

## **Reviewing 'Punjab Crisis' 1984: 'Turmoil in Punjab,' 'Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle,' and 'The Punjab Crisis and the Unity of India'**

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As the fortieth anniversary of Operation Blue Star passes on June 4, 2024, then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's decision to send a large army contingent into the sacred space of the Golden Temple complex still reverberates through the Sikh community in India and the diaspora. Despite changes in the political system and political actors in the last four decades, the most recent general elections threw up two winners who campaigned as independents largely on their connection to the militant resistance to the central government. One was the son of one of Mrs. Gandhi's assassins and another who 'reportedly' had plastic surgery to more closely resemble Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale after whom he styles himself.<sup>1</sup> Even K.P.S. Gill, one of the 'War Cops' who ruthlessly pursued and eliminated militants post-Operation Bluestar, argued that there was no greater impetus to the Khalistan movement than Operation Bluestar, which he called 'the worst possible form of over-reaction that could have been contrived.' This, he argued, in conjunction with the anti-Sikh pogrom after Mrs. Gandhi's assassination.<sup>2</sup>

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### **Introduction**

Much has been written about the political, ideological, social and economic factors that led to Operation Bluestar, a decision that was defended by some, although it was evident that Mrs. Gandhi herself was horrified by the extent of the death and destruction. This article is a review of three of the major works on the events of 1984, two of which end on a cautiously optimistic note on the signing of the Rajiv-Longowal Accord in 1985. The third, published in 2022, provides an in-depth and front row account from the then Amritsar Deputy Commissioner and follows the events until the end of militancy in the early to mid-1990s.

These works provide very different perspectives on the question of how the political context in Punjab, beginning with a conflict between orthodox and heterodox Sikhs and the politicization of Sikh identity, spiraled out of control into a 'full-blown ethno-national struggle'<sup>3</sup> with an extreme level of violence. Why was an attack on the Golden Temple Complex chosen as the remedy (as Brass argues 'why could it *not* have been' a conciliatory political gesture toward the Akalis)<sup>4</sup> and what went so wrong in an operation that was sold to Mrs. Gandhi as an in-and-out mission which would leave little damage?

Two major themes tie together much of this work. Firstly, the deinstitutionalization and centralization of politics during this era undermines the functioning of political parties and other institutions. Mrs. Gandhi, who preferred weak Chief Ministers and unstable state level politics, centralized power at the Center and manipulated politics with a variety of tools, including dismissing Chief Ministers and imposing President's Rule.<sup>5</sup> This interference from the Center, along with factional politics in the Akali Dal fueled by the Center, and the rise of a new center of power located in the militants, destabilized politics.

Brass' seminal article, published in 1988, and his follow-up piece discussing the socio-economic underpinnings of the Punjab crisis,<sup>6</sup> places the political unrest and the growth of separatist politics within the context of state-center relations. His chapter compares the successful resolution of a political conflict in Punjab during the Nehruvian era with the spiraling events which took place under Mrs. Gandhi's administration, focusing attention on what he views as the most crucial aspect of the complex conflict.

Tully and Jacob, renowned BBC journalists, provide, in their engrossing narrative, a very detailed description of the machinations underlying the political strategies from the Center. Mrs. Gandhi is portrayed as an indecisive leader, insulated in her coterie, and true to form responding in an over-the-top manner when forced into a decision.<sup>7</sup> While many accounts argue that the intention was to let the situation build into a crisis that Mrs. Gandhi could then solve in a grand gesture for electoral purposes,<sup>8</sup> their interpretation is more of exhaustion and befuddlement. Brass argues that while Mrs. Gandhi may on occasion be hesitant, she was particularly concerned with taking a decision that would precipitate an electoral wave against her in the north Indian Hindi speaking states.<sup>9</sup> Brass also argues that Mrs. Gandhi was incapable of viewing political issues through an ideological lens rather than as purely

transactional, reinforced in this case, by her antipathy towards the Akalis who led a protracted resistance against her during the Emergency.

