *Problem of the North West Frontier*, 22.
- ⁵⁹ Elliott, *The Frontier*, 103; Davies, *Problem of the North West Frontier*, 240.
- ⁶⁰ Elliott, *The Frontier*, 1.
- ⁶¹ Ghai, *The Partition of Punjab*, 22.
- ⁶² Khilnani, *British Power in the Punjab*, 171.

⁶³ Thorburn, *Punjab in Peace and War*, 288.

⁶⁴ Gupta, *North West Frontier Legislative and Freedom Struggle*, 2-3.

⁶⁵ Schofield, *North-west Frontier and Afghanistan*, 87.

⁶⁶ Nijjar, *History of the United Panjab*, 62.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁶⁸ Dodwell, *The Cambridge History of India*, 450.

⁶⁹ Arrora, *Commerce by River in the Punjab*, xxiii; Davies, *Problem of the North West Frontier*, 23.

⁷⁰ The major exports from Punjab were English cotton piece goods, silks of all sorts, Chintzes, European colored clothes, merinos, velvets, copper, tin, tea, cardamom, pepper, betel nuts, sugar, country muslin, indigo, dried ginger, borax, ammonium salt, potassium carbonate, turmeric, pewter, salt, steel, gun powder, and various medicines. Imports to Punjab included silk, horses, drugs, manna, wool, gold coins, furs, gold and silver wire and thread, Persian carpets, currants, turquoises, antimony, quince seeds, saffron, goat hairs, pistachio nuts, dried grapes, almonds, pomegranates, melons, grapes, pears, apples, asafetida, dried apricots, cinnamons seeds, sheep skins, camel hair, cloaks, drugs, madder, sheep wool, liquorices, rice, ghee, sarsaparilla gum, Arabic mint, Rhubarb and fruits. See Arrora, *Commerce by River in the Punjab*, xxv.

⁷¹ Davies, *Problem of the North West Frontier*, 23; Dodwell, *The Cambridge History of India*, 451.

⁷² Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, 500.

⁷³ Davies, *Problem of the North West Frontier*, 23-30.

⁷⁴ Khilnani, *British Power in the Punjab*, 175.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 176.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 177.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 178.

⁸¹ Ibid., 179; Ghai, *The Partition of Punjab*, 21.

⁸² Malik, *The History of the Punjab*, 182.

⁸³ Roberts, *History of British India*, 345; Khilnani, *British Power in the Punjab*, 179.

⁸⁴ Khilnani, *British Power in the Punjab*, 179-180.

⁸⁵ Rawlinson, *The British achievement in India*, 83.

⁸⁶ Talbot, 'The Punjab under Colonialism', 7.

⁸⁷ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, 39-40.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 39 and Talbot, 'The Punjab under Colonialism', 5.

⁸⁹ Rawlinson, *The British achievement in India*, 81; Khilnani, *British Power in the Punjab*, 183.

⁹⁰ Arrora, *Commerce by River in the Punjab*, 25.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Yadav, 'British Policy towards Sikhs', 185.

⁹³ Malik, *The History of the Punjab*, 185-189.

⁹⁴ Thorburn, *Punjab in Peace and War*, 185-87.

⁹⁵ Chhabra, *Social and Economic History of the Punjab, 1849-1901*, 135.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 139; Thorburn, *Punjab in Peace and War*, 182.

⁹⁷ Chhabra, *Social and Economic History of the Punjab*, 152-53.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 140-45.

⁹⁹ Rawlinson, *The British achievement in India*, 81.

¹⁰⁰ Nijjar, *History of the United Panjab*, 71.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 70.

¹⁰² Thorburn, *Punjab in Peace and War*, 197-210; Ibid., 70-88.

¹⁰³ Arora, 'British Policy Regarding Imperial Service Troops in the Punjab States', 253.

¹⁰⁴ Singh, H. *Agrarian scene in British Punjab*, v.

¹⁰⁵ Arora, 'British Policy Regarding Imperial Service Troops in the Punjab States', 253-254.

¹⁰⁶ Singh, H. *Agrarian scene in British Punjab*, v.

¹⁰⁷ In view of danger of Russia, Mortimer Durand added that "the safest game now is the bolder game of trusting the Native States and carrying them with us... If we cannot trust native troops and Native States to fight for us, up to a reasonable limit of defeat, we must be beaten whenever Russia advances." See Arora, 'British Policy Regarding Imperial Service Troops in the Punjab States', 256.

¹⁰⁸ Allan, et. al., *The Cambridge Shorter History of India*, 839.

¹⁰⁹ Arora, 'British Policy Regarding Imperial Service Troops in the Punjab States', 256.

¹¹⁰ Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj*; Mazumdar, *Indian Army and the Making of Punjab*, 11.

¹¹¹ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, 43.

¹¹² Ibid., 41.

¹¹³ Mazumdar, *Indian Army and the Making of Punjab*, 10.

¹¹⁴ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, 42.

¹¹⁵ Mazumdar, *Indian Army and the Making of Punjab*, 17; Talbot, 'The Punjab under Colonialism'.

¹¹⁶ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, 43.

- ¹¹⁷ Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj*; Mazumdar, *Indian Army and the Making of Punjab*, 10.
- ¹¹⁸ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, 44.
- ¹¹⁹ Ibid., 43.
- ¹²⁰ Mazumdar, *Indian Army and the Making of Punjab*, 14.
- ¹²¹ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, 43.
- ¹²² Ibid.
- ¹²³ Mazumdar, *Indian Army and the Making of Punjab*, 18.
- ¹²⁴ Ibid.
- ¹²⁵ See Yong, *The Garrison State*.
- ¹²⁶ Malik, *The History of the Punjab*, 185-189.
- ¹²⁷ Khosla, *The Growth of Railway System in the Punjab*, 284.
- ¹²⁸ Ibid., 285.
- ¹²⁹ Arrora, *Commerce by River in the Punjab*, 32.
- ¹³⁰ Ibid., 33.
- ¹³¹ Ibid., 34.
- ¹³² See Andrew, *The Punjaub Railway*.
- ¹³³ Ibid., 34-35.
- ¹³⁴ Gill, 'External Trade of British India through the Punjab', 1-2.
- ¹³⁵ Malhotra, *Afghan Search for Identity*, 14.
- ¹³⁶ Gill, 'External Trade of British India through the Punjab', 2.
- ¹³⁷ Ibid., 3.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 2-4.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 8-9.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 9.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 10.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 11.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 73.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 75.

¹⁴⁶ Ali, *Punjab under Imperialism*, 4.

¹⁴⁷ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, 43.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 50.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 51.

¹⁵⁰ Singh, H., *Agrarian scene in British Punjab*, vi.

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