A second theme emerges in Singh's focus on civil-military relations. It is quite remarkable that 38 years from Operation Bluestar, a comprehensive narrative and analysis would emerge with new perspectives, accounts and explanations of events not previously documented or available. Singh supplies an authoritative description as a front row participant providing an in-depth and penetrating analysis of political maneuverings by politicians, state actors, Akali leaders and the army itself written in a compelling style.

When the army arrived in Amritsar in preparation for the commencement of Operation Bluestar, sent by the Center and placed in command of the police and the paramilitary forces which were already on the ground, the then deputy commissioner Gurdev Singh had not been intimated that the army was on the move. Ramesh Inder Singh describes him as 'muttering', 'I did not requisition him'!<sup>10</sup> Ramesh Inder Singh, who was with Gurdev Singh as he was going on leave, and Gurdev Singh were wondering what the intention of was bringing in the army. They thought perhaps it was for some political settlement.<sup>11</sup>

The central focus is on the conflicts between the civilian and military leaders, the latter whose commanding officers were given to arrogance and hubris. This no-holds-barred authoritative text exposes the foibles of the army, strongly contradicting the position taken by Army renditions such as that of Lieutenant General K.S. Brar, who argues that despite all the negative repercussions, the army action was necessary.<sup>12</sup> Singh directs his most critical judgment at the cynicism of the political leaders for whom death and destruction is just a means to a political end but saves a salvo for the Akali Dal leaders. They, in his view, did little to deter the events, but strolled out of the Sarai complex under army guard. 'Let history judge these men.'<sup>13</sup>

All three of the works highlighted here focus on the political developments and political machinations that brought the militants led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale to prominence beginning in 1978. Congress formulated a strategy of utilizing a religious extremist (according to Tully and Jacob, selected from a list of 20 possibilities)<sup>14</sup> to challenge, embarrass and hopefully split the Akali Dal which was then in a coalition government in Punjab with the Janata Party. A relatively unknown head of a religious institution, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, was supported by Congress in the 1979 SGPC elections and won a few seats

with his candidates. He also campaigned for a few Congress candidates during the subsequent general elections, reportedly sharing a stage with Mrs. Gandhi. The intention of contesting seats in the former organization was to undermine the dominance of the Akalis which derived funding through the SGPC.

Tully and Jacob argue that the Congress Party through Zail Singh, then Union Home Minister, former Punjab Chief Minister, and eventually President of India, and Sanjay Gandhi, Mrs. Gandhi's son, even identified the issue that would catapult Bhindranwale to prominence as a defender the Panth and Sikh orthodoxy. In this way, he would be able to challenge the Akali Dal for support from particularly rural Jat Sikhs. They found the Nirankaris, a Sikh sect seen as heretical, to be a foil for a 'fundamentalist' like Bhindranwale, but how they operationalized this potential conflict is not specified. (Tully and Jacob relay intriguing facts such as these that leaves the reader wondering what that would look like and who was their source?)

Bhindranwale and his supporters led a protest procession against the Nirankaris who were, conveniently by this reading, holding a major convention in the holy city of Amritsar.<sup>15</sup> The clash between Bhindranwale and his men and the Nirankaris led to violence and killing of twelve Sikhs, the latter who were projected as martyrs. Sanjay Gandhi and Congress whipped up dissension and portrayed Bhindranwale as the hero of the piece, while at the same time creating a new political party, the Dal Khalsa which was identified with Bhindranwale.<sup>16</sup>

Within the factional conflicts of the Congress Party also, Bhindranwale became useful in Mrs. Gandhi's efforts to prevent leaders from becoming too powerful. When the Punjab Congress Chief Minister wanted to have Bhindranwale arrested, his personal rival, the Union Home Minister Giani Zail Singh protected Bhindranwale. Although, Bhindranwale was more closely aligned with the Akali Dal after 1980, it seems Indira Gandhi was in touch with him right up to the end.<sup>17</sup> Some believe he had 3 supporters in order: Congress, the Akalis, and then Pakistan (Interview).

### **Center-state relations**

Brass argues, in *The Punjab Crisis and the Unity of India*, that during the Nehru-led administration, powerful Congress Chief Ministers, who had consolidated their power at the state level, often building their support base at the local level initially, were supported rather than undermined

by the center. The central government would typically act as an impartial arbiter with regards to state level conflicts in an autonomous arena in an era where the Prime Minister had no serious challenges to his power. In the 1960s in Punjab there was a Akali Dal-led movement for 'Punjabi Suba', a Sikh majority state. Congress had already gone through the process of reorganizing states on a linguistic basis, but Punjab as a Punjabi speaking region was not included in that redrawing of boundaries. Many Sikhs also believed that they had been promised an autonomous region during decolonization as an important minority. This was never delivered, leading to the sentiment that Sikhs were discriminated against.

During the agitation for Punjabi Suba, involving mass protests and several fasts-unto-death by political leaders, a factional struggle for power emerged within the Akali Dal led by Master Tara Singh and Sant Fateh Singh. The then Congress Chief Minister Pratap Singh Kairon acted in concert with the center, (and in a manner which let Kairon take the lead rather than Delhi), to refuse to make concessions to Master Tara Singh, a leader whom they judged as communalist and secessionist. Nehru and Kairon intervened in this factional fight to aid the more moderate leader Sant Fateh Singh in replacing Master Tara Singh, to whom Punjabi Suba was conceded.<sup>18</sup> This can be contrasted with the 1980s when extremist politics in Punjab was promoted, and Mrs. Gandhi would undercut her own Chief Ministers.

The new state of Punjab was substantially smaller in area, but the Sikh percentage of the population increased along with their political importance. The Akali Dal, however, was and is unable to form a government without an alliance partner, usually the Jan Sangh/BJP. Congress then, as the opposing Party, promoted splits and defections among the Akalis to win an election or bring down an Akali-led government in the event such should occur. From 1966-1997, no Akali-led administration was able to finish its entire term.<sup>19</sup>

Mrs. Gandhi's response to intra-state conflicts was impacted by the elections of 1967, three years after her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, passed away, when Congress lost power in a number of states. Her imposition of the Emergency in the face of a party split and agitational politics by opposition parties, and the election debacle for the Congress following the restoration of democracy, led to a new pattern. Mrs. Gandhi controlled Congress-led states by personally choosing loyal Chief Ministers, who may not have any electoral base in the state of their own.

Brass also argues, like Tully and Jacob, for a systemic change in connection with Mrs. Gandhi's empowering of her son Sanjay Gandhi during and after the Emergency who brought the acceptance of increased lawlessness and violence into politics, which he terms an 'increased ruthlessness of inter-party conflict' and an acceptance of violence for political purposes by the police and bureaucracy.<sup>20</sup>

In the first part of the 1980s, the Akali Dal led numerous protests. Along with agrarian issues, there were also the outstanding issues that remained after the creation of Punjabi Suba that had not been addressed. Most importantly was the status of Chandigarh, intended to be the capital of Punjab, but serving as a joint capital for Punjab and Haryana with the status of a union territory. Other issues were the transfer of certain Punjabi speaking areas, river water allocation, a demand for an All-India Gurdwara Act, etc. Added onto these were issues from the Anandpur Sahib Resolution which called for restructuring Center-State relations in a fairly radical form. Meanwhile, there were also agrarian protests led by the Bharatiya Kisan Union (Indian Farmers' Union, BKU) which coordinated with the Akali Dal.

### **The question of socio-economic roots of the unrest**

The argument that this was essentially an agrarian movement with socio-economic changes providing the underlying issues, emerges in much of the writing on Punjab, as the strengthened landed peasantry engaged in commercial farming faced the slowing of Green Revolution gains. Singh, in fact, argues that "what was essentially an agrarian unrest...turned Punjab into a battlefield."<sup>21</sup> Issues that concerned the commercial farmers include: subsidized electricity for tube wells and the availability of water, credit for farm machinery, and the procurement prices for grain which is set by the government. One argument is that the larger farmers, largely Jat Sikhs, utilized religious appeals as well as appeals to agrarian issues to paper over the class differences in the interests between themselves and agricultural workers, many of whom were from the scheduled caste population.

Because the prosperity of the state and individual families was directly impacted by government policies, they were often coded as discrimination against the Sikhs. Not only the procurement price of grain, but also the lack of off-farm employment, given that industry was and is limited in Punjab, was seen as deliberate discrimination. Sikhs have traditionally

been represented in the military above and beyond their proportion in the population and have a proud record of service. Mrs. Gandhi announced a policy of lowering the percentage of Sikhs employed in the military to their percentage of India's population. This was greatly resented.<sup>22</sup>

It was an agrarian and political issue that according to Brar and Chief Secretary P.C. Alexander that provided the 'last straw' which prompted Mrs. Gandhi's decision. On May 23, 1984, building on a BKU campaign demanding higher procurement prices for crops, Longowal had called for stopping the movement of grains outside the state along with encouraging non-payments of government loans by farmers, beginning on June 3rd. This, according to Brar, put the onus on the Akalis for their provocative threats. He also faulted them for the civilian deaths that took place as pilgrims were trapped inside the Golden Temple complex due to Operation Bluestar beginning on a religious holiday. Why, he asked, could they not have delayed the Morcha set to start on Guru Arjun Dev's martyrdom day?<sup>23</sup> P.C. Alexander also called this 'invitation to anarchy' 'the proverbial last straw' which prompted Mrs. Gandhi's decision.

Brass and Singh are in broad agreement that not addressing regional issues, particularly the outstanding questions that remained after the creation of Punjabi Suba, while letting law and order and the criminal justice system founder through the destruction of political institutions were the roots of the crisis, rather than economic and class issues.<sup>24</sup> Not addressing regional issues cannot be solely laid at Congress' feet, however. When the Akalis were in power, it was with a Jan Sangh/BJP alliance partner whose support base was largely upper caste Hindu urban dwellers. This limited the type of issues that could be successfully raised or addressed. Further, the creation of Punjabi Suba also created the new Hindu majority state of Haryana for whom Punjab's gain would often be Haryana's loss with regards to the status of Chandigarh and the claims on river waters. In some instances when the Center had an agreement with the Akali Dal during this period of protests and negotiations, it was pressure from Bhajan Lal, CM of Haryana, that would force the Center to back out.<sup>25</sup> It was the 'disagreeable' Bhajan Lal's who ordered that Sikhs should be searched and humiliated on their way to the Asian games in Delhi.<sup>26</sup> Mrs. Gandhi feared that an agreement that appeared conciliatory to the Sikhs could precipitate an electoral protest 'wave' not in her favor. What is even more clear is the inability of Mrs. Gandhi to make the kind of concessions in terms of the secular political and agrarian issues that dominated the Akali Dal demands that would enable them to claim the

high ground of representing and defending the Panth back from Bhindranwale.<sup>27</sup>

### **Civil-Military Conflict/the Role of the Military**

As Operation Bluestar reached the mopping up stage, the extent of the damage to the largely destroyed central shrine of the Akal Takht, not by small arms fire and howitzers, but firing from the main guns of multiple tanks would become evident to all who gazed at it. In response to the devastation inflicted, the Army officer in charge of the operation, Lt General Sundarji, advised one of his subordinates to tell the press that no tanks were used. As that story did not seem believable given the evidence of the damage, the number of tanks and ammunition used were minimized in the final report. The tanks were taken to the border for some 'target practice' to use up some ammunition to make it possible to misrepresent the number of shells that were used in the military operation.<sup>28</sup> It is very evident why many Sikhs have no trust in how the Government represents the operation.

Ramesh Inder Singh arrived in Amritsar to assume the position of deputy commissioner from his predecessor to whom the planned army action had not been divulged as mentioned above. It was also not divulged to the President of India, supreme commander of the armed forces, when the Indian army was already moving toward Amritsar. Twenty-four hours from being inducted, Singh writes, he had two lieutenant generals and three major generals camping in and near his base and thousands of troops in the district. Soon after his arrival, he attended several civilian-military liaison conferences held immediately before the army action. In his account, he highlights the hubris and arrogance of the army decision makers, who treated the civilian administration representatives as ineffective at best and fellow travelers with the militants at worse. The military ignored on the ground information that the militants were well armed with automatic weapons and highly motivated to die as martyrs, insisting that they would flee at the sight of the army. After the fact, they claimed there was no useful intelligence to suggest otherwise.<sup>29</sup>

Singh also challenges an account from Lt General Brar claiming that efforts to protect the civilians who were present in the Sarai area, separate from the Parikrama area of the Golden Temple and Akal Takht, were successful. There were two groups of civilians - those trapped inside the



Golden Temple complex, and those residing or working in the labyrinth lanes surrounding the complex. Despite Singh's efforts to evacuate those residing nearby before the firing started, nothing was done. Lieutenant General K.S. Brar was not concerned about shutting off the electricity which would impact the civilians as he expected the operation to be over in just a few hours.<sup>30</sup> The choice of a religious holiday for the attack, which has often been commented on, and the introduction of a curfew which trapped hundreds of pilgrims inside the complex while opportunities for them to surrender and come out were offered in a bungled fashion, ended in high numbers of civilian casualties.

The tactics used to clear rooms, occupied by possibly militants, but also innocent pilgrims, in the dark, by the Kumaoni forces with no training in operating in built-up areas, consisted of kicking in a door and throwing a grenade.<sup>31</sup>

Operation Bluestar, Singh asserts, '...was a disaster--ill conceived, poorly planned, terribly executed.'<sup>32</sup> He blames the conception of the operation from the start when Sundarji met directly with Mrs. Gandhi, bypassing the chain of command, and promising a quick, in and out process with little damage.

One of the central themes of this book is the tension between military and civilian administration. When the army is deputed by the civilian administration to aid in extraordinary circumstances, it as Singh puts it 'takes over'.<sup>33</sup> In some cases, the army may be viewed as an impartial actor bringing law and order, as it was welcomed by Hindus living near the complex post-Operation Bluestar. In others, the army performs functions outside its bailiwick. In this case, it refused to turn the temple back over to civilian or religious administrators, organized the *kar sewa* itself to rebuild, choosing unpopular actors. This led to the rebuilt Akal Takht being torn down and then rebuilt in a way acceptable to religious hierarchy and the community.

Singh gives a detailed and highly critical account of what he calls 'a garrison state' – quoting an army personnel as 'first and only occasion when the army controlled almost all aspects of civilian administration' in the area of an entire state.<sup>34</sup> Civilian administration capitulated, paramilitary forces were placed under the army, and the army ran roughshod over the countryside, searching and interrogating young men under the thinnest of evidence. Even district magistrates were answering to the army. Singh argues that given the protracted time periods in which a modern army may be inducted to keep order, a new type of civilian-

military nexus needs to be developed as an army, acting as its own interest group, may become involved in policy decisions.

Singh argues for the importance of the chain of command in the army, the army-civilian administration interchange and communication, and civilian oversight.<sup>35</sup> Instead, the devastation wrought by Operation Bluestar and the highhanded treatment of civilians post-Operation Bluestar by the army set the stage for the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi and the years of turmoil that followed.

Singh also provides an analysis of the process by which law and order and the administration broke down in Punjab before the army action and the tortured path to a type of normality in the mid-1990s. As described above, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale rose to prominence in a clash with the *Nirankaris*, a group considered heretical by the Khalsa Sikhs, in which a number of Sikhs were killed. In revenge attacks, he and his followers became ever more prominent, forging complicated relationships with both the Congress Party, attempting to use him to undermine the Akali Dal with extreme language and actions, and the Akali Dal politicians attempting to use his mass appeal. As terrorist activities and criminal activities rose, both the police and the civilian administration were afraid to confront the militants or in league with them. The incident whereby DIG A.S. Atwal was murdered by terrorists outside the gate of the Golden Temple complex after paying obeisance inside is illustrative of the administrative collapse. His assailants disappeared unhindered back into the temple complex and his bodyguards and local police fled. Rather than pursuing him, the district police chief called the Chief Minister in Chandigarh, and the Chief Minister called Delhi. The answer that came back was not to enter the Golden Temple complex to pursue the culprits. No one was ever arrested for this act.

As Police and the administration were demoralized, an order was handed down 'from the top' to stop searching the kar sewa trucks that brought food and supplies into the Sarai complex which were bringing in weapons used in turning the Golden Temple complex into a fortress. The Akalis, who were associated with Bhindranwale in launching various protests, many of which focused on agrarian discontent rather than any type of religious or communal issue, supported the position that the police could not enter the Temple complex. Bhindranwale held daily durbars dispensing rough justice and giving out the names of police officers, etc., who had wronged any of his supporters. The 'writ of militancy ran deep and wide,' the police and paramilitary forces became ineffectual and

afraid of violence if they attempted to do their job. The situation became intractable as the government refused to either pursue serious negotiations to address the Akalis central concerns, or to reassert the government's writ over the increasingly violent and communalized situation.

Why was the situation allowed to deteriorate to this extent? Singh suggests that perhaps Mrs. Gandhi wanted to let everything deteriorate to the point that Congress could just swoop in and decisively settle the situation in time for the 1985 Lok Sabha elections. This without having to make a deal with the Akalis that could undermine support in neighboring Haryana - Punjab's competitor for territory, population and river waters. But he offers it as more of an argument put forth by others than his own central argument, asserting that perceptions will differ as to whether this was an electoral imperative.<sup>36</sup>

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Jatinder Kaur Tur, 'The men behind Amritpal Singh's election campaign from jail,' *The Caravan*, May 31, 2024.

<sup>2</sup> Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, *Punjab: The Knights of Falsehood* (Har-Anand Publications, 1997), 95.

<sup>3</sup> Ramesh Inder Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab: Before and After Blue Star: An Insider's Story* (HarperCollins Publishers, 2022), 437.

<sup>4</sup> Paul R. Brass, 'The Punjab Crisis and the Unity of India' in Atul Kohli, ed, *India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations* (Princeton University Press, 1988), 211.

<sup>5</sup> Brass, *India's Democracy*, 189.

<sup>6</sup> Paul R. Brass, 'Socio-Economic Aspects of the Punjab Crisis,' *Punjab Journal of Politics* 13:1-2.

<sup>7</sup> Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, *Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle* (Rupa Publications, 1985), 13-4, 219.

<sup>8</sup> Arun Shourie, *The Punjab Story* (Lotus Collections, Roli Books, 2007).

<sup>9</sup> Brass, 'The Punjab Crisis,' 211.

<sup>10</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 16.

<sup>11</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 17.

<sup>12</sup> Kuldeep Singh Brar, *Operation Bluestar: The True Story* (UBS Publishers Distributors Ltd., 1993).

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- <sup>13</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 511, 149.
- <sup>14</sup> Tully and Jacob, *Amritsar*, 57.
- <sup>15</sup> Tully and Jacob, *Amritsar*, 57-8.
- <sup>16</sup> Tully and Jacob, *Amritsar*, 59-60.
- <sup>17</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 509.
- <sup>18</sup> Brass, *The Punjab Crisis*, 176-7.
- <sup>19</sup> Virginia Van Dyke, 'The Khalistan Movement in Punjab, India and the Post-Militancy Era: Structural Change and New Political Compulsions,' *Asian Survey* 49, 6:26-8.
- <sup>20</sup> Brass, *The Punjab Crisis*, 179-80.
- <sup>21</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 69.
- <sup>22</sup> Joyce Pettigrew, *The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerilla Violence* (Zed Books, 1995), 6; Tully and Jacob, *Amritsar*, 49.
- <sup>23</sup> Brar, *Operation Bluestar*, 65, 31.
- <sup>24</sup> Brass, *Socio-Economic Aspects*, 13-4; Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 436-7, 78.
- <sup>25</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 60.
- <sup>26</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 64.
- <sup>27</sup> Despite many negotiations, the only concession Mrs. Gandhi made was on some minor religious issues and those were announced in a pro-Congress Gurdwara in Delhi.
- <sup>28</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 123-4, 254.
- <sup>29</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 19-21.
- <sup>30</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 92.
- <sup>31</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 144-5.
- <sup>32</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 164.
- <sup>33</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 243.
- <sup>34</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 243-4.
- <sup>35</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 254-5.
- <sup>36</sup> Singh, *Turmoil in Punjab*, 56.